The High Court consequently dismissed the Bureau of Indian Standards’ appeal and affirmed the accused’s acquittal.

The Court was hearing a criminal appeal filed by the Bureau of Indian Standards against a Judicial First Class Magistrate Court order acquitting a manufacturing firm and its partners of offences under Sections 11(1) and 12(b), read with Section 33, of the BIS Act.

A Bench of Justice A. Badharudeen observed: “On scanning the statutory words in Sections 11 and 12, read with Section 33 of the BIS Act, the ‘use’ of a spurious ISI mark is punishable under the said provisions and mere possession of an object capable of affixing such a mark, without any evidence to establish its use in the manufacture of goods, does not attract the penal provisions of Sections 11 and 12, read with Section 33 of the BIS Act.”

Advocate Manoj Ramaswamy appeared for the Bureau. Advocate K. Mohanakannan appeared for the accused, while Public Prosecutor M.A. Shihab appeared for the State.

Background

BIS officials inspected the factory of M/s Mars Veneers and Boards and allegedly found a roller bearing a spurious ISI mark, although the firm did not hold a valid BIS licence. The officials also allegedly found a spurious ISI mark on a factory wall.

BIS filed a complaint against the partnership firm and its partners under Sections 11(1) and 12(b), read with Section 33, of the BIS Act. During trial, the prosecution examined three witnesses and produced six documents and the seized roller.

The Magistrate found that the prosecution had not proved that the accused used a spurious trademark or ISI mark on any article. No finished product bearing the alleged mark was produced, and the seizure of the roller was not properly proved beyond reasonable doubt to establish that it was operational and capable of applying the mark. The accused were consequently acquitted.

Challenging the acquittal, BIS contended that mere possession of a spurious ISI mark was sufficient to constitute the alleged offences. The accused argued that the provisions penalised the use of the mark and not its mere possession.

Court’s Observations

BIS Act Penalises Use, Not Mere Possession

The Court examined Sections 11, 12 and 33 of the BIS Act. It noted that Section 11 prohibited the use of the Standard Mark or its colourable imitation in relation to an article, process, patent, trademark or design without a licence. Section 12 similarly prohibited the unauthorised use of specified names, expressions and marks.

The Court reproduced the relevant statutory prohibition under Section 11: “No person shall use, in relation to any article or process, or in the title of any patent,or in any trade mark or design the Standard Mark or any colourable imitation thereof, except under a licence.”

The Court observed that the legislature had consciously employed the word “use” in both Sections 11 and 12. It held that the statutory language did not treat the mere possession of a spurious mark as sufficient to impose criminal liability.

The Court stated: “In both sections 11 and 12, the legislature vigilantly incorporated the word ‘used’ and the legislature in its wisdom never intended the word ‘possess’ to fasten criminal culpability on mere possession of a spurious ISI mark.”

No Manufactured Goods Bearing Spurious Mark Were Produced

The Court noted that the prosecution did not detect, seize or produce any manufactured goods bearing a spurious or fake ISI mark. Its case was confined to the roller allegedly capable of applying the mark and the mark found on the factory wall.

The Bench stated: “In this connection it is relevant to note that as found by the learned Magistrate, no manufactured goods, bearing a spurious or fake ISI mark, were either detected, seized or produced before the court. Instead a roller, alleged to be used for the purpose of mixing, bearing a fake ISI mark was taken into custody as MO1. Apart from that the prosecution case is that a fake ISI mark also was affixed on the wall.”

The Court held that the prosecution was required to establish that the spurious mark had been used in the manufacture of goods. Possession of an object capable of applying such a mark, without proof of its actual use, did not satisfy the penal provisions.

The Court therefore agreed with the Magistrate’s finding that the prosecution had failed to prove the use of any Standard Mark, trademark or ISI mark by the accused.

The Court stated: “In such view of the matter, the learned Magistrate is right in finding that the prosecution failed to prove the use of any standard trade mark or ISI mark in the instant case, to impose penal consequences on the accused persons. In fact, the said finding is only to be justified.”

Conclusion

The Court held that BIS’s challenge to the acquittal was unsustainable. It dismissed the criminal appeal and confirmed the Magistrate’s judgment acquitting the manufacturing firm and its partners.

Cause Title: Bureau of Indian Standards v. M/s Mars Veneers and Boards and Others (Neutral Citation: 2026:KER:79827)

Appearances

Appellant: Advocate Manoj Ramaswamy

Respondents: Advocates K. Mohanakannan and A.R. Pravitha; Public Prosecutor M.A. Shihab

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The High Court was considering a petition filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a direction to quash the Impugned Communication issued by the Respondent, NCAHP. The petitioner also sought an order directing the Gujarat State Allied and Healthcare Council (second Respondent) to grant permission to the Petitioner for establishing a new physiotherapy college in the name of Parul Institute of Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Sciences.

The Single Bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh held, “There is no dispute that the respondent No. 1 is empowered to frame norms and standards for the governance of Allied and Healthcare Education institutes. However, no policy on which the respondent No.1 seeks to place reliance has yet been framed in the present case. The apprehension that a policy yet to be framed may, at some future point, restricts the running of two colleges for the same course within one campus is purely speculative and far-fetched.”

Senior Advocate Gautam Narayan represented the Petitioner while Additional Solicitor General Chetan Sharma represented the Respondent.

Factual Background

The petitioner is a non-affiliating private university established under the Gujarat Private Universities Act, 2009. The petitioner operates two constituent physiotherapy colleges, namely Parul Institute of Physiotherapy, established in 2009, and Parul Institute of Physiotherapy and Research, established in 2022. The petitioner applied for the establishment of a new physiotherapy college, namely Parul Institute of Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Sciences, for the BPT course with an intake of 100 seats for the academic session 2026-27. Accordingly, the petitioner submitted an application. The said application of the petitioner was rejected by the impugned communication, whereby it was stated that more than one college should not be established for the same course within the same campus.

Reasoning

The Bench noted that the impugned communication showed that there were no regulations prohibiting the running of another college for the same course within the same premises of an existing college. It was further noticed that the respondents were considering that a regulation/policy about the same would be incorporated in the future.

The Bench also made it clear that in the absence of any such regulations existing at present, executive/administrative orders cannot be issued to circumvent and violate the rights of the petitioner available under Article 19(i)(g) of the Constitution.

The Bench found that an office order dated April 8, 2026 showed that the respondent Commission, in similar circumstances, had permitted commencing new courses in existing Allied and Healthcare Institutions or in new Allied and Healthcare institutions, pending the formalisation of regulations.

The Bench stated that the apprehension that a policy yet to be framed may, at some future point, restrict the running of two colleges for the same course within one campus was purely speculative.

Thus, allowing the petition, the Bench set aside the impugned communication.

Cause Title: Parul University v. National Commission for Allied and Healthcare Professions (Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:9267)

Appearance

Petitioner: Senior Advocate Gautam Narayan, Advocates Malak Bhatt, Somya Saxena, Anshul Rao

Respondent: Additional Solicitor General Chetan Sharma, Central Govt Standing Counsels Ripudaman Bhardwaj, Amit Tiwari, Advocates Ayushi Srivastava, Arpan Narwal, Kushagra Malik, Ujjwal Tyagi

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The Court was hearing TPL-KIPL Joint Venture’s petition challenging the Facilitation Council’s orders terminating unsuccessful conciliation proceedings and referring its payment dispute with KRA Infrastructure Developers Private Limited to DIAC under Section 18(3) of the MSMED Act.

