The special court has made unnecessary observations like asking if the National Investigation Agency was waiting for a "muhurat" (special occasion) to record statements of industrialist Mukesh Ambani's family and that they were enjoying their lives despite the alleged terror threat, Additional Solicitor General Anil Singh argued.

Waze is currently lodged in the Thane Central Prison, and his bail formalities, following the special court order on Tuesday, were yet to be completed.

A bench of Justice Girish Kulkarni and Justice Neela Gokhale posted for October 7 the appeal filed by the NIA challenging the special court order and issued notice to Waze.

"We are granting an ad-interim stay on the September 29 order passed by the special court. The state authorities shall immediately convey our order to the concerned jail authorities," the Court said.

The High Court passed the order after briefly hearing Additional Solicitor General Anil Singh, appearing for the NIA, who said the special court had erred in granting Waze bail.

Waze is yet to be released from jail as the formalities are not yet completed.

On February 25, 2021, an SUV with explosives inside was found near industrialist Mukesh Ambani's residence 'Antilia' in south Mumbai.

Businessman Mansukh Hiran, who was in possession of the SUV before it was allegedly stolen, was found dead in a creek in neighbouring Thane on March 5, 2021.

Waze was arrested by the NIA on March 13, 2021, in the combined case of the Antilia bomb scare and Hiran's killing. He was subsequently made an accused in a corruption case being probed by the CBI and Enforcement Directorate. Waze has already been granted bail in the corruption case.

Earlier on Wednesday, a bench of Justice Bharati Dangre and Justice Ashish Chavan had recused from hearing the plea, following which the NIA moved the other bench.

Singh told the bench headed by Justice Kulkarni that Waze was charged under serious offences and the special court has "totally gone wrong" in granting him bail.

"Waze had planted an explosives-laden car near the residence of an industrialist with an intent to create terror in the society. He is also accused of killing a person," Singh said.

He further questioned the special court's observations in the order copy wherein it lambasted the NIA for not recording the statements of any of the Ambani family members.

"The NIA has recorded the statements of three persons who are in charge of the security of the Ambani family. The special court has made unnecessary observations like asking if the NIA was waiting for a 'muhurat' (special occasion) to record the Ambanis' statements and also that the Ambani family was enjoying their lives despite the alleged terror threat," Singh said.

The High Court, after hearing the arguments, said it was granting an ad-interim stay on the special court order.

"Having heard the additional solicitor general and having perused the impugned order, we are inclined to grant an ad-interim stay. The order shall be conveyed immediately to the jail authorities," the High Court said.

On Tuesday, soon after the special NIA court granted bail to Waze, the agency moved the HC and mentioned the appeal before a bench headed by Justice Sarang Kotwal.

The bench, however, recused itself, following which the appeal was placed before the bench headed by Justice Dangre on Wednesday, which too recused itself.

The special court, in its order, had come down heavily on the central agency and questioned it as to what "muhurat" it was waiting for to record the statements of the alleged targets in the Antilia bomb scare case.

To date, the NIA has not recorded the statement of any member of industrialist Mukesh Ambani's family to prove that they were terrorised by the alleged act of parking of an SUV with explosives near their south Mumbai residence 'Antilia', the Court said in its order.

The NIA, in its appeal, sought the High Court to quash the special court order, terming it as "illegal and bad in law" and, by way of interim relief, sought for it to be stayed.

The Sessions Court had said the NIA failed to establish a prima facie case of terrorism under the stringent Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) against Waze, and that there was no evidence on record to prove Ambani's family was terrorised by his alleged act.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, appearing for the West Bengal government, mentioned the matter for urgent listing before a bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V Mohana.

"He is granted interim bail for elections," Mehta told the bench, while urging it to list the matter on October 1.

"We can assure that we will dismiss it, but we will dismiss it on Monday (October 5)," the bench said.

The CJI said the plea would be heard on October 5.

The Calcutta High Court on September 29 granted interim bail to Pradhan till October 20, allowing him to campaign for the October 6 bypoll to the Nandigram seat, vacated by Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari, who has opted to retain Bhabanipur, which he had also won in the state polls earlier this year.

It directed Pradhan to surrender before the trial court on October 21.

The High Court also directed Pradhan to deposit Rs 20,000 bail bond in each of the six criminal cases for which he was arrested.

All these criminal cases on charges such as murder and attempt to murder, and for violation of the Arms Act provisions, were filed against Pradhan in 2007 during the Nandigram anti-land acquisition movement.

The High Court also directed Pradhan to give his mobile phone number to the investigating officer, who will have the liberty to make calls to the candidate twice a day.

Campaigning for the bypoll ends on October 4, and the counting of votes will be held on October 9.

Pradhan was in judicial remand since his arrest on September 18 in connection with four cases registered at Nandigram police station and two more in neighbouring Khejuri.

The High Court had in April 2007 ordered a CBI investigation into the death of 14 people in police firing at Nandigram.

Pradhan's lawyer had stated before the High Court that the Congress candidate was arrested after filing his nomination for the Nandigram bypoll on September 15.

He had prayed for interim bail so that Pradhan could campaign and participate in the election properly.

The trial court at Kanthi had remanded him to judicial custody in one of the cases till October 7.

The Court consequently quashed proceedings under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code against a member of a district cooperative bank who was named in the suicide note of his political rival.

The Court was hearing a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, seeking the quashing of the First Information Report and consequent criminal proceedings for abetment of suicide.

A Bench of Justice R.M. Joshi observed: “In case the contention of learned Senior Counsel for informant is accepted that filing of number of proceedings as per law, would amount to abetment to suicide committed by person against whom such proceedings are initiated, would lead to a situation that any person who consistently is involved in the criminal activities or violation of the provisions of law either in individual capacity or in the capacity of post held by him, could never be prosecuted. There would be thus license to such person to commit illegality as the complainants would be held responsible in case he commits suicide in future. This may appear hypothetical situation but it is not wholly imaginary.”

The Bench further added: “Thus, on the basis of documents placed on record by prosecution itself it can be said that there is no evidence to show the knowledge of the deceased with regard to filing of complaint by Petitioner with police, muchless any complaint against him. Therefore, the act of filing of complaint by the Petitioner on fateful day can not be considered as an act of instigation to commit suicide. In any case, it was constitutional right of the Petitioner to report the incident happened with him to police. Since there is record to support occurrence of such incident, no malafides can be attributed in that regard against the Petitioner. Right to justice under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, is indefeasible right of a victim, i.e. Petitioner. Thus, his act to approach police station to record his complaint, by no stretch of imagination could be termed as offence by connecting the same with death of deceased.”

Advocate S.G. Ladda appeared for the petitioner; Additional Public Prosecutor S.B. Narwade appeared for the State; Senior Counsel R.S. Deshmukh appeared for the informant.

Background

The deceased, a former Member of Parliament and the then Chairman of a district cooperative bank, died by suicide after allegedly consuming poison. A handwritten note attributed his death to continuous mental harassment by the petitioner and a co-accused through proceedings allegedly instituted against him over approximately 20 years.

The petitioner and the deceased were political rivals. The petitioner was a member of the cooperative bank and had initiated proceedings under the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act concerning alleged non-compliance, irregularities and misappropriation connected with the bank’s affairs.

Following the suicide, the deceased’s son lodged a complaint. An FIR was registered against the petitioner and another person for abetment of suicide with common intention. A charge sheet was subsequently filed and the case was committed to the Sessions Court.

The petitioner contended that the proceedings instituted by him concerned acts performed by the deceased and others in their official capacities at the bank. He argued that no court or authority had found those proceedings malicious or an abuse of process.

The petitioner further contended that the complaint lodged by him on the day of the suicide concerned an incident involving him and did not initially name the deceased. According to him, there was no material showing that the deceased knew of the complaint before his death.

The State and the informant opposed the petition, contending that the repeated proceedings caused prolonged harassment and that the final police complaint acted as the immediate trigger. They also relied on the suicide note naming the petitioner.

The High Court clarified that it would not decide disputed questions such as the authenticity of the suicide note while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. It proceeded by accepting the charge-sheet material as presented.

Court’s Observations

The Court observed that Sections 306 and 107 of the Indian Penal Code require an act or omission accompanied by an intention to drive the deceased to commit suicide. The Bench added that the alleged act must involve instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid.

The Court stated: “Having regard to the nature of offence, what is relevant is what accused intends or seeks to achieve by his acts rather than what is perceived by the deceased. Unless there is material to indicate such intention on the part of accused, essential ingredients of Section 306 r/w Section 107 of Indian Penal Code would not get attracted.”

The Bench noted that the proceedings initiated by the petitioner principally concerned the administration of the cooperative bank and the acts of its office-bearers in their official capacities. The Court further observed that no judicial or administrative authority had previously described those proceedings as malicious or an abuse of process.

The Court observed that a member or other competent person was entitled to initiate proceedings where irregularities, misconduct or statutory violations were alleged. The Bench added that prosecuting a person merely for legitimately invoking legal remedies would impermissibly penalise the exercise of a legal right.

The Court held: “In considered view of this Court, it could not be done so except only in case of malicious or vexatious litigation in an appropriate case, wherein allegations regarding abetment may sustain. As discussed above there is absolutely no material on record to hold so in the instant case.”

The Bench noted that the petitioner and the deceased had previously been acquitted in counter-cases after receiving the benefit of doubt. The Court added that those decisions contained no finding that the petitioner’s complaint was mala fide, mischievous or intended to falsely implicate the deceased.

The Court further observed that although the police had filed a summary concerning the final complaint, the record supported the occurrence of the underlying incident. The Bench stated that the summary had been filed because the persons responsible could not be found, rather than because the reported incident was false.

The Court found that the earlier disputes and proceedings extended over approximately two decades and lacked temporal proximity to the suicide. The Bench held that they could not, by themselves, be treated as positive acts of incitement connected with the deceased’s decision.

The Court observed: “Here in this case, by no stretch of imagination it could be said that the earlier proceedings have any connection with the act of deceased to commit suicide.”

The Bench referred to Mohit Singhal v. State of Uttarakhand (2024), where the Supreme Court held that alleged acts lacking proximity to the suicide could not amount to instigation. The Court also referred to Amalendu Pal v. State of West Bengal (2010), which required proof of direct or indirect incitement and a positive act proximate to the suicide.

The Court added that despite the proceedings continuing for approximately 20 years, there was no material showing that the deceased had invoked the Maharashtra Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act, 1971 against the petitioner.

The Court examined the prosecution’s contention that the complaint lodged by the petitioner on the day of the suicide was the immediate trigger. The Bench noted that the initial complaint did not name the deceased and that his name appeared only when the FIR was registered after his death.

The Court stated: “However, there is absolutely no material on record to indicate that deceased had any knowledge with regard to any complaint being made against him before he committed suicide.”

The Bench therefore found no evidentiary connection between the petitioner approaching the police and the deceased’s decision to end his life. The Court added that the petitioner had a constitutional right under Article 21 to report an incident in which he claimed to be the victim.

The Court relied on Patel Joshnaben Pravinkumar Patel v. State of Gujarat (2026), where the Supreme Court held that lodging an FIR, even if false, does not by itself amount to instigating a person to commit suicide. The Bench added that a court must consider the surrounding circumstances instead of relying exclusively upon accusations in a suicide note.

The Court held: “Mere naming of Petitioner in suicide note without any supporting material would not be enough to accept his complicity in crime nor he could be made to undergo rigors of trial for that sole reason.”

The Bench further observed: “Therefore, factum of naming the Petitioner and putting blame on him in the suicide note is not enough to hold him liable for abetment to commit suicide unless there are surrounding facts supporting such blame so also the conduct of the accused is of the extent which would drive an ordinary person to commit suicide, which are absent here.”

The Court found that the petitioner’s conduct appeared bona fide and directed towards protecting his rights and the interests of the cooperative bank. The Bench added that the record disclosed no positive act intended to cause the deceased to end his life and therefore did not establish the necessary mens rea.

Conclusion

The Court held that no offence of abetment of suicide was made out against the petitioner because the record did not establish an intention to drive the deceased to commit suicide or conduct capable of producing that result.

The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the FIR and consequent criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code insofar as they concerned the petitioner.

