Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, Justice Shree Chandrashekhar, Supreme Court

While holding that pre-conversion caste or community status cannot automatically be transposed upon conversion, the Supreme Court has held that mere membership of a caste cannot be treated as conclusive proof that every individual belonging to it continues to suffer the social backwardness which Article 16(4) of the Constitution seeks to address.

The Court affirmed a Madras High Court judgment invalidating a Tamil Nadu Government Order that allowed individuals converting from backward classes, most backward classes, denotified communities, and scheduled castes to Islam to be issued community certificates as backward class Muslims.

The Court held that upon conversion to Islam or Christianity, or to any other non-Hindu social order in which caste is not recognised as the basis of social status and classification, that foundational basis ceases to operate in the same manner.

It also held that the constitutional benefit cannot be made to travel in this manner from the religion in which the relevant backwardness arose to a religion whose basic theological structure or otherwise does not recognise caste as its foundational basis

The Bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Shree Chandrashekhar held, "Mere membership of a caste cannot be treated as conclusive proof that every individual belonging to it continues to suffer the social backwardness which Article 16(4) of the Constitution seeks to address. A person belonging to a caste historically regarded as backward may, by reason of education, occupation, economic/social advancement or an elevation in social standing, have ceased to suffer the disabilities which constitute the basis of affirmative action. It is for this reason that the identification of a backward class cannot rest upon caste alone, and that the other circumstances bearing upon the continuance of social backwardness must also be examined."

Senior Advocates Mukul Rohatgi and Sidharth Luthra appeared for the State, while Senior Advocate Gopal Sankaranarayanan appeared for the Respondents.

The Court had reserved its order at the admission stage on a Special Leave Petition filed by the State of Tamil Nadu, challenging the Madras High Court judgment, which held that converts to Islam cannot claim Backwards Class Status for reservations.

Brief Facts

A Special Leave Petition was filed by the State of Tamil Nadu challenging the judgment passed by the Madras High Court holding that a person who embraces Islam becomes a Muslim and cannot, merely by reason of such conversion, acquire membership of a particular Muslim community recognised as a Backward Class. It further held that the executive could not, through the G.O., alter the legal position declared in the earlier judicial decisions.

The High Court accordingly declared the said G.O. unconstitutional, dismissed the writ petition and sustained the rejection of respondent no. 1's application for the community certificate. It further held that a person who converts to Islam cannot claim the status of Backward Class Muslim and is only a Muslim.

Before the High Court, the writ petition was filed by Respondent No. 1 herein, aggrieved by the rejection of issuance of a Backward Class (Muslim) community certificate as “Muslim Labbai”. The reason recorded for such rejection was that Respondent No. 1 had converted from Hinduism to Islam and was seeking a Muslim Labbai certificate, but had “only converted to religion and not to the caste”.

Contentions of the Parties

The State submitted that the impugned judgment travels beyond the pleadings and relief sought in the writ petition, inasmuch as the constitutional validity of the G.O. was never challenged by the writ petitioner. It was argued that the said G.O. was relied upon by the writ petitioner himself, yet the High Court proceeded to examine and invalidate it with State-wide consequences, without affording an effective opportunity to the State or hearing the persons and authorities likely to be affected thereby.

It was submitted that the G.O. does not extend any reservation benefit to a person belonging to a forward community merely because such person converts to Islam. Its operation is confined to persons who were already members of the identified backward communities prior to conversion. Thus, according to the State, the G.O. neither creates a new backward class nor confers membership of a Muslim community by conversion, but only recognises the continuance of an existing backward-class entitlement.

Observations and Findings of the Court

The Court noted the theology of Islam and observed that among sections of Indian Muslims, there have existed communities whose organisation displays several characteristics ordinarily associated with caste, including hereditary membership, occupational association, endogamy and graded social status. Such characteristics establish the existence of social stratification and, in particular contexts, caste-like structures. They do not, however, warrant treating Ashraf, Ajlaf and Arzal as three homogeneous castes constituting a single and uniform system throughout Muslim society in India.

The Court noted that the appropriate characterisation is therefore not that Muslim society in India has been wholly untouched by caste, nor that it has reproduced in every respect the classical caste system. Rather, distinct Muslim communities have, in varying degrees and in different regions, developed forms of hereditary social stratification which may be analogous to caste, while remaining distinct communities whose boundaries and social positions have not been uniformly fixed.

It was added that the decision of the Court in Indra Sawhney considered the manner in which backward classes may be identified, including among non-Hindus, and recognised that occupational groups, sects and denominations among non-Hindus may, for historical reasons, constitute backward classes under Article 16(4). It did not consider the effect of a change of religion upon an existing claim to affirmative action founded upon the social backwardness within the Hindu social order. 

