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No. Of Posts: 01

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Age Limit: Not stated

Last Date To Apply: Nov 19, 2026.

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The High Court also asked the State to take proactive steps towards taking control of the high-risk and critical glacial lakes at the earliest.

The Bench comprising Chief Justice A. Muhamed Mustaque and Justice Bhaskar Raj Pradhan stated, “We persuade the State Government as well as the Central Government to immediately take steps towards procuring and installing such early warning systems to prevent a recurrence of a calamity like the one that struck Sikkim in October, 2023. The State Government may respond to action taken towards the acquisition of such systems by the next posting.”

Senior Advocate Doma T. Bhutia represented the Petitioner, while Additional Advocate General Aarohi Bhalla represented the Respondent.

Factual Background

In the Notification No.72/HOME/2024 dated September 11, 2024, issued by the Home Department annexed to the reply affidavit filed on behalf of the Sikkim State Disaster Management Authority (SSDMA), it was stated that as per the report of the National Disaster Management Authority, Sikkim has 40 high risk glacial lakes. The affidavit reported about studies undertaken on the various lakes in Sikkim. The Amicus Curiae had suggested that keeping in mind the precautionary principle, disaster preparedness and the objective of anticipatory climate resilience, a State Nodal Officer for the protection of glacial lakes should be appointed within the SSDMA to oversee disaster preparedness for the said 40 glacial lakes of critical importance.

Reasoning

The Bench took note of the suggestion of the Amicus that a Nodal Officer should be an Officer of sufficient senior rank, preferably drawn from the Indian Administrative Service/Indian Forest Service/Indian Police Service having rich prior experience in disaster management and flood control initiatives, with excellent leadership and a quick-thinking approach. It was also suggested that the Nodal Officer would be required to multi-task and address the concerns and the comprehensive threat of GLOFs in the State of Sikkim.

The Bench stated, “While we are in agreement with the suggestion of the Amici Curiae we are of the opinion that the State should be given an opportunity to consider the above suggestion and take pro-active steps if not already taken towards taking control of the high risk and critical glacial lakes at the earliest. The State may file their response by next posting.”

The Bench considered the fact that certain Indian States, i.e. Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Bhutan have already installed early warning systems for mitigating GLOF disaster risk. It was further suggested to the Bench that while the study undertaken by the State Government is comprehensive and notifications constituting a High Level Steering Committee and a Multi-Disciplinary Task Force, as well as the Sikkim Commission on Glacial Hazards have already been issued, the State should also apprise this Court of the steps taken by these Committees and the Commission. “We are inclined to accept this suggestion and request the State to file a response by the next posting”, it added.

Reference was made to an article about the article published in The Economic Times Sikkim’s raising the issue of failing of cardamom plantation due to changing weather. Taking note of the State Government’s “Mero Alaichi, Mero Dhan” (My Cardamom, My Wealth) mission, which aims to change this, the Bench sought a response from the State Government on the steps taken by them on this initiative.

The matter has now been listed on November 18, 2026.

Cause Title: In Re- Climatic Justice in the State of Sikkim (Case No.: WP(PIL) No.11 of 2026)

Appearance

Petitioner: Senior Advocates Doma T. Bhutia, T. R. Barfungpa, Advocates Sudhir Mishra, Ritwika Nanda, Petal Chandhok, Aadya Sharma, Saurav Rai, Sonam Topden Bhutia, Parvin Manger

Respondent: Additional Advocate Generals Aarohi Bhalla, Zangpo Sherpa, Government Advocate S. K. Chettri, Assistant Government Advocate Sujan Sunwar, Deputy Solicitor General of India Sangita Pradhan, Advocates Natasha Pradhan, Amit Kumar Sharma, Rahul Rathi, Sachina P.Y. Subba

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The High Court was considering a criminal appeal filed by the accused convicts in a case registered under sections 120B, 153A, 153B, 295A, 417, 298, 121A, 123 IPC, Sections 3, 5, 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 and Sections 11, 35 of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010.

The Bench comprising Justice Ram Manohar Narayan Mishra and Justice Rajesh Singh Chauhan held, “Adopting, engaging in large scale conversion by means of allurement, threat, deceit, wrongful confinement and for that purpose receiving huge funding from within and outside the country with objective of converting India from secular to Islamic state... a conspiracy against government of the country. And it cannot be said that the case of the appellants does not come within the purview of Section 121- A IPC. Section covers conspiracy to overawe the Central or State Government by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force and for this actual use of force is not necessary.”

Advocate Abhishek Ranjan represented the Appellant, while Govt Advocate represented the Respondent.

Factual Background

The case originated with the lodging of the FIR on the allegations that some anti-social and anti-national organisations were destabilising the demography of the country by indulging in large-scale conversion on instructions of some religious organisations/syndicate / foreign elements and funding obtained from them, due to which the fraternity of the country is being disturbed. They were allegedly running a campaign with mala fide design targeting the gullible persons, deaf and dumb women, children, people of SC/ST and people of weaker sections for their conversion into Islam. After getting information from various sources and contents of the FIR lodged under Sections 419, 420, 295A, 505 and 506 IPC and an interrogation of suspects, these facts surfaced that Mohd. Umar Gautam was himself a convert to Islam from Hinduism and was undertaking a large-scale mass conversion of non-Muslims and people of weaker sections.

It became known that they had converted around 1000 persons from the Hindu religion to Islam, and they had also conducted interfaith marriages of these people. Umar and his associates had constituted an organisation, namely, National Dawah Centre in Jamia Nagar, New Delhi, with an objective to convert non-Muslims into the Muslim religion. It was also stated in the FIR that the other accused, Mufti Qazi Jhangeer Qasmi, a resident of New Delhi, is an associate of Umar Gautam and he had been issuing religious conversion certificates & marriage certificates in an unlawful manner.

During the course of investigation, the name of the other appellants surfaced, and they were chargesheeted for alleged offences by the Investigating Officer. The Trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellants. Aggrieved thereby, the accused convicts approached the High Court.

