Reverse Burden Provisions Do Not Relieve Courts Of Duty To Scrutinise Prosecution Evidence: Supreme Court Acquits POCSO Accused

Applying this principle, the Court acquitted a man convicted of kidnapping and aggravated penetrative sexual assault of a two-and-a-half-year-old girl, finding that the prosecution evidence contained material contradictions and that the accused had successfully rebutted its case.

The Court was hearing two appeals challenging a common Delhi High Court judgment affirming the conviction and sentence recorded by a designated POCSO Special Court under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

A Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria observed: “The statutory presumptions cannot be read to mean that the prosecution version is liable to be treated as gospel truth in every case. It has to be additionally observed by this Court the presumptive provisions notwithstanding, the courts are not absolved from discharging their essential duty to analyse the evidence on record in light of the features emerging in a particular case. The court should not mechanically accept the ipse dixit of the prosecution riding on the provisions regarding presumption of guilt to give a stamp of approval to every prosecution even if they are absurd or improbable in its story. At the end of the trial, the accused should not stand at a discount or at disadvantage only for the reason that the particular statute under which he is tried for the offence contains presumptive provisions about the guilt of the accused.”

Advocate Pulkit Prakash appeared for the appellant, while Additional Solicitor General Davinder Pal Singh appeared for the respondent.

Background

The prosecution alleged that the child went to the accused’s adjoining home while playing and that he then took her to a park and sexually assaulted her. The child’s mother relied on the account allegedly given by the child, bloodstains allegedly noticed on her clothing and a consultation with a private doctor. The child’s statement could not be recorded owing to her tender age.

The trial court convicted the accused of kidnapping and aggravated penetrative sexual assault, imposing rigorous imprisonment of one year and ten years respectively, along with fines. It acquitted him of criminal intimidation under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

The High Court affirmed the conviction, treating discrepancies in the witness accounts as peripheral and relying on the presumption under Section 29 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. It declined to accept the forensic findings concerning the child’s clothing on the reasoning that her mother might have washed it during the intervening period.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant challenged the appreciation of the oral and medical evidence. His defence was that the complaint arose from previous enmity over a shared water connection. The State supported the conviction and submitted that the discrepancies did not discredit the prosecution case.

Court’s Observations

The Court found material discrepancies between the mother’s account of the private medical consultation and the doctor’s testimony, including when the consultation occurred and who accompanied the child. It also noted improvements in the mother’s account, the doctor’s failure to prepare treatment records and the absence of corroboration for his claimed intimation to the police.

The Court reiterated that a prosecutrix’s sole testimony may support conviction if it is of sterling quality, while cautioning against relying on accounts containing contradictions and lacking corroboration.

Applying Rai Sandeep alias Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012), whose witness-reliability test was reiterated in Ganesan v. State represented by its Inspector of Police (2020), the Court found that the mother’s evidence did not satisfy the standard discussed in those decisions. The Court reproduced the test: “The court considering the version of such witness should be in a position to accept it for its face value without any hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused.”

The Court found that the hospital findings did not support the private doctor’s account. The forensic examination detected neither semen nor an isolatable male DNA profile on the relevant exhibits, and no blood was detected on the child’s clothing. Considering the medical and forensic evidence together, the Court found that it contradicted the alleged sexual assault.

Distinguishing the proposition invoked by the prosecution from State of U.P. v. Babul Nath (1994), the Court observed: “In a given state of facts, it may be a true proposition that the absence of injury or absence of semen does not ipso facto disprove the rapist act. State of U.P. vs. Babul Nath, was relied on by the prosecution for the aforesaid proposition. However, the instant case has a conspicuous differentiating factor inasmuch as the doctor’s evidence, as highlighted above, read with the FSL report, completely ruled out the possibility of any penetrative act.”

The Court noted that the mother’s cross-examination established the existence of a common water connection and a quarrel between the two households over water sharing. Against the deficiencies in the prosecution evidence, it accepted this as support for the defence that the complaint was motivated by enmity.

