Court Bound To Accept Religious Belief Of Community, Not To Sit In Judgment On It: Travancore Devaswom Board Tells Supreme Court In Sabarimala Case

The Travancore Devaswom Board (TDB) has filed its Written Submissions in the Sabarimala case and has submitted before the Supreme Court that the Court is bound to accept the belief of the community, and it is not for the Court to sit in judgment on that belief.

The Supreme Court passed an order for commencing the 9-judge bench for the hearing of the issues referred in the Sabarimala review from April 7, 2026.

The Board also adds that it is impermissible to add, modify or subtract from the specific constitutional text and accordingly, the additional derogation of ‘essentiality’ as engrafted by some judgments is entirely impermissible. 

The Board submits, "The beliefs and practices of the community have to be judged by the subjective belief of the community. The Court is bound to accept the belief of the community, and it is not for the Court to sit in judgment on that belief...It is impermissible to add, modify or subtract from the specific constitutional text and accordingly, the additional derogation of ‘essentiality’ as engrafted by some judgments is entirely impermissible...The permissible restrictions / derogations from the right to practice, profess and propagate religion, found in Article 25, were arrived at after detailed and meticulous deliberations and any other explicit or implied dilution of the right by interposition of other judicial restrictions would breakdown the delicate and intricate system of checks and balances envisioned by the framers...The rights of persons under Article 25 of the Constitution of India are to be read harmoniously with the “other provisions of this Part” and are to be balanced with the rights thereunder."

The State of Kerala has also recently filed its submissions in the matter. It has been said that any judicial interference into long-standing religious practices must only occur after wide-ranging consultations with eminent religious scholars and reputed social reformers of that specific faith.

While addressing the issue of the scope and ambit of the right to freedom of religion under Article 25 of the Constitution of India, the Board submits, "Religion, though incapable of precise definition, must involve a cohesive commonality of beliefs and practices for a community of persons; Their beliefs, practices and customs can be reviewed, if at all, where absolutely necessary, only by applying the subjective test of the beliefs of the community itself and only to the extent as to whether the belief or practice is in fact a part of that religion; It cannot be reviewed or tested by external, supposedly objective tests imposed by society or by judges in an adjudicatory matrix; A large volume of rituals, ceremonial practices and other seemingly procedural practices would nevertheless be entitled to the full protection of Article 25, so long as they are held to be part of the religion concerned; Since Article 25 protects the common beliefs and practices of a community, it is not open to an individual member of that community, in the purported assertion of that individual’s supposed constitutional right, to dilute or destroy the Article 25 rights of the entire community."

It was submitted, "Practices and beliefs of a religious community must be judged by courts purely applying a subjective test and not any external, objective test; Courts cannot and should not re-write practices and tenets of a religion or “rationalize religion” (per Malhotra J., dissenting, in the original Sabarimala judgment, now under review); Factually established religion and religious practices ought not to be subjected to judicial interpretation (M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das & Ors.26 i.e. the Ram Janambhumi Judgment) These principles harmonize and effectuate the primacy given to “Fraternity” in our constitutional Preamble;"

The Board argues that once a belief or practice is found factually established in what is acceptedvas a religion, then any further judicial application of a supposed essentialityvtest would amount to engrafting into Article 25, an additional restriction/derogation on what has already been found to constitute religion, apart andvdistinct from the four derogations already listed after much care and cautionvby our founding fathers and mothers.

TDB says that the idea of enquiry into the essentiality of a religious practice is anathema to Article 25(1). It is only if a religious practice is contrary to public order, morality, health, or the Part III rights of any person, that it may be interfered with, even though it may be considered to be essential to that religion. If, however, a practice is not offensive to public order, morality, health or the Part III rights of any person, and is considered a part of religion by its adherents, then the State does not have the power to restrict or regulate it on the ground that the same is not an essential part of the religion.

"To allow derogation in respect of as vital and significant a fundamental right as the right to religion, by ad-hoc and mere subjective executive instructions, orders, and directions, not having the trappings of either law or delegated legislation, would render susceptible such an important fundamental right to dangerous executive invasion; In the context of the aforesaid larger objectives and perspectives, even if a doubt existed as to this issue (which does not exist), constitutional courts and the 9-judge bench should adopt a teleological and purposive interpretation to sub-serve the object of strengthening the right of freedom of religion", it said.