Reasoning

The Bench noted that a speech by Maulana Kaleem Siddiqui on a YouTube channel was retrieved by the Investigating Officer, in which he appealed to take back the region of Hindustan and make it an Islamic state. He is the founder of Jamiyat Imam Ali, which had received a huge amount of donations in different accounts. The Bench further noticed that the main accused, Umar Gautam, was running the Islamic Dawah Centre (IDC), which had evidence of huge funding from different sources, and he had also organised the Annual Revert Get-Together of such converted persons.

The Bench also found that a video/photo collected from him and co-accused mobile phone data had proved his guilt. The Bench noted that his son, Abdullah Umar, received Rs 28 lakhs in his ICICI bank account, out of which Rs.3 lakh 8 thousand was received from the UK. A sum of Rs.6000 was transferred by him to the account of Shahabuddin to pay this to a converted Muslim, Neenu Kanwar, for the purposes of religious conversion.

The Bench took note of the fact that the appellants had undergone more than 4 years and 6 months of imprisonment till date during trial and after conviction in jail custody.

The Bench rejected the bail applications of the appellants Mohd. Umar Gautam, Mufti Qazi Jhangeer Qasmi, Sallahuddin Jainuddin Sheikh, Prasad Rameshwar Kawre @ Adam, Maulana Kaleem Siddiqui, Irfan Shaikh @ Irfan Shaikh, Kauser Alam, Dr. Faraz Babullah Shah.

The Bench found that the appellants, namely, Mohd. Saleem, Rahul Bhola @ Rahul Ahmad, Mannu Yadav and Kunal Ashok Chaudhari @ Atif, had not been convicted for charge under Section 121A IPC. “As a result, appellants, namely, (1) Mannu Yadav, (2) Abdullah Umar, (3) Dheeraj Govindrao Jagtap, (4) Bhoopriya Bando @ Arslan Mustafa, (5) Sarfaraz Ali Jafri, (6) Mohd. Saleem, (7) Kunal Ashok Chaudhari @ Atif and (8 ) Rahul Bhola deserve to be released on bail in the light of totality of facts and circumstances of the case, the role atributed to them, the evidence regarding overact committed by them in the alleged offences”, it ordered.

Cause Title: Kunal Ashok Chaudhari @ Atif v. State Of U.P. (Case No.: CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 4008 of 2024)

Appearance

Appellant: Advocates Abhishek Ranjan, Abhishek Singh, Amarjeet Singh Rakhra, Amjad Siddiqui, Ajai Pratap Singh Chauhan, Furkan Pathan, Indu Prakash Singh, Krishan Kumar, Mohemmed Amir Naqvi, Mukul Joshi, Najmussaquib, O.P. Tiwari, Prabhat Ranjan Pandey, Rahul Srivastava, Rajanish Kumar Tiwari, Rajesh Chandra Mishra, Rudra Pratap Singh, Salil Kumar Srivastava, Sameer Singh, Subhash Bisaria, Sushil Kumar Singh, Varun Kumar Gupta, Zia Ul Qayuim

Respondent: Govt Advocate, Shiv Nath Tilhari

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Applying the principle, the Court allowed the National Investigation Agency's appeal and quashed the Special Court's order granting bail to former police officer Sachin Waze in the Antilia bomb-scare case.

The Court was hearing an appeal under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, against the Special Court's order granting bail. Waze is facing charges under Sections 16, 18 and 20 of the UAPA, along with offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and the Arms Act, 1959.

A Bench of Justice G.S. Kulkarni and Justice Dr Neela Gokhale observed: “As per the legal principles in relation to bail in offences under the UAPA as discussed hereinabove, the statutory mandate requires the Court to refuse bail in the face of existence of reasonable grounds to believe that the accusation is prima facie true. Once this threshold is crossed, the appropriate judicial response is to ensure prioritization and expedition of the case, not to grant bail in disregard of the statutory mandate. The offence carries a sentence of life imprisonment, and incarceration of 5 years cannot be said to be long incarceration in the facts of the present case.”

Additional Solicitor General Anil C. Singh appeared for the NIA. Advocate V.M. Thorat represented Waze.

Background

The prosecution alleged that Waze was involved in placing a vehicle containing gelatin sticks and a threat note near the Ambani family's residence. It also alleged a staged vehicle theft, pressure on its owner to accept responsibility, his subsequent murder and destruction of evidence.

An earlier bail application had been rejected. After the investigation and framing of charges, the High Court permitted a fresh application to be decided on its merits and in accordance with law. The Special Court subsequently granted bail.

The NIA argued that the Special Court ignored the embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, the alleged conspiracy and the material attributing a central role to Waze. It also cited risks to witnesses and evidence.

Waze relied on prolonged incarceration and likely trial delay. He disputed the ingredients of a terrorist act, noting that the gelatin sticks lacked a detonator or fuse, and sought parity with co-accused granted bail.

Court's Observations

Section 43D(5) Required A Limited Prima Facie Inquiry

Relying on National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (2019), Vernon v. State of Maharashtra (2023) and Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2024), the Court held that the prosecution material must be assessed as a whole without conducting a mini-trial.

Referring to the statutory restriction, the Court noted the following formulation from Gurwinder Singh: “It lays down that if the Court, ‘on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure’, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such Accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond. It is interesting to note that there is no analogous provision traceable in any other statute to the one found in Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act. In that sense, the language of bail limitation adopted therein remains unique to the UAP Act.”

The Court found that the Special Judge had neither applied the settled criteria nor considered why the earlier bail request was rejected, as required by Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018). It also rejected the conclusions that the High Court's permission to file afresh indicated merit in the request and that framing charges required a lesser degree of satisfaction than deciding the bail application.

Prosecution Material Crossed The Statutory Threshold

The Court found prima facie material concerning the alleged substitution of number plates, placement of the vehicle near Antilia, the threat note, pressure placed on the vehicle's owner and destruction of electronic material.

It held: “Against the backdrop of the relevant material pointing to the prima facie involvement of Accused No. 1 in the offences as charged, Mr Thorat has addressed at length a plea of delay in commencement of the trial and of prolonged incarceration. On these submissions, we do not agree with Mr Thorat. The material taken cumulatively reflects a clear role attributed to Accused No. 1, in his actions having a direct nexus to the unlawful activities attracting the said provisions under the UAPA. We are of the considered view that the prosecution material as it stands crosses the threshold and the statutory embargo prescribed under Section 43D(5) operates with full force.”