A Bench of Justice Amit Mahajan observed: “… any party to the dispute can seek recourse to the Section 18 of the MSME Act, even if registration has been obtained subsequent to the execution of the Contract as Section 8 grants a discretion to a micro or a small enterprise in filing a memorandum with the authority. Thus, the Respondent No. 2 could have taken a recourse to Section 18 of the Act.”

Advocate Renu Gupta appeared for the petitioner. Advocate Rakesh Gupta appeared for the respondents.

Background

TPL-KIPL engaged KRA Infrastructure as a subcontractor under a November 2017 Letter of Intent and a January 2018 Work Order for construction and operation-related work concerning a sewage system in Karnal.

In November 2021, KRA Infrastructure demanded approximately ₹3.30 crore as outstanding dues. It approached the Facilitation Council under Section 18 of the MSMED Act in May 2022, claiming approximately ₹3.60 crore.

TPL-KIPL questioned the maintainability of the reference. It contended that KRA Infrastructure obtained MSME registration only on November 7, 2020, after the Letter of Intent and Work Order were executed. According to the petitioner, MSME registration operated prospectively and could not confer statutory benefits upon an earlier contract.

After attempts at conciliation in January 2023, May 2023 and July 2024 failed, the Council terminated the proceedings and referred the dispute to DIAC for arbitration. TPL-KIPL argued before the High Court that the Council should have decided its preliminary objections concerning jurisdiction and the enterprise’s eligibility before making the reference.

KRA Infrastructure contended that the petitioner could raise its jurisdictional objections before the arbitral tribunal under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It also maintained that it had operated as an MSME since 2007 and that the 2020 registration followed a change in the registration format.

Court’s Observations

NBCC Governed The Registration Objection

The Court relied on NBCC (India) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (2025), which considered whether an enterprise could seek a reference under Section 18 if it had not filed a memorandum under Section 8 before executing its contract with the buyer.

The Bench noted that the Supreme Court had examined the MSMED Act as beneficial legislation and interpreted the expression “any party to a dispute” in Section 18 as not being expressly confined to suppliers registered before entering into a contract. It also treated the filing of a Section 8 memorandum as discretionary for micro and small enterprises. The Supreme Court had thereafter referred the question for consideration by a larger Bench.

The High Court further noted that NBCC distinguished Silpi Industries v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation (2021) and Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v. Mahakali Foods Private Limited (2023), observing that the specific question concerning pre-contract registration had not been formulated or decided in those cases.

Quoting the statutory features identified in NBCC, the Court stated: “We have noted three clear features in the statutory regime. To start with, Section 18 of the Act does not use the expression ‘supplier’, instead employs the phrase, ‘any party to a dispute, may’. We have also noted that the definition of the expression ‘supplier’ is not confined to a micro or a small enterprise which has filed a memorandum under Section 8(1) but also includes companies or other entities engaged in selling goods or rendering services by an enterprise. Thirdly, Section 8 grants a discretion to a micro or a small enterprise in filing a memorandum with the authority.”

Final Bill Was Raised After Registration

Applying NBCC, the Court noted that KRA Infrastructure had obtained MSME registration in 2020 and had been certified as a small enterprise. Although the underlying Letter of Intent and Work Order preceded the registration, its final bill was raised subsequently in 2021.

The Court observed: “It remains undisputed that the registration has already been obtained under the MSME Act in the year 2020; the certification declares the enterprise as ‘small’; the claims arise from the Work order itself and the final bill has also been raised subsequent to the registration i.e. in 2021. However, the sole contention of the Petitioner is that the claims raised are prior to the period of their registration and the cause of action arises out of the LOI and the Work Order executed much before the registration.”

The Court held that NBCC squarely covered the petitioner’s objection. It consequently concluded that KRA Infrastructure was entitled to invoke Section 18 despite having obtained registration after execution of the contract.

Arbitration Referral Did Not Decide The Claims

The Court further observed that the Facilitation Council had referred the dispute for arbitration only after conciliation failed. The Council had not adjudicated the rival claims or contentions.

The Bench held: “Even otherwise, it is relevant to note that the impugned orders have been passed upon the failure of conciliation proceedings, with the dispute thereafter being referred for arbitration. No adjudication upon the rival claims and contentions of the parties has been made. Thus, the Petitioner fails to establish that it has been prejudiced by the impugned order.”

The Court clarified that its decision was confined to the petitioner’s objection concerning the enterprise’s subsequent registration. It made no observations on the merits of the underlying payment dispute.

The Bench added: “It is noted that only the limited ground raised before this Court regarding the subsequent registration of the Respondent No. 2 has been adjudicated and no observations have been made on the merits of the claims. Needless to say, the parties are at liberty to raise their respective contentions in the Arbitral proceedings in accordance with law.”

Conclusion

The High Court found no ground to interfere with the Facilitation Council’s orders referring the dispute to DIAC. It dismissed the writ petition and pending applications while leaving the parties free to raise their respective contentions in the arbitral proceedings.

Cause Title: M/s TPL-KIPL Joint Ventures v. Micro and Small Enterprise Facilitation Council, District Magistrate West, Government of NCT of Delhi and Another (Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:9282)

Appearances

Petitioner: Advocates Renu Gupta and Pratiksha Jalan

Respondents: Advocate Rakesh Gupta

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The Court was hearing a regular second appeal filed by the deceased man’s son against concurrent decrees recognising the daughter’s one-fourth share in a partition suit.

A Bench of Justice S.R. Krishna Kumar observed: “As can be seen from the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court the plaintiff no. 2, being the illegitimate daughter of late Agasara Hanumanthappa would be entitled to claim a share in his undivided share upon his demise. In the instant case, it is an undisputed fact that during his lifetime Agasara Hanumanthappa was entitled to half share in the suit schedule property while the remaining half share belonged to his son the appellant herein and upon the demise of late Agasara Hanumanthappa, his undivided half (50%) share would necessarily have to be divided equally between the respondent no.2 / plaintiff no. 2 and the appellant / defendant no. 1. In accordance with this well settled legal position, both the Courts have come to the correct conclusion that in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court defendant no. 1 would be entitled to the remaining 3/4th share in the suit schedule property.”

Advocate Siddappa B.M. appeared for the appellant. Advocate K.R. Lingaraju appeared for the first and second respondents, while Advocate M.G. Kantharajappa appeared for the legal representatives of the third respondent.

Background

The partition suit was instituted by Shanthamma and her daughter Laxmi. They contended that Shanthamma was the second wife of the deceased and that Laxmi was his daughter. They sought partition of the suit properties against Hanumanthappa, the deceased’s son through his first wife, and challenged sale deeds executed by him in favour of two purchasers.

Hanumanthappa and the purchasers disputed the asserted relationship and denied that the plaintiffs had any right or share in the properties.

The Trial Court found that Shanthamma and Laxmi had established their relationship with the deceased. It held that Shanthamma could not claim a share because her marriage had taken place during the subsistence of the first marriage. It nevertheless concluded that Laxmi was entitled under Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to inherit from her father.

The Trial Court found that the deceased and his son each held a half share in the suit property. It divided the deceased’s half equally between the son and the daughter, giving Laxmi one-fourth of the entire property and Hanumanthappa the remaining three-fourths.

The First Appellate Court affirmed the daughter’s share but set aside the direction for cancellation of the sale deeds. It directed that the parcels sold to the purchasers be allotted to Hanumanthappa’s three-fourths share through equitable partition.

