Justice S.V.N. Bhatti, Justice N.V. Anjaria, Supreme Court

While observing that Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 serves as an instrument of social amelioration designed to eliminate gender-based discrimination in property inheritance and place female heirs on an equal footing with male heirs, the Supreme Court has held that a widow’s limited estate right is transformed into an absolute right.

The Apex Court was considering the appeal arising from the Judgment passed by the Delhi High Court revolving around the scope, extent and operation of Section 51(2) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954.

The Division Bench of Justice S.V.N. Bhatti and Justice N. V. Anjaria held, “With the enactment of the Act, 1954, Khajano had a right contemporaneous with her entitlement under the Act, 1937, i.e., a limited estate. The highlighted words in the Explanation to Section 14(1) of the HSA, 1956, particularly “by inheritance … or in any other manner whatsoever”, make it clear that, with the enactment of the HSA, 1956, on 17.06.1956, the rights of a Hindu Widow are enlarged into absolute rights and, inferentially, include the right as Bhumidhar under the Act, 1954. To wit, if the unforeseen circumstance, namely a death, had happened between 20.07.1954 and 17.06.1956, when the HSA, 1956, had come into operation, the succession to the estate of Khajano should be regulated by Section 51(2)(a)(i) of the Act, 1954, inasmuch as on that day Khajano possessed a proprietary right but with a limited estate. By operation of Section 14(1) read with the Explanation, with effect from 17.06.1956, Khajano is not only a proprietor, but, through the general referential legislation of personal law, i.e., HSA, 1956, her limited estate right is transformed into an absolute right, thus changing the course of succession from Section 50 to Section 53 of the Act, 1954.”

Senior Advocate Rupesh Kumar represented the Appellant while AOR Anirudh Sharma represented the Respondent.

Factual Background

The subject matter of the Appeal revolved around a property in Bhawana Village, Delhi. The earliest propositus, or common ancestor, is the late Hardayal, had three sons: Khushi Ram, Tulsi Ram, and Naval Kishore. Mauji Ram is the son of Harnad and the grandson of Naval Kishore. Mauji Ram married Khajano, and they had a son, Ram Chander. Mauji Ram died, leaving his wife, Khajano, and son, Ram Chander. Bal Kishan and Baldeo are Tulsi Ram's grandsons and Khurdiya's sons. In 1937, Ram Chander died, leaving Khajano as the sole surviving representative of Mauji Ram's estate and his son. After the deaths of her husband and son, Khajano contracted Karwa (re-marriage) with another son of Khurdiya, i.e., Bal Kishan.

At the time of Khajano’s marriage to Bal Kishan, the latter had three sons with his first wife. Khajano, from her second marriage to Bal Kishan, had two sons, Chand Ram/ second Respondent and Chander Bhan/third Respondent. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force w.e.f. June 17, 1956. The Revenue Records recorded Khajano as Bhumidhar. In 1973, Khajano died, leaving her sons, Chand Ram/Ssecond Respondent and Chander Bhan/third Respondent, as her successors-in-interest. In 1997, the Respondents filed an Application for Mutation. The disputes now under appeal arose between the second and third Respondents, on the one hand, and the Appellants, on the other. The Application for Mutation by Succession in favour of the second and third Respondents was registered before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM), Narela, Delhi.

The Authorities ordered mutation in favour of Khajano's sons through Bal Kishan and rejected the Reversioners' claim. The Appellate Authority rejected the Reversioners' claim and applied the Succession Rules applicable to the property of a Hindu female or widow. When the matter reached the High Court, the Single Judge held that succession to Bhumidhari rights in Delhi after 1954 is governed by the Act, 1954, and not by the HSA, 1956. The Division Bench held that Section 15 of the HSA, 1956 is not applicable, as it applies only to property inherited by a female from her father or mother, whereas Khajano inherited it from her son. It accepted the position in law that the Act, 1954, is a complete Code in itself. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant approached the Apex Court.

Reasoning

The Bench highlighted how the HSA, 1956, is an important piece of legislation that transforms a Hindu female's right to the property she possesses. On a perusal of the provisions of the Act, the Bench explained that if the proprietor Bhumidhar, on the date of demise, holds only a “life estate”, succession is governed by Section 50 of the Act, 1954. The same proprietor, Bhumidhar, under the personal law applicable to her, is entitled to the holding absolutely and then the holding, i.e., as per Section 3(11a), shall devolve in accordance with the table mentioned in Section 53 of the Act, 1954. “Therefore, the deciding factors are the timing of death and the nature of the right held by the Bhumidhar at the time of her death, as per the personal law that would govern succession”, it added.

The Bench was of the view that by operation of Section 14(1) read with the Explanation, with effect from June 17, 1956, Khajano is not only a proprietor, but, through the general referential legislation of personal law, i.e., HSA, 1956, her limited estate right is transformed into an absolute right, thus changing the course of succession from Section 50 to Section 53 of the Act, 1954.

“The precedents on the entitlement of a Hindu woman lay down the position in law that continuing to restrict the right of a Hindu woman is not preferred to giving the expression used in Section 14(1), read with the 27 Explanation, its full meaning, unless and until a case squarely falls within the meaning of Section 14(2) of the HSA, 1956”, it added.

Considering that Khajano died in 1973, the Bench noted that Section 51(2)(a) defines the trigger point by the words “dies” and “such Bhumidhar”. “On the date, “such Bhumidhar” was a proprietor of all the land comprised in the holding. Since the sentence is in the simple present tense, a literal reading aligns with the time and the trigger point. If, in Section 51(2)(a), the word “dies”, for the purpose of always giving a restricted meaning, is read as “died”, then the same would be in disregard of the plain and simple language used in Section 51(2)(a) of the Act, 1954”, it added.

Thus, finding no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment, the Bench dismissed the appeal.

Cause Title: Sultan Singh (Dead) Through Lrs and Others v. The Financial Commissioner Government of NCT of Delhi (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1107)

Appearance

Appellant: Senior Advocate Rupesh Kumar, Advocate Pankhuri Shrivastava, AOR Neelam Sharma, Advocates Rajeev Sharma, Devang Vats, Sathwika Daggumalla

Respondent: AOR Anirudh Sharma, Advocate Varun Kesharwani

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