"Murder" Is "Heinous Offence" Under Juvenile Justice Act: Supreme Court Rejects Plea That It Is Only A "Serious" Offence

The Court was hearing an appeal by a child in conflict with the law in a murder case, where the issue arose whether the alleged offence should be treated as “serious” rather than “heinous” on the ground that Section 302 IPC prescribes punishment of death or imprisonment for life without expressly using the word “minimum”.

A Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice Ujjal Bhuyan rejected the contention, observing: “Even if we attempt to look at the aforesaid submission from one another angle, it falls flat on its face. Could it be said that because of the use of the disjunctive “or” between “death” and “imprisonment for life” in Section 302, there is no minimum punishment prescribed. The answer is an emphatic ‘No’. We say so because the word “or” merely confers upon the court the discretion to choose between the two punishments having regard to the gravity of the offence. It does not open any avenue for the imprisonment to be lesser than imprisonment for life.”

Advocate Sachin Patil appeared for the appellant, while Advocate Samir Ali Khan appeared for the State of Bihar.

Background

The case arose from allegations that the deceased had gone out with the appellant and another boy, after which his phone was found switched off, and his body was later recovered from a field. The appellant, who was found to be above 16 years of age at the time of the alleged offence, was proceeded against under the juvenile justice framework.

The Juvenile Justice Board initially held by majority that the child did not need to be tried as an adult. The appellate court reversed that view and directed that the matter be transferred to the Children’s Court. The Patna High Court affirmed the appellate order, leading to the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that Section 302 IPC should fall under the “serious offence” category under Section 2(54)(b) of the JJ Act because it does not expressly prescribe a minimum term of imprisonment in years. The State submitted that life imprisonment is itself a minimum punishment exceeding seven years, making the offence “heinous”.

Court’s Observations

The Court first examined the statutory classification of offences under the JJ Act. It noted that where the minimum punishment is seven years or more, the offence qualifies as “heinous” under Section 2(33). Where no minimum punishment is prescribed, or the minimum is less than seven years though the maximum exceeds seven years, the offence may fall within the “serious offence” category under Section 2(54).

Applying that framework, the Court held that Section 302 IPC cannot be placed in the “serious offence” category merely because it uses the formulation “death or imprisonment for life”.

The Bench stated: “It is a well settled rule that simply because the legislature prescribed the punishment without using the word “minimum”, it cannot be said that no minimum punishment exists. In interpreting a provision, legislative drafting style cannot override the object of the provision.”

The Court added: “Thus, we have no hesitation in saying that an offence punishable under Section 302 cannot be placed in the same category as offences which do not prescribe any minimum sentence under the definition of “serious offence” under Section 2(54) of the JJ Act.”

The appellant relied on Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2020), where the Supreme Court had identified a fourth category of offences which fell between “serious” and “heinous” because of their sentencing structure. The Bench rejected the reliance, holding that the decision addressed offences where courts had discretion to impose a sentence below seven years.

The Court observed: “The fourth category of offences carved out by this Court were intended to address offences where no minimum sentence is prescribed or where the minimum sentence is less than seven years. It refers to those provisions where the courts have discretion to impose sentence below seven years. In other words, it was a remedial measure to ensure that offences which were left unaddressed between the category of “serious” and “heinous” due to their sentencing structure were not left unclassified. Section 302 is not such a provision.”

The Bench also rejected the submission that Shilpa Mittal (2020) required reconsideration, observing that the legislature had accepted and codified the principle within Section 2(54) of the JJ Act.

The appellant further argued that since Section 21 of the JJ Act bars sentencing a child to death or life imprisonment without the possibility of release, life imprisonment under Section 302 IPC could not be treated as the minimum punishment for classifying murder as a heinous offence.

Rejecting this, the Court clarified that Section 21 does not erase or amend the punishment prescribed for murder. It only governs the manner in which punishment may operate when the offender is a child.

The Court held: “The plain reading of the provision indicates that what it proscribes is the imposition of the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release. It does not bar the award of the sentence of imprisonment for life altogether. What it means is that the provision does not erase or modify the punishment prescribed under Section 302 of the IPC, rather it modulates the manner in which that punishment is to be served in the case of a juvenile. What Section 21 ensures is that a juvenile is not incarcerated for the entirety of his natural life in order to give him a chance to participate in the mainstream.”

The Court further explained: “The benefit conferred by Section 21 operates specifically at the stage of sentencing. It comes into picture once the guilt is determined and the court has to decide upon the sentence to be imposed. It cannot be imported into the question of classification of offences for the purposes of determining the forum of trial. Categorization or classification deals with what punishment the offence would ordinarily yield under the statute. To conflate the two would be to confuse the nature of the offence with the consequence to be faced by the offender.”

The Court also considered whether the Sessions Court, while hearing an appeal against a preliminary assessment order, must mandatorily take assistance of psychologists or medical specialists. It held that, unlike the proviso to Section 15(1), Section 101(2) confers a discretionary power on the appellate court.

The Bench observed: “The net effect of the aforesaid discussion is that Section 101(2) confers a power upon the Appellate Court to seek the assistance of experts, the exercise of which remains within the discretion of the Court, to be assessed by weighing the factors discussed above on the facts of each case.”

It added that the appellate court’s role is to examine the correctness of the Board’s order on the material already gathered, and expert assistance may be sought where the facts require it.

The Court also reiterated that a preliminary assessment under Section 15 is not an inquiry into guilt. The Board must examine the child’s mental capacity, physical capacity, ability to understand consequences, and the circumstances in which the offence was allegedly committed.

The Bench stated: “At the outset, we must underscore that the Board at the time of assessment is not concerned with the guilt or innocence of the child in conflict with law. In other words, the Board must not express any view, draw any inference, or make any observations regarding the guilt or innocence of the child.”

The Court clarified that the expert report is only one input. The Board must also consider the Social Background Report, Social Investigation Report, witness statements and other relevant material before deciding whether the child should be tried as an adult.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that Section 302 IPC, which prescribes punishment of death or imprisonment for life, carries life imprisonment as the minimum punishment and must therefore be categorised as a “heinous offence” under the JJ Act.

The Court dismissed the appeal, upheld the decision directing trial as an adult, and directed the Registry to forward a copy of the judgment to all High Courts.

Cause Title: X v. State of Bihar & Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 728)

Appearances

Appellant: Sachin Patil, Kailas Bajirao Autade, Amaresh Narayan Singh, Muhammed Risvi, Shobhit Dwivedi, Shivkumar Jangwad, Shoaib Akhter, Vishnu Priya and Sadanand

Respondents: Samir Ali Khan, Pranjal Sharma, Kashif Irshad Khan, Prashant Bhardwaj, Rishi Bharadwaj, Aditya Pratap Singh and Rahul Mehalwal

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