Delay Must Be Explained By Establishing Existence Of “Sufficient Cause” For Entirety Of Period U/S. 5 Limitation Act: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court said that the power that the Court exercises in condoning the delay, is not for the purpose of putting the litigant back into the position he would have enjoyed during the prescribed period of limitation.
Justice J.B. Pardiwala, Justice R. Mahadevan, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the delay must be explained by establishing the existence of “sufficient cause” for the entirety of the period from when the limitation began till the actual date of filing.
The Court held thus in a Civil Appeal filed against the Judgment of the Karnataka High Court, which condoned the delay of 3966 days in preferring the Second Appeal against the First Appellate Court’s Judgment.
The two-Judge Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan observed, “… as is manifest from the entire discussion above, for the purpose of condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay has to be explained by establishing the existence of “sufficient cause” for the entirety of the period from when the limitation began till the actual date of filing. In other words, if the period of limitation is 90-days, and the appeal is filed belatedly on the 100th day, then explanation has to be given for the entire 100-days.”
The Bench said that the power that the Court exercises in condoning the delay, is not for the purpose of putting the litigant back into the position he would have enjoyed during the prescribed period of limitation and this is because, during the prescribed period of limitation, the litigant is entitled, as a matter of right, to file the Appeal or Application, as the case may be, and the Courts cannot object or refuse to admit the same.
AOR Akshat Shirvastava appeared on behalf of the Appellants while Senior Advocate Kiran Suri appeared on behalf of the Respondents.
Brief Facts
A parcel of land was originally owned and possessed by the Appellant’s father and after his demise, some disputes arose between the legal heirs including the Appellant and another person namely C. Patil, which led to the institution of the Partition Suit in 1971. During the pendency of the said suit, Patil purportedly donated 4 acres out of the said land which was the subject matter of the suit to the Government of Karnataka. Pursuantly, the Respondent housing corporation (Karnataka Housing Board/KHB) sometime in the year 1979 took over the possession of the land for the purpose of establishing a housing colony. In 1989, a compromise decree was passed in the suit whereby the Appellant became the absolute owner of the land. However, since the possession of the land was not reverted to the Appellant, one another suit was instituted and this time against the Respondent, praying for the relief of declaration of title and possession of the land.
The aforesaid suit was dismissed by the Trial Court and this was challenged by the Appellant. The First Appellate Court allowed the Appellant’s Appeal and decreed the suit in his favour. However, it declined to grant relief of possession in view of the fact that substantial construction had already been undertaken on the land by the Respondent, and thus, instead directed the grant of compensation to the Appellant. Since no action was taken by the Respondent in accordance with decree, the Appellant initiated execution proceedings in 2011. Thereafter, in 2017, a Second Appeal was preferred along with an application for condonation of delay of 3966 days, which was allowed by the High Court. Hence, the Appellant was before the Apex Court.
Court’s Observations
The Supreme Court in view of the above facts, noted, “As such, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, for the purpose of seeking condonation of delay in filing of an appeal or application, as the case may be, beyond the stipulated period of limitation, the delay in the filing has to be explained by demonstrating the existence of a “sufficient cause” that resulted in such delay for both the prescribed period of limitation as-well as the period after the expiry of limitation, up to actual date of filing of such appeal or application, as the case may be, or to put it simply, explanation has to be given for the entire duration from the date when the clock of limitation began to tick, up until the date of actual filing, for seeking condonation of delay by recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”
The Court said that in the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd (1962), the fixation that “within such period” covers only the period from the last day of limitation till the actual date of filing, does not appear to be supported either by the bare text of the provision or by the mere omission of an express contextual concomitant, in the form of any parameters to avert to any inaction, negligence or lack of diligence of a litigant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, that could be suggestive of the legislative intent to avoid applicability of such parameters for the condonation of delay thereunder.
“… it is clear that the period which is being effectively extended is only ancillary to the “sufficient cause” that would have occasioned. Even the bare text of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, makes it abundantly clear that while “sufficient cause” has to be shown for the duration covered by the expression “within such period”, nowhere does the provision allude that the “period” which would be effectively extended by the court, in exercise of its discretion for condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be the period for which “sufficient cause” is demonstrated”, it enunciated.