Cause Title: Sadashiv Ambadasrao Gayake v. State of Maharashtra & Another

Appearances

Petitioner: Advocate S.G. Ladda

Respondents: Additional Public Prosecutor S.B. Narwade; Senior Counsel R.S. Deshmukh, with Advocates Meenal Deshmukh and R.R. Jaiswal, instructed by Advocate V.A. Chavan

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In an epilogue, the Court noted that a single hookah session lasting about an hour involves an estimated 200 puffs and is equivalent in harm to smoking 100 cigarettes, calling it a myth that hookah is less harmful. It expected the State of Uttar Pradesh to notify stringent punishment for hookah service in Designated Smoking Areas, on the lines of other States. From his poem, "My Experience With Tobacco Smoking", Justice Saraf then drew on his own experience to address the young, recounting how he began with an innocent cigarette offered by a senior in law school and later failed repeatedly to quit. “…Trust the cough, not what I said. At twenty, full of swagger, sure and free. Don't be the fool who scoffed, only to become a boiling frog", the lines read.

The Court dismissed a batch of 80 writ petitions by restaurateurs who contended that a food licence and a compliant smoking area entitled them to run hookah bars. It rejected the "self-service" and "rental" models, holding that Article 19(1)(g)  of the Constitution of India must yield to the non-smoker's right under Article 21, to breathe clean air in public places. It also held that food safety and municipal authorities cannot license hookah bars, while police may enforce the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act, 2003 (COTPA).

Advocate Harshit Singh appeared for the petitioner and Advocate Siddharth Shankar Dubey appeared for the respondent.

The petitioners held food licences under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 and operated hookah facilities in Designated Smoking Areas. The lead petitioner ran a café in Gomti Nagar, Lucknow. A police raid was followed by a preventive order dated May 15, 2023 under Section 133 CrPC, which recorded that hookah was served without permission, consumed outside the café and given to minors.

The controversy traces to a suo motu PIL, in which the High Court restrained hookah service during COVID-19. The Chief Secretary banned hookah bars on September 5, 2020. On February 21, 2023, the Court left applicants free to seek licences, and a circular of March 29, 2023 followed, requiring compliance with the amended 2008 Rules.

The Court held the COVID ban was temporary, but rejected the argument that the circular implicitly legalised hookah bars. It held that the pre-2017 phrase "no other service(s)" allowed hookah under Narinder S. Chadha, whereas the substitution of "No service" removed that qualification, so Chadha no longer applies. It endorsed R. Bharath v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine Kar 41.

“We are at consensus ad idem with the ratio laid down in R. Bharath (supra) that post the amendement of 2017 to the Rules, there is not an iota of doubt that ‘service’ of hookah is absolutely impermissible in the Designated Smoking Area. The amendment on a literal and purposive interpretation leads one to the above inexorable conclusion”, the Bench noted.

The "self-service" argument was termed an afterthought, absent from the pleadings and unworkable given the technical preparation hookah requires. The "rental" argument failed because the patron cannot take the apparatus anywhere and must use it within the smoking area. Drawing on statutory and dictionary definitions, the Court held that preparing, delivering, lighting and replenishing hookah for consideration is a "service".

Placing reliance on G.K. Krishnan and Indian Handicrafts Emporium, it held that "regulation" includes "prohibition".

While no specific ban on hookah smoking exists, the Court said encouraging it through service cannot be permitted. It held that police powers under Sections 12 and 13 of COTPA extend to search and seizure.

“…We agree with the petitioners that there is no specific prohibition or ban on hookah tobacco smoking. However, the encouragement of hookah smoking by providing the hookah apparatus, tobacco and rendering services intrinsically linked to smoking of the same cannot be permitted keeping in mind the amended Rule 4(3) of the Rules, 2008. The very rationale of ‘no service’ in a smoking area is to protect the non-smoking personnel and waiting staff…”, the Bench said.

“…Furthermore, the self-service model attempted to be portrayed by the counsel suggesting obscured ideas of providing a prepared and ready to use hookah outside the smoking zone to the customer and charging them for the same is nothing but an attempt tp obfuscate the entire process of hookah smoking and is clearly an argument in sophistry to circumvent the object to be achieved as stated in the Preamble and escape from the clutches of the COTPA by making a mockery of the same. If one were to agree with the submissions put forth by the petitioners one would be hoodwinking oneself of the goals to be achieved by COTPA and the Rules framed thereunder”, the Bench further noted.

Consequentially, the Registry was directed to send the judgment to the Chief Secretary and the Director General of Police for compliance. In an epilogue, the Court expected the State to notify stringent punishment for hookah service, as other States have done.

Cause Title: M/s Aftek Foods and Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. and others (Neutral Citation: 2026:AHC-LB:69218-DB)

Appearances:

Petitioners: Harshit Singh (who argued), Vatsala Singh, Nitesh Kumar Mishra and Shobhit Mohan Shukla, Advocates.

Respondents: Siddharth Shankar Dubey, and Akhilesh Kumar Srivastava, Om Shankar Tiwari, Advocates.

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The Court quashed a detention order under the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988, after finding, among other infirmities, that the prosecution had neither sought cancellation of bail nor established that the detenu had misused his liberty.

The Court was hearing a habeas corpus petition filed by the detenu’s wife challenging an order directing his preventive detention under Section 3(1) of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988.

A Bench of Justice M. Nagaprasanna and Justice Hema Kulkarni observed: “The grant of bail does not, by itself, create an impregnable shield against preventive detention. But where a person already stands enlarged on bail, the Detaining Authority must demonstrate, from cogent and proximate material, a compelling necessity for nevertheless invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of preventive detention. There must be material indicative of a real and imminent propensity to indulge again in prejudicial activity; the subjective satisfaction cannot rest upon the mere existence of the criminal case which had already been considered by the Court while granting bail. Preventive detention looks to the future. It cannot be fashioned into an additional punishment for the past.”

Advocate Pruthviraj P. Hittalamani appeared for the petitioner, while Government Advocate Rakesh M. Bilki appeared for the respondents.

Background

The preventive detention proposal was initiated by the jurisdictional Police Inspector and forwarded through the concerned police authorities to the Detaining Authority. The detention order treated the detenu as habitually engaged in the possession, transportation, supply and sale of narcotic substances.

The order principally relied upon three criminal cases. In the first, involving a small quantity of ganja, the detenu had been convicted and sentenced to pay a fine. In the second, involving an alleged recovery of about 3.171 kilograms of ganja, he had been granted regular bail and the trial remained pending.

The most recent case had been registered against the petitioner, who was allegedly found selling ganja. The detention grounds recorded that she had implicated the detenu as the supplier during the investigation. The detenu was issued a notice under Section 35(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, to cooperate with the investigation, which remained pending for want of a forensic report.

The detenu submitted representations against the detention order. His wife subsequently approached the High Court, contending that he had not been informed of his right to make a representation to the Central Government, which possessed the statutory power to revoke the detention order. It was also argued that the order relied upon concluded, pending or stale criminal proceedings and overlooked the regular bail granted under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

The State submitted that the detenu had repeatedly committed offences of the same nature and that preventive detention was necessary to stop him from continuing such activities. It further contended that he was aware of his right to make a representation to the Central Government.

Court’s Observations

The Court noted that Section 3 of the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 authorises preventive detention to prevent illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. Section 12 independently empowers the Central Government to revoke or modify a detention order, including one passed by an officer empowered by a State Government.

The Court held that the right to seek exercise of this statutory power must be effectively communicated to the detenu.

It observed: “If the statute confers upon the Central Government, the power to revoke an order of detention, the detenu must necessarily have an effective opportunity to invoke that power by making a representation. A right to make a representation, if kept beyond the knowledge of the person whose liberty is taken away, would be a right existing only on paper. The right becomes real and meaningful only when the detenu is made aware that such a representation can be made and to whom it can be made.”

The Bench found it admitted that the detenu had not been informed of his right to represent to the Central Government. The State’s contention that he might otherwise have known about the right could not discharge the Detaining Authority’s obligation.

The Court remarked: “The duty is upon the Detaining Authority to communicate the right; it cannot be shifted upon the detenu to discover it for himself. What the law commands to be communicated cannot be presumed to have been known.”

The Bench relied upon Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India (1995), Alfiya A. v. State of Kerala (2026), Amreen v. Commissioner of Police (2025) and Wahengbam Bimal Meitei v. District Magistrate, Imphal West District (2026) while reiterating that Article 22(5) imposes corresponding obligations upon the Detaining Authority to communicate the grounds of detention and provide the earliest opportunity for an effective representation.

The Court rejected the contention that the subsequent placement of the detention before the Advisory Board could cure the failure to inform the detenu of his right to approach the Central Government.

It underscored: “Consideration by the Advisory Board and the right of the detenu to make a representation to the Central Government operate in their respective spheres. One cannot be employed as a substitute for the other. A constitutional safeguard denied at the stage when it ought to have been made available cannot be resurrected by pointing to a subsequent procedural event.”

The omission was not treated as a technical or inconsequential procedural lapse. The Court held that it struck at the constitutional protection under Article 22(5) and rendered the detention vulnerable.

The Court found that the detenu had been granted regular bail after consideration of Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. There was no allegation that he had absconded, tampered with evidence, intimidated witnesses or otherwise breached the conditions of bail.

Despite the detention grounds alleging violation of bail conditions, the prosecution had never approached the competent court for cancellation of bail.

The Court observed: “When the ordinary law provides a specific remedy for dealing with breach of conditions of bail, the extraordinary jurisdiction of preventive detention cannot be invoked as a substitute for that remedy. What the prosecution has not even attempted to achieve by seeking cancellation of bail cannot be permitted to be achieved through the backdoor of preventive detention.”

The Bench explained that bail under Section 37 is subject to stringent statutory conditions. The competent court must be satisfied that reasonable grounds exist for believing that the accused is not guilty and is unlikely to commit an offence while on bail. That judicial satisfaction could not be rendered meaningless through a bald executive assertion that the detenu was likely to repeat similar activities.

It observed: “What is striking in the case at hand is that the bail continues to hold the field. It has neither been challenged nor cancelled. No application alleging misuse of liberty or violation of its conditions has been placed before the competent Court.”

The Court relied upon Sushanta Kumar Banik v. State of Tripura (2022) and Roshini Devi v. State of Telangana (2026), which emphasised the need for strict scrutiny of preventive detention orders where the detenu had already been released on bail. It reiterated that a mere apprehension of repetition, without further material, was insufficient to invoke preventive detention.

Applying these principles, the Court noted that the bail order remained in force, no cancellation application had been filed and no competent court had found that the detenu had misused his liberty.

The Bench held: “Preventive detention cannot be converted into a parallel mechanism for cancellation of bail, nor can subjective satisfaction of the executive be permitted to become a substitute for recourse to the ordinary remedies available under criminal law.”

The detention order was also vitiated by the failure to inform the detenu of his right to represent to the Central Government. The Court concluded that the cumulative effect of these infirmities could not be sustained in law.

Conclusion

The High Court allowed the habeas corpus petition and quashed the preventive detention order. It issued a writ directing the Superintendent of the Central Prison to release the detenu forthwith and directed the Registry to communicate the operative portion of the order immediately.

Cause Title: Mala v. State of Karnataka & Others

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The Bench held that State of Maharashtra v. Digambar (1995) 4 SCC 386 cannot be read to mean that delay must invariably defeat an Article 300-A claim where the deprivation is continuing and without authority of law. It directed the State to initiate acquisition under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.

A Bench of Justice Anil S. Kilor and Justice Rajnish R. Vyas observed, “…we hold that the respondents have used the petitioner’s land for a public purpose without demonstrating any authority of law by which the petitioner or his predecessor in title was deprived of the property. Mere absence of objection, in the absence of material establishing lawful surrender, transfer or consent to permanent deprivation, cannot constitute authority of law within the meaning of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India”.

Advocate A. R. Ingole appeared for the petitioner and P. P. Pendke, AGP appeared for the respondent.

The petitioner's father owned land in Kolara (Rith), Chimur, Chandrapur, over which the Satara-Masal road was built in 1979 without acquisition, while the father died in 1998. The petitioner challenged a communication dated December 15, 2025, by which the Zilla Parishad's Executive Engineer rejected his representation for compensation on the ground of delay exceeding 20 years, relying on Digambar.

The State argued that the father had voluntarily allowed the work, which was undertaken as drought relief, and that delay and laches were unexplained. It contended that Digambar, a three-judge Bench ruling, rendered the later two-judge decisions per incuriam. The petitioner relied on official communications, including RTI material, indicating that compensation was payable.

The Court noted the State produced no document showing written consent. It held that the law recognises compulsory acquisition or acquisition by agreement, and that the agreement must be in writing. On Digambar, it clarified that it was not declaring a larger Bench decision per incuriam, and that Digambar continues to govern discretionary relief under Article 226 where delay, laches or acquiescence justify refusal. It noted that Sukh Dutt Ratra & Another vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others (2022) 7 SCC 508 had considered Digambar and still granted relief.

It rejected the State's "nil compensation" argument based on K.T. Plantation and held that the obligation to pay just and fair compensation is a constitutional consequence of compulsory deprivation.