It also found a reasonable apprehension that his release could affect witnesses and trial integrity.

Prolonged Incarceration Was Not A Singular Consideration

Referring to Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) and Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency (2026), the Court recognised the constitutional power to grant bail where prolonged incarceration and delay violate Article 21. However, time does not mechanically entitle an accused to bail.

In the present case, the Court observed: “Before parting, we may observe that the argument of prolonged pre-trial incarceration cannot be a singular factor or a sole consideration for bail in the facts of the present case. This, more particularly, in the context of several other considerations as discussed by us, which in our opinion, are germane in considering whether accused No.1 could at all sustain his plea for bail. Liberty as enshrined under Article 21 thus in the facts of the case, would be required to be viewed in a wider perspective in the context of the serious accusations involving offences under the UAPA and the manner in which the provisions of law would mandate such consideration. Further, as urged on behalf of the NIA, the trial is also set to commence.”

Conclusion

The High Court allowed the NIA's appeal and quashed and set aside the order granting bail. It held that the material crossed the prima facie threshold under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA and that the embargo operated with full force.

The Court also disposed of the NIA's interim application as not pressed.

Cause Title: National Investigation Agency v. State of Maharashtra and Another (Cause Title: 2026:BHC-AS:45322-DB)

Appearances

NIA: Anil C. Singh, Additional Solicitor General, assisted by Chintan Shah and Amogh Singh, Special Public Prosecutors, and others

Respondent: Advocate V.M. Thorat, assisted by Advocate Sajal Yadav and others

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Referring to C.W.T. and others v. Chander Sen and others (1986) 3 SCC 567, the Court reiterated that a son’s son is not a Class I heir, and that property devolving under Section 8 is not HUF property in the son’s hands vis-à-vis his own son. It held that neither Section 6 of the Act nor Section 29-A inserted by the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989 applied, since the appellant was not a surviving coparcener on his grandfather’s death.

A Bench of Justice Augustine George Masih and Justice Sunita Agarwal observed, “…With the partition decree, the property of N. Ramachandran falling in the share of the father of the appellant became his exclusive property in his individual capacity and cannot be said to be coparcenary. There is no question of devolution of the property once partitioned and became exclusive individual property of the first respondent upon the appellant herein so as to recognise his right on the premise of attaining coparcenary rights with his birth…”.

“…In the codified Hindu Law of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the right of a son’s son in his grandfather’s property during the lifetime of his father which existed under the personal Hindu Law as enforced before the Act 1956, was not saved expressly by the legislature while enacting the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is to be read as a self-contained provision laying down the scheme of devolution of the property of the Hindu male dying intestate”, the Bench noted.

Advocate K. Paari Vendhan appeared for the appellant and Advocate K.K. Mani appeared for the respondent.

The suit property originally belonged to the appellant’s grandfather, N. Ramakrishnan. In 1993, his daughter filed a suit for partition, which was decreed on a compromise dated February 3, 1994, allotting 1,811 sq. ft. to the appellant’s father. The appellant was born on January 6, 1994. In April 1997, his father sold the property to the original defendant nos. 2 and 3. A suit was then filed on the minor’s behalf through his mother, seeking partition and possession of half share, without challenging the compromise decree or the sale deeds.

The City Civil Court, Chennai passed a preliminary decree, which the Madras High Court set aside in first appeal on August 11, 2010. The appellant contended that he became a coparcener by birth before the compromise decree, that Section 29-A preserved the coparcenary character of the property, and that his father could not alienate it without legal necessity. The purchasers contended that the grandson was excluded under Section 8 and the suit was collusive, the father having remained ex parte throughout.

The Bench observed that the right of a son’s son in his grandfather’s property during his father’s lifetime, which existed under pre-codified Hindu law, was not expressly saved by the Legislature, and that Section 8 is a self-contained provision. It held that on N. Ramakrishnan’s death, the property devolved on his Class I heirs as tenants in common, and with the partition, it ceased to be joint family property. Since succession opened before the appellant was born, there was no question of any interest devolving on him.

Cause Title: J. Rajesh (Minor) Through His Mother And Natural Guardian J. Gomathi v. M. Kumaran (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1208)

Appearances:

Appellant: Advocate K. Paari Vendhan

Respondents: Advocate K.K. Mani

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The Court held that such a case is, at most, one of selling counterfeit goods covered by Section 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Since Section 115(4) of that Act permits search and seizure only by a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, it found that the raid conducted by a Police Sub-Inspector was illegal and the FIR vitiated.

A Single Bench of Justice M.W. Chandwani observed, “It is the specific case of the complainant that the applicant was found storing counterfeit Tin sheets having the name of the Company printed on it. This act does not amount to infringement of copyright within the meaning of the Act of 1957…”.

“…Needless to mention that there is difference between using a Logo of a Company and name of a Company. That apart, it is not alleged in the FIR that either the Logo or the name of the Company is an Artistic work, which is a condition for existence of Copyright. There is no whisper in the entire FIR that the name ‘JSW Steel Ltd.’ is an Artistic work either created by the Company or by an artist and the right is assigned to the said company. Thus, there is no allegation in the FIR that the Company was having any copyright in the name of the Company nor infringement of the said copyright has been alleged”, the Bench had also noted.

Advocate Shoeb Asgar Khan appeared for the applicant and Abhijeet G. Mate, APP appeared for the respondent.

The complainant, an investigating officer with EIPR (India) Pvt. Ltd., was authorised by JSW Steel Ltd. to act against counterfeiters. On January 28, 2026, after obtaining oral permission from the Deputy Superintendent of Police, he raided the applicant’s shop at Saoner along with a police party, and found 137 tin sheets bearing the name ‘JSW Steel Ltd 0.50 mm’, valued at Rs. 1,57,550. An FIR was registered the same day under Sections 51 and 63 of the Copyright Act.

