Amidst a backdrop of political transition in his representing state, Senior Advocate Jaideep Gupta argued for a non-rigid understanding of religious "denominations" and "sampradayas," asserting that these terms embody the diverse philosophical schools and methods of worship recognized by the framers to protect India’s pluralistic civilization.

Gupta addressed the ambiguity surrounding the term "religious denomination" in Article 26, noting that since the Constitution does not provide a formal definition, the Supreme Court in the landmark Shirur Mutt case relied on the dictionary meaning.

He addressed suggestions that the Hindi word for denomination should be considered, clarifying the historical context of the Constituent Assembly. He noted that while Dr. Rajendra Prasad had asked members to sign a Hindi version of the document, the Assembly had ultimately not passed the Constitution in both English and Hindi as dual-original texts.

The counsel explained that at the time Shirur Mutt was decided, a Hindi definition could not have been consulted because an official, authoritative Hindi version did not yet exist. This changed with the insertion of Article 394A, which provided for an authoritative text in the Hindi language. However, he corrected the misconception that the Hindi translation should prevail over the English version.

Citing Clause 2 of Article 394A, he pointed out that the translation must be construed to have the same meaning as the original English text. In the event of a conflict or difficulty in construction, the President is empowered to revise the translation, but the English text remains the authoritative reference.

Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah intervened to observe that the English word "denomination" holds more weight than the Hindi "sampradaya" for legal determination. He agreed that while the Hindi text is an "authoritative translation," it serves as a linguistic reflection rather than the primary tool for legal determination.

The Bench noted that in this specific instance, there is no true conflict, as the English word used in the Shirur Mutt judgment has remained the standard for defining the scope of denominational rights under Article 26 for decades.

CJI Kant asked Gupta, "So according to you 'Sampradaya' and 'Denomination' are the same thing."

Gupta replied, "Yes, it is a same thing."

He cited the Ramakrishna Mission as a prime example of a denomination—a group of individuals who united under the teachings of Swami Vivekananda to form a distinct body.

Justice Nagarathna said, "See the constitution framers were conscious of the fact that there are various schools of thought or philosophies or whatever. If you are being propagated through Mutts or such institutions, which ultimately has been given the name of denomination in the Constitution, for a lack of a better word...that is not so rigid. Sampradaya is method of worship, it is the philosophy of that denomination, which should dominate everything...even temples are aligned to certain Mutts...there are temples which are also not aligned...but the denomination is where the framers were aware that there were many reformers, thats is why I said that the other day, "Ekam Sat Vipra Bahudha Vadanti" (Truth is One, but the wise call it by many names)...there are various paths to the truth to brahmin...Constitution framers were aware...but for the lack of a better word, they used 'denomination', so do not make it rigid."

Justice Joymalya Bagchi noted that when legislation under Article 25(2)(b) (social reform) appears to encroach upon a denomination’s rights under Article 26(b), the Court must examine the extent of that encroachment. He argued that the Court must identify which integral practices remain protected. He emphasized that the "essential religious practices" test is vital in this context. Without determining what is truly integral to a denomination, the Court cannot accurately measure if a state reform is a reasonable or disproportionate interference.


On the last date of hearing, Senior Advocate Gupta submitted, "Now I start by saying that since I am representing a state in the midst of political change, therefore, I am going to disappoint a lot of people in this room by not addressing your lordships on Sabarimala itself...Secondly, I am not shirking my duty here because when the matter referred to your lordships, the question raised was whether it should be decided without reference to the facts, and your lordships said yes, just like TMA Pai Foundation was decided without any reference to the facts. We can decide these questions without a reference to the facts."

He then added, "I have a difficult task because the State is going through the change, at the same time it is rare pleasure that I do not have to defend a particular client...That allows me to assist the Court with a greater degree of freedom."

Then Senior Advocate Indira Jaising intervened said, "He doesn't know who his client is...three times they have changed...there will be fifth round, each round the position is different."

Justice Nagarathna remarked, "As a counsel today, you are sui generis."

Doctrine of Precedence

He referred to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Maktul v. Manbhari (1958) and Sakshi v. Union of India (2004). He said that. He said that a larger bench or a court of higher authority can, no doubt, decline to follow judgments rendered by courts of lower authority. However, the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning, once laid down and accepted, for a long period of time ought not to be altered unless the court can say positively that it was wrongly decided and/or is productive of inconvenience; except in cases where serious inconvenience or injustice would follow from perpetuating an erroneous construction or ruling of law.