Allowing the petition, the Court directed the respondents to initiate acquisition under the 2013 Act, including a Section 11 preliminary notification, and to complete it within a stipulated period. The competent authority must specifically consider the consequences of the extraordinary delay while fixing compensation. Disbursement among legal heirs of the original owner will follow the law. No costs were awarded.

Cause Title: Shekhar Ghanshyam Janbandhu v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-NAG:12657-DB)

Appearances:

Petitioner: A. R. Ingole, Advocate.

Respondent: P. P. Pendke, AGP, Abhishek Rao, Advocate, Gayatri Reve.

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The appeal before the High Court was filed by the appellant, who was convicted for an offence under Sections 5(m) and 5(n), punishable under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. He was ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 20 years.

Considering that the defence counsel in the present matter had substantially confined the cross-examination to putting suggestions and obtaining denials, the Bench of Chief Justice A. Muhamed Mustaque and Justice Bhaskar Raj Pradhan ordered, “The Sikkim State Legal Services Authority (SSLSA), which engages Legal Aid Counsel, has the responsibility to supervise and monitor the manner in which Legal Aid Counsel conduct such cases. The SSLSA shall obtain a report from the Trial Court regarding the performance of all the Legal Aid Counsel of such cases. The SSLSA shall also undertake appropriate training and sensitisation of the Legal Aid Counsel, particularly with regard to effective cross-examination and the manner of defending an accused in a criminal trial.”

“Another aspect which requires consideration is that, where the victim is a child below twelve years of age, unless an effective system put in place by the SSLSA to provide assistance and support in appropriate form, such victims may face a bleak future, including fear, psychological trauma, difficulty in reintegration and reluctance to return to mainstream society. An adequate support and rehabilitation mechanism for the victim, therefore, requires to be established, with appropriate mechanisms to ensure continued care, assistance and support to the victim”, it ordered.

Legal Aid Counsel R. C. Sharma represented the Appellant while Additional Public Prosecutor S. K. Chettri represented the Respondent.

Factual Background

It was alleged that the victim, who was eight years old, had gone to the house of the accused, who is the victim’s uncle, to meet her grandmother, who lived with the accused. The grandmother was not at home, and only the accused was present. Taking advantage of the circumstances, the accused committed the offence of penetrative sexual assault against the victim. The victim’s mother noticed blood stains in the toilet and took the victim to the Pakyong Primary Health Centre for medical assistance. The victim revealed that the accused had raped her and also narrated that similar incidents had occurred on previous occasions. Accordingly, the mother of the victim reported the incident to the Police Station. It was in such circumstances that the accused was convicted.

Reasoning

The Bench first dealt with the contention about the proof of the age of victim and clarified that the mere fact that the particular person who made the original entry in the Birth Register was not examined could not by itself render the evidence regarding the age of the victim unreliable, particularly when the official witness, namely the Registrar of Births and Deaths was examined and the date of birth was also supported by the school record.

The Bench further found that the victim in her cross examination stated that she knew the accused for a long time and that she used to call him fapang/kaka. “As seen from the records, during her examination-in-chief, the victim was found crying and the Court gave her some time to relax before proceeding with her deposition. The victim categorically stated that the accused had forced his penis into her private part, the vagina, and that she felt pain at that time. She also narrated that the accused had committed the same act on two previous occasions”, it added.

The Bench found no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the victim child witness. The identity of the accused was also not in dispute, as the accused was the victim’s uncle. The Bench noted that the evidence lent credence & corroborated the testimony of the victim and of her mother.

“The victim and the accused are related to each other. The incident occurred when no other person was present in the house. Therefore, the absence of an eyewitness to the occurrence is not, by itself, material and no one can be expected to testify to the presence of the accused. The accused was not a stranger to the victim. The circumstances afforded the accused an opportunity to commit the offence when no other person was present in the house. The medical examination also does not indicate any inability on the part of the accused to perform the sexual act”, it held.

Thus, finding no reason to differ with the findings of the Trial Court, the Bench dismissed the application.

Cause Title: Ashok Subba v. State of Sikkim (Case No.: Crl. A. No.01 of 2024)

Click here to read/download Order

The Court said the claimant must first identify the particular road, then show that it existed and was in use, and only then that the opposite party obstructed it. Consequentially, the Bench listed 15 categories of material that may be considered, including revenue and measurement maps, 7/12 extracts, earlier Section 143 orders, spot panchnamas, photographs, government records and oral evidence. It added that the list is not exhaustive and that no single document is compulsory in every case.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Amit Borkar observed, “…A person cannot approach the Mamlatdar under Section 5 merely because he requires a convenient access to his agricultural land and seek creation of a new road over another person's land. The power under Section 5 is to deal with obstruction to an existing road or customary way. It is not a power to create a new road. Therefore, while deciding such proceedings, the Mamlatdar has to first identify the particular road claimed by the person, consider whether that road was existing and being used, and thereafter consider whether the opposite party has obstructed that particular road. The evidence regarding the road and the evidence regarding obstruction have to be considered and thereafter together, on the basis of the entire material available on record”.

Advocate Sanjay P. Shinde for the petitioners and S.D. Chipade, AGP appeared for the respondent.

The Bench laid down the following material as relevant, which may be considered while deciding proceedings under Section 5 of the Mamlatdars’ Courts Act:

(i) The plaint and its description of the particular road or customary way, including its starting point, ending point, direction, width and the lands or Gat numbers through which it is claimed.

(ii) Village map, cadastral map, Gat map and other revenue maps showing the existence and location of the road.

(iii) Measurement maps or reports prepared by TILR, District Superintendent of Land Records or other competent Land Records authority.

(iv) 7/12 extracts and other revenue records showing the road, shivrasta, pandhan, cart road or customary way.

(v) Earlier orders passed under Section 143 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code or other statutory proceedings concerning the same road.

(vi) Spot panchnama recording the physical existence, direction, width, location and condition of the road and the nature and place of the alleged obstruction.

(vii) Sketch or map prepared during the spot inspection showing the road with reference to the boundaries of the concerned Gat numbers.

(viii) Photographs or other material showing the physical condition of the road, obstruction, cultivation, track marks or other signs of its earlier use.

(ix) Oral evidence regarding the existence of the road, its period of use, the persons using it, the manner of use and the date on which the alleged obstruction was first caused.

(x) Documents and evidence showing long-standing use of the particular road or customary way.

(xi) Government or local authority records, including Gram Panchayat, village forms, Zilla Parishad, Public Works Department or sanctioned road plans, wherever relevant.

(xii) Earlier civil Court proceedings, judgments, orders, maps or Commissioner's reports concerning the same road, property or route.

(xiii) Documents showing the possession and cultivation of the concerned Gat numbers, including crop inspection records, where relevant to the identity or use of the road.

(xiv) Evidence relating to the exact date on which the obstruction or attempted obstruction first commenced, for determining the limitation under Section 5(3) and Section 5(4) of the Act.

(xv) Any other relevant documentary, oral or physical evidence which helps in identifying the particular existing road or customary way and the alleged obstruction to that road.

The dispute concerns Gat No. 415 at Varkheda, Dindori, Nashik. Respondent No. 3 claimed a right of Vahivat over an East-West road and sought removal of obstruction by the petitioners.

On December 7, 2015, he filed Vahivat Case No. 35 of 2015 before the Tahsildar, Dindori, who allowed it on March 18, 2017. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Kalwan, dismissed the petitioners' revision on September 12, 2017. The petitioners then filed a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227.

The petitioners argued that the road claimed in an earlier civil suit was different, that the panchnama was vague, and that a Crop Inspection Case had recorded their possession. Respondent No. 3 said he had used the road for years and had no other access.

The Court held that lack of alternate access does not prove that the claimed way existed. It said possession of Gat No. 415 and use of a road are different matters, so the crop inspection finding could not end the case but had to be examined. It found no clear finding on the identity of the road, noted the panchnama was not tied to the East-West road described in the plaint, and flagged an unexplained discrepancy in its date (January 14, 2015 or 2016).

The Court quashed both orders and restored the case to the Tahsildar. He must give notice, conduct a fresh spot inspection, consider Land Records measurement if the location is disputed, verify the panchnama date and record specific findings on the road's identity, prior use, obstruction and its start date. The inquiry is to conclude within four months, with all merits contentions open and no costs.

Cause Title: Balasaheb Karbhari Uphade & Ors. v. Tahsildar, Dindori & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-AS:39451)

Appearances:

Petitioners: Sanjay P. Shinde, Advocate.

Respondent: S.D. Chipade, AGP, Sachin S. Gite, Sarfaraj J. Shaikh, Mahesh Pawar and Aman Kazi, Advocates.

Click here to read/download the Judgment

A bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta asked the Centre to look into the issue of hospitals mandating the purchase of medicines from their chemists and said it is the common man who suffers from this system.

"This is carnage. Plain and simple. The cancer drug is priced at an MRP of Rs 27,000 despite being supplied to retailers for Rs 2,700.

"Corporate hospitals don't spare anyone. They won't allow even the dead body to be taken out. The pharma sector is not bothered," the bench told Solicitor General Tushar Mehta appearing for the Centre.

The bench was hearing petitions concerning regulation of medicine prices, generic prescriptions and controls on medical devices under the Drugs (Prices Control) Order (DPCO), 2013.

At the outset, Mehta said they need to find a way out and some balance has to be created.

Justice Mehta said, "Why this distinction? Essential or non-essential does not matter? Why not keep a 16 per cent margin on MRP of everything?

"Think about what happens. Ultimately, the result is that the taxpayers suffer. In corporate hospitals, the MRP of an essential cancer drug was Rs 27,000 when the price to retailer (PTR) was Rs 2,700. Just see the difference."

The solicitor general said that he needed to discuss with the officials and agreed that the issue requires attention.

Justice Mehta went on and said the government should also look into the issue that many corporate hospitals mandate that one has to buy from their chemist or from "so and so pharmacy" and if the patient gets it from outside, then they are not assuring treatment.

"If that patient is taking treatment under a government scheme, who reimburses? The taxpayer does. So why not uniform criteria?

"DPCO says 16 per cent margin. Every medicine is covered under the Essential Commodities Act. We don't know why they are asked to fix prices like this," he said.

Justice Mehta further told the solicitor general that if one gets a pharmacist who is very humane and says that he will give the medicine to the needy for Rs 2,700, then the patient would start thinking whether the drug is genuine or spurious.

"The question is why this 10 times' markup? Where does this huge chunk of money go? Who is benefiting from it?

"Ultimately, the loser is the honest taxpayer. We will examine this issue thoroughly. This affects a large section of the society," the bench said, adding that first it is the pricing and then the ethical practices of medical practitioners.

Mehta added that pharma companies are not the gainers and it appears that the gainers are the private hospitals.

"Let me have a meeting with the officials. Give me two weeks," he submitted.

Justice Mehta said a simple statin, without combination, costs Rs 40 and with a combination of aspirin it is Rs 70.

"How is this happening? Corporate hospitals are industries. It is not a service at all. Why should the common man suffer all this?" the bench told the solicitor general.

The solicitor general submitted, "I am not saying the petitioners are wrong, but some way which balances equities will have to be found. As I understand, pharma companies are not the ones benefiting from it."

The bench posted the matter for further hearing on October 12 and said it will hear the response of the Centre on the issue.

The Apex Court was hearing two petitions including one by Kishan Chand Jain which highlight that while scheduled medicines face ceiling prices, the bulk of non-scheduled formulations, estimated at around 80 per cent or more by number and value in the market, allow manufacturers greater freedom in setting MRPs, subject to annual increase limits of 10 per cent.

On September 22, terming it a "broad daylight dacoity" against patients, the top court expressed shock over the overpricing of essential cancer medicines, noting that one drug carried an MRP of Rs 27,000 despite being supplied to retailers for Rs 2,700.

It questioned how the patients could be cheated like this and said, "It is very surprising that the authorities who are supposed to take action on this are silent."

One of the petitions sought a direction to authorities to make drug formulations more cost-effective by preventing alleged unethical overpricing of essential medicines by pharma companies and retailers.

It also sought directions to ensure strict price control under the DPCO, to prevent violations of the price-fixing mechanism in the drug supply chain and disproportionate profit-making by retailers through unfair trade practices.

The other plea has sought disciplinary action against medical practitioners for not prescribing generic medicines to patients.

A division bench of Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice DN Ray upheld the single judge’s order, finding no grounds to interfere with the decision quashing the Central Information Commission's (CIC) 2016 directive and imposing a cost of Rs 25,000 on Kejriwal.