The applicant sought quashing under Section 528 of the BNSS, contending that the FIR alleged only counterfeiting and not copyright infringement, and that the investigation was not carried out by an officer of the requisite rank. The complainant contended that the company’s logo is an artistic work, that registration is not necessary to claim copyright, and that an FIR is not an encyclopaedia.

The Court noted that under Section 13 of the Copyright Act, copyright subsists in classes of works including original artistic works, and that even a logo can attract copyright if it qualifies as an artistic work. However, the FIR alleged only the use of the company’s name, not its logo, and contained no averment that the name was an artistic work or that the company held any copyright in it.

Distinguishing Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra and others (2021) and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramjan Khan and others (2024), it observed that while an FIR need not be an encyclopaedia, it must disclose a cognizable offence, relying on Somjeet Mallick v. State of Jharkhand and Others (2024). It found that the case fell within the first category in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, and that the FIR was an abuse of the process of the Court.

Cause Title: Shadab Sheikh Qayyum Sheikh v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-NAG:15223)

Appearances:

Applicant: Advocates Shoeb Asgar Khan and Syed Salman Ali

Respondent: APP Abhijeet G. Mate, Advocates Kartik N. Shukul and Gaurav Khatwani

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The Court held that merely because the complainant did not possess a certificate of identity under the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 on the date of the alleged incidents, invocation of the Act’s penal provisions is not precluded. It noted that Section 4(2) of the Act, recognising the right to self-perceived gender identity, was in force at the relevant time, though since omitted by the 2026 Amendment Act.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Mehroz K. Pathan observed, “In my considered opinion, therefore, the allegations of assault and outraging the modesty of a woman can be sustained even where the victim is a transgender person who identi2es herself as a woman…”.

“…merely because the Complainant did not possess a certi2cate of identity under Section 6 of the Act of 2019 at the time of the alleged commission of the offence by the Applicant would not, by itself, preclude the invocation of the penal provisions of the Transgender Act of 2019. A perusal of the FIR would show that Section 18(D) of the Transgender Act of 2019 have been rightly invoked, and the allegations therein prima facie attract the provisions invoked against the Applicant”, it noted further.

Advocate Anil Thakkar appeared for the applicant and Swati V. Kolhe, APP appeared for the respondent.

The complainant, a transgender person who had undergone hormonal treatment since 2015 and dressed as a woman from 2021, alleged that the applicant, an Agniveer in the Indian Army, befriended her and proposed marriage.

She alleged that he committed forcible sexual intercourse with her on October 28, 2025, and again on October 30, 2025 at a flat, while abusing her in filthy language. An FIR was registered on November 1, 2025 under Sections 75, 296 and 351(2) of the BNS read with Section 18(d) of the 2019 Act.

The Additional Sessions Judge, rejected the applicant’s discharge application under Section 250 of the BNSS on July 6, 2026. The applicant contended that the complainant was not a woman, that the identity certificate was issued only on February 12, 2026, and that the relationship was consensual and on a promise of marriage. The State contended that Section 75(1) does not expressly stipulate that the victim must be a woman and that transgender persons are entitled to self-identify.

The Court noted that Section 2(k) of the 2019 Act defines a transgender person to include transgender women irrespective of any therapy undergone, and that a person may so identify even without a certificate, Section 5 being only an enabling mechanism.

The Bench referring to National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014), held that self-determination of gender cannot be questioned by others. It found that the acts constituted an offence under the law as it stood when committed, and that the FIR contained direct allegations of outraging the modesty of the complainant, prima facie attracting Section 75 of the BNS and Section 18(d) of the 2019 Act.

Holding that the plea of consent is a matter for trial and that the charge-sheet disclosed sufficient material, the Court dismissed the revision application.

Cause Title: Vishal Sunil Ingle v. State of Maharashtra (Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-NAG:15063)

Appearances:

Applicant: Advocate Anil Thakkar

Respondent: APP Swati V. Kolhe

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The Court declined to interfere with an interim order of the High Court which had permitted the Enforcement Directorate to share two sealed-cover reports with the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and had granted liberty to the CBI to conduct a preliminary enquiry in a PIL against Pastor Ankur Yoseph Narula and his wife, Sonia Narula.

The Court, however, requested the High Court to hear the parties and decide the objection regarding the locus of the PIL petitioner before examining the merits of the matter.

The Bench, comprising Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe ordered, “We are not inclined to interfere with the interim order passed by the High Court. However, we request the High Court to hear the parties and to decide the objection with regard to the locus of respondent no. 1 to file a Public Interest Litigation and thereafter to examine the merits of the matter. 5. It is clarified that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter.”

Senior Advocates Mukul Rohatgi and Abhishek Manu Singhvi appeared for the Petitioners, while Solicitor General Tushar Mehta and Senior Advocate Mohan Rao appeared for the Respondents

The PIL raised allegations concerning religious conversions, healing advertisements, foreign missionaries, FCRA, money laundering, construction, GST, social-media activity and political influence. It sought investigations by the Enforcement Directorate and the CBI, freezing of bank accounts, attachment of properties, restraint upon construction and deactivation of social-media accounts.

An FIR was also registered against Respondent No. 1 under Sections 285, 223 and 196(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. The FIR is relied upon only as part of the pre-existing adversarial background and the chronology bearing upon motive, candour and bona fides; it is not pleaded as an automatic disqualification from maintaining a PIL. Subsequently, he addressed a representation to the Enforcement Directorate alleging foreign funding and money-laundering activities against the petitioners.

Respondent No. 1 was arrested and released on bail by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jalandhar. Thereafter, instituted the PIL within thirteen days thereof.

The Enforcement Directorate filed a status report in sealed cover, and the High Court observed that it would be open for the investigating agencies to examine the issues raised.

The Division Bench of the High Court had perused a further sealed-cover report in Chambers. Without commenting upon the merits, the High Court permitted the Enforcement Directorate to share both reports with the CBI in a sealed envelope. It granted liberty to the CBI to conduct a preliminary enquiry and submit its report in sealed cover. The High Court also restrained the parties from sharing the proceedings with the media and listed the matter for a further date.

