Cannot Reduce Sentence Beyond Statutory Minimum Since No Power Under Article 142 Bestowed: Kerala High Court

The Kerala High Court said that it cannot reduce the sentence beyond the statutory minimum, since no power under Section 142 of the Constitution of India bestowed on the Court.

The Court was deciding a Criminal Appeal filed by the accused challenging his conviction and sentence on multiple grounds by the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge.

A Single Bench of Justice A. Badharudeen observed, “Following the decision in Pounammal’s case (supra), referred by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused also, this Court cannot reduce the sentence beyond the statutory minimum, since no power under Section 142 of the Constitution of India bestowed on this Court. Therefore, this contention could not be appreciated in the matter of sentence.”

The Bench elucidated that the power under Article 142 of the Constitution could not be invoked to reduce a sentence than the minimum sentence provided by the statute, as the same would amount to legislation by the Court overstepping on the domain of the legislature, which is impermissible.

Advocate R. Anil represented the Appellant/Accused, while Sr. Public Prosecutor Rekha S. represented the Respondent/State.

Case Background

As per the prosecution allegation, the Appellant-accused demanded Rs. 25,000/- as illegal gratification from a person as a motive or reward for not making any reduction in the value of improvements of the land acquired for Kochi International Airport and for disbursing the compensation. The accused allegedly demanded and accepted Rs. 10,000/- on September 5, 1997 and Rs. 15,000/- on September 19, 1997.

He was allegedly trapped by the trap team and hence, the prosecution alleged commission of offences punishable under Section 7 as well as under Section 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) by the accused. Being aggrieved by the conviction and sentence awarded by the Special Judge, the accused was before the High Court.

Court’s Observations

The High Court in the above regard, said, “Regarding the mode of proof of demand of bribe, if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.”

The Court noted that the presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a Court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof.

“On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands. The mode of proof of demand and acceptance is either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence”, it added.

The Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dashrath v. State of Maharashtra (2025) wherein it was held that the excise of power conferred by Article 142, in a case such as the present where a minimum sentence is prescribed by the statute, cannot be tinkered, for, the same would amount to legislation by the Court; and, prescription of a term of sentence quite contrary to what the Parliament has legislated would be legally impermissible. It was further held that the statutory prescription in relation to punishment for a minimum period, unless challenged, cannot be reduced by the Court even in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution.

“On scrutiny of the evidence, it could be gathered that the evidence of PW1 not at all shaken during cross-examination to disbelieve his version as to demand and acceptance of Rs.10,000/- by the accused on 05.09.1997 as well as Rs.15,000/- on 19.09.1997. Even though it is argued by the learned counsel for the accused/appellant that there was delay in producing the FIR before the court, it is discernible that the trap was laid in Ernakulam district whereas the FIR was registered in Thiruvananthapuram”, it also noted.

The Court was of the view that the FIR available in this case was not clear to read when the FIR was received by the Court and the same was in a dilapidated condition.

“Even if it is accepted that the FIR was received only on 20.09.1997 by the Court, considering the fact that, the trap was on 19.09.1997, the delay is too short or no substantive delay. Therefore, this aspect has no much significance to hold that the same is fatal to the prosecution”, it added.

Conclusion

Furthermore, the Court observed that the Special Court rightly appreciated the evidence available to hold that the accused accepted Rs. 25,000/- illegal gratification to establish the ingredients to find commission of the offences.

“In such view of the matter, the conviction imposed by the Special Court is only to be confirmed. … Coming to the sentence, the same can be modified considering the request of the learned counsel for the appellant, to the statutory minimum”, it concluded.

Accordingly, the High Court partly allowed the Appeal, confirmed the conviction imposed by the Special Court, and modified the sentence.

Cause Title- A.K. Rajendran v. State of Kerala (Neutral Citation: 2025:KER:72764)

Appearance:

Appellant: Advocates R. Anil, Delvin Jacob Mathews, George Philip, and Raju Radhakrishnan.

Respondent: Sr. Public Prosecutor Rekha S.

Click here to read/download the Judgment