"In the totality of facts and circumstances of the present case, no error on any of the submissions of the appellant hearing can be found in the judgment impugned. The appeal stands dismissed accordingly with no further order as to cost," the High Court said in its order.

While quashing the CIC order, the single-judge bench of the high court had on March 31, 2023 also imposed a fine of Rs 25,000 on Kejriwal and reprimanded him for misusing the RTI provisions, saying his approach was casual.

During the hearings of his appeal, Kejriwal's Counsel Abhishek Manu Singhvi had challenged the basis for imposing costs, arguing that his client had not "persisted" seeking PM Modi's degree, as against the single bench observation to this effect.

He had contended that the CIC had initiated proceedings 'suo motu' and named him as a respondent based on a letter and not a formal application.

Furthermore, Gujarat University had submitted before the single bench that the degree was already available online; however, in his review petition before the single bench, Kejriwal's lawyers had pointed out that it was never made online — a plea that was rejected.

If the degree is indeed available online — presumably made so by Gujarat University in view of its public importance — then it should fall within the ambit of the RTI Act, and the cause of action would cease to exist, Kejriwal's lawyer argued.

Representing the University, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta had argued that Kejriwal fought the case relentlessly and even held press conferences to defame the institution.

He had submitted that the high court should impose costs on Kejriwal for filing his appeal to ensure that the RTI Act is not misused and government officials are not made to spend productive working hours dealing with requests that do not serve the Act's purpose.

In 2016, Kejriwal had written to the CIC demanding that the prime minister's degree should be made public. In April 2016, the then CIC M Sridhar Acharyulu had directed the Delhi University and the GU to provide information to Kejriwal on the degrees that Modi received.

Three months later, the High Court stayed the CIC order after the University approached it against that order.

The CIC order came a day after Kejriwal wrote to it, saying he has no objection to government records about him being made public and wondered why the commission wanted to "hide" information on Modi's educational qualifications.

Based on the letter, the CIC directed the University to give records of Modi's educational qualifications to Kejriwal.

The University vehemently objected to the CIC order, saying that someone's "irresponsible childish curiosity" cannot become public interest under the Right to Information (RTI) Act.

In May 2016, the then GU Vice Chancellor, MN Patel, had announced that PM Modi completed his MA in Political Science in 1983 with 62.3 per cent as an external student.

While posting his degree on its website, the GU also challenged the CIC's order in the High Court, with the single bench quashing the CIC directive and pulling it up for venturing into "judicial activism", while imposing a cost of Rs 25,000 on Kejriwal.

Kejriwal then challenged before the division bench of the High Court the single judge order.

Justice Amit Mahajan passed the order while noting that the FSSAI passed the order without giving any opportunity to the company to file a reply or give any explanation.

“The petition is allowed. The impugned order (of FSSAI) is set aside. The respondent is at liberty to pass a fresh order after according a hearing to the petitioner,” the Court said while dictating the order and noted that principles of natural justice have been violated.

The Court added that it remained undisputed that the June 30 order of FSSAI directing petitioner Red Bull to not use the term ‘energy drink’ in its product was passed without giving any opportunity to it to file any reply.

It further said that FSSAI is free to take a fresh decision in the matter after following due process by issuing a show cause notice to Red Bull and granting it an opportunity of hearing.

The Court was informed by FSSAI that no separate show cause notice was given and that the June 30 letter itself was a notice and that the concern was only with the use of the words ‘energy drink’, and not with the product itself.

The Court passed the order on a plea by Red Bull challenging a June 30 order of FSSAI directing the company to discontinue using term ‘energy drink’ on its beverage products.

The Court, therefore, allowed Red Bull’s petition challenging the FSSAI's June 30 order, on the limited ground that natural justice principles had been violated.

The petitioner company submitted that it had been using the ‘energy drink’ descriptor for its beverage products in India since 2002 and that FSSAI had itself previously recognised its use for the relevant category of caffeinated beverages.

A bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V Mohana passed the order while hearing a plea filed by a former woman cricketer, who said there was neither a single female voter nor any woman candidate in the election.

The petitioner sought a stay on the election scheduled today.

"Having regard to the issues raised by the petitioner, especially of women's representation in the Rajasthan Cricket Association, we direct that the election, which is scheduled to take place today, will take place. However, the result be not declared," the bench said.

The Apex Court asked the Rajasthan High Court to decide the pending plea related to non-holding of election of the state cricket association.

The bench was informed that the election was to commence at 11.30 am today and the result was scheduled to be declared later in the day.

While hearing the plea pending before it, the High Court had in July appointed the additional chief secretary of the Rajasthan government's home department to act as administrator of the Rajasthan Cricket Association.

It said all district cricket associations would be under the supervision of the administrator until the regular committee is formed.

A bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V Mohana said the Apex Court has already passed a judgement on the issues raised in the PIL.

For implementation of the directives, a fresh petition cannot be entertained, it said.

However, the bench allowed the counsel for petitioner Yadavi Aditya Rasiwasiya to give a representation to the authorities concerned.

The plea has named the Centre, all states and Union Territories, the Central Board of Secondary Education and the Council for the Indian School Certificate Examinations as parties.

"Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus whereby directing Respondent Nos 1 and 2 (Central ministries) herein to frame and implement an appropriate Central legislation vis-a-vis the menace of bullying/ragging in schools/pre-university educational institutions," the plea said.

The plea also sought directions for framing supplementary guidelines to the proposed Central legislation, which would be mandatorily implemented by schools and pre-university institutions to ensure that complaints related to bullying and ragging are effectively considered and disposed of.

The petitioner sought the compulsory introduction of a subject dealing with the evils of bullying and ragging in the curriculum.

The plea also sought a direction to ensure that such a subject forms part of the curriculum followed by all Central and state education boards.

The Court quashed their inclusion in the Act’s Schedule, invalidated the resulting market-fee demands and directed a refund of the fees collected with 12% simple interest.

The Court was hearing appeals against a Single Judge’s decision upholding the inclusion of Rice Bran Oil and De-Oiled Rice Bran within the definition of agricultural produce and affirming the market fee imposed on their manufacture and sale.

A Bench of Justice Rajasekhar Mantha and Justice Ajay Kumar Gupta observed: “The ‘De-oiled Rice Bran’ and ‘Rice Bran Oil’ are not ‘agricultural produce’. The inclusion of ‘De-oiled Rice Bran’ and ‘Rice Bran Oil’, under the expression ‘Oils’ in the Schedule to the Act of 1972 is illegal and is quashed and struck out therefrom. Rice Oil produced from rice bran is also illegal and is quashed and struck out from the schedule to the Act of 1972.”

Senior Advocates Jaydip Kar and Sakya Sen appeared for the appellants. Advocate General Surojit Nath Mitra and Senior Advocate Nilanjan Bhattacharyya represented the State.

Background

The appellant manufactures Rice Bran Oil and De-Oiled Rice Bran in Burdwan. The products were transported to Kolkata for sale, where the 1972 Act was not applicable.

An executive notification issued in 2002 included Rice Bran Oil and Rice Oil in the Schedule to the Act. Another notification issued in 2008 extended the Act’s operation to Burdwan, following which the appellant was directed to obtain a licence and pay market fees.

The 2014 Amendment expanded the definition of agricultural produce to include processed or unprocessed produce and related, secondary and by-products. It also introduced statutory definitions of “processing” and “sale”. The 2017 Amendment and a subsequent executive notification expanded the Schedule to cover oils, including Rice Bran Oil and De-Oiled Rice Bran.

The appellant challenged the notifications and the constitutional validity of the amendments. It contended that Rice Bran Oil and De-Oiled Rice Bran were manufactured products that had lost the characteristics of paddy and could not be brought within the definition of agricultural produce.

It also challenged an appellate order requiring it to pay approximately ₹1.74 crore as market fees. The appellant argued that the amendments required the President’s prior sanction under Article 304(b) of the Constitution, that the statutory definition of sale conflicted with the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, and that market fees could not be collected without providing corresponding services.

The State maintained that the products originated from paddy and were covered by the amended definition of processed agricultural produce.

The Single Judge dismissed the challenges and upheld the market-fee liability, leading to the appeals before the Division Bench.

Court’s Observations

The Court rejected the contention that the 2014 and 2017 amendments restricted the freedom of trade and commerce guaranteed under Article 301 of the Constitution.

Referring to State of Madras v. N.K. Nataraja Mudaliar (1968) and Jindal Stainless Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2017), it distinguished a restriction on trade from a restriction on the physical movement of goods. It found that the market fee did not impede the movement of the products within or between States.

The Court observed: “A clear distinction must be drawn between restriction on free trade as opposed to free movement of goods of trade. The former may include imposing a fee for trading in an area. The latter entails restricting the transport of goods. Restriction on free trade is not regulated under Article 301 of the Constitution of India.”

The amendments fell within the State Legislature’s power over trade and commerce under Entry 26 of the State List and did not require the President’s prior sanction. The Court consequently upheld the constitutional validity of the 2014 and 2017 amendments.

The Court also rejected the challenge to the definition of “sale” introduced by the 2014 Amendment.

It noted that the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 codified general contractual principles but allowed other laws to prescribe how particular transactions would be treated. The definition under the 1972 Act addressed the specific possibility of agricultural produce being transferred from one market area to another without a formal transfer of ownership.

The Court observed: “The definition of ‘sale’ provided under the Act of 1972, thus, addresses a specific mischief: a person may transfer the physical possession of agricultural produce from one market area to another market area but cannot escape ownership liability to the market committee of that area for services provided thereat.”

The Court held that the definition was intended to prevent market-fee evasion and was not contrary to the Sale of Goods Act, 1930.

The original definition of agricultural produce empowered the State Government to include or exclude agricultural produce from the Schedule. The Court held that this delegated power did not authorise the executive to alter or enlarge the substantive statutory definition.

The Court observed: “Section 2(1)/(a), however, could not and did not empower the executive to alter the definition of ‘agricultural produce’. Every item included in the schedule must, therefore, be consistent with the said definition.”

It held that the 2002 notification exceeded the statutory definition by including Rice Bran Oil and Rice Oil even though they were not agricultural produce. The notification was consequently quashed on the ground of excessive delegation.

The 2008 notification was not quashed because it merely extended the Act to Burdwan. However, the Court clarified that it could not be used to levy market fees on Rice Bran Oil or De-Oiled Rice Bran.

The Court examined the definition of “processing” introduced by the 2014 Amendment. It covered treatments such as powdering, crushing, decorticating, de-husking, parboiling, polishing, ginning, pressing and curing, as well as other manual, mechanical, chemical or physical treatments.

It held that the inclusion of processed produce did not bring products created through manufacturing and industrial activity within the definition of agricultural produce.

Referring to Commissioner of Trade Tax v. Kumar Paints and Mill Stores (2023) and Commissioner of Central Excise, Hyderabad-I v. Xerox India Ltd. and Others (2026), the Court noted that manufacture results in a commercially recognisable new commodity distinct in name, character and use from its raw material.

The Court observed: “The process by which Rice Bran Oil and De-oiled Rice Bran are finally produced from paddy is, thus, not an agricultural activity but manufacturing and industrial. The said oils lose all the characteristics of paddy. The paddy, which is a grain, is converted to liquid. It marks the conversion of a solid substance to a liquid substance.”

Paddy is converted into rice, husk and bran. The bran then undergoes solvent extraction to produce crude Rice Bran Oil and De-Oiled Rice Bran, following which the crude oil is refined into several separately marketable products.

The Court further observed: “When Rice Bran Oil and De-oiled Rice Bran are produced, they may not lose its logical and consequential causal connection with paddy. They however, are not perceived by the Market as oils, derived from paddy. The market does not recognize them as produce of paddy since they lose all its characteristics of paddy.”

The Court relied on Noble Resources and Trading India Private Limited v. Union of India and Others (2025), which distinguished products undergoing a simple operation from those emerging through manufacture as a separate marketable commodity.

It distinguished Park Leather Industry (P) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2001), Sangam Milk Producer Co. Ltd. v. Agricultural Market Committee (2024), Champaklal H. Thakkar and Others v. State of Gujarat and Another (1980), Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan and Others (1990) and Britannia Industries Ltd. v. Bombay Agricultural Produce Marketing Committee (2010).

The Court noted that the products considered in those decisions retained the essential characteristics of their agricultural raw materials or resulted from comparatively simple processes. Rice Bran Oil and De-Oiled Rice Bran, by contrast, lost every semblance of paddy and were recognised as different commodities in the market.

It held that a product’s agricultural origin was insufficient when the statutory definition specified the techniques through which agricultural produce could be obtained.

Although its finding that the products were not agricultural produce was sufficient to invalidate the levy, the Court considered the broader question of whether a market committee could collect fees without providing an individual service to the payer.