The Court observed: “In wake of the inconsistent prosecution evidential version, further weakened by non-supportive medical evidence, the story of previous enmity on account of water quarrel could gain cogent ground to become believable and acceptable. It could therefore be said that the complaint was a motivated one filed with ill-intention and out of enmity.”

Turning to Sections 29 and 30 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, the Court explained that presumptions concerning commission of an offence and culpable mental state are rebuttable. It held that the prosecution must first establish the basic facts constituting the offence before the burden shifts to the accused.

The Court referred to the Bombay High Court’s reasoning in Navin Dhaniram Baraiye v. State of Maharashtra, through P.S.O., P.S. Ajni, District Nagpur (2018), reproducing: “A perusal of the above quoted provision does show that it is for the accused to prove the contrary and in case he fails to do so, the presumption would operate against him leading to his conviction under the provisions of the POCSO Act. It cannot be disputed that no presumption is absolute and every presumption is rebuttable. It cannot be countenanced that the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act is absolute. It would come into operation only when the prosecution is first able to establish facts that would form the foundation for the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act to operate.”

The Court explained that an accused may rebut the presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 by discrediting prosecution witnesses in cross-examination, exposing inconsistencies and gaps, pointing to conflicting medical evidence or advancing a valid factual or statutory defence.

Emphasising the role of the complete evidentiary record, the Court observed: “The presumption of commission of offence and that of guilty mental state which has been applied at the beginning of the trial in view of the presumptive provisions in that regard, may at the stage of the conclusion of evidence, vanish if the reverse burden is successfully discharged by the accused to rebut the prosecution case. In ultimate analysis, it will be the total canvass of evidence which would play a decisive role. The presumptive provisions do not operate to oust the evidence standing in favour of the accused.”

The Court explained that reverse-burden provisions do not permit conviction on a preponderance of probabilities. The prosecution must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, whereas the accused may counter its case on a preponderance of probabilities. It relied on Noor Aga v. State of Punjab and Another (2008), which addressed comparable presumptions under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

Referring to V.D. Jhingan v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1966), concerning Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, the Court reproduced: “It is sufficient if the accused person succeeds in proving a preponderance of probability in favour of his case; it is not necessary for the accused person to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt or in default to incur a verdict of guilty. The onus of proof lying upon the accused person is to prove his case by a preponderance of probability. As soon as he succeeds in doing so, the burden is shifted to the prosecution which still has to discharge its original onus that never shifts i.e. that of establishing on the whole case the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The Court also referred to Gangadhar alias Gangaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2020) on heightened scrutiny of foundational facts under stringent narcotics legislation, and Trilok Chand Jain v. State of Delhi (1975) on the ineffectiveness of a presumption where the prosecution’s own story is inherently inconsistent with the presumed fact.

Relying on Naresh Kumar alias Nitu v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2017), concerning presumptions under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court reiterated that such provisions cannot dilute the accused’s right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. It further held that statutory presumptions do not displace the rule favouring the accused where the evidence permits two views, one consistent with innocence.

The Court cited Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973), reproducing: “The onus even in such cases upon the accused is not as heavy as is normally upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. If some material is brought on the record consistent with the innocence of the accused which may reasonably be true, even though it is not positively proved to be true, the accused would be entitled to acquittal.”

Applying these principles, the Court found that the appellant had successfully rebutted the prosecution account. It held that the material contradictions, non-corroborative medical evidence and cogent defence prevented a finding that guilt had been established beyond reasonable doubt.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed both appeals and set aside the High Court judgment upholding the appellant’s conviction and sentence under Section 363 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. It acquitted him of both offences and directed his immediate release, if in custody, unless required for another offence.

Cause Title: Deepak in JC v. State Govt. of NCT Delhi (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1008)

Click here to read/download Judgment