Supreme Court: Judicial Imposition Of Timelines On Governor Under Article 200 Erroneous; Deemed Assent Concept Amounts To Virtual Takeover OF Executive Function

The Supreme Court while answering the Presidential Reference, held that the imposition of timelines on the Governor under Article 200 of the Constitution are erroneous.

The Court observed that a state of doubt or confusion has arisen in relation to various issues concluded in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025 INSC 481).

In exercise of powers conferred under Article 143(1) of the Constitution, the President of India on May 13, 2025 referred fourteen questions relating to interpretation of powers of the Governor under Articles 200 and 201 along with certain ancillary questions for opinion of the Court.

The five-Judge Bench comprising Chief Justice of India (CJI) B.R. Gavai, Justice Surya Kant, Justice Vikram Nath, Justice P.S. Narasimha, and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar observed, “… we are required to clarify that the paragraphs 260-261 of the judgment in State of Tamil Nadu (supra), pertaining to the imposition of timelines on the Governor under Article 200 are erroneous.107 It must also be pointed out that there was no occasion for the issue of setting a timeline for disposal of Bills referred to the President under Article 201, to arise before this Court, while considering State of Tamil Nadu (supra). Thus, it is clarified that any observations on the aspect of timelines applicable to the President under Article 201, or conclusions thereof on this aspect, are merely obiter, and ought to be treated as such.”

The Bench said that the Ministry’s circulars cannot be incorporated by way of judicial interpretation in such a manner, so as to apply as a Constitutional fetter, on the Governor and the President and such an exercise of judicial construction would not be appropriate.

Solicitor General Tushar Mehta made submissions on behalf of the Union of India. Senior Advocate Neeraj Kishan Kaul appeared for the State of Madhya Pradesh, Senior Advocate Harish Salve for the State of Maharashtra, Senior Advocate Maninder Singh for the State of Rajasthan, ASG K.M. Nataraj for the States of Orissa and Uttar Pradesh, ASG Vikramjit Banerjee for the State of Goa, Senior Advocate Vinay Navare for the Union Territory of Puducherry, and Senior Advocate Guru Krishna Kumar for the State of Haryana. Senior Advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi made submissions on behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu, Senior Advocate K.K. Venugopal appeared for the State of Kerala, Senior Advocate Kapil Sibal for the State of West Bengal, Senior Advocate Gopal Subramanium for the State of Karnataka, Senior Advocate Anand Sharma for the State of Himachal Pradesh, Senior Advocate Arvind Datar for the State of Punjab, Senior Advocate S. Niranjan Reddy for the State of Telangana, and Advocate General Amit Kumar for the State of Meghalaya. Senior Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Advocates Avani Bansal, Vivek Sharma, and Sudiep Shrivastava appeared for the Intervenors.

Background

As per the Orders of the CJI, the reference was placed before the Constitution Bench following the procedure prescribed under Order XXXVII of the Supreme Court Rules on July 22, 2025. Formal notices were issued to States and Union Territories and they were asked to file written submissions. Pursuant to the filing of the submissions, hearing commenced on August 19, 2025.

Court’s Opinion

The Supreme Court in the aforesaid background, remarked, “We are of the opinion that from the above discussion, the following position of law clearly emerges: Firstly, ordinarily, the Governor exercises his functions in accordance with the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers. Secondly, the Constitution itself provides that the Governor may discharge certain functions upon his discretion, and without being bound by the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers. Thirdly, the circumstances or occasions where the Governor is to discharge his functions without being bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, are either expressly provided, or through necessary implication where the constitutional context requires exercise of this discretion.”

The Court noted that it is for the Court to determine from the spirit and text of the Constitution, and from the manner in which the Constitution has been practiced, to see whether the Governor requires to be conferred discretion in exercise of his function under Article 200. It was of the view that the Governor must be given this Constitutional option, i.e., to exercise his discretion under Article 200.

“… the role of the President in protecting and defending the Constitution – in binding the Union as a cohesive unit – is crucial. It is reiterated, that the President will be unable to exercise his functions, until the Governor a priori reserves the Bill for his assent. It is unlikely that the Council of Ministers – without whose support the Bill could not have been passed by the Legislature – will advise the Governor, to return a Bill to the Legislature, or refer it to the President, under Article 200, thus frustrating the operation of numerous provisions of this Constitution, including the President’s powers. In such a scenario, it is unfathomable to hold that the Governor is not conferred with discretion, under Article 200”, it enunciated.

The Court was of the opinion that the inclusion of the phrase “in the opinion of the Governor” in the second proviso to Article 200 is a definitive expression of the fact that Governor does enjoy discretion in discharging his functions under Article 200.

“It is but obvious, that any Bill that has been reserved by the Governor for the consideration of the President, cannot become law until such assent is given. Therefore, the deliberate inclusion of the phrasing “provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent” in Articles 31A proviso, 31C proviso, Article 254(2), Article 288(2) and Article 360, is significant. The framers of the Constitution cannot be presumed to have employed this wording superfluously, to simply mean that the President’s assent was a precondition only if and when the Bill is reserved for his consideration”, it added.