Referring to Jalkal Vibhag Nagar Nigam v. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation (2021), it noted that the distinction between a tax and a fee had substantially diminished and that an exact correlation between the amount collected and an individual service rendered was unnecessary.

The Court examined Section 17 of the 1972 Act and held that market fees could validly be imposed when scheduled agricultural produce entered a notified market area, irrespective of whether the trader individually used the committee’s facilities.

It observed: “A market committee, therefore, is the market regulator, who ensures transparent selling and buying of agricultural produce in the designated area is carried out in accordance with the rule of law of trade and commerce. Therefore, the duty of the market committee is not to provide services at the door step of an entity without the latter asking for.”

The Court clarified that market committees provide regulatory services by licensing traders, managing market yards, maintaining measurement facilities, resolving disputes and regulating the sale of agricultural produce.

The appellant argued that the collection of market fees in addition to Goods and Services Tax amounted to double taxation. The Court did not decide this issue because the factual details concerning the other taxes paid had not been placed before it and the market-fee demand had already been invalidated on a different ground.

It observed: “In the present case, since we have held that the appellant will not be called upon to pay the market fee as Rice bran oil and de-oiled rice bran are not agricultural produce. This issue is not pronounced upon in these proceedings. The question of double taxation cannot be decided in the context of the limited facts of the case.”

The Court rejected the contention that the 1972 Act conflicted with the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951.

It held that the Central legislation regulated manufacturing processes in scheduled industries, while the State enactment governed the commercial sale of agricultural produce within notified market areas.

The Court observed: “The Act of 1972 and the Central Act of 1951 thus operate across entirely different areas and or fields. The Act of 1972, therefore, does not occupy a field covered by the Central Act of 1951.”

Conclusion

The Calcutta High Court allowed the appeals and set aside the Single Judge’s decision.

It quashed the executive notifications insofar as they included Rice Bran Oil, De-Oiled Rice Bran and rice oil produced from rice bran within the Schedule to the 1972 Act. All market fees imposed on these products were declared illegal, and the assessment and appellate orders against the appellant were quashed.

The Court directed the Burdwan Market Committee to refund all market fees paid by the appellant with 12% simple interest within 14 days. It clarified that the direction would not create rights in favour of third parties who had not challenged the inclusion of the products under the Act.

The Registry was also directed to refund any amount deposited by the appellant during the proceedings, together with accrued interest. The Court passed no order as to costs.

Cause Title: Sethia Oil Industries Ltd. and Another v. State of West Bengal and Others

Appearances

Appellants: Senior Advocates Jaydip Kar and Sakya Sen; Advocates Jai Kumar Surana, Srijib Chakraborty and Debangshu Dinda

Respondents: Advocate General Surojit Nath Mitra; Senior Advocate Nilanjan Bhattacharyya; Advocates Mary Datta and Bijitesh Mukherjee; Advocates Swapan Banerjee and Diptendu Narayan Banerjee

Click here to read/download Judgment

The Court quashed the rejection of an applicant’s request for an arms licence and directed its reconsideration after noting his subsequent acquittal in the criminal case relied upon by the authorities.

The Court was hearing a writ petition challenging orders passed by the District Magistrate and the Divisional Commissioner refusing an arms licence for a non-prohibited bore revolver or pistol under the Arms Act, 1959.

A Bench of Justice Alok Kumar, while stating that the grant, refusal, renewal, or cancellation of an arms licence is subject to well-defined statutory and judicial safeguards, observed that “mere involvement or registration of a routine FIR against an applicant or license holder is generally an insufficient ground for outright cancellation or refusal unless active misuse, violence, or a direct threat to public safety is demonstrated.”

Advocate Shailendra Kumar Singh appeared for the petitioner.

Background

The petitioner, a builder and director of a development company, applied for an arms licence on the ground that his business required him to travel at different hours and that he apprehended a threat to his life.

The police conducted an inquiry and recommended the grant of a licence. The recommendation was forwarded by the Senior Superintendent of Police to the District Magistrate.

The District Magistrate nevertheless rejected the application, substantially relying on the pendency of a criminal case against the petitioner. The Divisional Commissioner subsequently dismissed his appeal and affirmed the rejection.

Before the High Court, the petitioner contended that the licensing authority had not recorded any reason for disregarding the favourable police report. He further submitted that he had already been acquitted in the criminal case before the Divisional Commissioner decided his appeal.

The petitioner also relied upon his arms-shooting training and maintained that the nature of his business created a genuine requirement for self-protection.

The State defended the refusal under Section 14(1)(b)(ii) of the Arms Act, 1959 read with Rule 12(3)(a) of the Arms Rules, 2016. It contended that the licensing authority was required to refuse a licence whenever necessary for the security of public peace or public safety.

Court’s Observations

The Court clarified that citizens in India do not possess a fundamental right to carry firearms. The grant, refusal, renewal and cancellation of arms licences are governed by the Arms Act, 1959 and the statutory safeguards prescribed under it.

It observed: “It is true that citizens have no fundamental right to bear arms. Unlike in the United States, possessing or carrying a firearm in India is strictly a regulated privilege governed by statutory law of the Arms Act of 1959. The grant, refusal, renewal, or cancellation of an arms license is accordingly subject to well-defined statutory and judicial safeguards.”

While an arms licence remains a regulated privilege, the licensing authority cannot exercise its discretion arbitrarily or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.

The Court held that Sections 14 and 17 of the Arms Act require a licensing authority to record objective reasons showing a genuine danger to public peace or safety.

It stated: “Under section 14 and section 17 of the Arms Act, authorities cannot reject or revoke a license based on vague allegations, whims or caprice; such decisions require recorded, objective reasons showing genuine danger to public peace or safety.”

The mere existence of a criminal case could not automatically establish such a danger. The authority was required to examine the nature of the allegations and determine whether the applicant’s conduct involved active misuse, violence or a direct threat to public safety.

The Court found that the District Magistrate’s decision and its affirmance in appeal rested substantially on the pending criminal case.

However, the petitioner had been acquitted before the Divisional Commissioner affirmed the rejection. The appellate authority had therefore failed to account for a material development that removed the principal basis of the original decision.

The Court observed: “That ground, however, no longer holds, since the petitioner has since been acquitted of the said charges vide judgment dated 23.02.2024 passed by the learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate-XIII, Patna a development that predates the order of the Divisional Commissioner, Patna dated 30.04.2024 affirming the rejection.”

The Court consequently found both orders unsustainable.

The Court held that police verification reports and threat assessments could not be mechanically accepted or disregarded. The licensing authority was required to evaluate them on their merits.

It observed: “Police verification reports and threat assessments must be weighed conclusively, rather than dismissed or accepted through generalized assumptions.”

The Court further clarified: “An arms license to an individual cannot be denied solely on the ground that the applicant does not have any ‘specific threat or imminent danger’.”

Thus, the absence of an identified imminent threat could not, by itself, justify refusal. The authority was required to consider the applicant’s circumstances and the nature of the asserted requirement.

The Court also addressed the requirement of arms-safety training under the Arms Rules, 2016.

It held: “The authorities shall not insist upon a safety training course conducted by the accredited trainer or master accredited trainer having license under rule 39, unless the same has been notified by the Central Government by issuing a general or special order in this regard as envisaged in Rule 10(3) of the Arms Rule, 2016.”

Accordingly, the licensing authority could not insist upon a particular training course unless the Central Government had notified that requirement in the manner contemplated by the Rules.

Conclusion

The High Court quashed the orders passed by the District Magistrate and the Divisional Commissioner refusing the petitioner’s arms-licence application.

It directed the District Magistrate to obtain a fresh police report and reconsider the application in light of the petitioner’s acquittal. The authority was also directed to consider that the petitioner was a builder and businessman seeking an arms licence for self-protection in connection with the nature of his work.

The District Magistrate was directed to decide the application within three months from the filing of a copy of the judgment. The writ petition was accordingly allowed.

Cause Title: Sanjay Kumar Yadav v. The State of Bihar and Others

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The High Court was considering a criminal revisional application preferred under Section 482 read with Sections 395 and 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, whereby the de facto complainant/petitioner challenged the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, rejecting the protest petition filed by the petitioner and accepting the Final Report True, No Clue (FRT) submitted by the police, and dropping the special proceeding.

The Single Bench of Justice Uday Kumar held, “When electronic screenshots and links are formally seized under a seizure list and corroborated by a Section 164 statement, the investigating agency cannot throw up its hands reporting "no clue" merely because a local cyber inquiry hit a dead end with an intermediary (Facebook/Meta), without exhausting specialized State CID cyber-forensic or IP-log tracking protocols.”

Advocate Shayan Sachin Basu represented the Petitioner while Advocate Achin Jana represented the State.

Factual Background

The petitioner, belonging to the Scheduled Caste community, lodged a written complaint alleging that the accused persons belonging to the general caste, hurled foul, unparliamentary, and casteist expletives targeting his caste identity, religion, God, and family through the social media platform ‘Facebook’. The said complaint culminated in a case under Section 3(1)(r)/(s) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

The police submitted an FRT (Nil/No clue) stating that assistance sought from the Facebook authority through the Cyber Police Station, Kolkata, yielded no actual user particulars from Facebook. Upon receipt of the notice of closure, the petitioner filed a protest petition. By the impugned order, the Special Court rejected the petition, holding that since charge sheets had been filed in three other special cases instituted by the same complainant and a "Nil" charge sheet/FRT was filed after due investigation, no cogent reason to nullify the said FRT and order re-investigation was made out.

Reasoning

Referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Anr.(1985), the Bench reiterated that upon submission of a final report, the Magistrate or Special Judge is duty-bound to evaluate the protest/naraji petition independently on its merits to ascertain whether cognizable material has been overlooked or if the investigation has been perfunctory.

The Bench noted that the Special Judge opined that the "Nil" report in the present case had to be accepted as the complainant had filed three other special cases where charge sheets were submitted. The Bench found such reasoning adopted by the Special Judge to be shocking. “Criminal jurisprudence examines every distinct criminal transaction and occurrence on its own foundational worth and evidentiary matrix. A litigant’s resort to law in prior or parallel separate transactions can never form a legal basis to non-suit or presume a lack of merit in a distinct subsequent grievance of casteist insult committed via digital media. Such reasoning is perverse and contrary to the basic tenets of criminal adjudication”, it added.

Referring to the judgment in Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali alias Deepak & Ors., (2013), the Bench held that the failure of the trial court to direct further investigation through a higher supervisory rank (such as the Deputy Commissioner of Police tier or a specialized cyber cell) in the face of such digital material caused a serious miscarriage of justice.

Thus, setting aside the impugned order, the Bench quashed the acceptance of the FRT and the dropping of Special Case. “The matter is remanded to the Special Court, Alipore, with a direction that further investigation into Behala Police Station Case No. 274 dated 17.10.2022 shall be conducted under the direct supervision of the Deputy Commissioner of Police (South-West Division / Specialized Cyber Cell supervisory tier, Kolkata Police)”, it ordered.

Cause Title: Sri Sayan Mondal v. State of West Bengal (Case No.: CRR 2992 OF 2023)

Appearance

Petitioner: Advocate Shayan Sachin Basu

Respondent: Advocates Dr Achin Jana, Kritika Jai

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Location: Maharashtra

No. Of Posts: 01

Remuneration: Rs. 160,000 Per Month

Educational Qualification: LLB

Experience: 10 years’ work experience in Legal wing of Corporates.

Age Limit: 45 years

Last Date To Apply: Oct 09, 2026.

How To Apply: Interested candidates may appear for an interview along with bio-data, original and attested copies of certificates to prove their age, qualification, experience etc.

Click here for the official notification

The High Court was considering an application filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), with a prayer to set aside the impugned orders passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge/Special Judge (Anti-Corruption) in a case registered under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Sections 166, 120-B of the IPC.

The Single Bench of Justice Nand Prabha Shukla held, “Considering the fact, that the prosecution sanction is mandatory in view of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as per Amendment Act No.16 in 2018) even for the retired public servants and despite the Amendment Act No. 16 of 2018 being prospective in operation, the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut took cognizance vide order dated 28.08.2025 against the applicant without applying the judicial mind in a most casual and cursory manner, which has resulted in failure of justice and is not tenable in the eyes of law.”

Advocate Arvind Kumar Tiwari represented the Applicant while Government Advocate represented the Opposite Party.

Factual Background

The applicant, Dina Nath Jauhar, assumed the charge as the Vice-Chancellor of Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar University, Agra in 2011 and subsequently tendered his resignation in 2013. In the year 2014, the Vigilance Department, Uttar Pradesh initiated an open inquiry against the Deputy Registrar and others. After the inquiry, the draft final report was forwarded to the State Government, wherein the Government of U.P. recommended registering an FIR and investigating the matter. The FIR was lodged under Sections 409, 406, 420, 120B IPC and 13(1)(d), 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the applicant and several others pertaining to the allegations of various financial irregularities.

