The Supreme Court has reiterated that Article 311(1) of the Constitution is attracted only when an employee is dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate in rank to the authority that actually appointed the employee.

Applying this principle, the Court restored the removal of a Railway Protection Special Force Rakshak after finding that the Adjutant who removed him was not lower in rank than the Assistant Commandant who had appointed him.

The Court was hearing an appeal by the Union of India against an Allahabad High Court judgment affirming the First Appellate Court’s decision invalidating the removal on the ground that it had been ordered by an authority subordinate to the purported appointing authority.

A Bench of Justice Aravind Kumar and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi observed: “It is well settled that while determining the authority by which an employee was appointed for the purposes of Article 311(1) of the Constitution, the court is required to ascertain the authority which in fact made the appointment with reference to the order of appointment and the statutory or regulatory framework governing such appointment. Once that authority is identified, the constitutional protection under Article 311(1) has to be examined with reference to the hierarchical position of the authority which subsequently passes the order of dismissal or removal.”

The Bench further held: “At this stage, it is relevant to note that the constitutional prohibition contained in Article 311(1) is attracted only where the order of dismissal or removal is passed by an authority subordinate in rank to the authority by which the employee was appointed, whereas, this essential ingredient of Article 311 is absent in the facts of the present case.”

Additional Solicitor General Vikramjit Banerjee appeared for the Union of India. Advocate Mananjay K. Mishra appeared for the respondent.

Background

The respondent was selected as a recruit for the post of Rakshak in the Railway Protection Special Force. A call letter issued by the Commandant required him to report for initial training and stated that his appointment was subject to successful completion of that training.

After he completed the training, the Assistant Commandant issued a Battalion Order recording his appointment as a Rakshak and posting him to a battalion. A subsequent order confirmed that the recruits were to be treated as regular Rakshaks from the date of the earlier appointment order.

While in service, the Rakshak was granted casual leave but did not resume duty on its expiry and remained absent for 72 days without informing the competent authority. He was charge-sheeted under Rule 44 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 for gross negligence and breach of discipline.

The departmental inquiry proceeded ex parte after he failed to appear. The Enquiry Officer found the charges proved, following which the Adjutant issued a show-cause notice and passed an order removing him from service. His departmental appeal was dismissed.

The Trial Court dismissed his civil suit challenging the removal. It held that the Assistant Commandant had appointed him and that the Adjutant was competent to impose the penalty.

The First Appellate Court reversed that decision. It treated the Commandant’s call letter as the appointment order and held that the subsequent Battalion Order was merely a posting order. On that basis, it concluded that the Adjutant was subordinate to the appointing authority and that the removal violated Article 311(1). It also found that the ex parte inquiry had denied the employee a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The High Court affirmed that decision.

Before the Supreme Court, the Union contended that the call letter was only an offer requiring the selected candidates to undergo training, while the Battalion Order issued after successful completion of training was the operative appointment order. The employee maintained that the Commandant had appointed him and that the Assistant Commandant’s subsequent order concerned only his posting.

Court’s Observations

The Supreme Court found the distinction between the call letter and the subsequent Battalion Order material. The call letter did not unconditionally appoint the respondent as a regular Rakshak. It made the proposed appointment dependent upon successful completion of the prescribed training and referred to acceptance of the offer and cancellation of candidature.

The Court observed: “The Call Letter dated 03.05.1979 did not contain an unconditional declaration that the respondent stood appointed as a regular Rakshak, however, it expressly made the proposed appointment conditional upon successful completion of initial training and used expressions such as ‘accept the offer’ and ‘candidature for the post’. Consequently, the respondent was required to successfully complete the prescribed training before his appointment could take effect as a regular member of the RPSF.”

In contrast, the Battalion Order issued after the respondent completed his training expressly stated that the recruits were appointed as Rakshaks. It recorded their grade, effective appointment date, personal numbers and respective postings.

Relying on Ramanand Singh v. State of Bihar (1984), the Court rejected the contention that the Battalion Order was merely a posting order. It held that one order could validly operate both as an appointment order and a posting order.

The Court found that the First Appellate Court and the High Court had erroneously treated the conditional call letter as the appointment order. The subsequent Battalion Order confirmed that the appointment became effective only after the recruit successfully completed the initial training.

