Supreme Court, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, Justice N.V. Anjaria

The Supreme Court has held that rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 cannot operate as res judicata to bar a subsequent FIR or criminal proceedings founded on the same or substantially similar allegations, where information disclosing a cognizable offence is furnished to the police under Section 154 of the CrPC.

The Court was hearing a criminal appeal challenging an order of the Allahabad High Court which had refused to quash an FIR and consequential proceedings registered for offences under the Indian Penal Code, after an earlier application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC on substantially similar allegations had been rejected by the Magistrate.

A Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria held: “... an order passed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC is confined to directing, or declining to direct, the exercise of the statutory power of investigation under Chapter XII of the Code. Such an order neither entails an adjudication on the merits of the allegations nor determines any right or liability of the proposed accused. Applying the same principle, the rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, being an order rendered at the threshold without any adjudication on the merits after trial, cannot be accorded such finality as would attract the doctrine of res judicata so as to bar the subsequent registration of an FIR or the continuation of criminal proceedings founded upon the same or substantially similar allegations.”

The Bench further held: “Independent of whether an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC has been allowed or rejected, the duty of the Police under Section 154 of the Cr.PC remains governed by the statutory mandate of the Code. The obligation to register and investigate a cognizable offence does not emanate from a direction issued by the Magistrate under Section 156(3) but flows directly from Sections 154 and 156 of the Cr.PC. itself. This position stands authoritatively settled by the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others wherein it was held that where the information furnished discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, registration of an FIR is mandatory. The police officer cannot avoid that statutory duty and at the stage of registration, the enquiry is confined to whether the information ex facie discloses a cognizable offence, the truthfulness, credibility or otherwise of the allegations being matters for investigation and not for refusing registration.”

The Court added: “The consequence is self-evident. The rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC cannot curtail or extinguish the independent statutory obligation cast upon the Police under Section 154 of the Cr.PC. If, notwithstanding such rejection, information disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence is subsequently furnished to the Police, the statutory duty recognised in Lalita Kumari (supra) continues to operate with full force.”

Advocate Bibek Tripathi appeared for the appellant; Advocates Adarsh Upadhyay and Parul Shukla appeared for the respondents.

Background

The prosecution case arose from allegations that the appellant represented that he had influence in the Directorate of Education, Prayagraj, and could secure clerk appointments for the complainant’s son and grandson on payment of ₹20,00,000. The complainant alleged that, acting on this assurance, money was transferred to the appellant’s bank account, but no interview for the promised appointments was conducted.

The complainant further alleged that when he and his family members questioned the appellant about the money and the promised appointments, the appellant abused and threatened them. On the complaint, an FIR was registered for offences under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Before registration of the FIR, the complainant had filed an application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Prayagraj, seeking a direction for registration of an FIR on substantially similar allegations. The Magistrate called for a police report, noticed that the report described the dispute as one relating to purchase and sale of land, and rejected the application. The revision against that order was also dismissed.

The appellant then approached the Allahabad High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking quashing of the FIR and all consequential proceedings. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that rejection of the earlier Section 156(3) CrPC application could not by itself bar a subsequent FIR if the information otherwise disclosed cognizable offences. The appellant challenged that order before the Supreme Court.

Court's Observations

The Court first traced the statutory framework under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It noted that Section 154 CrPC is the ordinary route for setting the criminal law in motion, while Section 156(3) CrPC empowers a Magistrate to order investigation of a cognizable offence where recourse to the police has failed.

The Court observed: “Read together, Sections 154, 156(3) and 190 disclose a graded statutory scheme, the ordinary and primary recourse of an informant lies with the Police under Section 154 Cr.PC, recourse to the Magistrate under Section 156(3) is a step properly taken where that primary recourse has failed or been refused and cognizance under Section 190 is a distinct and subsequent stage, triggered by any of the three contingencies noted above, and not confined to a police report consequent upon a Section 173 of the Cr.PC direction alone.”

Referring to Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and Others v. V. Narayana Reddy and Others (1976), the Court said the power under Section 156(3) CrPC operates in relation to investigation and does not amount to taking cognizance of the offence.

The Court held: “The provision is intended to secure the exercise of the statutory power of investigation under Chapter XII where the Police fail or refuse to discharge their statutory duty. An order passed thereunder is, in substance, a judicial direction requiring the Police to exercise the powers vested in them under Section 156(1) of the Cr.PC.”

The Court also clarified that Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Others v. State of Gujarat and Another (2019) expanded the temporal ambit of the Magistrate’s power to ensure fair investigation, but did not change the essential character of an order under Section 156(3) CrPC.