Before the High Court, Hanumanthappa argued that a daughter born from a void marriage could not claim a share in ancestral joint-family property. The respondents relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Revansiddappa v. Mallikarjun (2023).

Court’s Observations

Daughter’s Right In Father’s Share Was No Longer Unsettled

The High Court observed that the plaintiffs had not challenged the First Appellate Court’s modification concerning the sale deeds and equitable partition. The only surviving issue was whether the daughter could inherit half of her father’s notional half share.

The Court stated: “Under these circumstances, the only question that arises for consideration in the present appeal is as to whether both the Courts were justified in declaring that the plaintiff no. 2 being illegitimate daughter of late Agasara Hanumanthappa was entitled to 1/4th share i.e. half share in the notional half share of late Agasara Hanumanthappa in the suit schedule property. The said issue is no longer res integra in the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in Revansiddappa's case supra.”

Section 16 Rights Are Confined To Parents’ Property

Referring to Revansiddappa v. Mallikarjun (2023), the Court noted that Section 16(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act statutorily confers legitimacy on a child born from a marriage that is null and void under Section 11.

The Court further noted that Section 16(3) restricts the child’s rights to the property of the parents and does not create rights in the property of any other person. It also referred to the Supreme Court’s ruling that the legitimacy conferred by Section 16 must be read into Section 3(1)(j) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Quoting the Supreme Court, the High Court stated: “While conferring legitimacy in terms of sub-section (1) on a child born from a void marriage and under sub-section (2) to a child born from a voidable marriage which has been annulled, the legislature has stipulated in sub-section (3) of Section 16 that such a child will have rights to or in the property of the parents and not in the property of any other person.”

The Bench added that, under Revansiddappa, a child clothed with legitimacy under Section 16 could not be treated as an illegitimate child for determining legitimate kinship under the Hindu Succession Act.

Parent’s Notional Share Must First Be Determined

The Court noted that Revansiddappa required the share of a deceased Mitakshara coparcener to be ascertained by assuming a partition immediately before the coparcener’s death. Once the deceased parent’s share was identified, the heirs, including children protected by Section 16, became entitled to succeed to that share.

The High Court quoted the Supreme Court’s conclusion: “For the purpose of ascertaining the interest of a deceased Hindu Mitakshara coparcener, the law mandates the assumption of a state of affairs immediately prior to the death of the coparcener namely, a partition of the coparcenary property between the deceased and other members of the coparcenary. Once the share of the deceased in property that would have been allotted to him if a partition had taken place immediately before his death is ascertained, his heirs including the children who have been conferred with legitimacy under Section 16 of the HMA 1955, will be entitled to their share in the property which would have been allotted to the deceased upon the notional partition, if it had taken place.”

Applying this principle, the Court observed that the deceased held a 50% share and his son held the remaining 50%. Upon the father’s death, his share devolved equally upon the son and daughter. The daughter, therefore, received one-fourth of the entire property, while the son’s aggregate entitlement became three-fourths.

Conclusion

The High Court held that the Trial Court and First Appellate Court had correctly applied the principles subsequently affirmed in Revansiddappa v. Mallikarjun (2023). Finding no question of law, much less a substantial question of law, it dismissed the son’s regular second appeal. The preliminary decree granting the daughter a one-fourth share and the son a three-fourths share consequently remained undisturbed.

Cause Title: Hanumanthappa v. Shanthamma and Others (Neutral Citation: 2026:KHC:56474)

Appearances

Appellant: Advocate Siddappa B.M.

Respondents: Advocate K.R. Lingaraju; Advocate M.G. Kantharajappa

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The High Court clarified that the condition must first be recognised as a specified disability under the Act’s Schedule or notified by the Central Government.

The Court was hearing a petition under Article 226 seeking a direction to the Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities to include Mayer-Rokitansky-Küster-Hauser Syndrome Type-II as a specified disability. The petitioner also challenged two communications rejecting her request for its inclusion.

A Bench of Justice Amit Mahajan observed: “It is thus evident that the benefit of reservation under Section 32 of the RPwD Act is available only to a ‘person with benchmark disability’ under Section 2(r) of the RPwD Act, and cannot be claimed merely on the strength of a percentage of disability”.

The Bench added: “To qualify as such, the condition must first fall within a ‘specified disability’ under the Schedule, or a category notified by the Central Government under clause 6 thereof. Only thereafter does the question of assessing its extent at not less than 40% under Section 56 of the RPwD Act, and its certification under Sections 57 and 58 of the RPwD Act, arise.”

Advocate Dushyant Kishan Kaul appeared for the petitioner. Advocate Devvrat Yadav appeared for the Department, while Advocate Sayid Marzook Bafaki appeared for the other respondents.

Background

The petitioner has MRKH Syndrome Type-II, a congenital condition associated in her case with right renal agenesis. In 2017, the Kerala Government classified congenital absence of the uterus as a 50% disability, following which a State Disability Assessment Board certified the petitioner as having 50% disability.

After appearing in NEET-2018, the petitioner’s claim for admission to an MBBS course under the quota for persons with disabilities was rejected because her condition was not included in the Schedule to the RPwD Act.

The Kerala High Court upheld the rejection but permitted her to approach the Central Government for inclusion of the condition in the Schedule. Her representation was subsequently considered by a High-Powered Inter-Departmental Committee comprising medical experts from AIIMS, the Directorate General of Health Services, the Indian Council of Medical Research and Lady Hardinge Medical College.

The Committee concluded that MRKH Syndrome was a congenital anomaly but did not independently qualify as a disability because it did not affect the individual’s daily functioning. The Department consequently rejected the representation through communications issued in February and October 2023.

The petitioner argued that her 50% disability certificate exceeded the statutory benchmark of 40% and that Section 2(s) broadly covered long-term impairments interacting with barriers to hinder participation in society. The Department submitted that inclusion of a new specified disability was a policy decision for the Central Government and that the expert committee had found no effect upon daily functioning.

Court’s Observations

Specified Disability Must Precede Benchmark Assessment

The Court explained that Section 2(s) defined a “person with disability” through three elements: a long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairment; its interaction with barriers; and the resulting hindrance to full and equal participation in society.

Reading Sections 2(c) and 2(s) together, the Court held: “Combined reading of Sections 2(c) and 2(s) of the RPwD Act makes it clear that the mere existence of an impairment is not sufficient. It is only when the impairment, in interaction with such barriers, hinders the person’s participation in society on an equal basis with others that the person falls within the ambit of a ‘person with disability’.”

The Court noted that a “specified disability” under Section 2(zc) meant a disability included in the Schedule. Clause 6 of the Schedule authorised the Central Government to notify an additional category.

Referring to Vikash Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission (2021), the Court observed that “person with disability” under Section 2(s) could not be conflated with “person with benchmark disability” under Section 2(r). The latter expression applied only where the individual had a specified disability.

The Bench consequently held that a medical assessment of 40% or more became relevant only after the underlying condition qualified as a specified disability. The petitioner’s 50% certificate could not independently satisfy that statutory requirement.

Court Cannot Direct Government To Notify A Disability

The Court observed that inclusion of a condition in the Schedule required a notification by the Central Government under clause 6. It therefore could not issue a mandamus compelling the Government to notify MRKH Syndrome Type-II as a specified disability.

Relying on Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Association v. Union of India (1989), Mallikarjuna Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1990) and State of Himachal Pradesh v. Satpal Saini (2017), the Court held that judicial review could examine whether the Government’s decision was arbitrary or contrary to law, but could not compel legislative or delegated legislative action.