The main question was whether social backwardness arising within one social order or religion can continue to furnish the same constitutional entitlement upon a person's entry into another social order or religion.

"Upon conversion to Islam or Christianity, or to any other non-Hindu social order in which caste is not recognised as the basis of social status and classification, that foundational basis ceases to operate in the same manner. The fact that the consequences of the earlier disability may continue in the form of educational deprivation, occupational disadvantage, economic hardship or other material circumstances cannot carry the antecedent social backwardness into the new religion. To permit such continuation would be to detach the consequences from the social structure which produced them and to transpose social backwardness of one religion into another religion in which such backwardness is not recognised as the basis of social classification. The constitutional benefit cannot be made to travel in this manner from the religion in which the relevant backwardness arose to a religion whose basic theological structure or otherwise does not recognise caste as its foundational basis", the Court held.

It was added that the provision operates specifically in the field of Scheduled Caste status and cannot, by itself, determine every question arising under Article 16(4) of the Constitution. It reflects the constitutional understanding that the status attached to caste- based disability is not wholly detached from the social and religious order within which that disability is constitutionally recognised.

But a caste identity cannot be treated as an immutable personal attribute carrying with it, irrespective of a change in religious affiliation, every constitutional protection or benefit which was available on account of that identity and the social backwardness attaching to it, the Court added.

Regarding the validity of the GO, the Court observed, "The fact that Islam does not prescribe a caste hierarchy religion based on birth does not, by itself, negate the existence of historically evolved forms of social disadvantage among particular Muslim communities; equally, the existence of such formations cannot justify treating every Muslim, or even every such formation, as belonging to one predetermined caste-like class. What is constitutionally relevant is the demonstrable social and educational backwardness of the particular group, established by relevant and objective criteria. This preserves the necessary distinction between what a religion doctrinally prescribes and how its adherents may, in particular social contexts, have organised themselves. Therefore, the idea of the State in the present case drawing parallels with caste-based stratification in Hindu system to that in Muslims is against the ethos of the Constitution."

The Court held that no statutory benefit, protection, reservation or other entitlement under Article 16(4) of the Constitution, the enjoyment of which is predicated upon a particular Hindu social order, can be claimed or extended merely on the basis of such antecedent membership after the person has converted to Islam, Christianity or any other non- Hindu social order. Such conversion severs the legal foundation of an entitlement which is specifically conditioned upon membership of that Hindu social order.

The Court held, "Where a person, after having converted from the Hindu social order to a non-Hindu social order, reconverts to Hindu social order, the question of his entitlement to affirmative action under Article 16(4) cannot be determined merely by reference to his antecedent status. Such entitlement would require an independent, fact-specific determination by the competent authority as to whether the original caste or social identity has genuinely revived upon reconversion and whether the person satisfies the applicable constitutional and legal requirements for such affirmative action."

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the conclusion of the High Court and held that a person who converts to Islam does not, by that act alone, become a member of any one of the seven notified Backward Class Muslim communities in the State.

Hence, the Court dismissed the special leave petition.

Cause Title: The Secretary to the Government, Government of Tamil Nadu v. Sameer Ahmed and Ors. [Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 1129]

Appearances:

Petitioner: Senior Advocate Mukul Rohtagi, Senior Advocate Sidharth Luthra, Advocate on Record B. Karunakaran, Advocate Aravindh Raj, Advocate Jayasri, Advocate Pooja Lakshmi, Advocate Somaya Gupta, Advocate Shwetang Parthasarthy

Respondents: Senior Advocate Gopal Shankaranarayanan, Advocate on Record Shrutanjaya Bhardwaj- 4258, Advocate on Record Bhakti Vardhan Singh, Advocate on Record P. V. Yogeswaran, Advocate Pooja Dhar, Advocate Ayushman Agrawal, Advocate Indumugi C, Advocate Tushar Shrivastava, Advocate Joel James, Advocate Omkar Hemanth, Advocate Suvaroop Saha Roy, Advocate Shubhanshi Phogat, Advocate Yashi Bajpai, Advocate Aanchal Saini, Advocate P V Yogeswaran, Advocate Venkata Raghuvamsy D, Advocate Mohamed Ismail, Advocate Narendra Kumar Pandey, Advocate J Tarun Kumar, Advocate Ankt Khatri, Advocate Ashish Kumar Upadhyay, Advocate Y. Lokesh, Advocate V. Kandha Prabhu, Advocate Dhatri Singh, Advocate Hari Preethi, Advocate Maitri Goal, Advocate Guneswaran Pv, Advocate K. Velmurugan, Advocate Dr Prahlad Narayan Singh, Advocate Arun Singh, Advocate L. R. Venkatesan

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