Sentence For Remainder Of Natural Life Without Remission Cannot Be Held Unconstitutional: Supreme Court
The Apex Court dismissed Article 32 petitions filed by convicts challenging sentences for imprisonment for the remainder of their natural life, holding that the issue stood settled by the Constitution Bench in Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016).
The Supreme Court has held that a sentence directing imprisonment for the remainder of natural life, including without remission in select cases, is valid and cannot be challenged as unconstitutional before a two-judge Bench after the issue has already been answered by a five-judge Constitution Bench.
The Court dismissed the Article 32 petitions as misdirected, observing that an attempt to re-agitate the settled issue amounted to misuse, if not abuse, of the process of law.
The Court was hearing four writ petitions by convicts who had either been sentenced by courts to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life or whose death sentences had been commuted by the President to imprisonment for the remainder of natural life without remission or parole.
A Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Augustine George Masih observed: “A five-judge Bench has said that sentences for the remainder of natural life are valid. Where does the scope arise for it to be contended that such sentences are invalid/unconstitutional or trample upon statutorily granted rights in the form of Section 432 CrPC, that too before a Bench of two judges? We can only say that such an endeavour is a misuse, if not the abuse of process of law.”
Senior Advocate Rishi Malhotra appeared for the petitioners, while Attorney General R. Venkataramani & Solicitor General Tushar Mehta represented the Union.
Background
The petitioners challenged the legality of sentences requiring them to undergo imprisonment for the remainder of their natural lives. Some of them also challenged the effect of presidential clemency orders, which had commuted death sentences to life imprisonment without remission or parole.
Their central contention was that the Indian Penal Code recognised only death or imprisonment for life for murder, and that a sentence for the remainder of natural life either had no statutory basis or defeated the statutory remission power under Section 432 CrPC.
Court’s Observations
The Court first examined the maintainability of the petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. Referring to Daryao v. State of U.P. (1961), Vasanta Sampat Dupare v. Union of India (2025), and Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India (2024), the Bench reiterated that Article 32 is wide, but not unstructured.
The Court stated: “As is demonstrated from the above judgments, the scope of Article 32 although wide in some sense, is restricted in another sense. The right of a prisoner to approach this Court obviously cannot be outrightly restricted but this right cannot be used to circumvent other procedures, using it as a shortcut to ventilate their grievances before a Court of law.”
The Bench then considered whether it could interfere with clemency orders passed by the President or Governor. Referring to Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P. (2006), Maru Ram v. Union of India (1981), Kehar Singh v. Union of India (1989), Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016), and Pyare Lal v. State of Haryana (2020), the Court held that judicial review of clemency powers is confined to limited grounds such as mala fides, arbitrariness, non-application of mind, irrelevant considerations, or exclusion of relevant material.
The Court observed that the petitioners were not alleging any such defect in the clemency decision, but were effectively asking the Court to independently reduce their sentences.
The Bench remarked: “If the argument advanced by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is accepted, we would be sitting in appeal, (not judicial review) over the exercise of an executive power, which is not permissible.”
On the validity of whole-life imprisonment, the Court relied on Swamy Shraddananda (2) v. State of Karnataka (2008), where the Supreme Court recognised a special sentencing category between ordinary life imprisonment and death.
The Bench then referred to Union of India v. V. Sriharan (2016), where the Constitution Bench upheld the power of courts to impose life imprisonment for the remainder of natural life and, in appropriate cases, place such sentence beyond remission.
The Court noted: “Given the conclusion of the majority as extracted above, we only wonder how the petitioners have raised this contention.”
It further clarified that where a life sentence is imposed without the specific condition of “without remission”, the State’s power under Section 432 CrPC remains unaffected. However, in select cases involving grave crimes, where the sentence specifically excludes remission, such exclusion cannot be termed unconstitutional.
The petitioners also relied on Joseph v. State of Kerala (2023). The Court rejected that reliance, explaining that Joseph only held that the State Government cannot, by executive instruction, assume the judicial role of imposing sentences beyond 14 or 20 years.
The Bench said that this was precisely why Swamy Shraddananda (2) (2008) recognised the special category as one to be used by courts in appropriate cases.
Conclusion
The Court held that some petitioners had not first pursued statutory or constitutional remission remedies. In cases where clemency orders had already been passed by the President, the petitioners failed to show any recognised ground for judicial review.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed all Article 32 petitions as misdirected and disposed of all pending applications.
Cause Title: Ramasrey @ Fakkad v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 764)
Appearances
Petitioners: Senior Advocate Rishi Malhotra, with Advocates Sweta Rani, Ansuiya, Shivaansh Maini and Prem Malhotra
Respondents: Attorney General R. Venkataramani; Solicitor General Tushar Mehta; Additional Solicitors General S.V. Raju and Raja Thakare, with other counsel