Husband Alleging Extramarital Affair Because Wife Spoke To Male Friend Is A “Gender-Based Stereotype” Amounting To Cruelty: Jharkhand HC

The Court held that the husband’s allegation of adultery, based on the wife talking to a man on his phone, amounted to cruelty towards her, and that the claims of cruelty and desertion were not established.

Update: 2026-11-12 10:40 GMT

The Jharkhand High Court has dismissed a husband’s appeal against the refusal of a divorce on grounds of cruelty and desertion, holding that allegations of an extramarital relationship levelled against a wife merely because she talked to a male friend are typical gender-based stereotypes and themselves amount to cruelty towards her.

The Court held that the husband failed to prove either cruelty or desertion under Section 13(1)(i-a) or (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

The Division Bench of Chief Justice M.S. Sonak and Justice Manoj Prasad observed, “To our considered view, such allegations are typical gender-based stereotypes, where, if a woman talks to a man, even if he is a friend, charges of adultery or of an extramarital relationship are levelled. We are, therefore, of the considered view that such allegations amount to cruelty towards the wife.”

The Bench added that counter-allegations by a wife of an extramarital relationship against her husband, without appropriate proof, may also amount to cruelty, but that in this case the allegations were made by the husband against his wife, and therefore no case of mental cruelty was made out.

Advocate Atanu Banerjee appeared for the Appellant, while Advocate Ranjan Kumar appeared for the Respondent-wife.

Brief Facts

The appellant-husband filed a First Appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, challenging the judgment and decree of the Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court, Bermo at Tenughat, Bokaro, which dismissed his petition for dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The General Manager of Indian Explosive Pvt. Ltd., where the husband worked, was impleaded by the Court to obtain details of his salary.

The marriage between the parties was solemnised according to Hindu rites, and the couple had a son and a daughter. The husband alleged that the wife kept her distance from him, disregarded her in-laws, was of suspicious character and spoke continuously on his mobile phone with another male person, resulting in quarrels. He alleged that she left the matrimonial home without informing her in-laws, went to her parental home and had lived there since, despite his several efforts at settlement and restitution of conjugal rights.

The wife denied the allegations. She stated that she was tortured and that demands for dowry were made, that allegations of an extramarital relationship were levelled against her while the husband had himself established such a relationship with a woman working with him, and that she returned to her parents’ home on account of physical and mental torture.

The Trial Court held that the suit was maintainable, but decided the issues of cruelty and desertion against the husband. It did not give much weight to the evidence of the parties’ minor daughter, who admitted in cross-examination that her evidence was prepared at her father’s dictation. It found that the documents produced by the wife, including a compromise at the intervention of the High Court and the complaint regarding dowry demands, were never disputed. The suit was accordingly dismissed.

Contentions of the Parties

The husband submitted that there had been no restitution of conjugal life since the wife left the matrimonial home, that all efforts at settlement had failed, and that the witnesses examined on his behalf had categorically supported his case. It was submitted that the daughter had deposed that her mother frequently quarrelled with her father and grandmother, and that the Trial Court failed to consider this.

It was further submitted that, although the petition was filed under Section 13(1)(i-a), it was also a case of desertion under Section 13(1)(i-b), on which there was a specific pleading and an issue framed but no speaking finding by the Trial Court. It was also contended that the filing of criminal cases against the husband, which ended in no finding of guilt, amounted to cruelty.

The wife submitted that the impugned judgment warranted no interference. It was submitted that the wife’s separate residence was not disputed, but that the reason was that her dignity was compromised, an allegation of an extramarital relationship was made against her, and she was tortured for illegal demands for dowry.

It was pointed out that she had stated in her written statement that she was ready to restore conjugal life and had made efforts for the same even during mediation before the High Court.

Observations/Findings of the Court

The Bench framed two points for determination, namely whether the husband established cruelty entitling him to a decree under Section 13(1)(i-a), and whether a decree could be granted on the ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(i-b). It observed that, though cruelty is not defined under the Act, it should be such that matrimonial life becomes incompatible and conjugal life cannot be restored on account of the behaviour of either spouse.

On physical cruelty, the Court noted that two of the husband’s three witnesses were his colleagues and friends, and that their evidence could not be accepted without an element of suspicion. It observed that evidence from a family member, particularly the mother who was allegedly a victim of the quarrels, would have corroborated the husband’s case, but none was brought on record.

As regards the daughter, the Court observed that “when a minor child is residing with only one of her parents, the possibility of poisoning of mind against the other spouse/parent cannot be ruled out.” Noting that she admitted her evidence was prepared under her father’s dictation, the Court held that her evidence could not be read to conclude the allegations of cruelty.

It found the husband’s own statement uncorroborated by any credible evidence, and noted that no complaint was made before any competent authority and no effort at reconciliation was made at any time.

On mental cruelty, the Court held that allegations of an extramarital relationship, if proved, may amount to mental cruelty in appropriate cases, but that the husband’s allegations here, including that the wife spoke to an unknown male on his phone, were typical gender-based stereotypes which themselves amounted to cruelty towards the wife. It concluded that no case of mental cruelty was made out.

On desertion, the Court held that, although no case was instituted specifically under Section 13(1)(i-b), the pleadings referred to desertion and an issue had been framed, and that “merely not referring to any specific provision of law will not be fatal to a party’s case if the pleadings are to that effect and the provision of law also allows such pleading.”

It noted that the order of the Co-ordinate Bench recorded the wife’s desire to restore conjugal life, which the husband refused, and held that this sufficiently established the absence of animus deserendi. The Court observed that the undisputed documents showed a compromise had been entered into to settle the criminal case, though its terms requiring the parties to live together were not complied with.

It also noted that the husband’s challenge before the High Court to an interim maintenance order of just Rs. 3000, though dismissed, spoke volumes about his conduct. It held that the case of desertion was not established either.

The Court accordingly decided both points against the husband and dismissed the appeal.