After the completion of the investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted the charge-sheet against the rest of the co-accused while the investigation against the applicant remained pending. Further, a supplementary charge-sheet was submitted against the applicant under Sections 166, 120B of IPC and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended vide Act No. 16 of 2018). The Additional District and Sessions Judge/Special Judge (Anti-Corruption), Meerut took cognisance and summoned the applicant to face trial under Section 166, 120-B and Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Arguments

It was the case of the applicant that he, being a retired public servant, the previous sanction in terms of Section 19 was mandatory as the cognisance was taken subsequent to the Amendment Act No. 16 of 2018, which came into effect on July 26, 2018. The applicant submitted that the criminal proceedings launched against him stood vitiated as no previous sanction in view of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was obtained.

Reasoning

Referring to Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as engrafted after amendment vide Act No. 16 of 2018, the Bench explained that after coming into operation of the Amendment Act No. 16 of 2018, the sanction for prosecution is mandatory even in the case of retired public servant

On a perusal of the facts, the Bench noted that though the applicant resigned/retired from his services in the year 2013, but the FIR was registered on September 4, 2018 i.e., subsequent to the Amendment Act No. 16 of 2018, which came into effect on July 26, 2018 and the cognizance was taken on May 28, 2025 i.e., subsequent to the said amendment of 2018.

Considering that the said amendment was prospective in operation, the Bench affirmed, “...it is trite that unless otherwise provided either expressly or by necessarily implication if Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act does not contain any express provision to show that they are retrospective in nature nor it is discernible by application, it shall be prospective in operation and shall be applicable from the date of commencement i.e., (w.e.f., 26.07.2018) as the legislature did not say anything otherwise and the Courts shall assume that the statute is meant to be prospective. Thus, it was mandatory for the prosecution to obtain prior prosecution sanction even in case of a retired public servant before taking cognizance.”

The Bench noted that though the prosecution sanction was sought by the prosecution vide its application dated May 8, 2024 but the same was denied on the ground that the prosecution sanction was not required as the applicant/accused had already retired. “The said order denying the sanction was passed without oblivious of the fact that it was mandatory to seek prosecution sanction even in the case of retired public servant before taking cognisance after the Amendment Act No. 16 of 2018, which came into effect on 26.07.2018 and has resulted in failure of justice”, it added.

Thus, allowing the application, the Bench set aside the impugned cognisance order and remitted the matter back with the direction that the prosecution/competent authority may take necessary steps to obtain fresh sanction as mandated under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (As amended vide Act No. 16 of 2018) within 6 weeks.

Cause Title: Dina Nath Jauhar v. State of U.P. and Another (Neutral Citation: 2026:AHC:202086)

Appearance

Applicant: Advocates Arvind Kumar Tiwari, Vineet Kumar Singh

Opposite Party: Government Advocate

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The Bench rejected the constitutional challenge to Section 93(1)(b) of the Act but left service, proof of contravention, the penalty and the conditions of clause (b) to be examined in a statutory appeal under Section 107. It also directed the Department to account for ₹15,40,000 retained from the deceased's premises.

A Division Bench of Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Vimal Kumar Yadav observed, “…this Court holds that Section 93 does permit proceedings to be commenced after death, provided the conditions prescribed by the provision are satisfied. Whether those conditions were satisfied when the Department proceeded against the Petitioner is a separate matter and does not depend on the existence of the statutory power under Section 93 of the Act…Section 93 of the Act is not an independent penal provision against the legal representative”.

Advocate Bharat Bhushan appeared for the petitioner and Monica Benjamin, Senior Standing Counsel appeared for the respondent.

The DGGI searched the Dwarka residence of Ankit Dabas on July 23, 2020 and found ₹15,40,000, which the Department says he submitted voluntarily and which was placed in a fixed deposit. He died on May 06, 2021, and the Department was informed in October 2021. On July 31, 2024, a show cause notice proposed a penalty under Section 122(3)(a) against his widow, Jaiwanti, as legal representative, invoking Section 93.

The Order-in-Original of February 01, 2025 was passed ex parte. Its clause AD imposed a penalty of ₹1,50,000, while clause AE stated that no penalty was being imposed. The petitioner says she never received the notice, and hence filed the writ petition.

The Court held that Section 93 contains no qualification requiring proceedings to have commenced during the lifetime, and that its closing words distinguish liability determined before death but unpaid from liability determined afterwards. Investigation during the lifetime was not the source of the power, which flows from the statute.

Section 93 is not an independent penal provision against the legal representative, and under clause (b) liability is confined to the estate. The Court distinguished the Madras High Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Late Dr. K.C.G. Verghese (2019) 416 ITR 155 (Mad) as resting on a different statutory scheme. On Article 14 of the Constitution of India, it held that Section 126(3) guarantees an effective hearing, that inability to give a personal account "cannot be treated as an admission", and that the provision has a rational basis.

“The loss of the person possessing first-hand knowledge may seriously affect the explanation available to the representative and the weight that can fairly be attached to the evidence. Section 126(3) of the CGST Act in fact requires an effective opportunity of hearing. The representative must receive the relied-upon material and be permitted to contest the alleged contravention, the statutory basis and the proposed amount. Inability to give a personal account of the deceased’s affairs cannot be treated as an admission. The statute also preserves an Appeal against an adverse determination”, the Bench noted.

The Court granted the petitioner four weeks to file an appeal, which shall not be rejected as time-barred, and left all merits open. The Department must furnish a complete account of the ₹15,40,000 within three weeks, identifying the statutory basis for any retention.

Cause title: Jaiwanti v. Union of India & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:8282-DB)

Appearances:

Petitioner: Bharat Bhushan, Nidhi Gupta and Anuay Mishra, Advocates.

Respondent: Raj Kumar Yadav and Preeti Gothwal, Senior Standing Counsel Monica Benjamin, Laiba Arif and Prerika Narang, Panel Counsel Vaishali Gupta with Advocate Rashi Aggarwal, Advocates.

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The appellant approached the High Court by filing a Criminal Appeal under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the judgment of conviction.

The Single Bench of Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas held, “Although a Judge may legally ask leading questions to the witness under Section 165, such power must be exercised only for clarification and to obtain proper proof of relevant facts. The Judge cannot suggest answers, introduce material facts not already spoken to by the witness, or supply essential ingredients of the offence-such as assault made by the accused if the witness herself has not deposed to them. Nor can the Judge neutralize contradictions brought out in cross-examination or repair weaknesses in the prosecution case.”

“The trial Court power conferred under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 cannot put leading question as to the directly commission of alleged offence by the accused person which may prompt witness to say affirmatively”, it added.

Advocate Somnath Verma represented the Appellant while Panel Lawyer Sonia Kuldeep represented the Respondent.

Factual Background

The case dates back to the year 2011 when Sarpanch lodged an intimation before the Police Station alleging that a quarrel took place between deceased Umrao Singh and Shivnadh and his son Prataap Singh, and during the course of the altercation, they assaulted the deceased with bamboo sticks on his neck and chest, as a result of which Umraj Gond died. An FIR was registered for commission of an offence punishable under Sections 302 and 34 of the IPC against the appellant Prataap Singh and co-accused ie., the father of the accused, namely Shivnadh.

The prosecution, after completing the due and necessary investigation, submitted the charge-sheet before the concerned Jurisdictional Magistrate First Class who committed the case for trial. The Trial Court sentenced the appellant under Section 304 Part 1 of IPC, but acquitted the other co-accused, Shivnadh, of the charges under Sections 304 and 34. Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence, the appellant preferred the Criminal Appeal.

Reasoning

Referring to the testimony of the prosecution’s star witness, the Bench noted that this witness had not stated that the appellant had assaulted the deceased. The Bench noted that the Trial Court, with an object to get the answer to find out relevant facts had put questions which were beyond the power conferred under Section 165 of the Evidence Act.

The Bench stated that Section 165 of the Evidence Act confers vast and unrestricted powers on the trial Court to put any question he pleases in any form at any time, to any witness, or to the parties, about any fact, relevant or irrelevant in order to discover relevant facts.

The Bench noted that the Star witness, PW1, who was the wife of the deceased, in examination-in-chief had not stated anything about the involvement of the appellant with the crime in question and even in the cross-examination she admitted that the assault was started when she was in her house and after hearing the sound, she came out from the house. She voluntarily stated that, seeing the assault, she requested both the accused to leave her husband, but nowhere stated the name of the appellant. Considering such circumstances, the Bench held that the Trial Court, in the garb of Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, could not ask the questions which might have compelled any witness to answer.

“Thus, the manner in which the question has been put by the learned trial Court it will amount to intimidating the witness or to confuse or coerce the witness. Thus, this question and the answer are not sufficient to convict the appellant for the offence for which he has been charged”, it added.

Affirming the view that the power under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act is meant to advance the cause of justice and discovery of truth, not to tilt the balance in favour of either party, the Bench found that the Trial Court had put a leading question as to the direct commission of the alleged offences by the accused person, which had prompted the witness to say affirmatively; however when the same question was put forth, the witness had answered that the accused had assaulted the deceased, which was against the jurisprudence of the role of the judge during trial of cases.

Taking note of the fact that the witness had not supported the case of the prosecution, the Bench held that the question put forth by the Trial Court under Section 165 of the Evidence Act was not sustainable. The Bench thus allowed the appeal and acquitted the appellant.

Cause Title: Pratap Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh (Neutral Citation: 2026:CGHC:41565)

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The petition filed on June 02, 2022 was by a retired bank employee with HR+/HER2- metastatic breast cancer. She sought action under Section 92 or 100 to make Ribociclib affordable, along with a free-treatment scheme. However, unfortunately, she passed away during the pendency of the petition.

The Court did not direct the Centre to invoke Section 100 of the Act for Ribociclib, however, it held that the provision is to be invoked where a patented medicine is sold at an exorbitant price, but that whether to do so is a policy decision for the Central Government, to be taken after collating data on affordability.

Advocate Maitreyi Sachidananda Hegde appeared as amicus curiae while P. Sreekumar, ASGI, O. M. Shalina, DSGI, Senior Advocates G. Shrikumar, Joseph Kodianthara, T. A. Shaji appeared for the respondents.

On September 16 2022, the Court continued the matter suo motu as "In Re Exorbitant Pricing of Life Saving Patented Medicines" and appointed Advocate Maitreyi Sachidananda Hegde as Amicus Curiae. Eli Lilly and Novartis, the patentees of Abemaciclib and Ribociclib, were impleaded. Cancer institutes and the Drug Controller General were added in July 2026. Only Section 100 was pressed at the hearing.

The Court first held, on expert affidavits, that Palbociclib, a cheaper off-patent drug, is not interchangeable with Ribociclib. Rejecting the argument that Section 100 is limited to the Government's own use, it relied on sub-sections (4) and (6), which permit authorisation of any person and non-commercial sale, and on the express mention of "medicine or drug". It distinguished the Bombay High Court's ruling in Garware Wall Ropes and drew on Articles 21 and 47, Section 83 and the Supreme Court's decision on essential supplies during the pandemic.

The Court said patentees are protected and that even the Government is bound by a patent under Section 156. The record lacked data on affordability, so the decision to invoke Section 100 rested with the Centre.

Earlier, the Court had passed an interim order directing the DPIIT to consider compulsory licensing of Ribociclib

The Court disposed of the petition with three findings: Section 100 includes manufacture and non-commercial sale to needy patients; it is to be invoked where a patented medicine is sold at an exorbitant price; and the Government must collate data on affordability and proceed under Section 100 if found necessary.

Cause title: In Re Exorbitant Pricing of Life Saving Patented Medicines v. Union of India & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:KER:74251)

Appearances:

Petitioner: Advocate Maitreyi Sachidananda Hegde, Amicus Curiae.

Respondent: ASGI P. Sreekumar, DSGI O. M. Shalina, Senior Panel Counsel T. C. Krishna, Senior Advocate G. Shrikumar with Advocates Arun Kumar P. and Praveen Anand, Senior Advocate Joseph Kodianthara with Advocates John Vithayathil and Hemanth Singh, Senior Advocate T. A. Shaji with Advocate Athul Shaji, Advocate K. M. Gopakumar, Rahul Bajaj appeared in person.

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Justice Sanjeev Narula issued notice to the jail authorities and directed them to file a status report in the matter. The Court fixed November 2 for next hearing.

Imam has sought access to research material on a pen drive using a standalone computer inside the prison premises, without any internet connectivity and under the supervision of Tihar jail staff.

