Electricity Boards Face Strict, Not Absolute Liability In Electrocution Compensation Cases: Supreme Court

The Court was hearing appeals filed by Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation against orders of the Karnataka High Court which had held it liable to pay compensation in two electrocution matters.

A Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh observed: “ … the question is whether in cases such as these i.e. electrocution of an individual, the standard of liability upon bodies such as the appellant is strict or absolute. We are of the considered view that to impose strict liability would be more appropriate, for not in all cases can it be said that the electricity boards are liable. The transmission of electricity is undoubtedly inherently dangerous. Those who carry out the inherently dangerous activity should bear the burden, and the State is no exception to that rule. Such enterprises operate on a loss distribution mechanism i.e. they are in the best position to spread the loss incurred through insurance or higher prices, as the case may be. It can also be said that they are expected to factor in these possibilities.

The Bench added: “It is for these reasons that they are liable to compensate the injured/deceased irrespective of any fault on their part, provided that none of the exceptions to the rule of strict liability apply to the case at hand. Granted that they would have taken all reasonable care to protect individuals from electrocution.”

Advocate Srishti Govil appeared for the appellant, while Advocate V.C. Shukla appeared for the respondents. Advocate Aditi Prakash appeared as Amicus Curiae.

Background

The appellant challenged the High Court’s finding fastening liability on it and directing payment of compensation in electrocution matters. The High Court had rejected objections on maintainability, absence of fault, and disputed questions of fact, holding that the writ petitions were maintainable as they sought relief for a tortious act of the State.

On merits, the High Court adopted the framework of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for computing compensation. In one matter, compensation was awarded for death caused by electrocution. In the other, compensation was awarded for serious injuries suffered after contact with a high-voltage line.

Before the Supreme Court, the principal issues were whether the writ petitions were maintainable despite disputed facts, whether the standard of liability in electrocution cases is strict or absolute, and what yardstick should be used for determining compensation.

Court’s Observations

The Supreme Court first considered whether writ jurisdiction could be invoked for compensation in electrocution cases. It referred to the settled principles on alternate remedy and disputed questions of fact, and held that while Article 226 jurisdiction is not barred merely because another remedy exists, disputed factual issues may make a writ petition inappropriate.

In the specific context of electrocution claims, the Court relied on Chairman, Grid Corpn. of Orissa Ltd. v. Sukamani Das (1999), and stated: “What is been held here is that if questions of fact are disputed, then Article 226 would not be an appropriate remedy in cases of electrocution.”

The Court found that the cases before it raised several factual questions, including whether the victims’ conduct or third-party conduct contributed to the accidents, whether statutory safety distances were complied with, whether safety relays were functioning properly, and whether liability, if any, lay on a different entity. Since these issues could not be resolved merely on affidavits, the Court held that the writ route was unsuitable.

The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had treated the disputed facts as largely irrelevant because it applied the standard of absolute liability. The Supreme Court disagreed with this approach and explained that the nature of liability had to be examined first.

The Court observed: “The High Court had, in effect, held the disputed facts to not be of much relevance because, according to it, it is the standard of absolute liability that is applicable and not strict liability. Since absolute liability obviously has no exceptions, the presence of disputed facts, if at all, would not absolve the appellant herein. In deciding the correctness of this finding, we must then go to the meaning of absolute liability and strict liability.”

Explaining absolute liability, the Court said that it leaves no scope for exception and is applied to enterprises engaged in inherently dangerous or hazardous activities where harm results from an accident in the performance of such activity.

The Court stated: “Absolute liability, as the name itself suggests, is a kind of liability that leaves no scope for exception from such liability. To put it simply, the person who has been deemed to be absolutely liable shall be so liable irrespective of the facts and circumstances in which such imputation has been made upon them. It is applied only to enterprises and comes into play when the activity in which the enterprise is engaged, is inherently dangerous or hazardous and someone has been harmed as a result of the accident that has taken place in performing such activity.”

The Court traced strict liability to Rylands v. Fletcher and noted that the doctrine focuses on the hazardous nature of the activity rather than fault in the manner of carrying it out. It relied on Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar (2008), which treated electricity as one of the categories to which the rule applies.

The Court quoted: “Strict liability focuses on the nature of the defendant's activity rather than, as in negligence, the way in which it is carried on (vide Torts by Michael Jones, 4th Edn., p. 247). There are many activities which are so hazardous that they may constitute a danger to the person or property of another. The principle of strict liability states that the undertakers of these activities have to compensate for the damage caused by them irrespective of any fault on their part. As Fleming says ‘permission to conduct such activity is in effect made conditional on its absorbing the cost of the accidents it causes, as an appropriate item of its overheads’ (see Fleming on Torts, 6th Edn., p. 302).”