The Court explained that while the expression “sufficient cause” and “within such period” are itself inextricably linked together, both these expressions have nothing to do with the manner in which the Court proceeds to condone the delay i.e., the period which the Court extends in exercise of its discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Length of the delay may be instructive but not determinative
The Court observed that the delay by itself is not inherently indicative of negligence and in certain cases, unavoidable circumstances such as illness, fraud, miscommunication, or bona fide mistake may stretch over long periods, yet remain excusable if they are explained with candour and supported by material. It added that conversely, an unexplained delay of even a few days may reveal inaction or deliberate disregard of statutory timelines, and therefore disentitle the party to indulgence.
“The quantum of delay has no direct nexus in law with sufficiency of the cause. The law are independent and diverse factors. Hence the extent of delay should not determine whether the cause is sufficient or not. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the criterion. The criterion for condoning the delay is sufficiency of reason and not the length of the delay”, it emphasised.
Technical Considerations vis-à-vis Substantive Justice
The Court remarked that while substantial justice must be advanced, the law of limitation is equally binding, and “sufficient cause” must be shown in substance, not in empty form and this ensures that the balance between justice and certainty is not skewed in favour of unmerited litigants.
“However, at the same time, the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether “sufficient cause” has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny”, it elucidated.
The Court further noted that the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the Applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay.
In what circumstances can the exercise of discretion to condone the delay be interfered with?
The Court said that the Appellate Court cannot embark upon an inquiry to enter a finding based on its likes or dislikes and the true test is to see, if it had been up to the Appellate Court, could the delay have been plausibly condoned for the same reason that was assigned by the court below, by looking into the material on record to see if the ingredients of Section 5 of the Limitation Act were fulfilled or not.
“If the ingredients of the provision is found to not have been fulfilled, the appellate court can and ought to interfere with the order of the court below”, it added.
Public Policy vis-à-vis Public Interest in matters of delay on part of the State or any of its instrumentalities
The Court was of the view that the delay cannot be condoned, merely because not doing so would result in non-suiting the State and thereby run the ostensible risk of public interest suffering and such by no stretch can be the sole consideration for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as to do so would be to ignore the provision of Section 3 and the overarching public policy of giving quietus to lis, that forms the bedrock of the Limitation Act.
“The State is under a higher duty to act in time, for in every matter it litigates, it does so not in its private capacity, but as the trustee of the people’s interest. Hence, repeated indulgence in condoning delays on grounds of bureaucratic inefficiency would amount to eroding the very object of limitation statutes, which are enacted in every civilised jurisdiction for the sake of finality, certainty, and public order”, it also said.
Conclusion
Coming back to the facts of the case, the Court remarked that the High Court erroneously condoned a massive delay of 3966 days on account of certain lapses at the administrative levels and of there being no follow-ups in the proceedings, along with finding certain merits in the case of the Respondent against the maintainability of the suit of the Appellant and that of the relief molded by the First Appellate Court.
“We have no hesitation in stating that such grounds are nowhere near to being “sufficient cause” as per Section 5 of the 1963 Act. The High Court lost sight of the fact that the precedents and authorities it relied upon by it had delays of two-digits, or even that of single-digit, more particularly the delay in those cases was supported by sufficient cause. The present case, however, stands on a very different footing, owing to such an enormous delay. Hence, we are not inclined to accept the condonation of the delay by the High Court”, it concluded.
Accordingly, the Apex Court allowed the Appeal, set aside the High Court’s Judgment, imposed an additional cost of Rs. 25,000/- on the Respondent, and directed the Registry to circulate one copy each of the Judgment to all the High Courts.
Cause Title- Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1104)
Appearance:
Appellants: AOR Akshat Shrivastava
Respondents: Senior Advocate Kiran Suri, AORs E. C. Vidya Sagar, D. L. Chidananda, Advocates Subhash Chandra Sagar, Hemant Kumar Sagar, Shailendra Singh, and S J Amit.