The Court stated: “Thus, it is well settled that this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot direct the legislature, or the executive exercising delegated legislative power, to enact or amend a law. The scope of judicial review in such matters is confined to examining whether the decision of the authority is arbitrary or contrary to law.”

Expert Committee’s Decision Was Not Arbitrary

The Court noted that the expert committee had distinguished between a medical condition and a disability. The Committee found that disability arose when an impairment hindered daily activities and stated that any condition subsequently resulting in a specified impairment would already be covered under the appropriate category in the Act.

The Bench found that this test flowed from Section 2(s) itself and had also been applied to conditions such as diabetes, cystic fibrosis and a single kidney.

The Court observed: “On a careful perusal of the record, this Court finds no arbitrariness or perversity in the view taken by the Committee. Pertinently, the test of whether daily functioning is affected flows from Section 2(s) of the RPwD Act itself. The Committee is an expert body comprising medical experts from AIIMS, DGHS, ICMR and Lady Hardinge Medical College, and it applied the same yardstick to other conditions as well, including diabetes, cystic fibrosis and single kidney. There is, thus, no hostile discrimination against the condition of the Petitioner.”

The Court acknowledged the petitioner’s concerns regarding social stigma but held that sympathy could not support a direction unavailable in law.

The Bench added: “The concerns of the Petitioner about social stigma are real and deserve sympathy. However, sympathy alone cannot be a ground to issue a direction that the law does not permit. Whether such social barriers justify treating MRKH Syndrome as a disability is a matter that the Committee and the Central Government are best placed to weigh.”

Conclusion

The High Court held that the communications rejecting the petitioner’s request did not suffer from illegality, arbitrariness or perversity and dismissed the petition. It clarified that the petitioner could submit a fresh representation if new medical material emerged and directed that any such representation be considered in accordance with law. Pending applications were also disposed of.

Cause Title: Anu Aravind P. v. Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities, Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment

Appearances

Petitioner: Advocates Dushyant Kishan Kaul, Jaimon Andrews, Piyo Harold and Adhishwar Suri

Respondents: Advocates Devvrat Yadav, Kartik Sharma, M. Chawla and Pearl Sharma; Advocates Sayid Marzook Bafaki, Lakshmi Sree P., Risvi Muhammad and Vaisakh S.

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The Court was hearing an appeal by bank officers against the High Court’s refusal to interfere with criminal proceedings arising from an FIR lodged by a company whose loan accounts had been classified as non-performing assets.

A Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran observed: “Admittedly, the respondent enterprise was enjoying credit facilities from the bank which turned NPA in which circumstance, there would have been proceedings initiated. Non-compliance of the RBI’s guidelines and circulars cannot result in a criminal prosecution, merely on the ground that the Directors of the enterprise are the members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. There is no specific allegation as to any of the officers having denigrated the directors merely on the basis of their caste. In fact, the very contention of the de facto complainant, as noticed in the order of the High Court is that it is a small-scale industry, predominantly managed by women belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes; but the Managing Director of the company, the second respondent is not a woman.”

Senior Advocate Rajiv Shakdher appeared for the appellants. Senior Advocate Shadan Farasat appeared for the respondent company and its director, while Advocate Disha Wadekar appeared for the State of Telangana.

Background

The respondent company had obtained credit facilities from the State Bank of India beginning in 2010 and had furnished collateral security. According to its director, the company incurred a capital loss of ₹2 crore during 2012–13 and its accounts were declared NPAs in 2016 despite repayment of a ₹2.90 crore term loan and a further payment of ₹45 lakh towards regularisation.

The company alleged that certain bank officials subjected its promoters to caste-based discrimination. It accused the officers of forging documents and supplying false or frivolous information to their superiors, allegedly causing the exercise of lawful authority to injure or annoy the promoters. The company contended that this attracted Section 3(1)(q) of the SC/ST Act.

The complaint also alleged an economic boycott of small-scale enterprises managed by members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. It claimed that enterprises owned by influential persons belonging to higher castes were granted rehabilitation packages and substantial concessions, while similar relief was denied to the respondent company. Non-implementation of RBI circulars and denial of a rehabilitation package were also alleged.

The bank officers maintained that the documents described as forged or fabricated had been furnished by the company’s directors, who had stood as guarantors for the loan account. The High Court, however, found that the officers had a duty to follow the Central Government and RBI framework governing the revival and rehabilitation of micro, small and medium enterprises and declined to interfere with the prosecution.

Court’s Observations

RBI Circular Dispute Did Not Justify Criminal Proceedings

The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had specifically noticed allegations concerning non-implementation of RBI circulars, denial of a rehabilitation scheme and forgery or fabrication of documents submitted as security for the company’s loans.

The Bench, however, held that the High Court’s finding concerning the officers’ duty to follow the MSME revival and rehabilitation framework did not justify continuing criminal proceedings against them.

The Court stated: “In spite of these compelling circumstance, the High Court refused to consider the case set up by the writ petitioners by referring to various decisions and eventually finding a duty on the accused, the appellants herein to follow the directions issued by the Central Government and the RBI with regard to the framework for revival and rehabilitation of the MSMEs. We are of the definite opinion that this does not justify the invocation of criminal proceedings against the officers of the bank.”

The Court further observed that the company’s accounts had admittedly become NPAs and that recovery proceedings would consequently have been initiated. It found no specific allegation that any officer had denigrated the directors because of their caste and was not convinced that the prosecution should continue on the allegations raised.

Objections Can Be Raised Before Debts Recovery Tribunal

The Court clarified that quashing the criminal proceedings would not prevent the company from raising its objections before the appropriate recovery forum.

The Bench held: “Violation of the circulars and guidelines, refusal to grant rehabilitation package in accordance with the circulars, false information or misrepresentations being made to initiate coercive action against a borrower could all be agitated in a recovery proceedings, and it is for the adjudicating authority to decide as to whether such allegations are legally valid and could interfere with a valid recovery sought by the bank.”

The Court accordingly left those contentions open for consideration by the Debts Recovery Tribunal in the relevant proceedings.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed FIR No.1 of 2019, registered on February 4, 2019 at Police Station CID, Hyderabad, along with all proceedings arising from it. The respondent company’s contentions concerning RBI guidelines, rehabilitation measures and the bank’s recovery action were left open to be raised before the appropriate forum. Pending applications were also disposed of.

Cause Title: Chavan Dharmendar and Others v. State of Telangana and Others (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1133)

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Applying this, the Court granted regular bail to Punit Narendra Garg, a former Executive Director of Reliance Communications Limited (RCOM), in the Enforcement Directorate’s (ED) money-laundering case. It found reasonable grounds to believe he was not guilty at this stage, and that he was unlikely to offend on bail. It also relied on his custody of over eight months and the sharp expansion of the prosecution, which made an early trial unlikely.

A Bench of Justice Sanjeev Narula observed, “…The communications relied upon by ED do indicate his participation in the subsequent transactions, but such participation would constitute money laundering only if the assets or funds concerned were proceeds of crime. It is this essential connection which, on the material presently available, has not been sufficiently established. These circumstances, assessed on the broad probabilities applicable at the stage of bail, provide reasonable grounds for believing that the Applicant is not guilty of the offence alleged. This finding is confined to the requirements of Section 45 and does not determine the legality of the underlying transactions or the Applicant’s eventual culpability, which remain matters for trial”.

