Benefit U/S 4 Probation of Offenders Act Available Even If Sentence Imposed Is Only Fine: Supreme Court
The Court held that the expression “release” under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 must be construed purposively and extends to setting an offender at liberty even from the obligation of payment of fine, not merely from physical custody.
The Supreme Court held that the benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, is available even in cases where the sentence imposed is only a fine, and not imprisonment.
Rejecting a narrow construction, the Court clarified that the concept of “release” cannot be restricted to release from custody alone, but must be understood in the broader context of relieving the offender from the consequences of sentencing.
The Court was hearing an appeal arising from the judgment of the Bombay High Court affirming the conviction of the appellants under Sections 323 and 324 read with Section 34 IPC, where the sentence imposed was only a fine. The appellants limited their challenge to seeking the benefit of Sections 3 and 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.
A Bench of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar observed: “During course of arguments, much emphasis was laid by the Counsel for the State that Section 4 uses the expression ‘release’ in context of ‘instead of sentencing’ and thus, when the person is sentenced only for fine and not for imprisonment, there is no occasion for the Court to ‘release’ him, thereby making application of Section 4 of 1958 Act impossible. In light of the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, the expression ‘release’ has to be read accordingly. In this context, we are of the opinion that ‘release’ cannot mean release only from custody. It has to be read as releasing from the obligation to serve a sentence of payment of a fine. This view is further strengthened by the meaning of the word ‘release’ as contained in the Advanced Law Lexicon. It is defined, inter alia, as ‘to set at liberty’. Therefore, ‘release’ as contained in Section 4 of the 1958 Act should be read as to set the offender at liberty from receiving a sentence, even of fine only.”
Advocate Amol B. Karande represented the appellant, while Advocate Aaditya Aniruddha Pande represented the respondents.
Background
The prosecution's case pertained to an incident of assault involving multiple accused persons. The Trial Court convicted the appellants under Sections 323 and 324 IPC and imposed only fines, without awarding any custodial sentence. The High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence.
Before the Supreme Court, the appellants did not press the appeal on merits but sought extension of the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, relying on the reformative object of the legislation and the absence of prior criminal antecedents.
The State opposed the plea, contending that Section 4 applies only where imprisonment is imposed, as the provision contemplates “release instead of sentencing,” and where only a fine is imposed, no such “release” is possible.
Court’s Observation
The Court undertook a comprehensive examination of the scheme, object, and legislative history of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. It reiterated that the Act is a beneficial legislation rooted in the reformative theory of punishment, intended to rehabilitate offenders and reintegrate them into society rather than subject them to punitive consequences.
The Court emphasised that the statutory expression “punishment” necessarily includes a fine, as evident from Section 53 IPC and the corresponding provisions under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. It was observed that excluding fine-only cases from the ambit of Section 4 would defeat the legislative intent and create an artificial distinction not borne out by the statutory scheme.
Rejecting the State’s contention, the Court authoritatively held that “‘release’ cannot mean release only from custody, ... it has to be read as releasing from the obligation to serve a sentence of payment of fine.” It further clarified the scope of the provision in categorical terms, stating that “‘release’… should be read as to set the offender at liberty from receiving sentence, even of fine only.”
The Court also examined the interplay between Sections 3 and 4 of the Act, noting that while Section 3 applies to specified minor offences and requires absence of prior conviction, Section 4 has a broader ambit and enables release on probation of good conduct for offences not punishable with death or life imprisonment.
Further, the Court highlighted that the grant of probation is not automatic but depends upon the formation of an opinion that such release is “expedient,” which requires consideration of multiple factors, including the nature of the offence, character of the offender, antecedents, social background, and surrounding circumstances.
The Bench also adverted to the relationship between Section 360 CrPC and the Probation of Offenders Act, observing that both provisions share a common reformative objective, though the latter provides a more elaborate framework including supervision by probation officers and removal of disqualification under Section 12.
Conclusion
Applying the above principles, the Court held that the appellants were entitled to the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. While affirming the conviction, it directed that the appellants be released on probation of good conduct under Section 4, and in the case of one appellant, after due admonition under Section 3.
The Court further directed that the fine imposed be treated as compensation payable to the victims, and clarified that in view of the grant of benefit under Sections 3 and 4, the appellants would not suffer any disqualification attaching to a conviction under Section 12 of the Act.
Cause Title: Milind S/o Ashruba Dhanve & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 355)
Appearances
Appellants: Amol B. Karande, AOR; Vishal Jogdand; B. Pallesh Lakshmi; Akshada; Ashutosh Srivastava, Advocates.
Respondent: Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR.