Psychological Or Psychiatric Evaluation Of Children In Custody & Visitation Disputes Not Barred: Supreme Court Lays Down Guidelines
The Court held that courts dealing with custody, visitation, and parental access disputes are not altogether precluded from seeking expert psychological assistance. However, the Court cautioned that any such process must satisfy the requirements of demonstrable necessity, minimum intrusion, institutional neutrality, proportionality, and paramount consideration of the psychological well-being of the child.
Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice N. Kotiswar Singh, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has held that psychological or psychiatric evaluation of minor children in custody, visitation and parental access disputes is not altogether barred. However, the Court clarified that such evaluations must be guided by the principles of demonstrable necessity, minimum intrusion, institutional neutrality, proportionality and paramount consideration of the child's psychological well-being.
The Court further laid down guidelines to govern psychological and psychiatric assessment of children in custody-related proceedings to protect them from re-traumatisation and unnecessary psychological exposure.
The Court was hearing appeals filed by the mother of a minor child, challenging orders of the Bombay High Court that had modified an earlier direction for the appointment of a single independent expert. Instead, the Bombay High Court had directed the evaluation of the child by a panel of multiple experts in proceedings concerning parental access and visitation rights. The dispute arose against the backdrop of pending POCSO proceedings involving allegations of sexual abuse against the father.
A Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh held: “… we are unable to accept the broad proposition advanced on behalf of the Appellant that courts exercising jurisdiction in custody or visitation matters are altogether precluded from seeking expert psychological assistance wherever allegations under the POCSO Act are pending. Such an absolute rule may unduly restrict the ability of courts to secure informed assistance in appropriate cases involving welfare of children.”
The Bench further observed: “However, where such assistance is considered necessary, the process adopted by the Court must satisfy the requirements of demonstrable necessity, minimum intrusion, institutional neutrality, proportionality, and paramount consideration of the psychological well-being of the child.”
Senior Advocate Shobha Gupta appeared for the appellant, while Advocate Shahrukh Alam appeared for the respondent.
Background
The case arose out of a long-standing custody and visitation dispute between estranged parents concerning their minor daughter. The mother alleged that the child had been sexually abused by her father when the family was residing in the United States.
Following the parties' separation, criminal proceedings under the POCSO Act were initiated in India and remained pending. Meanwhile, disputes concerning custody, visitation and parental access continued before various courts.
The father sought the appointment of an independent psychiatric expert specialising in child psychology to evaluate the child and facilitate the restoration of emotional connection between him and the child. The Family Court rejected the request, noting the seriousness of the allegations, the fact that the child was already undergoing therapeutic treatment, and the possibility of harm arising from further evaluative processes.
The Bombay High Court subsequently directed the appointment of an independent expert and later modified the direction to permit the constitution of a panel of experts. Eventually, a four-member panel was constituted for the evaluation of the child. The mother challenged those directions before the Supreme Court, contending that the process would expose the child to repeated and intrusive psychological scrutiny and could result in re-traumatisation.
Court's Observations
The Supreme Court undertook an extensive examination of the child-centric philosophy underlying the POCSO Act and reiterated that the statute is not confined to the creation of offences but also seeks to ensure that child victims are protected from processes capable of causing further emotional harm or secondary victimisation.
Referring to Sections 24, 33(5), 36 and 39 of the POCSO Act, the Court observed that the legislative framework consistently emphasises child-friendly procedures, minimum exposure and preservation of psychological well-being throughout legal proceedings.
The Court noted that the welfare of the child remains the paramount consideration in all custody and visitation disputes and that emotional stability, psychological security, dignity and mental health form integral components of that welfare. It observed that courts must remain sensitive not only to the outcome of custody proceedings but also to the impact of judicially-directed processes themselves on the child.
The Bench observed: “Courts must remain alive to the distinction between therapeutic engagement intended to support healing and recovery of the child, and repeated evaluation as part of adversarial processes undertaken in aid of litigation to vindicate the claim of the rival parties, which may prove to be highly stressful causing mental and emotional strain on the child.”