Senior Advocates Arvind Nigam, Pavan Narang appeared for the petitioner and Senior Advocate Zoheb Hossain appeared for the respondent.

“…repayment trail is relevant and may also bear upon the alleged improper utilisation of the later credit facilities. The further inference that the assets acquired in 2008 and 2010 thereby became proceeds of the scheduled offences requires examination of the criminal activity from which those assets were derived and cannot be ipso facto assessed. Refinancing, by itself, does not answer that enquiry. On the material presently placed before the Court, the requisite connection between the earlier acquisitions and the alleged scheduled offences remains a substantial disputed question”, the Bench said.

The case arises from CBI and ED proceedings over alleged loan diversion by RCOM, resulting in a ₹2,929.05 crore loss to SBI. The scheduled offences span 2013–2017. The ED identified three transactions involving the applicant, a 2008 yacht, a 2010 Manhattan apartment, and educational payments for his daughters, attributing about ₹149.77 crore as proceeds of crime. The ED argued that subsequent loans were used to repay earlier borrowings that funded these assets. The applicant contended that the assets predated the offences, he only became Executive Director in October 2017, and the education payments were approved employment benefits.

Arrested in January 2026, the applicant sought bail under Section 483 of the BNSS and Section 45 of the PMLA after the Special Judge denied relief in June 2026 and a bulky supplementary complaint was filed in August 2026.

The Court noted that Section 45 twin conditions must be satisfied on broad probabilities and framed two core questions: the character of the assets and the applicant's involvement. Placing reliance on Pavana Dibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement, the Court observed that the assets were acquired years before the scheduled offences. While the repayment trail required a trial, the link between the 2008–2010 acquisitions and the 2013–2017 offences remained a substantial disputed question. Citing Anoop Bartaria, the Court emphasized that while Section 3 does not require knowledge of tainted origin, the property must still constitute proceeds of crime.

Treating the applicant's communications as showing participation in later dealings rather than resolving the asset's origin, the Court excluded his custodial statements under Prem Prakash and noted the NCLT order did not exonerate him. Finding that the absence of his name from the predicate FIRs and the non-arrest of others weighed in his favour, the Court held there were reasonable grounds to believe he was not guilty for the purposes of bail.

On custody, the Court noted a consolidated record of about 77,384 pages and 56 witnesses. Placing reliance on V. Senthil Balaji, Mahesh Joshi and Arvind Dham, it held that Section 45 cannot justify indefinite pre-trial detention where trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time. It held that ED’s concerns about witnesses and evidence could be met through conditions, and that Supreme Court directions for time-bound investigation did not govern his detention.

The applicant was released on a personal bond of Rs. 1,00,000 with two sureties, to the Special Judge’s satisfaction. The conditions require him to surrender his passport and not leave India without permission, and to give his contact details to the Investigating Officer.

Cause Title: Punit Narendra Garg v. Directorate of Enforcement (Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:9285)

Appearances:

Petitioner: Arvind Nigam, Pavan Narang, Senior Advocates, VP Singh, Priyank Ladoia, Arjun Narang, Kushagra Jain, Puneet Dhanoa and Jitesh Lakra for the petitioner.

Respondent: Zoheb Hossain, Senior Advocate, Vivek Gurnani, Panel Counsel, Pranjal Tripathi and Shyam Bhageria, Kota Shastri, I.O., for ED, Advocates.

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Accordingly, the Court quashed the three-year blacklisting of a medicine supplier and the two-year debarment of one of its products by the Madhya Pradesh Public Health Services Corporation. The Corporation had acted on a single laboratory report declaring four batches Not of Standard Quality, without drawing the second sample that the tender document made mandatory. The Court also faulted the High Court for making the quashing contingent on a retesting that was never carried out and had become impossible once the batches expired.

A Bench of Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Augustine George Masih and Justice Sandeep Mehta observed, “…The underlying principle finds expression in the safeguards contemplated under Section 25(3) and (4) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. The Court held that where delay predominantly attributable to the State or its instrumentalities results in the loss of an effective opportunity to have a sample retested by a superior laboratory, the adverse action founded upon the disputed analysis cannot be sustained. The principle is relevant to the present controversy, having regard to the express procedure prescribed under Clause 6 of Annexure IX and the subsequent loss of an effective opportunity for re-testing…”.

Senior Advocate Siddharth Bhatnagar appeared for the appellant and Senior Advocate S.K. Gangele appeared for the respondent.

The appellant, M/s JPEE Drugs, supplies medicines to Government hospitals. Under a tender floated for district hospitals in Madhya Pradesh, it supplied Ascorbic Acid tablets and Ethambutol Hydrochloride tablets. In September 2024, the Corporation issued a show-cause notice after test reports declared three batches of the former and one batch of the latter Not of Standard Quality. The firm said the drugs had failed because of improper storage and handling after supply. Under the tender terms, one failed batch meant debarment of the product for at least two years, and three failed batches meant blacklisting of the firm for at least three years.

The Corporation’s Managing Director passed orders within a week of the notice, recording that no reply had been received, although the firm said it had replied within the time allowed. The orders debarred Ethambutol for two years, blacklisted the firm for three years and directed recovery of batch values. A further order rejected the firm’s representation. The firm’s writ petition before the Madhya Pradesh High Court was disposed of in October 2025. The High Court found the action flawed for non-compliance with Clause 6 of Annexure IX of the tender document, but directed fresh samples to be tested at the Central Government Laboratory and left the blacklisting to depend on the result. Review petitions by both sides were dismissed in February 2026. The firm then approached the Supreme Court, which stayed the blacklisting in May 2026.

The Court noted that Clause 6 required a second sample from the same batch to be sent to another laboratory, with blacklisting to follow only on confirmation. This was admittedly not done, and the State’s counsel could not dispute it. It held the High Court was not justified in deferring the quashing once it had found the procedure breached. The retesting ordered within fifteen days had not happened even after more than six months, and all four batches had since expired. The direction for retesting, the Court said, had lost its purpose and stood frustrated by efflux of time.

The Court citing, Medipol Pharmaceutical India Pvt. Ltd. v. PGIMER (2021) 11 SCC 339, reiterated that a person penalised on a Government Analyst’s report holds a valuable right, reflected in Section 25(3) and (4) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, to have the sample tested by a superior laboratory. It held the principle fully applicable, though the case arose from administrative and contractual action. The firm had been denied an effective opportunity to controvert the reports, and the later expiry of the batches made that opportunity nugatory. The Court concluded that the procedural infirmity, together with the irretrievable loss of retesting, rendered the blacklisting and debarment unsustainable.

Cause Title: M/s JPEE Drugs v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1143)

Appearances:

Appellant: Siddharth Bhatnagar, Senior Counsel.

Respondent: S.K. Gangele, Senior Counsel.

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The Court was hearing an appeal against a Telangana High Court judgment affirming the rejection of the Waqf’s application resisting execution. The lower courts had found that its application under Order XXI Rule 58 was not maintainable because the execution petition sought possession rather than attachment and had also rejected its claim on merits.

A Bench of Justice S.V.N. Bhatti and Justice N.V. Anjaria observed: “Courts adjudicating an Application under Order XXI Rule 97 must do so in accordance with Rule 101 of the CPC and conduct a full-fledged inquiry into all questions, including those relating to the right, title, or interest in the property arising between the parties.”

Senior Advocate C. Aryama Sundaram appeared for the appellant-Waqf, while Senior Advocate Basava Prabhu S. Patil appeared for the first respondent.

