The Delhi High Court has observed that a consent decree obtained by unlawful means can only be assailed before the Court which recorded the compromise and cannot be assailed in an appeal or through a separate suit.

In that context, the Bench of Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav observed that, "a consent decree can neither be assailed in an appeal nor by way of a separate suit. Furthermore, the unlawfulness of the compromise, which formed the genesis of such consent decree, could be assailed only before the court which recorded the compromise."

The Court also stressed that this view was in line with the intent of the procedure established by law, of giving certainty and predictability to the rights and liabilities of the parties and not let them agitate and reagitate by attempting to invoke the jurisdiction of different judicial forums

Senior Counsel Geeta Luthra and Senior Counsel AS Chandhiok, along with others, appeared for the appellants. Counsel Kuljeet Rawat, along with others, appeared for the respondents.

In this case, Lt. Col. Gaj Singh filed a Civil Suit for property partition, citing Shib Sahai as the common ancestor— a 1989 preliminary decree allocated shares among the parties. Due to jurisdiction changes, the case shifted to Tis Hazari Courts and eventually transferred to Patiala House Courts. In 2018, a judgment directed the preparation of the final decree, concluding the legal proceedings.

On hearing the parties, an issue framed by the High Court was whether the final decree was liable to be set aside, in absence of there being any challenge to the preliminary decree, owing to the ground that the preliminary decree was obtained on the basis of suppression of facts by the original plaintiffs.

The Court observed that it was clearly discernible from the language of Section 97 of CPC that where any party aggrieved by a preliminary decree fails to appeal from such decree, it is precluded by law from disputing its correctness in any appeal against the final decree.

In furtherance, it was observed that the only recourse which was available to the appellants to ventilate their grievance was to approach the court which had passed the preliminary decree as that court would alone have had the adequate jurisdiction to entertain the plea raised by them. In that context, it was said that, "Even assuming for a moment that the argument raised by the appellants is true and requires a thoughtful consideration on merits, in view of the explicit bar envisaged under CPC, as discussed above, the appellate proceedings against the final decree are not an appropriate stage to challenge the same. The only recourse which was available to the appellants to ventilate their grievance was to approach the court which had passed the preliminary decree as that court would alone have had the adequate jurisdiction to entertain the plea raised by them. If this court were to examine this issue in appellate proceedings, the same would be in the teeth of the mandate under Order XXIII of CPC which requires the unlawfulness of the compromise to be dealt by the court recording such compromise."

In light of the same, it was held that the final decree was not liable to be set aside on the ground that the preliminary decree was obtained on the basis of suppression of facts by the original plaintiffs.

Cause Title: Smita Chaudhry & Ors. vs Gaj Singh Yadav & Ors.

Click here to read/download the Judgment