The Court also relied on M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari (2002), which held that those undertaking hazardous or risky activities involving exposure to human life may be liable irrespective of negligence.

The Court observed: “Even assuming that all such measures have been adopted, a person undertaking an activity involving hazardous or risky exposure to human life, is liable under law of torts to compensate for the injury suffered by any other person, irrespective of any negligence or carelessness on the part of the managers of such undertakings. The basis of such liability is the foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of such activity.”

On this basis, the Court held that electricity transmission is inherently dangerous, but that strict liability, and not absolute liability, is the correct standard for electrocution cases.

The Court clarified that because the applicable standard is strict liability, recognised exceptions to that doctrine remain available. These may include situations involving the claimant’s own default, acts of third parties, statutory authority, act of God, consent, common benefit, or remoteness of consequences.

The Court noted that such exceptions had been recognised in several judgments and referred to Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2001). It then held that because the record raised disputed questions potentially bearing on such exceptions, the matters required adjudication before the appropriate forum rather than summary determination in writ proceedings.

On compensation, the Court held that the Motor Vehicles Act framework could not be mechanically applied to electrocution cases. Referring to Raman v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. (2014), it said that the multiplier method is not the applicable yardstick for such claims.

The Court observed: “On the question of yardstick of compensation, we find this Court to have observed in a two-Judge Bench decision in Raman v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd., that the multiplier method cannot be applied to determine compensation in cases of electrocution. Since the calculation paradigm as provided for in connection with the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is dependent on the multiplier, the scenario thereunder could not have been applied mutatis mutandis to electrocution cases, as done by the High Court in the impugned judgment.”

The Court further explained that the Electricity Act, 2003 provides for liability in certain situations but does not prescribe a method for calculating compensation.

The Court stated: “It is a matter of law that the Electricity Act 2003 does not provide for the method to calculate compensation. What it does provide is the liability of the licensee to pay compensation in certain scenarios under Section 57 thereof but does not say anything regarding the method applicable to calculating the same. This holding in Raman (supra) relies on Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha. Be that as it may, the overarching principle of just and reasonable, fair compensation would govern the calculation here as well, based on the income of the person and other related claims.”In view of the disputed factual questions, the Court held that the writ petitions seeking compensation were not maintainable. It therefore set aside the High Court’s orders, while leaving the affected parties free to pursue appropriate remedies.

The Court held: “Having held as above that there are disputed questions of facts involved, we are of the view that the Writ Petition seeking compensation filed by the respondent was not maintainable.”

The Court clarified that the alternate proceedings, if filed, must be decided according to law on an expeditious basis and uninfluenced by observations made in the judgment. It also protected the interim compensation already paid during the Supreme Court proceedings.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that the writ petitions seeking compensation were not maintainable in view of the disputed factual questions involved. It set aside the High Court’s orders, while leaving the respondents free to pursue appropriate remedies before the competent forum. The Court directed that any such proceedings be decided expeditiously and without being influenced by observations in the Supreme Court judgment.

The Court also clarified that the interim compensation already paid during the proceedings shall not be recovered from the respondents, and that such payment shall not influence the total compensation, if any, that may be awarded in appropriate proceedings. Both appeals were allowed, with parties left to bear their own costs.

Cause Title: Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited v. Rekha & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 847)

Appearances

Appellant: Srishti Govil, AOR, with Advocates Sumana Naganand, Ashwini Ravindra, Pranav Jain, Hepsiba Bobin, Tanish Manuja, Anaida Khan, Tushar Mohindroo and Tushar Mahindroo

Respondents: V.C. Shukla, Advocate, with Anantha Narayana M.G., AOR, and Advocates Gaanesh Kamath, Ramprasad H. Alva B and Prabhsimar Singh; Sarim Naved, Advocate, with Maulshree Pathak, AOR, and Advocates Saurabh Sagar, Zeeshan Ahmad and Mohd Noumaan; Aditi Prakash, Amicus Curiae; Ankur S. Kulkarni, AOR, with Advocates Uditha Chakravarthy and Abhay Singh Yadav; Patil Rekha Chandra Gouda, AOR; Shubhranshu Padhi, AOR, with Advocates Pranav Giri, Jay Nirupam, D. Girish Kumar, Ekansh Sisodia and Ritik Sharma

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