The Court further cautioned: “The justice delivery system must, therefore, guard against any process which has the effect of prioritizing adversarial claims of litigating parties over the emotional safety and psychological integrity of the child, thus, compromising with the welfare of the child.”
Examining the High Court's orders, the Supreme Court held that replacing an independent expert with a panel of multiple experts was not a mere procedural modification. According to the Court, the change significantly increased the extent of psychological exposure to which the child could potentially be subjected.
The Bench observed that the High Court had failed to explain why evaluation by a single expert was inadequate, why multiple experts were necessary, how the process complied with the principle of minimum intrusion, or whether the possibility of re-traumatisation had been considered.
The Court also found fault with the fact that the request for the constitution of a panel was substantially based upon names suggested by the father. Stressing the importance of institutional neutrality, it observed that psychological evaluation must not assume the appearance of an adversarial inquiry intended to validate or discredit allegations made against either parent.
The Bench observed: “The child must not be placed in a position where the evaluative process assumes the appearance of an adversarial inquiry intended to validate or discredit allegations made against either parent. The legitimacy of the process itself depends upon the confidence that it remains strictly welfare-oriented and independent of adversarial objectives.”
The Court also emphasised that before subjecting a child to any further assessment, courts should consider obtaining psychological assessments of the parents themselves, as such assessments may provide valuable inputs regarding the child's welfare and the appropriateness of access or visitation arrangements.
Safeguards Laid Down by the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court framed an extensive set of principles to guide courts dealing with psychological or psychiatric evaluation of children in custody, visitation and parental access disputes. The Court held that the welfare, emotional security, dignity and psychological well-being of the child must always remain paramount. Psychological evaluation should not be ordered routinely merely because custody or visitation disputes exist. Courts must first record specific reasons establishing necessity, relevance and the inadequacy of less intrusive alternatives.
The Court directed that the principles of minimum intrusion and minimum exposure must guide all such exercises. Repeated, overlapping or multi-layered evaluations should ordinarily be avoided unless compelling circumstances exist and reasons are recorded in writing.
Where evaluation is necessary, it should ordinarily be conducted by a single independent court-appointed expert possessing expertise in child psychology and trauma. The constitution of a panel of experts should remain exceptional and be resorted to only where indispensable.
The Supreme Court further directed that experts must remain demonstrably neutral and independent, with no prior engagement with either litigating party except on a purely professional basis. The process must remain child-centric and welfare-oriented rather than adversarial or investigative. Courts must remain conscious of the risk of re-traumatisation and regulate the number of sessions, duration of interactions and the number of professionals interacting with the child.
The Court also directed that any evaluation must remain consistent with the child-friendly safeguards contemplated under the POCSO Act. The identity of the child, disclosures made during evaluation, therapeutic records and evaluative reports must remain strictly confidential.
The Court added that audio-video recordings, session notes and therapeutic material should not ordinarily be made available to parties except where specifically required by judicial determination. Further, evaluative reports must remain confined to the purpose for which they were commissioned and should not contain findings regarding criminal culpability.
The Court additionally observed that where a child is already under the care of a qualified therapist, substitution of the existing therapeutic environment should ordinarily be avoided. In cases involving virtual or hybrid interactions, adequate safeguards concerning privacy, emotional safety and absence of external influence must be ensured.
The Court further directed that courts ordering evaluation must retain continuing supervisory jurisdiction over the process and remain empowered to modify, regulate or discontinue the exercise if circumstances so warrant.
Conclusion
Finding that the Bombay High Court had failed to adequately consider the risks associated with repeated and multi-layered psychological evaluation of the child and had not recorded reasons justifying the constitution of a four-member panel of experts, the Court modified the impugned orders and remitted the matter to the Family Court for fresh consideration in light of the principles and safeguards laid down in the judgment.
Cause Title: SVT v. CA (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 638)
Appearances
Appellant: Senior Advocate Shobha Gupta with Advocates Dhiraj Abraham Philip, Febin Mathew Varghese, Lija Merin John, Soyarchon Khangrah, Namrata Mohapatra and Achalika Ahuja.
Respondent: Shahrukh Alam, Advocate with Advocates Sarthak Bhatia, James Bedi, Sonali Jain and Chaitanya Madhav.