Marital Status Cannot Constitute Valid Ground To Deny Welfare Measures Benefits To Otherwise Eligible Daughter: Supreme Court

The Court was hearing a Civil Appeal arising out of a judgment passed by the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, whereby the claim of the appellant, a married daughter of a deceased fair price shop dealer, seeking compassionate allotment of the dealership had been rejected on the ground that she stood excluded from the definition of “family” under the Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution) Control Order, 2016 and the Government Order governing appointment of fair price shop dealers in rural areas.

A Bench of Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe affirmed that “marital status cannot constitute a valid ground for denying the benefit of a welfare measure to an otherwise eligible daughter.”

Advocate Anand Verma appeared for the appellant. Senior Advocate S.R. Singh appeared for the State of Uttar Pradesh. Advocate Rukhmini Bobde appeared as Amicus Curiae.

Background

A fair price shop situated in a village panchayat in District Amethi had been allotted to the appellant’s mother in October 2012. Subsequently, the Uttar Pradesh Government notified the Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution) Control Order, 2016, in exercise of powers under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.

Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order defined “family” to include the head of the family, spouse, dependent adult children, unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters, and dependent parents. Thereafter, the State Government issued Government Order No.6 of 2019 governing the identification, reservation and appointment of fair price shops in rural areas. Paragraph IV(10) of the Government Order excluded married daughters from the definition of “family”.

The appellant’s mother passed away in March 2024, leaving behind the appellant and her sisters, including a visually impaired sister. According to the appellant, despite her marriage, she continued to reside with her mother and sisters and remained the sole earning member of the family.

The appellant thereafter applied before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate seeking allotment of the fair price shop under the dependent quota. However, the application was rejected solely on the ground that she was a married daughter and therefore excluded from the definition of “family” under the Government Order. The Deputy Commissioner affirmed the rejection order, following which the appellant approached the Allahabad High Court.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition, relying upon earlier Division Bench decisions in Smt. Kusumlata and Saida Begum. However, while dismissing the petition, the High Court observed that the issue involved a substantial question of law concerning the rights of married daughters who were being denied benefits solely on account of marriage and accordingly granted a certificate under Article 134-A of the Constitution.

Court’s Observation

The Supreme Court examined the provisions of the 2016 Order and the Government Order governing allotment of fair price shops under the dependent quota. The Court noted that while Clause IV(5) of the Government Order required the applicant to be a local resident, Clause IV(10) excluded married daughters from the definition of “family”.

Referring to Articles 14, 15(1) and 21 of the Constitution, the Court observed that constitutional guarantees of equality and non-discrimination must be interpreted in the light of the constitutional commitment to social and economic justice embodied in the Directive Principles of State Policy.

The Court observed that the object of allotment under the dependent quota was to provide immediate financial relief to the family of a deceased dealer facing hardship and to ensure continuity in the functioning of the public distribution system.

Examining the exclusion of married daughters from the definition of “family”, the Court held, “The impugned provision proceeds on the assumption that upon marriage a daughter ceases to be a member of, or dependent upon, her parental family. Such an assumption is constitutionally impermissible.”

The Court further held that dependency was a question of fact and could not be conclusively determined solely by reference to marital status. It was observed that while a married son continued to remain within the fold of the family irrespective of marital status, a daughter stood excluded solely because she was married.

The Court observed, “The distinction is founded upon a gender-based stereotype that a daughter, upon marriage, becomes a member of another family and loses all ties with her natal family. Such a presumption is incompatible with the constitutional guarantee of equality and perpetuates historical notions of gender inequality which the Constitution seeks to eradicate.”

Rejecting the submission of the State that married daughters may not satisfy the requirement of local residence, the Court held that residence was an independent eligibility criterion which had to be examined on the facts of each case and that blanket exclusion of married daughters based upon speculative assumptions was constitutionally untenable.

The Court further held that once dependency was accepted as the governing criterion of the scheme, exclusion of a married daughter solely on account of marital status became irrational and self-defeating. The Court observed that the exclusion failed the test of reasonable classification and was manifestly arbitrary, being founded solely upon gender stereotypes.

While considering whether the expression “unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters” in Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order required to be struck down or purposively interpreted, the Court applied the doctrine of purposive construction.

The Court observed, “To read the words ‘unmarried, legally separated and widowed daughters’ in Clause 2(p) of 2016 Order would produce a result which is inconsistent with constitutional guarantees under Articles 14 and 15(1) as the same would amount to exclusion of a married daughter on a gender-based stereotype which is constitutionally impermissible.”

The Court held that the descriptive categories of daughters in Clause 2(p) reflected categories of daughters who remained in or had returned to the natal household and that dependency, and not marital status, constituted the governing criterion of the scheme.

The Court further held that the expression “daughter” in Clause 2(p) must be read to include a married daughter, provided she establishes dependency on the deceased dealer and satisfies all other eligibility conditions prescribed under the Government Order, including local residence requirements.

Referring to conflicting judicial views, the Court agreed with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court as well as decisions of the Bombay, Karnataka and Calcutta High Courts, recognising that marital status cannot constitute a valid ground for denying welfare benefits to an otherwise eligible daughter. The Court held that the contrary view expressed did not lay down the correct law and accordingly stood overruled.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that the appellant had continued to reside in the same village even after marriage, had actively assisted her mother in operating the fair price shop and had assumed responsibility for maintaining her sisters following her mother’s demise.

The Court noted that these factual assertions had not been disputed by the authorities and that the sole ground for rejection of her application was her status as a married daughter.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal and quashed the orders passed by the Allahabad High Court, Deputy Commissioner and Sub-Divisional Magistrate rejecting the appellant’s application.

The Court directed the competent authority to issue the necessary allotment order in favour of the appellant within four weeks.

Cause Title: Kulsum Nisha v. State of U.P. & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 617)

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