The Board contended that courts must use a subjective test—judging practices based on the community's own doctrines—rather than imposing external, objective standards of "rationality" or "morality". A secular judge is bound to accept the community's bona fide beliefs.

It also says, "Subject to the submissions on ‘essentiality’ made earlier, it well established that social reforms or the need for regulations contemplated by Article 25(2) cannot obliterate essential religious practices or their performances and what would constitute the essential part of a religion can be ascertained with reference to the doctrine of that religion itself. Lastly on this point, Article 26 in general and 26(b) in particular would have to be subject to the same interpretation namely that the rights of a religions domination, inter-alia, to manage its own matters of religion can only be derogated on the three heads of public order, morality and health (and notably not on the fourth head of “other provisions of Part-III”) nor can they be derogated on the broad head of social welfare and reform."

The submissions strongly argued that the "essentiality test" (determining if a practice is "essential" to a religion) is a judicial overreach not found in the constitutional text. They assert that all religious practices, whether deemed "essential" or not, should be protected unless they violate specific constitutional restrictions.

Religious freedom is subject only to public order, morality, and health, and other provisions of Part III. The Board argued that "morality" in this context refers to societal standards like honesty or decency, not a broad "constitutional morality" that could be used to strike down traditional practices

Regarding the issue of the inter-play between the rights of persons under Article 25 of the Constitution of India and rights of religious denomination under Article 26, the Board said, "Denominations and even sections thereof, understood in the widest possible sense, are protected under Article 26...Management of affairs of denominations or sections thereof cannot be diluted or deprived by legislature, which, however, can regulate administration of property associated with religion and religious practices...In case of a conflict between an individual right under Article 25(1) and the right of a denomination under Article 26, the right of the denomination would prevail as Article 25(1) is subject to other provisions of Part III which includes Article 26...Article 25(2)(a) does not permit the State to regulate religious practices themselves, but only economic, commercial, or political activities that are associated with religious practices, as clarified by the Supreme Court in Shirur Mutt. The freedom to practice religion under Article 25(1) therefore remains protected except where such practices conflict with public order, health, or morality."

The submissions also address the tension between individual rights and denominational rights. The Board argues that Sabarimala is a denominational temple with the right under Article 26 to manage its own internal "matters of religion." They contend that Article 26 is not explicitly "subject to other provisions" of the Fundamental Rights chapter in the same way Article 25 is. Therefore, the specific traditions of a denomination—such as the celibate nature of the deity at Sabarimala and the resulting entry restrictions—should be protected from being overridden by general claims of individual equality under Article 14.

The Board raises serious concerns about the "judicialization" of faith through Public Interest Litigations. The TDB argues that challenges to religious practices should only be brought by actual practitioners or "adherents" of the faith, not by interlopers or strangers who do not believe in the deity. Because religious customs involve complex questions of history and tradition, the Board asserts they cannot be decided on the basis of affidavits in a PIL. Instead, they should be tested in a civil court where witnesses can be cross-examined and historical evidence can be formally proved, it says.

"Judicial interference by way of PIL is available if there is injury to public because of dereliction of constitutional or statutory obligations on the part of the Government. Here it is not so and in the religious sphere the Court is not the appropriate forum. Every matter of public interest or curiosity, especially with respect to religious matters cannot be the subject-matter of PIL. Courts will interfere only if there is a clear violation of constitutional or statutory provisions or non-compliance by the State with its constitutional or statutory duties. None of these contingencies arise in this present case. (BALCO Employees' Union (Regd.) v. Union of India)191...In a pluralistic society of people with diverse faiths, beliefs, and traditions, entertaining and allowing PILs which challenge religious practises followed by diverse denominations, would amount to damage to the Constitutional and secular fabric of this country", it says.

It adds that a mere statement about being an adherent can neither be self-fulfilling nor conclusive. A person must demonstrate reasonably in his claims, actions, and petition that he belongs to the religion or religious denomination or group about whose practice he is protesting. The moment he does so, his individual protestation and subjective beliefs must be submerged and subsumed within the collective ethos of all adherents to that religion / religious belief and would naturally become inconsequential.

Cause Title: Kantaru Rejeevaru Vs Indian Young Lawyers Association; Sabarimala Custom Protection Forum Vs Indian Young Lawyers Association [R.P.(C) No. 3358/2018 in W.P. (C) No. 373/2006]