Challenging the said order, the Petitioners filed the present SLP. They also contended that the impugned order identified no cognizable offence, suspected transaction, role attributable to them or scope of enquiry, and recorded neither any failure of the existing agencies nor any prima facie case warranting recourse to the CBI.

It averred, “The disclosed official record does not support a CBI process. Respondent Nos. 3 to 7 placed on record the police enquiry, which found no cogent evidence, particulars of any alleged victim or witness, or material disclosing any cognizable offence. No alleged victim came forward, and the complaint was consigned to the record on 16.04.2026. More significantly, Respondent No. 9-CBI stated on affidavit that no exceptional circumstance requiring its intervention, failure or bias of the State machinery, national or inter-State ramifications, or involvement of Central Government officials had been shown. The CBI accordingly opposed the relief seeking investigation by it. The remaining departmental replies likewise record no concluded violation against the Petitioners.”

On maintainability, the petitioners contended that the threshold scrutiny of the PIL petitioner’s credentials and bona fides remained unperformed.

The Plea, filed by AOR Siddharth Batra also argued, “The Petitioners are also challenging the operative use of sealed cover material. They have received neither report, a redacted copy, nor a meaningful gist identifying the offence, transaction, statutory provision or conduct under scrutiny. They can answer the PIL, but not the undisclosed material that produced the impugned consequence. No claim of privilege or public-interest immunity has been adjudicated, reason for complete nondisclosure recorded, or less restrictive alternative considered.”

It was also argued that the High Court had overridden the independent discretion of the investigating authorities. By way of interim relief, the petitioners sought a stay of all further proceedings in the PIL qua them, while clarifying that they did not seek immunity from any investigation lawfully commenced by a competent authority.

The Plea submitted, “Despite this record, on 05.08.2026 the Hon’ble High Court perused an Enforcement Directorate report in sealed cover and permitted the investigating agencies to examine the issues raised therein. On 27.08.2026, after perusing a further sealed-cover report, the Hon’ble High Court directed both reports to be transmitted to the CBI, granted liberty to conduct a preliminary enquiry and required the CBI to submit its report in sealed cover. The order neither rejects the police enquiry nor records any reason for departing from the CBI’s own stand. A central agency which E opposed its involvement has thus been drawn into a continuing courtmonitored process on the basis of material withheld from the persons directly affected.”

The Supreme Court stated that it was not inclined to interfere with the interim order passed by the High Court. It, however, requested the High Court to hear the parties and decide the objection with regard to the locus of Respondent No. 1 to file a PIL, and thereafter to examine the merits of the matter.

The Court clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits. With these observations, the Special Leave Petition was disposed of.

Cause Title: Ankur Yoseph Narula & Anr. v. Tejasvi Minhas & Ors. [SLP (C) No. 31685 of 2026]

Appearances:

Petitioners: Sr. Adv. Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, AOR Siddharth Batra, Adv. Ranjeeta Rohtagi, Adv. Edward Augustine George, Adv. Stephan Masih, Adv. Gunjeet Singh Syal, Adv. Chinmay Dubey, Adv. Shivani Chawla, Adv. Akshit Lunial, Adv. Mehul Gulati, Adv. Jyoti Aggarwal, Adv. Pradeep Shekhawat, Adv. Sanjivani Aggarwal, Adv. Swaraj Swarup Aggarwal

Respondents: Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, A.S.G. Suryaprakash V. Raju, Advocate General Maninderjit Singh Bedi, A.A.G. Rajat Bhardwaj, Sr. Adv. Mohan Rao, Sr. Adv. Zoheb Hossain, Sr. Adv. Nachiketa Joshi, Sr. Adv. Guru Krishna Kumar, AOR Pushkar Sharma, AOR Karan Sharma, AOR Amrish Kumar, AOR Arvind Kumar Sharma, AOR Shreekant Neelappa Terdal, AOR Apoorva Singhal, AOR Abiha Zaidi, AOR Yashraj Singh Bundela, Adv. Akshit Chauhan, Adv. Nikita Verma, Adv. Vinod Kumar, Adv. Sahil Malik, Adv. Vikrant Bhardwaj, Adv. Annam Venkatesh, Adv. Hitarth Raja, Adv. Vivek Gurnani, Adv. Bhuvan Kapoor, Adv. Anmol Chandan, Adv. Suryodaya Prakash Tiwari, Adv. Dr. Arun Kumar Yadav, Adv. B.L.N. Sanjit, Adv. Prerna Dhall, Adv. Eklabhya Dwivedi, Adv. Aman Mehta, Adv. Sanchar Anand, Adv. Dr. Ravinder Kumar Anand, Adv. Rajat Rathee, Adv. Aman Kumar Thakur, Adv. Aditya Kumar, Adv. Apar Gupta, Adv. Pragya Jain, Adv. Yashpriya Sahran, Adv. Sahil Mander, Adv. Pritam Raman Giriya, Adv. Divyangi Gupta, Adv. Aryan Sarawgi, Adv. Ronit Rampuriya, Adv. Arpit Garg

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The High Court was considering a Petition challenging an Order-in-Original passed by the Commissioner of Customs (Import-I).

The Bench comprising Justice M. S. Karnik & Justice Sandesh D. Patil ordered, “By consent of both the parties, the Order dated 11th August, 2026 is quashed and set aside.”

Senior Advocate Venkatesh Dhond represented the Petitioner while Advocate Jitendra B. Mishra represented the Respondent.

Factual Background

The petitioner claimed that the order in question was passed by taking recourse to Artificial Intelligence (AI) without independent application of mind. The Petitioner had as an example cited two non-existent judgments of the Supreme Court which were relied by the Commissioner while passing the said Order.

Reasoning

The Bench took note of the respondent’s contention that the impugned Order could be quashed and the matter could be remanded back to the Commissioner.

The Bench further ordered, “The Petitioner is directed to appear before the Respondent No.1 on 5th November, 2026 at 11:00 a.m. after which the Respondent No.1 shall fix the next date of hearing.”

