Specific Declaration That Document Is Invalid Not Necessary If It Ex Facie Reveals That Conveyor Doesn't Have Title: SC
The Supreme Court observed that if a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over it, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary.
The Court was deciding an appeal preferred by the legal representatives that arose out of a suit for partition by a person claiming shares in the property.
The two-Judge Bench comprising Justice Aniruddha Bose and Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia held, “The High Court as also the Trial Court have held that since the deeds were proved, implying that Cheruthey had the right to execute the lease deed on 14th July 1910 so far as the deed of re-lease is concerned, the same might entitle her to be the beneficiary as a lessee thereof. But it would be trite to repeat that even if subsistence of a deed is proved in evidence, the title of the executing person (in this case Chiruthey) does not automatically stand confirmed. If a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over the same, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary. The Court can examine the title in the event any party to the proceeding sets up this defence. Chiruthey could not convey any property over which she did not have any right or title. Her right, if any, would stem from the second deed of lease (Exhibit A-1).”
Senior Advocate V. Chidambaresh represented the appellants while Advocate C.K. Sasi represented the respondents.
Facts of the Case -
A suit for partition was instituted by the respondent (Chandu) claiming 8/20 shares in the suit property and the appellants were the defendants in the said suit and were successors-in-interest of one person named Sankaran. Both were uterine brothers and were the sons of a woman who was married twice. Sankaran was born from the first wedlock and Chandu from the second one. The suit property was situated in Kerala and the succession law governing the inheritance of parties before Hindu Succession Act, 1956 became operational and was the modified form of Mitakshara Law applicable to Makkathayees.
The Trial Court sustained the claim for partition and decreed in favour of the plaintiff. The First Appellate Court set aside the decree and dismissed the suit. The main issue before the Court was whether the mother had any title over the subject-property which the plaintiff claimed through the series of transactions. The First Appellate Court disbelieved that the deed of July 1925 was in discharge of liability under the mortgage deed. The High Court in the judgment under appeal primarily relied on the deeds executed in July 1910 to sustain the claim of Chandu represented by his successors-in-interest. Hence, the matter was before the Apex Court.
The Supreme Court in the above context of the case said, “These back-to-back transactions may be unusual, but in absence of any evidence pointing to any illegality, we hold them to be valid. The High Court on finding that these deeds are valid restored the Trial Court’s judgment and decree. The underlying reasoning of the High Court was that Chiruthey had legitimate right over the property. We however, find a flaw in this reasoning of the judgment of the High Court.”
The Court took note of the fact that no claim was made before any forum for invalidating the deed of July 1910 but in absence of proper title over the subject property, that lease deed even if she was its sole lessor would not have had been legally valid or enforceable.
“If right, title or interest in certain property is sought conveyed by a person by an instrument who herself does not possess any such form of entitlement on the subject being conveyed, even with a subsisting deed of conveyance on such property, the grantee on her successors-in-interest will not have legal right to enforce the right the latter may have derived from such an instrument. We, however, have not disturbed the transaction arising from Exhibit A-20 as the two legal heirs of Madhavan were also the lessors therein and to that extent, the document marked as Exhibit A-20 would not have collapsed for want of conveyable title, right or interest”, it noted.
Furthermore, the Court observed that what she got back by way of the document was limited right as that of a lessee and not as a successor of her first husband.
“Moreover, this lease (Exhibit A-1) was also for a period of twelve years and the re-lease deed made in the year 1925 which is Exhibit A-2 could not operate as by that time, the entitlement of Kuttiperavan over the subject property also stood lapsed as the document marked as Exhibit A-1 also had a duration of twelve years. No evidence has been shown before us as to how Kuttiperavan, in the capacity of a lessee could exercise his right after the term of lease granted to him was over”, it added.
The Court also said that the mother had lost her right over the subject property on her contracting second marriage and that her status over the said property, post-1910 if at all was that of lessee and hence, there is no indication in any of the deeds that the said lease could travel beyond the stipulated term of twelve years.
It concluded that the ownership of the suit property could not be said to have devolved in any manner whatsoever to the original plaintiff, who was born within the wedlock.
Accordingly, the Apex Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decision of the High Court, and confirmed that of the First Appellate Court.
Cause Title- Kizhakke Vattakandiyil Madhavan (Dead) Thr. LRs. v. Thiyyurkunnath Meethal Janaki and Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2024 INSC 287)
Appearance:
Appellants: Senior Advocate V. Chidambaresh, AOR A. Venayagam Balan, Advocates K. P. Rajagopal, Jaimon Andrews, Piyo Harold Jaimon, and AOR Naresh Kumar.
Respondents: AORs Mr. C. K. Sasi and John Mathew.
