The Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench has held that the nature of the disclosure and the substance of the information received determine whether a person acquires the knowledge required under Section 19 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. It discharged a village social worker, the husband of the Sarpanch, who had accompanied a child victim’s parents to the school to question the accused teacher and was later charged under Section 21(1) for failing to report the offence.

The Court observed that the duty to report attaches to any person who acquires credible knowledge of the offence, including through the victim’s parents, and that no exemption exists for social workers, village elders or elected representatives. It held, however, that prosecution under Section 21(1) must rest on material showing that the particular accused acquired such knowledge and failed to report. The allegation that the villagers discouraged the parents from approaching the police, it said, cannot take the place of the ingredients of that provision, though it may be examined under other penal provisions.

A Bench of Justice Hiten S. Venegavkar observed, “The nature of the disclosure, therefore, assumes importance. Where a child narrates an incident of sexual assault to a parent, teacher, guardian or another adult, the person receiving such information ordinarily acquires the knowledge contemplated by Section 19. Similarly, where a parent or another person communicates sufficiently clear and credible information about the commission of an offence to another adult, the statutory obligation may arise in the circumstances of that case. However, where the information is vague, uncertain or does not reasonably convey that an offence under the Act has been committed, the mere receipt of such information cannot automatically establish the knowledge required for prosecution. The question therefore must be considered upon the substance of the information and the surrounding circumstances”.

Advocate K. N. Shermale appeared for the applicant, while APP S. D. Ghayal appeared for the respondent no. 1 and Advocate Sarika Maru Tekale was appointed to represent the victim.

The child, a third-standard student, told her mother on August 1, 2025 that her teacher had sexually assaulted her. On August 4, 2025, her parents narrated the incident to villagers, including the applicant. They went to the school, where the teacher allegedly apologised. The applicant and others allegedly advised the parents against approaching the police, thereafter, an FIR was lodged on August 7, 2025.

The applicant, accused No. 3 in a case, sought discharge under Section 250 of the BNSS. The Fast Track Special Judge (POCSO), Ahmednagar, rejected the plea on July 23, 2026, reasoning that he received information, accompanied the parents and did not report. He then approached the High Court under Section 438 of the BNSS.

The Court read AAA v. Linda Sema and Others, 2026 (8) SCC 68 as holding that knowledge includes awareness from credible information, and that a recipient cannot conduct a private inquiry before reporting. “…Direct disclosure by the child is a circumstance which establishes credibility without requiring independent verification. It does not follow that credible information received through a parent, guardian or another person is invariably excluded from Section 19. Such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the language of the provision and would defeat its protective purpose”, it noted.

It clarified that the judgment does not limit liability to persons told directly by the child, as that would defeat the provision’s protective purpose. It also noted that the Supreme Court had upheld discharge of persons whose mere presence at a verification exercise did not establish knowledge.

“…Nevertheless, the relationship between the recipient of information and the child, the circumstances in which the information was communicated, and the nature of the recipient's subsequent conduct may be relevant in determining whether the statutory ingredients are disclosed. A teacher or Headmistress who receives a clear disclosure of sexual assault from a child stands in a materially different factual position from a person who is casually informed about a dispute and accompanies the parents to an institution at their request. The difference does not arise from an exemption based upon status, but from the nature of the information received and the evidence concerning the alleged failure to report”, it said.

“…A person cannot be prosecuted merely upon an assumption that, because information was discussed in his presence, he must necessarily have acquired the requisite knowledge and committed the offence of nonreporting”, the Bench further said.

The allegation of pressure was directed at the group, and the material did not distinguish the applicant’s individual conduct. Section 21(1), the Court noted, does not create a separate offence of dissuading a complaint. It said the Special Judge had not examined the difference between receiving information and acquiring knowledge under Section 19.

The Court allowed the revision, quashed the July 23, 2026 order insofar as it concerned the applicant, and discharged him under Section 21(1). It clarified that the discharge is no finding on the pressure allegation, and that the Special Judge may consider Section 358 of the BNSS if evidence discloses a distinct offence. The trial against the other accused will continue. The Court appointed an advocate for the informant and requested payment of her fees by the High Court Legal Services Sub-Committee.

Cause Title: Rajendra Suryabhan Darade v. State of Maharashtra and Another (Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-AUG:52608)

Appearances:

Applicant: Advocate K. N. Shermale.

Respondent: APP S. D. Ghayal, Advocate Sarika Maru Tekale (appointed).

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