Cause Title: Quanta Logistics Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs (Import-I) (Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-OS:24069-DB)

Appearance

Petitioner: Senior Advocate Venkatesh Dhond, Advocates Bimal Rajasekhar, Sunand Subramaniam

Respondent: Advocates Jitendra B. Mishra, Sangeeta Yadav

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Location: Delhi

No. Of Posts: 03

Remuneration: ₹80,000 – ₹1,50,000

Educational Qualification: LLB

Experience: 2-9 years in handling legal matters related to legal advice, drafting and vetting of agreements/contracts, litigation, arbitration, regulatory compliance in Government Organizations, PSUs, or reputed organizations; minimum 2 years (730 days) in the National Highways Sector.

Age Limit: 45 years

Last Date To Apply: Nov 19, 2026.

How To Apply: Interested candidates may apply online through the website.

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Upholding the treatment of a Gujarat-origin candidate under the General Category, the Court dismissed her appeal against the rejection of her claim for Rajasthan’s ST reservation in the Nursing Officer recruitment.

The Court was hearing a special appeal against a Single Judge’s dismissal of the candidate’s writ petition challenging the State’s decision to consider her candidature under the General Category instead of the ST category.

A Bench of Justice Vinit Kumar Mathur and Justice Chandra Shekhar Sharma, while referring to Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v/s Dean Seth G.S. Medical College (1990), observed: “In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgments referred to hereinabove, we are in agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that a candidate belonging to the Scheduled Tribe (ST) category in a State other than the State of Rajasthan, upon applying for a post pursuant to an advertisement stipulating that such a candidate shall be considered under the General Category, would automatically be dis-entitled to claim the benefit of reservation under the Scheduled Tribe category.”

The Apex Court, in Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao (1990), had held that "when a Scheduled Caste or tribe migrates, there is no inhibition in migrating, but when he migrates, he does not and cannot carry any special rights or privileges attributed to him or granted to him in the original State specified for that State or area or part thereof".

Advocate C.S. Kotwani appeared for the candidate. Additional Advocate General N.S. Rajpurohit appeared for the State.

Background

The candidate hailed from Gujarat, where her caste was recognised as a Scheduled Tribe. After marrying a Rajasthan resident belonging to the same caste, she moved to Rajasthan and applied for appointment as a Nursing Officer, claiming the benefit of ST reservation.

The State declined to consider her under the ST category and instead treated her candidature under the General Category. The recruitment advertisement contained a specific condition that a reserved-category candidate migrating to Rajasthan would be considered under the General Category.

The Single Judge dismissed her writ petition by relying on Ranjana Kumari v. State of Uttarakhand (2018), which concerned the reservation status of a candidate who migrated from one State to another. The candidate then filed the special appeal before the Division Bench.

She argued that her caste was notified as a Scheduled Tribe in both Gujarat and Rajasthan and that her candidature should therefore have been considered under the ST category. The State relied on Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao v. Dean, Seth G.S. Medical College (1990) and Action Committee on Issue of Caste Certificate to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the State of Maharashtra v. Union of India (1994) to contend that State-specific reservation privileges do not travel with a candidate upon migration.

Court’s Observations

Reservation Privileges Do Not Travel Upon Migration

The Court referred to Marri Chandra Shekhar Rao (1990), in which the Supreme Court explained that migration itself remained unrestricted, but the special privileges attached to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe status in the State of origin did not automatically extend to another State.

The Supreme Court had held: “If that right is not given in the migrated state it does not interfere with his constitutional right of equality or of migration or of carrying on his trade, business or profession. Neither Article 14 , 16 , 19 nor Article 21 is denuded by migration but he must enjoy those rights in accordance with the law if they are otherwise followed in the place where he migrates.”

The Supreme Court further explained that Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe specifications under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution were made in relation to particular States. It held that extending the special privileges granted in the State of origin throughout the country would negate that State-specific constitutional scheme.

Same Caste In Both States Did Not Confer Reservation Benefit

The Court also relied on Action Committee (1994), in which the Supreme Court held that the considerations for including a caste or tribe in a State’s reserved list depended on the disadvantages and social hardships experienced within that State. Those conditions could differ substantially elsewhere.

The reproduced passage stated: “Coincidentally it may be that a caste or tribe bearing the same nomenclature is specified in two States but the considerations on the basis of which they have been specified may be totally different. So also the degree of disadvantages of various elements which constitute the input for specification may also be totally different.”

The Court therefore rejected the argument that notification of the same caste as an ST in both Gujarat and Rajasthan entitled the candidate to Rajasthan’s reservation benefit. Her status in the State of origin did not confer the privileges available to members of the Scheduled Tribe constitutionally specified for Rajasthan.

Candidature Was Considered Under General Category

The Court recorded that the material facts concerning the candidate’s origin, migration and treatment in the recruitment process were undisputed.

It observed: “Having considered the submissions made at the bar, we note that undisputed facts in the present case disclose that the appellant belongs to a caste which is categorized in the ST category in the State of Gujarat. After her marriage with a person belonging to ST category, the appellant started living in the State of Rajasthan. While she was living in the State of Rajasthan, she applied for appointment to the post of Nursing Officer and claimed reservation as a ST category candidate. However, while the exercise for appointment to the post of Nursing Officer was in progress, her candidature was rejected in ST category and appellant was considered in general category.”

Applying the Supreme Court precedents and the advertisement’s express condition, the Division Bench agreed with the Single Judge that the candidate was disentitled to claim Rajasthan’s ST reservation. The State’s decision did not disqualify her from the recruitment process but required her candidature to be assessed under the General Category.

Conclusion

The Rajasthan High Court dismissed the special appeal and upheld the Single Judge’s refusal to direct consideration of the candidate under the ST category. It sustained the State’s decision to treat her as a General Category candidate for the Nursing Officer recruitment.

All pending applications were also disposed of.

Cause Title: Baria Sharmishtha Ben v. State of Rajasthan and Others (Neutral Citation: 2026:RJ-JD:55282-DB)

Appearances

Appellant: C.S. Kotwani, Advocate

State: N.S. Rajpurohit, Additional Advocate General, assisted by Kanchan Jodha, Advocate

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The High Court quashed the proceedings against 20 persons described in the complaint as SDPI leaders who had allegedly staged a protest demanding the resignation of then State Minister K.S. Eshwarappa.

