The Supreme Court has set aside the Kerala High Court’s direction to send a Principal Sub Judge for training, holding that adverse remarks against judicial officers should not be passed lightly and must satisfy the principles governing judicial restraint.

The Court was hearing a civil appeal arising from a partition suit in which the Kerala High Court had reversed the Trial Court’s decree, dismissed the suit, and directed that its judgment be forwarded to the Kerala Judicial Academy for further action concerning the Principal Sub Judge.

A Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi, while relying on State of Punjab v. Shikha Trading Co. (2023), reiterated that “remarks adverse in nature, should not be passed in ordinary circumstances, or unless absolutely necessary which is further qualified by, being necessary for proper adjudication of the case”.

The Bench further underscored that “remarks by a court should at all times be governed by the principles of justice, fair play and restraint”, and that the “words employed should reflect sobriety, moderation and reserve”.

Nishe Rajen Shonker, AOR, appeared on behalf of the appellant, while Venkita Subramoniam T.R, AOR, represented the respondents.

Background

The dispute arose from a partition suit concerning the alleged last Will and testament of the parties’ mother. The plaintiff filed the suit after claiming that she had no knowledge of the Will relied upon by the defendants.

The Trial Court held that the Will had not been proved in accordance with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, and passed a preliminary decree granting the plaintiff a share in the property.

The defendants approached the High Court in the first appeal. The High Court reversed the decree in a brief judgment, held that the Trial Court had relied on extraneous considerations while rejecting due execution of the Will, dismissed the suit, and directed that a copy of its judgment be forwarded to the Director (Academic), Kerala Judicial Academy.

Before the Supreme Court, the appeal was confined to two aspects: the manner in which the High Court had dealt with the first appeal, and whether the remarks and direction against the Principal Sub Judge were justified.

Court’s Observations

The Supreme Court first examined the role of a First Appellate Court under Section 96 CPC and the requirements of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC. It noted that the First Appellate Court is the final court on facts and is required to state the points for determination, its decision on those points, the reasons for the decision, and the relief granted where the decree is reversed or varied.

The Court referred to Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001), Madhukar v. Sangram (2001), H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith (2005), B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy (2010), Somakka v. K.P. Basavaraj (2022), Mahender Pal Chabra v. Subhash Aggrawal (2024), and Laliteshwar Prasad Singh v. S.P. Srivastava (2017), among other decisions, to reiterate that a first appeal is a valuable right and that reversal of a trial court’s findings requires reasons.

The Court observed: “The Court in first appeal is the final court of fact. The facts once determined by the Appellate Court are not open to challenge before the High Court, and even this Court does not undertake re-appreciation of evidence under Article 136 until and unless some glaring error such as complete misdirection is pointed out.”

Applying those principles, the Court found that the High Court’s judgment did not meet the standard required of a First Appellate Court. It noted that the High Court had not framed points for determination, had not explained why points were not framed, and had not recorded reasons showing how the Trial Court had erred in law.

The Court stated: “On the anvil of the principles summarised supra, regarding the jurisdiction and responsibility in first appeal as also the necessity of reasoned orders, we test the impugned judgment. In our considered view, the said judgment does not stand true to these well recognised principles. Points for determination have not been framed; reasons for not framing them have not been provided; nor are there reasons recorded to show how the Court below had erred in law with reference to judicial pronouncements.”

The Bench added that since the High Court was reversing the Trial Court, it was required to engage with the Trial Court’s appraisal of evidence and state its own reasons for taking a different view.

The Court held: “After all, the findings of the Civil Court were being overturned. Had it been a case of agreement, in view of Santosh Hazari (supra) general agreement would have sufficed but that is not the case. Granted that the High Court is a higher Court and exercises supervision over the Courts under its jurisdiction, but it too is first and foremost a Court of law. If orders such as these are permitted to stand, it sends a wrong message of the judgments of the Civil Courts/Trial Courts being able to be set aside without due effort and application of mind. That, needless to say, would be a grave error.”

The Supreme Court also noted that the High Court ought to have discussed the legal requirements for proving a Will, particularly because it had taken a view contrary to the Trial Court.

The Court referred to Sections 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872, and Sections 59 and 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. It noted that the signature of the testator must be established, the Will must be attested as required by law, the testator must be shown to be of sound mind, and at least one attesting witness must be examined.

The Bench referred to H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma (1958), Meena Pradhan v. Kamla Pradhan (2023), and Parvathi Nairthi v. Laxmi Nairthy (2026), and observed:

“The High Court ought to have in its judgment discussed the above aspects, more so, because it took a view contrary to the Court below. Had it done so, its conclusion that the judgment impugned before it was erroneous, would have been far more palatable. The attitude to be adopted by appellate Courts should be that of a friend, philosopher and a guide rather than wielding the heavy-handed baton of superior authority pointing out errors committed by its underlings.”

Turning to the direction against the Principal Sub Judge, the Supreme Court referred to State of U.P. v. Mohd. Naim (1963), S.K. Viswambaran v. E. Koyakunju (1987), and State of Punjab v. Shikha Trading Co. (2023).

The Court reiterated that before passing adverse remarks, a court must consider whether the person whose conduct is criticised was before the court or had an opportunity to explain, whether the material on record justified the remarks, and whether the remarks were necessary for deciding the case.

The Court quoted State of U.P. v. Mohd. Naim (1963), observing: “If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is this: the proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates must be maintained, and they must be allowed to perform their functions freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by anybody, even by this Court. At the same time, it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions, Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat the very purpose for which they are made.”

The Bench also relied on State of Punjab v. Shikha Trading Co. (2023), where the Court had cautioned that adverse remarks, due to the power attached to judicial office, may affect the independence of judges and deter officers from discharging their duties.

The Court underscored: “It should not be lost sight of and per contra, always be remembered that such remarks, due to the great power vested in our robes, have the ability to jeopardise and compromise independence of Judges, and may deter officers and various personnel in carrying out their duty”.

It further flows therefrom that “adverse remarks, of serious nature, upon the character and/or professional competence of a person should not be passed lightly”, the Court concluded.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Kerala High Court’s judgment as a whole.

It also set aside the direction against the Principal Sub Judge of the Principal Sub Court, Thrissur, restored the first appeal to the file of the Kerala High Court for fresh hearing, and left all contentions open to the parties. The Court made no order as to costs and disposed of pending applications.

Cause Title: Lakshmi v. Gopi & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 709)

Appearances

Appellant: Nishe Rajen Shonker, AOR, with Advocates Anu K. Joy, Alim Anvar, Santhosh K and Devika A.L.

Respondents: Venkita Subramoniam T.R., AOR, with Advocates Varun Mudgal and Hari Vishnu

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