However, the counsel emphasized two other principles underlying the doctrine of precedent, which he traced back to the House of Lords judgment in Bourne v. Keane. He noted that these principles had been incorporated into Halsbury’s Laws of England and subsequently accepted by the Supreme Court in various judgments. He explained that, although not strictly bound, a higher court would ordinarily follow a settled line of authority unless compelling reasons existed to depart from it, such as when a previous interpretation was plainly erroneous or produced injustice.

Scope and ambit of the right to freedom of religion under Article 25

He submitted that the term 'religion' must be understood in the context of the term 'governance'. He said, "Religion has not been defined in the Constitution and is hardly susceptible of any rigid definition. A religion undoubtedly has its basis in a system of beliefs or doctrines which are regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well-being..."

He argued that the interplay between Articles 25 and 26 had been debated and developed by the Court over the span of seventy-five years. He maintained that this accumulated constitutional wisdom should be carefully examined before any departure from established legal principles was made. He urged the Bench to consider the long-standing judicial history of these constitutional provisions before redefining their relationship.

Gupta submitted that the Court’s task was to interpret the ambit of existing rights, including Article 21, rather than creating new ones. He referenced the Puttaswamy judgment to argue that defining the core of these rights was a standard exercise in constitutional interpretation. He maintained that the Doctrine of Essential Religious Practices was not an external addition to the Constitution but a settled interpretive tool used by the judiciary for decades to determine which practices received protection.

When Justice Nagarathna questioned who held the authority to adjudicate the "essentiality" of a practice, the counsel clarified the Court's methodology. He explained that the Court did not substitute its own theological views or personal opinions for religious doctrine. Instead, he argued that the Court adjudicated based on evidence provided by members of the faith. 

He also drew a distinction between striking down a practice for violating constitutional values, such as equality, and the process of identifying whether a practice was essential. He contended that while invalidating a practice for being discriminatory might involve overriding a religious claim, the "essentiality" test was a separate, evidence-based inquiry designed to understand the true nature of the religious claim itself.

Justice Nagarathna compared the determination of an essential religious practice to the judicial process of proving custom and usage, a view with which Senior Advocate Jaideep Gupta concurred. He noted that courts must determine whether a practice is considered essential by the faith's followers based on evidence rather than theological substitution.

The Bench highlighted the difficulty in separating secular activity from religious practice, citing the Paryaya ceremony and the use of ghee in a havan. Justice Nagarathna observed that while purchasing ghee is a secular commercial act, its use in a ritual links it to religion.

Gupta responded that if religious texts like the Agamas prescribe specific ritual requirements, the Court should not re-examine those quantities, as the essential practices doctrine operates differently when merely distinguishing secular acts from religious ones.

Today, while continuing his previous submissions, Senior Advocate Jaideep Gupta submitted that the placement of social welfare and reform within Article 25—the very provision guaranteeing religious freedom—was a deliberate constitutional choice. He contended that because many historical social practices eventually became "sanctified" as religious customs, any meaningful state-led social reform would inevitably intersect with religion.

Justice Nagarathna said, "This Article 25(2)(b), it cannot violate what is guaranteed under Article 25(1)...in the name of social reform, it cannot hollow out the religion..."

Accordingly, Senior Advocate Jaideep Gupta concluded his arguments.

On the last date of hearing, the Court reflected on the delicate balance between preserving India's ancient religious "constant" and upholding constitutional mandates. Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice M.M. Sundresh questioned the long-term consequences of opening the judicial door to internal religious disputes, warning that it could lead to the collapse of pluralistic traditions if every practice were litigated.

The Bench comprising Chief Justice Surya Kant, with Justices B.V. Nagarathna, M.M. Sundresh, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, A.G. Masih, Prasanna B. Varale, R. Mahadevan, and Joymalya Bagchi, is hearing review petitions and writ petitions arising out of the 2018 Sabarimala Judgment, which allowed women of all ages to enter into Lord Ayyappa's temple. The pleas were filed, inter alia, regarding the entry of Muslim women into mosques and dargahs, and the rights of Parsi women to enter Fire Temples if they have married outside their community and the legal validity of female genital mutilation within the Dawoodi Bohra community.

Cause Title: Kantaru Rejeevaru Vs Indian Young Lawyers Association; Sabarimala Custom Protection Forum Vs Indian Young Lawyers Association [R.P.(C) No. 3358/2018 in W.P. (C) No. 373/2006]

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