The Bench held: “The subsequent Battalion Order dated 25.02.1980 further confirms that his appointment as a regular Rakshak had already been made with effect from 04.12.1979. Thus, the documents do not support the conclusion of the First Appellate Court and the High Court that the Commandant/Chief Security Officer was the authority which appointed the respondent.”

The Court referred to Krishna Kumar v. Divisional Assistant Electrical Engineer, Central Railway (1979), which held that the relevant inquiry under Article 311(1) is whether the officer passing the removal order is subordinate in rank to the officer who actually made the appointment. Delegation of appointment powers does not, by itself, elevate the hierarchical status of the delegate.

The Court examined Sections 6 and 9 of the Railway Protection Force Act, 1957, along with Rules 20 and 43 and Schedules I and II of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959.

It found that although overall control over appointments rested with the Chief Security Officer, Section 6 permitted other superior officers to exercise appointment powers. Rule 20 read with Schedule I expressly empowered an Assistant Security Officer to appoint Senior Rakshaks and Rakshaks.

Similarly, Rule 43 read with Schedule II empowered the Assistant Security Officer to remove Senior Rakshaks and Rakshaks. The Court observed: “On a conjoint reading of Sections 6 and 9 of the RPF Act and Rules 20 and 43 read with Schedules I and II of the Rules, it is inferred that although control in the matter of appointment rests with the Chief Security Officer, the statutory scheme permits the exercise of the power of appointment by other superior officers competent under the Rules. The Rules expressly confer upon the Assistant Security Officer the power to appoint Senior Rakshaks and Rakshaks and also confer upon such authority the power to impose the penalty of removal upon Senior Rakshaks and Rakshaks.”

The Court said this interpretation was consistent with Union of India v. Chandra Pal Pandey (1993), which held that the expression “shall rest” in Section 6 did not vest appointment powers exclusively in the Chief Security Officer.

The Court noted that the Adjutant who passed the removal order was of the same rank as the Assistant Commandant who had appointed the respondent. The Trial Court had recorded that the Adjutant was not lower in rank, and the respondent had produced no material establishing subordination.

The Court held: “Consequently, the Order of Removal dated 18.03.1983, having been passed by an authority which was not subordinate in rank to the authority which had appointed the respondent and which was competent under Schedule II of the Rules to impose the penalty of removal upon a Rakshak, cannot be held invalid on the ground of violation of Article 311(1) of the Constitution. Therefore, the contrary conclusion reached by the First Appellate Court and affirmed by the High Court is unsustainable.”

The Supreme Court also rejected the contention that the departmental inquiry violated the principles of natural justice. It noted that the respondent had acknowledged the charge-sheet, submitted his response and received notice of the inquiry.

Despite being informed of the proceedings, he failed to appear. A show-cause notice proposing removal was subsequently issued, but he did not submit a representation.

The Court observed: “The principles of natural justice require that a reasonable opportunity of defence be afforded to the delinquent employee. In the present case, the respondent was made aware of the disciplinary proceedings and was afforded an opportunity to participate therein. Accordingly, on the facts and circumstances of the present case, the departmental enquiry cannot be held to be vitiated merely on the ground that it proceeded ex-parte and therefore, the contention raised by the respondent alleging violation of the principles of natural justice is rejected.”

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the Union of India’s appeal and set aside the judgments of the Allahabad High Court and the First Appellate Court. It restored the Trial Court’s dismissal of the employee’s civil suit and reinstated the order removing him from service.

The Court held that the Assistant Commandant’s Battalion Order was both the appointment and posting order, the Adjutant who ordered the removal was not subordinate to the appointing authority, and the departmental inquiry was not vitiated merely because it proceeded ex parte.

Cause Title: Union of India & Ors. v. Ramdhani Prasad (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1047)

Appearances

Appellants: Additional Solicitor General Vikramjit Banerjee; Advocates Vaishali Verma, Harish Panday, Shashwat Parihar, Nring Chamwibo Zeliang, Prabhati Nayak and Arun Kumar Yadav; Amrish Kumar, AOR

Respondent: Advocates Mananjay K. Mishra, Bhaskar Pandey and Prabhsharan Singh Mohi; Aviral Kashyap, AOR

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