Background

The first respondent obtained an ex parte decree in 2015 for specific performance of an alleged agreement of sale concerning 373 square yards of property comprising shops in Hyderabad. The decree also entitled him to possession.

When the decree-holder initiated execution proceedings, Alladin Charities and Zakat Wakf entered as a third-party objector and resisted delivery of possession. It claimed an independent title and possession based upon a Farman issued by the former Nizam of Hyderabad, a Muntakhab describing the endowed property, a 1976 Trust Deed and proceedings under the Waqf Act, 1995.

The Executing Court dismissed the application after finding that Order XXI Rule 58 dealt with objections to attachment rather than delivery of possession. It also held that the Waqf had not established that the property covered by the execution petition formed part of its notified property.

The Telangana High Court agreed that the application should have been filed under Order XXI Rule 97. It nevertheless dismissed the appeal on merits after finding insufficient material connecting the disputed municipal numbers with the Waqf property.

Before the Supreme Court, the Waqf contended that citing the wrong procedural provision could not justify rejecting its substantive objection. It argued that the identity and title of the property required a detailed inquiry under Rules 97 to 101.

The decree-holder defended the orders but, in response to the Court’s query concerning correlation between the property descriptions in the earlier sale deed, agreement and court-executed sale deed, suggested remanding the matter so that both parties could file additional pleas and evidence.

Court’s Observations

Rules 97-101 Extend To Strangers Claiming Independent Rights

Referring to Periyammal v. V. Rajamani (2025), the Court noted that the execution procedure is not confined to resistance offered by a judgment-debtor. A stranger claiming an independent right, title or interest may also invoke the adjudicatory mechanism.

Summarising the precedent, the Bench stated: “Order XXI Rule 35 of the CPC confers jurisdiction on the Executing Court to remove any person bound by the Decree who refuses to vacate the property. Rules 97 to 101 of Order XXI deal with situations where execution is obstructed or resisted by ‘any person’, including even a stranger to the Decree who is not bound by it or who claims an independent right, title or interest in the property.”

The Court further noted that Rule 97 operates before execution of a possession decree, while Rule 99 applies when a stranger claiming rights in the property has already been dispossessed and seeks restoration.

Resistance Must Be Adjudicated Before Possession Is Delivered

The Court observed that a decree-holder facing resistance from a purported stranger must seek adjudication under Rule 97 rather than bypassing the objection and repeatedly seeking a possession warrant under Rule 35.

The Bench stated: “If a purported stranger to the Decree resists execution, the DHR’s sole remedy lies under Order XXI Rule 97 of the CPC. The Holder cannot bypass such obstruction and insist on the reissuance of the warrant for possession under Order XXI Rule 35.”

The Court held that the resulting inquiry must comply with Rule 101 and encompass every question of right, title or interest arising between the parties. It found that some conclusions in the orders under challenge did not conform to these principles.

Fresh Pleas And Evidence Permitted

The Court did not finally determine whether the disputed property belonged to the Waqf or the decree-holder. It instead restored the dispute to the stage at which the rival title and property-identification claims could be examined through a complete inquiry.

The Bench directed: “The matter is remanded to the VII Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad, State of Telangana for disposal as indicated above.”

Both parties were permitted to raise further or fresh pleas and place their respective material before the Executing Court.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the Executing Court and the Telangana High Court.

It remanded the matter to the VII Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court at Hyderabad, with directions to permit additional pleas from both sides, conduct a fresh inquiry under Order XXI Rules 97 to 101 CPC and decide the dispute afresh in accordance with law.

The Court made no order as to costs and disposed of the pending applications.

Cause Title: Alladin Charities and Zakat Wakf v. Mohammed Saleem Alias Mohd. Wajid Ali and Another (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1122)

Appearances

Appellant: Senior Advocate C. Aryama Sundaram; Advocate-on-Record Pranab Kumar Mullick; Advocates Soma Mullick and Rishabh Agrawal

Respondents: Senior Advocate Basava Prabhu S. Patil; Advocate-on-Record Juristrust Law Offices

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The Court found force in the Enforcement Directorate’s submission that, although its complaint described the investigation qua the accused as complete, a vital stage of the probe remained in progress. While Bose was in custody in August-September 2026, about 45 immovable properties of his family were traced through certified deeds, and valuation reports are awaited. Information shared under Section 66(2) of the PMLA has also led the CBI to begin further investigation.

A Bench of Justice Tirthankar Ghosh observed, “...I am of the opinion that the petitioner has failed to overcome the rigors of Section 45 PMLA Act, as such the prayer for bail of the petitioner at this stage is rejected”.

Senior Advocates Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi and Sabyasachi Banerjee appeared for the petitioner while S. V. Raju and Dhiraj Trivedi, ASGs and Senior Advocate Zoheb Hossain appeared for the respondent.

Bose is a former Vice-Chairman of South Dum Dum Municipality, MLA and Minister of State. The ED alleges he laundered proceeds of about Rs. 20.40 crore generated through illegal municipal recruitments. The alleged routes include flats acquired for inadequate consideration, Rs. 8.09 crore in cash deposits through hospitality businesses, shareholding transfers with unsecured loans, and structured payments to himself and his children. He denies the allegations and says no proceeds have been traced to him.

The CBI registered the predicate case on April 22, 2023, on the High Court's direction, without naming Bose. The ED recorded its ECIR on May 11, 2023, and arrested him on May 11, 2026, after he appeared on summons. The Special Court rejected his bail by an order dated May 21, 2026. Bose argued that the delay in arrest negated custodial necessity, that the “reasons to believe” and “grounds of arrest” were verbatim identical, and that Section 45 is not an absolute bar. A separate writ challenging the arrest of 2026, is pending.

The Court noted the ED’s own statement that investigation qua Bose was complete. It nonetheless found that the traced properties, the information shared with the CBI, newly surfaced sources of funds and the CBI’s further investigation justified continued custody. It endorsed the observation in Kanhaiya Prasad that money laundering is not an ordinary offence and that bail cannot be granted through cryptic orders that ignore the rigours of Section 45.

“Yet, I find that there is some force in the submission of Enforcement Directorate in view of the issue relating to justification of custody as during the period of August to September 2026, while the petitioner was in custody in course of investigation itself, immovable assets belonging to the petitioner and his family members which number about 45 (by way of certified copies of the deeds having been obtained from the office of the Additional District Sub Registrars) could be traced. Registered valuers have been engaged to estimate the market value of such properties and the report is awaiting. Additionally, information has been shared with the Central Bureau of Investigation under Section 66(2) of the PMLA, 2002 in respect of number of undeserving candidates being recommended by the petitioner for being employed in the municipality. Other sources of funds have also surfaced in course of such investigation by examining the material witnesses. The Central Bureau of Investigation has also commenced further investigation after informing the Learned Special Court pursuant to receipt of information by the Enforcement Directorate. A vital stage of the investigation is in progress”, the Bench noted.

Holding that the petitioner had failed to overcome Section 45, the Court rejected bail “at this stage,” dismissed the application and disposed of pending applications.

Cause Title: Sujit Bose v. Directorate of Enforcement C.R.M. (R) 58 OF 2026

Petitioner: Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi and Sabyasachi Banerjee, Senior Advocates, with Kuldeep Rai and others.

Respondent: S. V. Raju and Dhiraj Trivedi, ASGs, and Zoheb Hossain, Senior Advocate, with others.