The Court was hearing a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking the quashing of proceedings for offences under Sections 143, 147, 341, 353 and 290 read with Section 149 of the IPC arising from an alleged attempt to obstruct the convoy of the then Chief Minister of Karnataka.

A Bench of Justice Rajesh Rai K observed: “… the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the right to conduct a peaceful protest is a Constitutional right guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of India merits consideration. Such a right cannot be curtailed by initiating criminal proceedings on the basis of frivolous allegations.”

The Court further observed: “A perusal of the charge-sheet material does not disclose that the petitioners had either obstructed the convoy vehicle of the Chief Minister or made any attempt to use criminal force to deter a public servant from discharging his official duties. There is also no specific allegation attributing any act of mischief to the petitioners. Even if the entire allegations in the charge sheet are taken at their face value, the materials would, at best, indicate an attempt on the part of the petitioners to stage a protest, and admittedly, no overt act constituting the alleged offences is established from the charge-sheet material.”

Advocate Lethif B. appeared for the petitioners. High Court Government Pleader Mahesha P. appeared for the State.

Background

The then Chief Minister was scheduled to attend a programme in Dakshina Kannada district. A police sub-inspector and another person were deployed for security duty near a junction through which the convoy was expected to pass.

The complaint alleged that, when the convoy reached the junction, a group of 15 to 20 persons approached from a nearby road carrying SDPI flags and black flags. They were allegedly raising slogans demanding K.S. Eshwarappa’s resignation in connection with a death that had occurred the previous day.

The complaint further alleged that the group moved towards the Chief Minister’s vehicle, raised slogans and obstructed the convoy. The police initially registered offences relating to unlawful assembly, rioting, wrongful restraint and public nuisance. After investigation, the charge-sheet also invoked Section 353 of the IPC, which concerned assault or criminal force used to deter a public servant from discharging official duties.

The petitioners argued that the complaint and charge-sheet disclosed no actual assault or use of criminal force against any public servant, no act of mischief and no ingredients of the alleged offences. The State opposed the petition, submitting that the statements of the material witnesses and eyewitnesses prima facie disclosed their involvement and that the allegations should be examined during trial.

Court’s Observations

Complaint Concerned A Roadside Protest

The Court examined the complaint and noted that the original allegation concerned a protest staged on the roadside to demand the resignation of a State Minister.

It observed: “As could be gathered from the complaint averments, initially, the FIR was registered on the basis of the suo-moto complaint lodged by respondent No.2 for the offences punishable under Sections 143, 147, 341 and 290 r/w 149 of IPC. The specific allegation in the complaint is that the petitioners had staged a protest by demanding the resignation of one of the Minister of the State, on the roadside at a place called Valachil.”

The Court found that the charge-sheet material did not support the allegation that the petitioners had obstructed the convoy. It also disclosed no attempt to use criminal force against a public servant or any specific act of mischief.

Standing By Roadside With Flags Did Not Constitute Invoked Offences

The Court considered the statements of the material witnesses, including eyewitnesses, and found that they described an attempt to protest by standing on the roadside and displaying organizational flags.

It held: “Even the statements of the material witnesses, including the eyewitnesses, disclose that the petitioners had merely attempted to stage a protest by standing on the roadside and displaying the flags of their organization, such an act, by itself, would not constitute the offences punishable under Sections 353, 290 or the other provisions of the IPC invoked against them.”

The Court found no overt act satisfying the ingredients of the offences alleged in the charge-sheet. The materials, even when accepted at face value, indicated no more than an attempt to stage a protest.

Continuing Prosecution Would Be Abuse Of Process

Having found the necessary ingredients of the alleged offences absent, the Court held that the criminal case could not be permitted to continue.

It observed: “In the aforesaid circumstances, permitting the criminal proceedings to continue against the petitioners, in the absence of the necessary ingredients constituting the alleged offences, would amount to an abuse of the process of Court. Accordingly, I proceed to pass the following.”

The Court accordingly exercised its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC to terminate the proceedings.

Conclusion

The Karnataka High Court allowed the petition and quashed the criminal proceedings against all 20 petitioners for the offences under Sections 143, 147, 341, 353 and 290 read with Section 149 of the IPC.

It held that the charge-sheet materials disclosed neither obstruction of the Chief Minister’s convoy nor criminal force against a public servant or any specific act of mischief. The materials showed, at most, an attempt to conduct a roadside protest. The Court separately recognised the right to peaceful protest as a constitutional right guaranteed under Article 19.

Cause Title: Abdul Jaleel alias Yaseen Arkula and Others v. State of Karnataka and Another (Neutral Citation: 2026:KHC:59324)

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The Court noted a considerable increase in Sub-Inspectors issuing notices threatening to open rowdy sheets against persons named in one or two criminal cases, mostly arising out of private family property or matrimonial disputes. It quashed the impugned notice and directed the State Government to issue necessary instructions to all police stations.

A Single Bench of Justice M.G.S. Kamal observed, “The officer who is empowered to open and maintain, history/rowdy sheet is Superior Police officer of the rank of Superintendent of police or Sub-divisional police. The jurisdictional Police Inspector or the officer in-charge of the police station shall with the prior orders of Superintendent of police or Sub-divisional Police Officer enter name of Rowdy in the Register of Rowdies. A Sub-Inspector or Police cannot on his own open a Rowdy sheet…”.

“…The said guidelines of issuance of notice has to be read along with guideline No. iii which is in consonance with the object, purport and rigour of Clause (5) of the Order No.1059 of the Karnataka Police Manual…The very fact, that this kind of notices are being issued runs contrary to the mandate of law, which bars opening a Rowdy Sheet without the prior orders of Superintendent of Police or the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, who is authorised by the Superintendent of Police. Therefore it goes without saying that even if a notice is required to be issued, such notice has to be issued by the Superintendent of Police or authorised the Sub Divisional of Police Officer or with his prior order. Such power cannot be exercised by an Officer below the rank of the Superintendent of Police or Sub-Divisional Police Officers”, the Bench said.