Imam's counsel said he has been in custody since January 2020 and was in the final year of his PhD at the time of his arrest. His synopsis has been approved by the University Grants Commission (UGC) and Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), he added.

The special public prosecutor for Delhi Police said the state has not opposed the plea even before the trial court and only the jail authorities have objected to the pen drive and not to books before the trial court.

The prosecutor said the prayer could be allowed under the supervision of jail authorities if the accused is ready to show the material he was seeking to access.

Imam was arrested on August 25, 2020, and booked under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) for being one of the "masterminds" of the February 2020 riots in northeast Delhi that left 53 people dead and more than 700 injured.

The case under the anti-terror UAPA law concerns the alleged "larger conspiracy" behind the 2020 riots.

The violence erupted during protests against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, and the National Register of Citizens.

The Bench of the Supreme Court, while delivering a split verdict in the matter concerning the reference in the challenge to the Chief Election Commissioner Act, 2023, has requested the Chief Justice of India to consider constituting a permanent 5-Judge Bench to decide pure constitutional issues.

Despite their difference of opinion, both judges issued a concurring procedural order directing the case papers to be placed before the Chief Justice of India to consider constituting a Constitution Bench directly, avoiding the procedural delay of a three-judge bench, while also highlighting the urgent institutional need to address long-pending references.

Justice Dipankar Datta has also opined that it has become "fashionable nowadays" to blame the Collegium for every infelicitous choice.

Cause Title- Dr Jaya Thakur v. Union Of India and other connected matters (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1040)

Date of Judgment- September 23, 2026

Coram- Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma

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2) "Judges appointing judges" is a myth; sanctity of collegium resolution is lost each time executive implements it selectively: Justice Dipankar Datta Says in Election Commissioner appointment case

While delivering his opinion on the matter of reference in the challenge to the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, Justice Dipankar Datta has opined that it has become "fashionable nowadays" to blame the Collegium for every infelicitous choice.

Justice Datta highlighted that the Collegium's role is merely recommendatory and that the executive holds final decisive control—frequently overriding recommendations, delaying reiterated names, and forcing the judiciary into a Hobson's choice to keep the institution running.

Despite delivering the split verdict, both judges issued a concurring procedural order directing the case papers to be placed before the Chief Justice of India to consider constituting a Constitution Bench directly, avoiding the procedural delay of a three-judge bench, while also highlighting the urgent institutional need to address long-pending references.

Cause Title- Dr Jaya Thakur Vs Union Of India and other connected matters [Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1040]

Date of Judgment- September 23, 2026

Coram- Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma

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3) Supreme Court quashes POCSO case against father in custody battle; frames safeguards to curb misuse of child abuse laws in matrimonial dispute

The Court quashed an FIR alleging sexual assault by a father on his minor daughter, after a CBI investigation directed by the Court itself found the child's allegations unreliable, uncorroborated, and inconsistent with CCTV evidence and psychiatric evaluation. The Court held that continuing the prosecution on such material would amount to a gross abuse of process, and restored legal custody of the child to the father, who had been granted custody through prior proceedings culminating before this Court in 2023.

Opening the judgment, the Bench observed that when parental acrimony escalates to the level of falsely attributing sexual assault to one parent, the harm inflicted extends beyond the child's trauma to a lasting injury on the parent-child bond itself, compounded by the humiliation the accused parent suffers even after exoneration. Recording this as part of a "growing menace", the Court proceeded to lay down structured safeguards to prevent such misuse of the POCSO Act in the specific context of ongoing matrimonial disputes.

Cause Title- R v. E & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1049)

Date of Judgment- September 24, 2026

Coram- Justices J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K.V. Viswanathan

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4) Allegation of forcible sex hard to accept when prosecutrix voluntarily travelled & stayed with accused: Supreme Court acquits rape accused

The Court acquitted a man sentenced to ten years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 376 of the IPC, noting that forcible intercourse without consent was hard to accept given that the prosecutrix had voluntarily absented herself from home for five to six days, traveling all around with the accused and staying with him.

Setting aside the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Punjab and Haryana High Court, the Bench observed that a court cannot selectively rely on a prosecutrix's testimony to convict on one charge after finding the same evidence untrustworthy to acquit on a related charge. Pointing to major internal contradictions, including conflicting details of their journey and her failure to raise an alarm or attempt escape on crowded streets over several days, the Court held that her claims of forcible confinement and non-consensual intercourse were uncredible, emphasizing that moral impropriety cannot substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Cause Title- Paramjit Singh Bedi v. State of Punjab (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1054)

Date of Judgment- September 25, 2026

Coram- Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar

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5) A father facing POCSO case cannot be considered entitled to child custody

The Court held that a parent facing prosecution under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act cannot be considered entitled to custody of a child, irrespective of the eventual outcome of the criminal proceedings, so long as the prosecution remains pending. The Court clarified that the safety and disclosure of a child cannot be subordinated to a parent's claim to custody merely because the underlying criminal case has not attained finality. The parties married in 2011, and their son and daughter were born in 2013 and 2019 respectively, where in 2023, the son made a disclosure of sexual abuse by the father during counselling at NIMHANS, leading to registration of an FIR under the POCSO Act and, subsequently, a chargesheet. The Family Court nonetheless granted sole custody to the father in 2024, a decision affirmed by the Delhi High Court in January 2026, prompting the present appeals.

Ruling on cross-appeals arising out of a prolonged custody dispute, the Court also permitted the mother to relocate the two minor children to the United Kingdom, where she is employed as a university lecturer, holding that continued denial of relocation would aggravate the complete parental alienation of children already caught in litigation spanning over seven years.

Cause Title- D v. S (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1043)

Date of Judgment- September 23, 2026

Coram- Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta

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6) Mother's attempt to cement her position in academic world & pursuing jobs cannot be branded as "nomadic lifestyle": Supreme Court in child custody case

The Court held that a mother's continuous pursuit in employment, undertaken to secure a stable and better future for her children, cannot be characterised as a "nomadic lifestyle" disentitling her to custody. The Court found such a description "absolutely unjustified and far removed from reality", holding that the lower courts had failed to appreciate the compulsions behind the mother's career moves.

The Court further permitted the mother to relocate both children to the United Kingdom, where she is employed as a university lecturer, holding that continuing to deny relocation would only deepen the parental alienation already afflicting the children during their formative years.

The mother, an academician holding a doctorate in engineering, left the matrimonial home in 2018 while pregnant with her second child, after which she held custody of both children while moving between academic postings at IIT Jodhpur, VIT Vijayawada, and Bengaluru, before securing a lectureship at the University of Hull, UK.

Cause Title- D v. S (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1043)

Date of Judgment- September 23, 2026

Coram- Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta

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7) Possibility of his reformation: Supreme Court commutes death sentence of man who raped & throttled his 6 year-old step-daughter to death

The Court commuted the death sentence of a man convicted of sexually assaulting his six-year-old step-daughter over several months and finally throttling her to death, holding that the State had failed to lead any evidence to show that he was incapable of reformation, a burden that, rests squarely upon the prosecution before the extreme penalty can be sustained. The Court found that notwithstanding the gravity of the crime, the absence of criminal antecedents, the convict's unblemished conduct in custody, and the State's silence on the question of incorrigibility together foreclosed the death sentence in favour of imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life.

While upholding the conviction, the Court also made pointed observations on the credibility of the child's mother, the sole eyewitness to the crime, who had testified against her own husband. Rejecting the suggestion that her continued presence in the matrimonial home undermined her account, the Bench held that a woman whose movements, contacts and access to a telephone are all regulated by her husband is "a woman whose liberty is in the keeping of another", and that a mother would ordinarily be the last person to falsely implicate an innocent man while shielding the actual killer of her own child.

Cause Title- Waris v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1050)

Date of Judgment- September 24, 2026

Coram- Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Sandeep Mehta and Justice Vijay Bishnoi

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8) Section 413 BNSS- appeal by victim against order of acquittal passed by magistrate has to be filed before Sessions Court

The Court held that as per the proviso to Section 413 of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), an appeal filed by a victim against an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate has to be filed before the Sessions Court.

The Apex Court was considering a Special Leave Petition filed against an order rejecting the appeal filed before the High Court from an order of acquittal passed by a Judicial Magistrate, giving liberty to file an appeal before the Sessions Court.

Cause Title- Subhas Chandra Sarkar v. The State of West Bengal & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1052)

Date of Judgment- September 22, 2026

Coram- Justice J. B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran

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9) Article 311(1) bar applies only when dismissing authority is subordinate to actual appointing authority

The Court reiterated that Article 311(1) of the Constitution is attracted only when an employee is dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate in rank to the authority that actually appointed the employee.

Applying this principle, the Court restored the removal of a Railway Protection Special Force Rakshak after finding that the Adjutant who removed him was not lower in rank than the Assistant Commandant who had appointed him.

The Court was hearing an appeal by the Union of India against an Allahabad High Court judgment affirming the First Appellate Court’s decision invalidating the removal on the ground that it had been ordered by an authority subordinate to the purported appointing authority.

Cause Title- Union of India & Ors. v. Ramdhani Prasad (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1047)

Date of Judgment- September 24, 2026

Coram- Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi

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10) Anti-suit injunction restraining spouse from pursuing foreign matrimonial proceedings ordinarily unwarranted at inchoate stage

The Court held that an anti-suit injunction restraining a spouse from pursuing matrimonial proceedings before a foreign court is ordinarily unwarranted when those proceedings remain at an inchoate stage and have not culminated in a final decision. The Court upheld the Calcutta High Court’s decision vacating an ex parte interim injunction that restrained a wife from pursuing divorce and financial proceedings before a United Kingdom Family Court.

The Court was hearing the husband’s appeal against the Calcutta High Court judgment setting aside an anti-suit injunction granted by an Alipore Civil Court under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Cause Title- MPB v. VJB (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1034)

Date of Judgment- September 22, 2026

Coram- Justice S.V.N. Bhatti and Justice N.V. Anjaria

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11) NCDRC cannot brush aside surveyor reports in fire insurance claims without identifying specific deficiency

The Court held that the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission cannot disregard statutory surveyors’ reports in fire insurance claims without identifying a specific deficiency in their assessment. Setting aside an award of ₹2.40 crore in favour of a paper-board manufacturer, the Court upheld New India Assurance Company Limited’s repudiation of the fire-insurance claim after finding that the insured had made false declarations and breached the policy conditions.

The Court was hearing cross-appeals against an NCDRC order directing the insurance company to pay ₹2.40 crore with interest, ₹3 lakh as compensation for deficiency in service and ₹1 lakh towards litigation costs. While the insurer challenged the award, the insured sought enhancement based on its claim exceeding ₹7.31 crore.

Cause Title- M/s New India Assurance Company Limited v. M/s Hemkund Duplex and Board Private Limited (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1023)

Date of Judgment- September 21, 2026

Coram- Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva

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12) Once Article 22 of Constitution is breached, re-arrest of accused cannot be left to police discretion; requires prior judicial imprimatur

The Court held that once an accused is released on account of a breach of Article 22 of the Constitution of India, the power to re-arrest that person cannot rest with the same police authority responsible for the violation, and must instead carry the imprimatur of a Magistrate before custody can be resumed. The Court held that this judicial check applies not merely to the constitutional guarantee of being informed of the grounds of arrest, but equally to the guarantee of being produced before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours, both of which the Court found had been breached in the case before it.

Referring to Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra (2026) 1 SCC 500, the Bench directed that any application by the investigating agency seeking custody of a person so released must disclose the reasons for re-arrest, explain the earlier non-compliance, and carry the endorsement of an officer superior to the one who committed the violation, so that departmental accountability is triggered alongside any fresh custody request; the Magistrate must then decide such an application expeditiously, preferably within a week, applying principles of natural justice.

Cause Title- Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol v. State of Punjab (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1022)

Date of Judgment- September 21, 2026

Coram- Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar

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13) Revenue considerations can't cure ineligibility of bidders

The Court held that revenue considerations cannot cure ineligibility of a bidder, and the High Court would be justified in exercising the power of judicial review when the tendering Committee’s interpretation is patently arbitrary and dehors the terms of the DNIT Detailed Notice Inviting Tender (DNIT).

The appeal before the Apex Court was filed against the order passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court by which the High Court quashed the acceptance of the technical as well as the financial bid of Micky Traders ( H1 Bidder) and directed the Punjab State Agricultural Marketing Board ( Board) and the Market Committee, Ludhiana to issue a Letter of Acceptance (LoA) in favour of the eligible tenderer.