The Court clarified that the Governor has no option to withhold a Bill simpliciter, and therefore, it is not that the discretion so conferred, allows a situation wherein the Governor could frustrate a Bill in perpetuity.

“The text of Articles 200 and 201, has been framed in such a manner, so as to provide a sense of elasticity, for constitutional authorities to perform their functions, keeping in mind the diverse contexts and situations, and by consequence the need for balancing that might arise in the process of law making in a federal, and democratic country like ours. The imposition of timelines would be strictly contrary to this elasticity that the Constitution so carefully preserves”, it emphasised.

The Court explained that if there are no prescribed timelines under Articles 200 and 201, then expiry of them too, cannot amount to ‘deemed consent’. It further held that the concept of deemed assent of pending Bills by the Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142, is virtually a takeover of the role, and function, of a separate constitutional authority and the reliance on Article 142, cannot lead to supplanting constitutional provisions itself.

The Court also observed that Article 142 cannot be employed to arrive at a conclusion contrary to the express provisions of the Constitution. It reiterated that the jurisdiction under Article 142 cannot be invoked to achieve results that are contrary to the Constitution, or statutory provisions.

“… deemed consent of the Governor, or President, under Article 200 or 201 at the expiry of a judicially set timeline, is virtually a takeover, and substitution, of the executive functions by the Judiciary, through judicial pronouncement, which is impermissible within the contours of our written Constitution”, it added.

Conclusion

The Court, therefore, summarised the conclusions on the Presidential Reference as under –

1. The Governor has three constitutional options before him, under Article 200, namely - to assent, reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President, or withhold assent and return the Bill to the Legislature with comments. The first proviso to Article 200 is bound to the substantive part of the provision, and restricts the existing options, rather than offering a fourth option. Pertinently, the third option – to withhold assent and return with comments – is only available to the Governor when it is not a Money Bill.

2. The Governor enjoys discretion in choosing from these three constitutional options and is not bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, while exercising his function under Article 200.

3. The discharge of the Governor’s function under Article 200, is not justiciable. The Court cannot enter into a merits review of the decision so taken. However, in glaring circumstances of inaction that is prolonged, unexplained, and indefinite – the Court can issue a limited mandamus for the Governor to discharge his function under Article 200 within a reasonable time period, without making any observations on the merits of the exercise of his discretion.

4. Article 361 of the Constitution is an absolute bar on judicial review in relation to personally subjecting the Governor to judicial proceedings. However, it cannot be relied upon to negate the limited scope of judicial review that this Court is empowered to exercise in situations of prolonged inaction by the Governor under Article 200. It is clarified that while the Governor continues to enjoy personal immunity, the constitutional office of the Governor is subject to the jurisdiction of this court.

5. In the absence of constitutionally prescribed time limits, and the manner of exercise of power by the Governor, it would not be appropriate for this Court to judicially prescribe timelines for the exercise of powers under Article 200.

6. For similar reasoning as held with respect to the Governor, the President’s assent under Article 201 too, is not justiciable.

7. For the same reasons as indicated in the context of the Governor under Article 200, it is clarified that the President, too, cannot be bound by judicially prescribed timelines in the discharge of functions under Article 201.

8. In our constitutional scheme, the President is not required to seek advice of the Supreme Court by way of reference under Article 143, every time a Governor reserves a Bill for the President’s assent. The subjective satisfaction of the President is sufficient. If there is a lack of clarity, or the President so requires advice of the Supreme Court on a Bill, it may be referred under Article 143, as it has been done on numerous previous occasions.

9. The decisions of the Governor and President under Articles 200 and 201 respectively, are not justiciable at a stage anterior into the law coming into force. It is impermissible for the Courts to undertake judicial adjudication over the contents of a Bill, in any manner, before it becomes law. Pertinently, discharge of its role under Article 143, does not constitute ‘judicial adjudication’.

10. The exercise of constitutional powers and the orders of the President/Governor cannot be substituted in any manner under Article 142, and we hereby clarify that the Constitution, specifically Article 142 even, does not allow for the concept of ‘deemed assent’ of Bills.

11. There is no question of a law made by the State Legislature coming into force without assent of the Governor under Article 200. The Governor’s legislative role under Article 200 cannot be supplanted by another constitutional authority.

12. Hear cases of constitutional importance is irrelevant to the functional nature of this reference, and is returned unanswered.

13. Question 13 concerning the power under Article 142 is overly broad, and not possible to answer in a definitive manner. The opinion on the scope of Article 142 in the context of the functions of the Governor and President has already been answered as a part of Question 10.

14. Question 14 – pertaining to the Court’s jurisdiction to resolve disputes between the Union and State Governments outside of Article 131 – is also found to be irrelevant to the functional nature of the reference and hence returned unanswered.

Accordingly, the Apex Court answered the Presidential Reference.

Cause Title- In Re: Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1333)

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