Advocate Kushal N.K. appeared for the petitioner and Prashanth V. Mogali, HCGP appeared for the respondent.

The petitioner, an agriculturist from Bagalkot, was named in two FIRs registered under various provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. He contended that the cases arose out of pending civil suits. On June 10, 2026, the Sub-Inspector issued him a communication stating that a rowdy sheet would be opened against him under Order No. 1059 of the Manual.

The petitioner approached the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, relying on the Coordinate Bench decision in B.S. Prakash v. the State of Karnataka Writ Petition No.4504/2021 along with connected matters dated 22.04.2022, contending that the communication was in effect an order opening a rowdy sheet. The State contended that it was only a notice, and that the petitioner ought to reply to the Sub-Inspector.

The Court found that the communication was not a show cause notice but an intimation that a rowdy sheet would indeed be opened. It noted that Clause (5) of Order No. 1059 mandates prior orders of the Superintendent of Police or Sub-Divisional Police Officer before any name is entered in the Register of Rowdies, and that a Sub-Inspector cannot on his own open a rowdy sheet. It held that the guideline in B.S. Prakash requiring a proposal notice was an additional safeguard against police excess, to be read with the guideline requiring the superior officer to call for records and record reasons. It observed that the guideline had been misread, with Sub-Inspectors issuing notices to anyone they thought deserved to be rowdy-sheeted, without reference to prior orders.

The Court allowed the petition and quashed the notice dated June 10, 2026, and directed that the B.S. Prakash guidelines be read and applied accordingly, and that the State Government issue necessary instructions or a circular to all concerned police stations.

Cause Title: Manjunath Krishnappa Dalawai v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:KHC-D:17446)

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The High Court directed the medical college and its associated university to return an MBBS graduate’s original certificates within one week of receiving the order.

The Court was hearing an Article 226 petition challenging the withholding of the graduate’s academic certificates and related university approvals as a fee-recovery measure that allegedly prevented him from participating in the NEET PG 2026 counselling process.

A Bench of Justice Juwadi Sridevi observed: “The said certificates, being personal and academic credentials, are undoubtedly the exclusive property of the petitioner. In the absence of any statutory or legal authority, respondent No.3 has no authority whatsoever to retain the petitioner’s original certificates. Even assuming that the college has any monetary claim against the petitioner, the proper remedy, if any, available is to pursue appropriate proceedings in accordance with law for recovery of its dues. However, the college cannot retain the petitioner’s original certificates as security for recovery of any amount claimed by it and such retention is wholly unlawful and cannot be justified on the ground of any outstanding liability.”

Advocate P. Bosu Babu appeared for the petitioner. Assistant Government Pleader Swapna Madhuri appeared for the State, while Standing Counsel T. Sharat appeared for the health sciences university.

Background

The petitioner had submitted his original academic records to the medical college when he joined its MBBS course. After completing the course, he received a provisional certificate and subsequently completed his compulsory rotatory internship.

According to the petitioner, he had paid ₹47.50 lakh towards tuition and allied fees for the first four years but could not pay the final-year balance of ₹11.75 lakh because of financial constraints. He alleged that the college consequently retained his original certificates. The status of his application for the original degree certificate was also shown as awaiting the principal’s approval.

The petitioner submitted that the withholding of his records had prevented him from completing the process for permanent registration with the Medical Council or securing employment. He had also applied for NEET PG 2026 and required his original documents for verification during counselling and for reporting to the allotted institution.

He therefore sought the immediate return of his original certificates and clearance of the pending university approvals. The health sciences university opposed the petition, while the medical college and the associated university remained unrepresented despite service of notice.

Court’s Observations

College’s Custody Of Original Records Was Undisputed

The Court recorded that the petitioner had submitted his original certificates when he joined the MBBS course and had since completed the course. Their continued custody with the medical college was not disputed.

It observed: “It is not in dispute that the petitioner had submitted his original certificates to respondent No.3 at the time of admission into MBBS course and subsequently completed his course. It is also not in dispute that the original certificates of the petitioner were presently in the custody of respondent No.3.”

The Court treated the records as the petitioner’s personal and academic credentials and, consequently, as his exclusive property. The college had disclosed no statutory or legal authority permitting their continued retention.

Outstanding Dues Did Not Authorise Retention

The Court did not adjudicate whether the amount claimed by the college was payable. It proceeded on the assumption that the college might have a monetary claim and held that such a claim had to be pursued through appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.

Having rejected the use of the certificates as security for the claimed amount, the Court concluded: “Therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that the petitioner is entitled to the immediate return of his original certificates.”

The existence of an alleged outstanding liability could not justify retaining the student’s original records. The Court therefore separated the college’s right, if any, to recover its dues from the student’s right to obtain his personal academic documents.

Continued Retention Affected Counselling And Employment

The Court recorded the petitioner’s submission that the withheld certificates were required for professional registration, employment and postgraduate medical counselling.

His counsel submitted: “He further submits that the petitioner has applied for NEET PG 2026 and as per the online counselling schedule published by the Medical Counselling Committee (MCC), the petitioner is required to produce his original certificates for verification and report before the allotted college. He further submits that any further delay in release of the petitioner’s original certificates would irreparably prejudice his career, which cannot be compensated by any subsequent monetary relief.”

The petitioner’s need to produce the original documents provided the immediate context for seeking their return, although the Court’s holding rested on the absence of legal authority permitting the college to retain them.

Certificates Directed To Be Returned Within One Week

The Court allowed the writ petition and fixed a time limit for compliance.

It directed: “For the foregoing discussion, this Writ Petition is allowed, directing respondent Nos.3 and 4 to return the original certificates to the petitioner, within a period of one (1) week, from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.”

Conclusion

The Telangana High Court allowed the writ petition and directed the medical college and the associated university to return the petitioner’s original certificates within one week of receiving a copy of the order. It held that the certificates could not be retained as security for any alleged fee liability and that the proper remedy for recovering any dues was to institute appropriate proceedings in accordance with law.

The Court made no order as to costs. All pending miscellaneous applications were closed.

Cause Title: Kolakatla Shravan Kumar v. State of Telangana and Others

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