The Court said: “It is, therefore, evident that an order passed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC is not one rendered upon an adjudication on the merits of the allegations against the proposed accused but is confined to regulating the commencement of investigation in accordance with the statutory scheme of the Code.”

The Court then considered whether rejection of the earlier Section 156(3) CrPC application could attract res judicata. Referring to S.C. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2025), the Court noted that earlier decisions applying res judicata in criminal matters involved final adjudications, while later cases declining to apply the doctrine arose at preliminary quashing stages.

The Court explained: “The reconciliation undertaken in S.C. Garg (supra), therefore, demonstrates that the applicability of the doctrine in criminal proceedings cannot be determined in the abstract. The decisive consideration is the character and legal effect of the earlier proceeding. Where the earlier proceeding has culminated in a final adjudication determining the issue, the doctrine may operate in accordance with law. Conversely, where the earlier proceeding has not resulted in such adjudication on the merits, as was the case in Devendra (supra) and Muskan Enterprises (supra), the question of applying the doctrine does not arise.”

The Court held that the relevant inquiry was not whether an earlier application under Section 156(3) CrPC had been filed or rejected, but whether the rejection had the character of a final adjudication on merits. It answered that question in the negative.

The Court relied on Mahendri and Others v. State of U.P. and Another (2015), where the same argument had been rejected. In that case too, the contention was that rejection of a Section 156(3) CrPC application barred a subsequent FIR on the same allegations.

The Court quoted Mahendri as holding: “The declining of the aforesaid prayer, would not affect the merits of the controversy, nor would it reflect the veracity of the allegations made by the complainant in the First Information Report which was subsequently lodged on 10.10.2007. …..it is not possible for us to say, that the order passed by the concerned Court on 04.10.2007 would have any effect on the veracity or the merits of the allegations made by the complaint on 10.10.2007 or the proceedings which would emanate therewith….”

The Court said Mahendri was consistent with the statutory scheme and confirmed that rejection of a Section 156(3) CrPC application neither decides the controversy on merits nor reflects upon the truthfulness of allegations later made in the FIR.

The appellant relied on Mohan Karthik and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another (2026), but the Court held that the decision concerned a different issue. In Mohan Karthik, the question was whether the Magistrate could entertain a second application under Section 156(3) CrPC after an earlier rejection and after a closure report pursuant to a High Court-directed preliminary inquiry.

Distinguishing that decision, the Court held: “As already observed in the preceding paragraphs, the issue arising in the present case is entirely different. We are not concerned with the maintainability of a second application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC or the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to entertain the same. The question arising in the present case, therefore, bears no nexus to the dispute considered in Mohan Karthik (supra) and the said decision has no application to the controversy before us.”

After deciding the legal effect of the rejected Section 156(3) CrPC application, the Court examined whether the High Court was right in refusing to quash the FIR. It found no error in the High Court’s approach that the allegations prima facie disclosed cognizable offences and that the appellant’s defence about the nature of monetary transactions required investigation.

The Court observed: “In the present case, the FIR alleges that the appellant induced the informant to part with substantial sums of money on the representation that he could secure public employment for the informant's son and grandson, received such amounts in his bank account, furnished forged admit cards and examination results in furtherance of the deception, and thereafter threatened the informant when repayment was demanded. We are also conscious of the fact that the record indicates that the appellant is arraigned in five FIR’s with substantially similar allegations. These allegations, if accepted at their face value, unquestionably disclose the commission of cognizable offences warranting investigation.”

The Court also held that the appellant’s objections relating to the earlier police report, bank transactions, audio recordings, admit cards and other documents could not be examined at the quashing stage.

The Court said: “The various submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant regarding the true nature of the monetary transactions, the police report obtained in the earlier proceedings under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, and the evidentiary worth of the audio recordings, bank transactions, admit cards and other documents, are all matters falling within the domain of appreciation of evidence in a trial. At this stage, Court cannot undertake an examination of such material or determine which of the rival versions is more probable.”

Conclusion

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Allahabad High Court’s refusal to quash the FIR and consequential proceedings. It held that rejection of the earlier Section 156(3) CrPC application did not bar subsequent registration of an FIR, and that the allegations disclosed cognizable offences requiring investigation. Pending applications were disposed of.

Cause Title: Pramod Kumar Shukla v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 887)

Appearances

Appellant: Advocates Bibek Tripathi, Akshat Srivastava, AOR, Y. Lokesh, Arun Singh and Ajay Kumar Shrivastav

Respondents: Advocates Adarsh Upadhyay, AOR, Parul Shukla, AOR, Aman Pathak, Pallavi Kumari, Shashank Pachauri and Ankur Agnihotri

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