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The Court held that a co-owner’s one-third undivided share in a Delhi property cannot be sold in an e-auction until the veracity of the loan documents is adjudicated by a competent court. It accepted that a private asset reconstruction company is not an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, but found this was not decisive in the facts, since an assignee steps into the shoes of the assignor and cannot acquire a greater right.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Jasmeet Singh observed, “…the existence of an efficacious alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 particularly where the proceedings impugned before the Court are alleged to be founded upon fraud and forgery and the very existence of the underlying security interest is under challenge”.

“Hence I am of the view that the undivided 1/3rd share of the petitioner in property cannot be permitted to be sold in e auction till the veracity of the loan documents is adjudicated by a competent court of jurisdiction”, it noted further.

Senior Advocate Vaibhav Gaggar appeared for the petitioner and Senior Advocate Rajiv Nayar appeared for the respondent.

The petitioner, Shashi R. Jatia, owns a one-third undivided share in property No. B-50, Gulmohar Park, New Delhi. The remaining two-thirds belongs to her sister-in-law, respondent No. 3. Five loan facilities totalling ₹14.96 crore were obtained from ICICI Bank by mortgaging the property, with the petitioner shown as co-applicant. She stated that her signatures were forged and that she learnt of the loans only in May 2021.

The Economic Offences Wing registered an FIR on January 28, 2022. Its status report of December 13, 2024 recorded that forensic examination found her signatures forged. The loans were assigned to Prudent ARC on September 25, 2024, which issued an e-auction notice on April 25, 2026.

Her civil suit before the Saket Courts was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, read with Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, on June 09, 2023. Her appeal remains pending before the District Judge. She then filed the writ petition. The respondents objected on grounds of alternate remedy under Section 17, non-maintainability against a private entity, delay and laches, suppression of facts and a defective power of attorney.

Referring to Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311, the Court held that where fraud is alleged against the secured creditor, civil court jurisdiction is not excluded by Section 34, and the remedy does not lie before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Without examining the evidentiary value of the forensic and EOW reports, it found the allegations prima facie made out.

It observed that if the fraud is later proved, the recovery action would be without jurisdiction, and that an auction would create third-party rights and further litigation. It rejected acquiescence and laches, noting the petitioner acted promptly after learning of the loans and that her letter of June 29, 2021 did not admit authorising them. The suppression plea failed since the Tribunal’s orders showed no one appeared for her, and the power of attorney objection was held hyper-technical.

The Court allowed the petition and excluded the petitioner’s undivided one-third share from the auction. No restriction was imposed on the remaining two-thirds share.

Cause Title: Shashi R. Jatia v. Prudent ARC & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:9120)

Appearances:

Petitioner: Senior Advocate Vaibhav Gaggar, Advocates Abhijeet Chauhan and Mayank Singhal.

Respondent: Senior Advocate Rajiv Nayar, Advocates Naveen Soni, Sidhant Kumar, Om Batra and Anwita.

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The Court was hearing civil appeals challenging Madras High Court orders which upheld the Commissioner of Land Administration’s decision cancelling the patta and directing restoration of the land as a water body.

A Bench of Justice S.V.N. Bhatti and Justice N.V. Anjaria observed: “The Statement of Objects and Scope of the Acts of 1971 and 1948 is noted. Therefore, notifying a block of area in the development zone as commercial, industrial, residential, or mixed residential/mixed-use cannot be construed as taking away the Government's rights in Poramboke lands, forests, water bodies/tanks, etc. The said argument does not take into account that zoning regulations are not confined to a single survey number but apply when an individual undertakes development activity in the notified area. The development of a plot conforms to the notified zoning requirement. Reference to the subject matter being in a mixed residential zone, either in fact or in law, cannot be treated as effacing the effect of Section 14-A of the Act, 1948.”

Senior Advocate T. Raja and Advocate K.S. Mahadevan appeared for the appellants. Advocate-on-Record Jayasree Narasimhan appeared for the respondents.

Background

The dispute concerned 0.72 acres out of 1.68 acres in Survey No. 572 at Thirumullaivoyal Village, Tamil Nadu. The judgment noted that the 1911 Resurvey and Resettlement Register classified the land as “Government Poramboke–Kanakkan Kuttai”.

In 2011, the District Revenue Officer granted a ryotwari patta over the 0.72 acres to P. Ramadoss. He subsequently mortgaged the land to Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank. A portion measuring 0.22 acres was transferred to his wife, following which approvals were obtained and 20 apartments were constructed and sold.

In 2019, the Commissioner of Land Administration cancelled the patta after finding that the land had historically been classified as a Government poramboke watercourse and that the District Revenue Officer lacked authority to grant the patta. The Madras High Court upheld that decision and directed the demolition of the structures and restoration of the water body.

The appellants contended that the Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority’s classification of the land as a mixed-residential zone established that it was ryotwari land rather than a water body. The respondents relied upon the earliest survey and settlement records and argued that subsequent private transactions and planning approvals could not affect the Government’s rights under the 1948 Act.

Court’s Observations

Ryotwari Patta Available Only For Ryoti Land

The Court rejected the contention that a separate adjudication declaring the property to be a tank was necessary before the Government could protect it.

The Bench observed: “In our considered view, this contention appears untenable because the Act, 1948 does not require adjudication to protect communal Government Poramboke, etc. Simply put, the Ryotiwari tenures under the Act, 1948 apply to Ryoti land covered by the said Act. The inquiry in this behalf determines the nature of the land, the type of enjoyment, the period of enjoyment, and the entitlement to grant of patta.”

Referring to Salem Municipality v. P. Kumar and Others (2019), the Court noted that land forming part of a tank was excluded from the definition of ryoti land. The precedent also recognised that Section 14-A cancelled even previously granted pattas concerning private tanks or ooranis.

The Court held that entitlement to a patta had to be determined from the earliest revenue, survey and settlement records. It noted that the appellants had not shown that the disputed land was classified as ryoti land during the relevant survey and settlement operations.

The Bench stated: “Therefore, non-Ryoti lands do not fall within the scope of granting a patta under the Act, 1948. Whenever a dispute arises over entitlement to a patta, the nature of the land is determined by appreciating entries in the earliest Revenue Records, including Survey and Settlement Records. The Appellants do not contend that the Revenue Records show the subject matter as Ryoti land during the Survey and Settlement operation or the contemporaneous faslis. Since the Appellants claim a Ryotwari patta, they must establish the ingredients for the land to be termed Ryoti land and that P. Ramadoss is entitled to a Ryotwari Patta.”

Planning Classification Does Not Alter Government Rights

The Court held that zoning under the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971 regulates the permissible development of plots within a notified area. Such classification does not decide ownership or eliminate rights preserved under the 1948 Act.

The Bench explained that a zoning regulation operates across a development area rather than upon a single survey number. It consequently rejected the argument that the mixed-residential classification displaced the Government’s rights or established that the property was ryoti land.

Section 14-A Prohibits Patta Over Non-Ryoti Land

The Court observed that Section 14-A was intended to prevent officers from considering or granting ryotwari pattas for non-ryoti land and to preserve the existing land classification.

The Bench held: “Section 14-A of the Act, 1948, prohibits officers from considering and granting Ryotwari Patta for non-Ryoti land. The Legislature designed a prohibitory mechanism to prevent changes in land classification. The said Section even renders the Order already issued void. That being the statutory scheme, the DRO, Tiruvallur, without any reason, went beyond the provisions of the said Act and granted Patta.”

