Grant Of Sanction Under Prevention of Corruption Act Can’t Be Faulted Merely On Ground Of Absence Of Addition Or Deletion Of Words From Draft Order: Supreme Court
The appeal before the Supreme Court was filed against the order of the Bombay High Court upholding the order of conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Manmohan, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has ruled that if a draft order is placed before the sanctioning authority and he is satisfied that nothing needs to be added/deleted therefrom, the grant of sanction cannot be faulted merely on the ground of absence of addition of words to/deletion of words from the draft. All that is necessary for a sanction to be granted is for the sanctioning authority to be satisfied about the existence of a prima facie case.
The appeal before the Supreme Court was filed against the order of the Bombay High Court upholding the order of conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant accused under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
The Division Bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Manmohan asserted, “If a draft order is placed before the sanctioning authority and he is satisfied that nothing needs to be added/deleted therefrom, the grant of sanction cannot be faulted merely on the ground of absence of addition of words to/deletion of words from the draft. We have noticed that PW-3 made four minor corrections to ensure that the substance conforms to the form in which the sanction was required to be given, without altering the substance (i.e. the contents). That there has been a complete absence of application of mind by PW-3 is, thus, not proved; also, that there has been a failure of justice, has not been shown.”
Arguments
It was the case of the appellant that the sanction to prosecute was mechanically granted, and the investigation was conducted by an Inspector of Police, although in terms of the statutory mandate contained in Section 17 of the PC Act, no officer lower in rank than a Deputy Superintendent of Police could investigate the crime. It was further submitted that the Court may consider altering the sentence as the incident was more than 25 years old, and the appellant, by the passage of time had become a septuagenarian.
Reasoning
The Bench, at the outset, observed that there is a legal impediment to prosecute a public servant for corruption if there is no sanction.“Even otherwise, merely because there is any omission, error or irregularity in the matter of granting sanction, that does not affect the validity of the proceedings unless the court records its own satisfaction that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice”, it added.
The Bench noticed that the Sub-Divisional Officer made four minor corrections to ensure that the substance conformed to the form in which the sanction was required to be given, without altering the substance (i.e. the contents). The Bench was satisfied that a complete absence of application of mind by the Officer was not proved and thus there had been no irregularity, far less illegality, in grant of sanction.
The Apex Court further observed that the State Government having authorized by a general order, which is the law for the present case, that a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police may investigate any offence punishable under the PC Act and PW-4 who conducted the investigation being an officer of the rank of Inspector of Police in the Anti-Corruption Branch, it was not necessary to bring the law on record as evidence in the trial before it could be relied on. On the contrary, it was the duty of the special court to take judicial notice of such law, which it did. “Moreover, the vires of the said Government Order not having been questioned by the appellant on any ground, we affirm the finding of the Special Court in this behalf”, it said.
The Bench also found that the demand was proven without a doubt. Thus, the Bench concluded that no error was committed by the Special Court in convicting the appellant and by the High Court in affirming such conviction.
Considering the date of the incident of offence, the advanced age of the appellant, the mental anxiety and continued stress that he must have experienced all these years induced by the pendency of proceedings, the Bench partly allowed the appeal and altered the sentence of 2 years R. I. for the offence under Section 7 to a term of S.I. for a year without, however, altering the sentence of imprisonment ordered for the offence under Section 13(1)(d). The Bench further ordered that both the sentences would run concurrently.
Cause Title: Dashrath v. The State of Maharashtra (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 654)