Cause Title- Micky Traders v. L.R.Y. Labour Contractor & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1025)

Date of Judgment- September 21, 2026

Coram- Justice K.V. Viswanathan and Justice Alok Aradhe

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14) Investigation is police’s exclusive domain; courts cannot decide when it must stop except in exceptional cases

The Court held that investigating a crime falls within the police's exclusive domain and that courts cannot determine when it must stop, except in exceptional cases or where a statutory bar restricts further investigation. Setting aside a Bombay High Court judgment granting default bail to accused persons in a UAPA case, the Court upheld the additional time granted to the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad to complete its investigation.

The Court was hearing an appeal by the State of Maharashtra and the Anti-Terrorism Squad against the Bombay High Court’s decision invalidating a second extension of time for filing the charge sheet and granting default bail to the accused under Section 43D of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, read with Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Cause Title- State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Momin Moiuddin Gulam Hasan @ Moin Mistri & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1021)

Date of Judgment- September 21, 2026

Coram- Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar

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15) Hindu Succession Act| widow becomes absolute owner of property devolved in her favor upon husband’s demise; partition not sine qua non

The Court held that by operation of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the widow becomes an absolute owner of the property devolved in her favour upon the demise of her husband and the partition is not a sine qua non for continuing to enjoy the right as an independent or absolute owner of the property left behind by the prepositus.

The Apex Court was considering an appeal filed by the legal representatives of the Plaintiff, assailing the decision of the Karnataka High Court.

Cause Title- Ganapati (Dead) by His Lrs v. Prabhakar & Others (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1033)

Date of Judgment- September 22, 2026

Coram- Justice S.V.N. Bhatti and Justice N.V. Anjaria

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16) Mere conduct of arbitral proceedings can't per se determine juridical seat of arbitration

While explaining the distinction between “seat” and “venue” of arbitration, the Court held that the mere conduct of arbitral proceedings can not, per se determine the juridical seat of arbitration.

The Apex Court was considering an appeal challenging the judgment passed by the High Court whereby it was held that the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 filed by the Appellants was not maintainable.

Cause Title- Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. & Ors. v. M/S GSCO Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1038)

Date of Judgment- September 23, 2026

Coram- Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva

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17) Mere recovery of tainted money without proof of bribe demand cannot sustain conviction under PC Act

The Court reiterated that mere acceptance or recovery of alleged illegal gratification cannot sustain a conviction under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, without proof of the underlying demand.

Finding that the prosecution failed to prove either demand or acceptance, the Court set aside the conviction of a deceased former Patwari whose legal representatives had continued his appeal.

The Court was hearing an appeal against a Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment affirming the former Patwari’s conviction under Section 7 read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Trial Court had sentenced him to two years’ rigorous imprisonment and imposed a fine of ₹10,000.

Cause Title- Jaswinder Singh (Dead Through Legal Representatives) v. State of Punjab (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1031)

Date of Judgment- September 22, 2026

Coram- Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Arun Palli

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18) Absence of recovery of bonafide passenger’s ticket can't result in defeating railway accident compensation claim

While directing the Railways to satisfy an award within thirty days, the Court held that the victim was a bona fide passenger and the absence of recovery of his ticket cannot result in defeating the claim for compensation.

The appeal before the Apex Court was filed by the parents of one Maheshbhai, who, while travelling to Surat via Ahmedabad, was a victim of an untoward incident.

Cause Title- Sukhabhai Nanjibhai Makwana & Anr. v. Union of India (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1056)

Date of Judgment- September 25, 2026

Coram- Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar

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19) Arbitral Tribunal can’t exceed jurisdiction U/S.31(7)(A) A&C Act by awarding interest when contractual clause bars such interest for pre-reference period

The Court held that when a clause of the General Conditions of Contract (GCC) bars the grant of interest for the pre-reference period, the Arbitral Tribunal cannot award such interest by exceeding the bounds of its jurisdiction under Section 31(7)(a) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The Appeal before the Apex Court was filed against the order whereby the appeal preferred by the respondent under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was allowed and the grant of pre-reference interest by the Arbitral Tribunal, earlier disallowed by the Commercial Court, was restored.

Cause Title- North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Limited v. Astra Construction Private Limited (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1036)

Date of Judgment- September 22, 2026

Coram- Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe

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20) Absence of original document not fatal for prosecution in forgery case; can be proved by circumstantial evidence

The Court held that the non-production of an original document alleged to have been forged cannot, by itself, be the basis for discharging an accused of a forgery charge, since the offence may still be established through other evidence on record, provided that evidence excludes every reasonable possibility of doubt. The Court held that whether the prosecution has in fact discharged this burden is a matter for trial and cannot be pre-judged at the stage of framing of charge by treating the mere absence of the original document as fatal to the entire case.

Furthermore, it noted that once a Division Bench of a High Court has, in an earlier writ petition, specifically considered and rejected a challenge to an order framing charge on a particular ground, it is not open to the same accused to file a second writ petition before the same court re-agitating the identical ground; such a course is barred by the doctrine of issue estoppel, which precludes reopening an issue of fact or law already decided between the same parties in the same proceedings.

Cause Title- Antonetto J D'Souza v. Aldila Braganza and Others (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1032)

Date of Judgment- September 22, 2026

Coram- Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar

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21) Sessions Court cannot sentence murder convict to "remain in prison till rest of their life”

The Court held that a Sessions Court cannot direct a murder convict to remain imprisoned for the rest of their natural life where the direction excludes the statutory powers of remission and commutation.

While affirming the conviction of two men for the murder of three persons, including two children, the Court substituted their special-category life sentences with rigorous imprisonment for 25 years without statutory remission.

The Court was hearing an appeal against a Punjab and Haryana High Court judgment affirming the appellants’ conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and the Trial Court’s direction that they remain imprisoned for the rest of their lives.

Cause Title- Naval Kishore & Anr. v. State of Punjab (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1048)

Date of Judgment- September 24, 2026

Coram- Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi

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22) Can state notifications under commercial courts act dilute restriction to institute suit before any court inferior to district court? Supreme Court refers matter to larger bench

The Court referred to the larger Bench the issue of whether the restriction contained under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 to institute a suit for infringement before any Court inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit would be rendered otiose by the notification issued under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, by certain States notifying the Civil Judge (Senior Division) as a Commercial Court.

The matter before the Apex Court pertained to a Commercial Suit.

Cause Title- I.S.D.S. Private Limited & Anr. v. M/s Khemka Food Products Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (Case No.:SLP (C) No.6793 of 2026)

Date of Judgment- September 21, 2026

Coram- Justice J. B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran

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23) Framing all issues does not exhaust court's discretion to try a preliminary issue first: Supreme Court clarifies Order XIV Rule 2(2) CPC

The Court held that the mere framing of all issues in a suit does not, by itself, foreclose a court's power under Order XIV Rule 2(2) of the CPC to direct that a qualifying issue of law, one touching jurisdiction or a statutory bar, be tried in advance of the rest.

What forecloses that power, the Court clarified, is the commencement of a common trial on all the issues; once evidence has begun to be led generally, the issue in question ceases to be one "awaiting" prior treatment and becomes part of a composite trial already in motion.

The Court further explained that the power conferred by the provision is to "try" an issue first, not merely to decide or pronounce upon it first, and that this ordering can only operate prospectively. A court cannot, midway through a trial in which evidence has already been led on all issues, reach back and notionally carve out one issue as though it were still awaiting separate, prior adjudication.

Cause Title- John Mathew v. Santha Paul & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1020)

Date of Judgment- September 21, 2026

Coram- Justice K.V. Viswanathan and Justice Arun Palli

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24) Shocks the very conscience of the court: Supreme Court orders de novo probe into 2012 Dharmasthala minor's rape & murder case

The Court set aside a Karnataka High Court order refusing re-investigation into the 2012 rape and murder of a 17-year-old girl in Dharmasthala, holding that the manner in which three successive investigating agencies conducted the probe "shocks the very conscience of the court" and could not be allowed to stand despite the acquittal of the sole person prosecuted.

Directing that a de novo investigation be carried out by a freshly constituted Special Investigation Team, the Court clarified that the power of constitutional courts to order reinvestigation survives the commencement, and even the conclusion, of a trial, but drew a firm line: the accused already tried and acquitted, Santhosh Rao, cannot be subjected to further investigation or prosecution in the same FIR, since he enjoys protection under Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and Section 300 of the CrPC against being tried twice for the same offence.

The criminal appeal was filed by the mother of the deceased victim after the death of the original writ petitioner, her husband, during the pendency of proceedings.

Cause Title- Kusumavati Gowda v. The Government of Karnataka & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1030)

Date of Judgment- September 21, 2026

Coram- Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva

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25) Bareboat charter can end on valid termination notice without physical repossession of vessel: Supreme Court vacates arrest of vessel

The Court held that physical repossession of a vessel is not a precondition for terminating a bareboat charter where the contractual terms make a valid termination notice sufficient to end the demise charter. The Court consequently vacated the arrest of a vessel, M.V. Nereus Progress, after finding that the former charterer held it only as a gratuitous bailee when the arrest was effected.

The Court was hearing an appeal by the registered owner against a Madras High Court judgment affirming the vessel’s arrest under Sections 5(1)(b) and 5(2) of the Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017 at the instance of a creditor of the former demise charterer.

Cause Title- Owners and Parties Interested in M.V. Nereus Progress v. Om Freight Forwarders Ltd. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1055)

Date of Judgment- September 22, 2026

Coram- Chief Justice Surya Kant, Justice Joymalya Bagchi and Justice V. Mohana

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A bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu issued notice on Lawyer Puneet Batra's plea and stayed the High Court's order.

On September 25, the Apex Court asked the Goods and Services Tax (GST) authorities not to proceed with analysis of data seized from Advocate Puneet Batra's office till September 28. It had asked Additional Solicitor General S V Raju, appearing for the authorities, not to take action till the court hears the lawyer's plea.

Batra challenged the Delhi High Court's September 18 judgment, which held that law enforcement agencies can search a lawyer's office if there is prima facie evidence that the legal professional has committed an offence.

Last week, the Apex Court took note of submissions from Senior Advocates Vikas Singh and N Hariharan and agreed to list for urgent hearing a plea challenging the Delhi High Court judgment that upheld a GST search of Batra's office and the seizure of his computer.

Singh raised concerns over authorities' access to data containing privileged information about Batra's clients from the seized computer. "Computers have been seized. The materials will be accessed. Breach of privilege will happen," Singh had said.

Front-of-package labelling (FoPL) is a nutritional information graphic on food packaging that can assist consumers in making an informed decision about food purchases and healthier dietary choices.

A bench of Justice J B Pardiwala and Justice K Vinod Chandran said why does FSSAI want to waste so much time when the matter relates to the health issue of the citizens.

"We appreciate whatever you have done so far and we appreciate your initiative but there is a lot which is required to be done to give meaningful effect to what we want to achieve and where we want to reach. We are undertaking this entire exercise for the good of the nation and for the good of the citizens. We expect the authority to accept our order in its true spirit.

"Why voluntary compliance for a year? Why do you need so much time? Why do you want to start afresh with the exercise of hearing and calling for objections? You started in 2022 what did you do in the last four years," the bench remarked while reserving its order in the matter.

The counsel for FSSAI told the court that what was initiated in 2022 was Indian Nutrition Rating (INR) star-rating system in 2022 and the yardstick was completely different then.

The FSSAI has now proposed adopting a red hexagonal warning label for packaged food products high in nutrients of concern such as sugar, fat and salt and it would use a red hexagon against a white square-shaped background on the front of food packages.

The food regulator told the Apex Court that it would require approximately four months to issue and finalise the draft regulations.

It told the Apex Court that the draft amendment regulations would be published for 60 days to invite comments from stakeholders through domestic consultation and the WTO platform.

Further, FSSAI has proposed a 365-day voluntary implementation period for food business operators after notification of the regulations.

The Apex Court had earlier asked the FSSAI, which has proposed phased implementation of front-of-package labelling (FoPL) on packaged foods, to come up with more clarifications on the planned labels of "nutrients of concern", fat, sugar and salt.

The Apex Court was hearing a plea of the public charitable trust '3S and Our Health Society' which sought directions to the Centre, states and Union territories to implement mandatory FoPL on packaged foods.

The FSSAI had earlier told the Apex Court that it proposed to provide a prominent front-of-pack warning label in red for food products high in added saturated fat, added sugar and salt.

In a compliance affidavit filed last month, the FSSAI said the two-phased proposal is intended to provide a simple, prominent and easily comprehensible warning to consumers regarding food products which are high in specified nutrients of concern.

The FSSAI's affidavit stated that the FoPL is intended to be implemented in phases to facilitate both "consumer acceptability" and "provide the industry adequate time for reformulation".