The Court also rejected the appellants’ objections concerning lack of hearing and the revenue entries. It held that the patta-holder had been heard by the Commissioner and that the State’s material reinforced the land’s continuous classification as a tank and Government poramboke.

Alternative Land For Flat Owners

The Court observed that municipal approvals and alterations in the town-survey records had led bona fide flat purchasers to believe that the Government had no subsisting interest in the property.

The Bench stated that demolishing their homes without considering the hardship caused by the State authorities’ conduct would result in irreparable financial injury. Without compromising Section 14-A, it therefore directed the State to allot the affected flat owners a vacant and commensurate alternative site.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the Madras High Court’s judgment and dismissed the civil appeals without costs.

The Court directed the Tamil Nadu Chief Secretary and the Tiruvallur District Collector to allot a vacant, commensurate site to the flat owners represented by the society, preferably within six months. The authorities were directed to demolish the apartments occupying 0.22 acres after making that allotment.

The Court permitted development work on the vacant and unoccupied portion to continue expeditiously. It left the flat owners and the Bank free to pursue remedies against the developer, landowner or mortgagor before the competent civil court. The State was also left free to initiate or conclude disciplinary proceedings against the officials responsible for failing to maintain the records and water bodies.

Cause Title: S. Gururaj v. The Additional Chief Secretary/Commissioner of Land Administration and Others (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1146)

Appearances

Appellants: Senior Advocate T. Raja; Advocates K.S. Mahadevan, Swati Bansal, R. Rangarajan, Aravind Gopinathan, R.K. Srivastav, C. Raghavendren and C. Rubavathi; Advocates-on-Record Rajesh Kumar and M.A. Chinnasamy

Respondents: Advocates-on-Record Jayasree Narasimhan; Advocates R. Sarbeshvaran and Siddheesh Yadav

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The Court found that the prosecution had failed to establish a complete chain of circumstances connecting the appellant to the death. It set aside his conviction under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and directed his immediate release unless required in another case.

The Court was hearing an appeal challenging a Chhattisgarh High Court judgment affirming the Trial Court’s conviction of the appellant for murder and causing disappearance of evidence. The prosecution case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence, including WhatsApp messages, alleged recoveries and unexplained injuries on the appellant.

A Bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Vijay Bishnoi observed: “Another important feature of the case is that the deceased was a person habituated to substance abuse. Such a person is prone to accident. Therefore, the accident theory set up in defence is probable and creates a doubt about the prosecution case.”

Advocate Yasharth Kant appeared for the appellant, while Advocate Ankita Sharma appeared for the State.

Background

The judgment noted that the deceased was found lying in an open field with his motorcycle and a yellow rope beside him. The matter was initially reported to the police as an accidental death, but an FIR against unknown persons was subsequently registered after the autopsy raised suspicion of homicide.

The prosecution alleged that the appellant had fought with and killed the deceased before moving his body to the field. It relied upon WhatsApp messages allegedly exchanged between two witnesses, a disclosure statement, and the purported recovery of an iron rod, screwdriver, bloodstained soil and a shirt.

The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 302 and 201 IPC. The High Court affirmed the conviction after holding that the prosecution had established homicidal death, a quarrel, last-seen evidence, recovery of the alleged weapons and unexplained injuries on the appellant.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that no witness had placed the deceased with him on the relevant night, the WhatsApp messages were unsupported, and the recovered articles were not forensically connected to the deceased. The State relied upon the messages, the alleged bloodstains and the appellant’s unexplained injuries.

Court’s Observations

Circumstantial Chain Was Not Established

The Court reiterated that every circumstance relied upon in a case based entirely on circumstantial evidence must be fully established and must unerringly point towards the accused’s guilt.

Referring to Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984), the Bench held: “The circumstances taken cumulatively should form a chain so far complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused; the circumstances should be consistent only with the hypothesis regarding the guilt of the accused; and they must exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. Further, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established, meaning thereby that they ‘must’ or ‘should’ and not ‘may be’ established.”

The Court also referred to Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973) and reiterated that an accused must be, and not merely may be, guilty before a conviction can follow.

The Bench found no evidence that the deceased was last seen alive with the appellant. It noted that the witnesses relied upon by the prosecution to establish the deceased’s presence in the appellant’s house had not supported that case.

WhatsApp Messages Created Only Suspicion

The Court considered whether the WhatsApp communication could be treated as relevant under Sections 6, 7 or 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It held that the time of death had not been fixed through substantive evidence, making it difficult to establish that the messages formed part of the same transaction under Section 6.

The Bench further observed that both witnesses connected with the messages denied witnessing the incident, while the alleged sender also denied sending them.

The Court held: “Whether that information was based on PW-5’s personal knowledge or on hearsay, or assumptions, would depend on his deposition in Court. PW-5 and PW-6 both made a statement that they have not witnessed the incident. PW-5 goes to the extent of saying that he has not sent the message. In such circumstances, who was the author of that message; whether that message was sent on the basis of personal knowledge of the person who sent the message or it was based on hearsay information received by its author, are all questions of which there is no answer.”

The Bench consequently held that the messages did not establish that the deceased was present in the appellant’s house or that the appellant assaulted him. At most, they created suspicion, which could not sustain a conviction.

Recoveries Were Not Connected To The Deceased

The Court found doubt concerning whether bloodstained soil had been recovered from the appellant’s house or only from the field where the body was discovered. It noted material differences between the testimony of the seizure witnesses.

The Bench observed: “Whether the blood-stained soil was recovered from the house/ room of the accused or was recovered from the open field is an aspect on which one of the witnesses of the seizure memo has created a doubt. Additionally, the blood-stains could not be connected to the deceased and, admittedly, there is no DNA profile of the blood so recovered to match it with the DNA profile of the deceased. Same is the case with the iron rod and the screwdriver.”

The Court therefore held that the alleged recoveries did not complete the chain of circumstances against the appellant.

Accident Theory Created Reasonable Doubt

The Court noted that the deceased’s body was found in an open field beside his motorcycle. Although the autopsy surgeon described the death as homicidal, he admitted that the injuries could also have resulted from falling from a moving motorcycle.

The Bench held that this medical possibility, considered with the deceased’s substance-abuse history, rendered the accident theory probable and raised doubt about the prosecution’s version.

The Court further rejected the reliance placed on the appellant’s failure to explain his injuries. It held that this circumstance might have carried weight had the prosecution first established that the appellant and the deceased were seen fighting shortly before the body was found.

The Bench stated: “The absence of explanation of his injuries by the accused found during medical examination conducted on 11.02.2019, in no circumstance could lead to an inference that he is guilty. This circumstance may have been of value if the prosecution had been successful in establishing that the accused and the deceased were seen fighting soon before the body of the deceased was found. Notably, none of the prosecution witness has deposed that the accused and the deceased were fighting on the fateful night.”

Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that there was hardly any evidentiary basis upon which the appellant’s conviction could be sustained.

It allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments of the Trial Court and the Chhattisgarh High Court, and acquitted the appellant of all charges. The Court directed his immediate release unless he was required in another case and disposed of the pending applications.

Cause Title: Kusumlal Sao v. State of Chhattisgarh (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1148)

Appearances

Appellant: Advocates Yasharth Kant (AOR), Tanvi Saran, Sonal Kushwah and Abhinav Sharma

Respondents: Advocates Ankita Sharma (AOR), Arjun D. Singh, Akanksha Kumari and Gargi Vishwakarma

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