Asset Reconstruction Company Can Be Substituted As Complainant In Pending Prosecution U/S.138 Of NI Act: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court was considering a Special Leave Petition filed by the accused booked in a case registered under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Sheel Nagu, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has held that an Asset Reconstruction Company (ARC) can be substituted as the complainant in a pending prosecution under Section 138 read with Sections 141 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act) provided the ARC is put to strict proof that the ARC is the “holder in due course”.
The Apex Court was considering a Special Leave Petition filed by the accused booked in a case registered under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act).
The Division Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu held, “While a pending complaint under Section 138, N.I. Act does not abate on assignment to an ARC of the financial asset/debt under sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the SARFAESI Act, such assignment does not, per se, make the ARC the payee or the holder in due course. The ARC, to continue proceedings, must still prove that (i) the cheque, since dishonoured, itself was transferred and delivered to it along with the financial asset and not merely the underlying debt; (ii) there has been an endorsement/assignment in its favour sufficient to constitute it as a holder in due course under Sections 8 and 9 of the N.I. Act; (iii) the ingredients of Section 138 of the N.I. Act are satisfied; and (iv) there is no attempt to improve upon the case of the original complainant/secured creditor. Therefore, while permitting a substitution, the ARC has to be put to strict proof that the ARC is the “holder in due course”. Such question(s) of fact must obviously be decided on the basis of evidence led at the trial.”
Senior Advocate Siddhartha Dave represented the Appellant.
Arguments
It was the case of the petitioner that the first respondent, which is an ARC, is not the “payee” of the subject cheques and the High Court erroneously proceeded to hold that it had become a “holder in due course” by virtue of the deeming fiction in sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the SARFAESI Act, overlooking the three cumulative statutory conditions of Section 9 of the N.I. Act, which it did not satisfy. According to the petitioner, the first respondent did not qualify to step into the shoes of the original lender.
Reasoning
On a perusal of the facts of the case, the Bench noted that the Trial Magistrate allowed an application for substitution of the first respondent upon consideration of the decisions of the Delhi High Court. The said order was carried in a revision by the petitioners before the Sessions Court. The Bench noted that the revision was dismissed by an order and the same was followed by invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 482 of the CrPC by the petitioners unsuccessfully.
The Bench further noted that there was an assignment agreement between the original lender and the first respondent which included the three post-dated cheques issued by the petitioners to the original lender, since dishonoured, the cheque return memos, and the demand notice under Section 138, along with conferment of the right to institute, continue and enforce legal proceedings, including the pending complaints.
The Bench held, “To summarise, the scheme of Section 5 is that on acquisition of the financial assets, the ARC is deemed to be the lender and as a sequel thereto, all rights, title and interest of the bank/financial institution vest in the ARC. The ARC can, subject to fulfilment of the statutory requirements, continue pending proceedings instituted by the bank/financial institution, as if it were the original secured creditor. By virtue of sub-sections (4) and (5), having stepped into the shoes of the original secured creditor, the ARC is entitled to pursue the remedies available to the original secured creditor in relation to the financial assets so acquired. The right to continue proceedings would, however, be subject to compliance with the requirements of the statute governing that particular proceeding or remedy.”
The Bench further explained that the fact that a proceeding under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is criminal in form would not, by itself, exclude it from the expression “other proceeding of whatever nature”, provided that it relates to the financial asset acquired by the ARC and was pending by or against the bank or financial institution on the date of such acquisition. “Sub-section (4) of Section 5, for all intents and purposes, having provided for a continuity and the words “other proceeding of whatever nature” used by Parliament being very wide, the same must be allowed to operate in its full amplitude. Such width is intentional to ensure that no proceeding relating to the financial asset is lost for want of a party to prosecute it”, it added.
Thus, holding that while permitting a substitution, the ARC has to be put to strict proof that the ARC is the “holder in due course”, the Bench dismissed the special leave petition.
Cause Title: Kishore Avarsekar and Ors. v. Assets Care and Reconstruction Enterprises Ltd. & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1217)
Appearance
Appellant: Senior Advocate Siddhartha Dave, Advocates Poonam Tahilyani, Aniruddha Deshmukh