Judgment On Admission Under Order XII Rule 6 CPC Cannot Be Passed Where Triable Issues Require Adjudication: Supreme Court
The Court reiterated that a judgment on admission is an exception to the ordinary rule of civil adjudication and can be passed only where the admission is categorical, unconditional and leaves no room for controversy.
The Supreme Court has held that a judgment on admission under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, cannot be passed where the dispute involves substantial triable issues requiring the appreciation of evidence.
The Court further held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its own interpretation merely because another view is possible.
The Court was hearing an appeal challenging a Delhi High Court judgment whereby the High Court, in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, had set aside an order passed by the Additional District Judge refusing to decree a recovery suit under Order XII Rule 6 CPC and had proceeded to decree the suit based on an alleged admission contained in a written statement.
A Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi, upon examining the scope and ambit of Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, observed: “The object of the provision is to enable a party to obtain speedy relief where there is no substantial dispute requiring trial. At the same time, the provision cannot be invoked in a manner so as to deprive a party of adjudication where the controversy involves disputed questions of fact requiring evidence.”
Additionally, while examining the approach adopted by the High Court, the Bench further observed: “The need for framing of the aforesaid issues demonstrates that the Court itself found existence of disputed questions of fact requiring adjudication after appreciation of evidence and thus once the Court had concluded that triable issues existed and directed parties to lead evidence, it was inappropriate to subsequently invoke Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC and decree the suit without trial”.
Advocate Rakesh Kumar represented the appellant, while Advocates Anand Yadav, Pradyumn Rao & Chander Shekhar Ashri appeared on behalf of the respondent.
Background
The dispute arose from a family property and recovery suit instituted before the Delhi High Court concerning the partition of ancestral properties, recovery of money and a permanent injunction between members of a Hindu family. The plaintiff claimed entitlement to a share in the sale proceeds arising from the sale of ancestral agricultural land for approximately Rs. 15 crores.
According to the plaintiff, the entire sale consideration had been received by one of the defendants in his personal account. The plaintiff sought recovery of Rs. 45 lakhs jointly and severally from family members on the allegation that she had not received her lawful share in the sale proceeds.
One of the defendants, in his written statement, stated that pursuant to a family settlement entered into after the sale of the agricultural land, he had received Rs. 3 crores out of the total sale proceeds along with certain immovable properties.
Subsequently, the High Court passed a preliminary decree determining shares of the parties in the suit property and later modified the decree to hold that each party was entitled to a one-sixth share.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC seeking a decree on admission solely against the concerned defendant on the basis that he had admitted receipt of Rs. 3 crores, which allegedly exceeded his lawful share by Rs. 44,79,167/-.
The Additional District Judge dismissed the application, holding that the controversy required adjudication upon evidence and trial. However, the Delhi High Court, in revision under Section 115 CPC, reversed the order and decreed the suit on admission, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
Court’s Observation
The Supreme Court extensively examined the scope and object of Order XII Rule 6 CPC and reiterated that the provision confers discretionary power upon courts to pronounce judgment on admissions made in pleadings or otherwise. However, the Court clarified that the exercise of such power is conditioned upon the existence of a clear admission of fact, leaving no room for controversy.
Referring to Sections 17 and 18 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Court observed that although admissions constitute relevant evidence, every statement made by a party cannot automatically justify a decree on admission. The Bench observed: “Every statement made by a party cannot automatically result in a decree under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC.”
The Court further reiterated that where an alleged admission requires interpretation, inferential reasoning or examination of surrounding circumstances, the matter ought to proceed to trial, and parties cannot be denied the opportunity to lead evidence.
Relying upon Vikrant Kapila v. Pankaja Panda (2024) and Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd. (2011), the Supreme Court reiterated that Order XII Rule 6 CPC is an enabling and discretionary provision which must be exercised with caution because a decree on admission permanently deprives the defendant of adjudication on merits after trial.
The Court examined the written statement relied upon by the plaintiff and found that the statement concerning receipt of Rs. 3 crores had been made in the context of a family settlement amongst family members. The Bench held that the statement nowhere admitted that the amount received exceeded lawful entitlement or that any amount was liable to be refunded to the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court further held that the High Court erred in isolating one sentence from the written statement and construing it as an unequivocal admission of liability. The Court observed: “Pleadings cannot be read in a piecemeal manner and must be construed holistically.”
The Bench also noted that the written statement specifically disputed the plaintiff’s claim and consistently asserted the existence of a prior family settlement. The Court found that the defendant had specifically stated that he had received “only his share” under the family arrangement and therefore the alleged admission was neither unconditional nor unequivocal.
The Court further observed that the entire sale consideration had admittedly been received by another family member in his personal account and therefore several disputed factual questions arose concerning distribution of sale proceeds, inter se liabilities and entitlement of parties under the family arrangement. According to the Bench, such questions necessarily required adjudication upon evidence and could not be conclusively determined merely based on pleadings.
The Supreme Court found that the Trial Court itself had earlier framed issues concerning the entitlement of the plaintiff to recover money jointly and severally from multiple defendants and had directed the matter to proceed for evidence. The Court held that framing of issues itself demonstrated existence of disputed questions of fact requiring adjudication after the appreciation of evidence.
The Supreme Court upheld the order of the Additional District Judge refusing to pass a decree on admission and observed that the discretion exercised by the Trial Court was in consonance with settled principles governing Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The Court found that the Trial Court’s order suffered from neither perversity nor jurisdictional infirmity.
On the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, the Supreme Court reiterated that revisional courts cannot act as appellate courts and reassess findings of fact merely because another interpretation is possible. Referring to Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav (1965), DLF Housing & Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh (1969) and Sher Singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation (1978), the Bench held that interference in revision is permissible only where jurisdictional error or material irregularity is demonstrated.
The Court observed that in the present case, the High Court reassessed the factual matrix and substituted its own interpretation of the pleadings, thereby travelling beyond the permissible limits of Section 115 CPC.
The Supreme Court also rejected the contention that inconsistent pleadings taken by the defendant in another suit conclusively established liability. The Court held that such inconsistencies may constitute material for cross-examination during trial, but cannot by themselves form the sole basis for passing a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
“The Additional District Judge, by order dated 20.12.2017, while dismissing the application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, rightly observed that the controversy required adjudication after trial and appreciation of evidence and the discretion exercised by the Trial Court was in consonance with settled principles governing Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC and did not suffer from any perversity or jurisdictional infirmity”, the Bench concluded.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Delhi High Court judgment and restored the order passed by the Additional District Judge dismissing the application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The Court further clarified that observations made in the judgment would not influence the adjudication of the pending civil proceedings before the Trial Court.
Cause Title: Pushpa & Ors. v. Dayawati & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 603)