Supreme Court: High Courts Must Not Give Legitimizing Effect To Callous Attitude Of State Authorities; Remain Extra Cautious If They Are Seeking Condonation Of Delay

The Supreme Court in its important Judgment, observed that the High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if they are seeking condonation of delay.

The Court was deciding a Civil Appeal filed against the Judgment of the Karnataka High Court, which condoned the delay of 3966 days in preferring the Second Appeal against the First Appellate Court’s Judgment.

The two-Judge Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan remarked, “The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.”

The Bench clarified that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay.

AOR Akshat Shirvastava appeared on behalf of the Appellants while Senior Advocate Kiran Suri appeared on behalf of the Respondents.

Court’s Observations

The Court in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, noted, “An application seeking condonation of delay is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, on lofty ideals amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the statute.”

The Court said that the length of the delay is a relevant matter which the Court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not.

“Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter”, it emphasised.

The Court added that the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation and it is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the Court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

“We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants”, it remarked.

Public Policy vis-à-vis Public Interest

The Court enunciated that the limitation laws are themselves grounded in public policy and it is based on the maxim ‘interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium’ i.e., “it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation”; therefore, public interest is better served by timely governmental action than by condoning repeated lapses.

“State cannot simultaneously seek to represent the interest of the public and yet consistently fail to protect that very interest by allowing limitation periods to lapse. … Public interest is best served by ensuring efficiency and diligence in governmental functioning, rather than by condoning its lapses as a matter of course. Thus, a liberal inclination towards the State or any of its instrumentalities, in matters of condonation of delay, cannot be adopted, merely on the presumption that, if the delay is not condoned, public interest runs the risk of suffering, by a meritorious matter being thrown out. Public interest lies not in condoning governmental indifference, but in compelling efficiency, responsibility, and timely action”, it further observed.

The Court also said that public interest does not lie in condoning governmental negligence, but in compelling efficiency, responsibility, and timely decision-making and liberal condonation of delay on behalf of the State, merely on the ground that refusal might cause the dismissal of a potentially meritorious matter, is a misplaced proposition.

“Public interest is not synonymous with the cause of the Government; it is, instead, synonymous with the enforcement of rule of law, certainty in legal rights, and an administrative machinery that functions with diligence and accountability”, it added.

Moreover, the Court elucidated that the State is under a higher duty to act in time, for in every matter it litigates, it does so not in its private capacity, but as the trustee of the people’s interest; hence, repeated indulgence in condoning delays on grounds of bureaucratic inefficiency would amount to eroding the very object of limitation statutes, which are enacted in every civilised jurisdiction for the sake of finality, certainty, and public order.

“… we are of the considered opinion, that delay cannot be condoned, merely because not doing so would result in non-suiting the State and thereby run the ostensible risk of public interest suffering. Such by no stretch can be the sole consideration for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as to do so would be to ignore the provision of Section 3 and the overarching public policy of giving quietus to lis, that forms the bedrock of the Limitation Act”, it noted.

The Court said that no litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the Courts to misuse the process of law.

Conclusion

Coming back to the facts of the case, the Court remarked that the High Court erroneously condoned a massive delay of 3966 days on account of certain lapses at the administrative levels and of there being no follow-ups in the proceedings, along with finding certain merits in the case of the Respondent against the maintainability of the suit of the Appellant and that of the relief molded by the First Appellate Court.

“We have no hesitation in stating that such grounds are nowhere near to being “sufficient cause” as per Section 5 of the 1963 Act. The High Court lost sight of the fact that the precedents and authorities it relied upon by it had delays of two-digits, or even that of single-digit, more particularly the delay in those cases was supported by sufficient cause. The present case, however, stands on a very different footing, owing to such an enormous delay. Hence, we are not inclined to accept the condonation of the delay by the High Court”, it concluded.

The Court, therefore, directed the Court of Principle Judge (Junior Division), Kalaburagi to proceed with the execution of the decree in favour of the Appellant and ensure that the proceedings conclude within a period of 2 months.

Accordingly, the Apex Court allowed the Appeal, set aside the High Court’s Judgment, imposed an additional cost of Rs. 25,000/- on the Respondent, and directed the Registry to circulate one copy each of the Judgment to all the High Courts.

Cause Title- Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1104)

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