Judicial Review In CRPF Disciplinary Matters Limited To Decision-Making Process: Delhi High Court

The High Court reiterated that in disciplinary proceedings, courts cannot interfere with the merits of the decision or the quantum of punishment unless it is so disproportionate as to shock the judicial conscience, in which case the Court may mould the relief or, in rare cases, substitute the penalty.

Update: 2025-10-23 05:00 GMT

Delhi High Court 

The Delhi High Court has reiterated that the scope of judicial review in matters related to the Central Reserve Police Force’s disciplinary proceedings is confined to examining whether due process was followed in its decision by the disciplinary authority.

The High Court was hearing a writ petition filed by a dismissed constable of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) seeking reinstatement after being removed from service for furnishing a bogus matriculation certificate at the time of recruitment.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Subramonium Prasad and Justice Vimal Kumar Yadav, while relying on B.C. Chaturvedi vs. Union of India & Ors., (1995), reiterated that “the scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters is confined to examining the decision-making process and that interference with the quantum of punishment is justified only where the penalty imposed shocks the judicial conscience, in which case the Court may mould the relief by directing reconsideration or, in rare cases, substituting an appropriate punishment.”

Advocate Mohan Kumar represented the petitioner, while Avnish Singh, Senior Panel Counsel, represented the respondents.

Background

The petitioner had joined the CRPF in 2011 as a Constable (Water Carrier) after qualifying in all stages of recruitment. However, during the verification of his educational qualifications, the Haryana School Education Board, Bhiwani, reported that his matriculation certificate was bogus. Consequently, a departmental inquiry was initiated in December 2016.

After completion of the inquiry, the petitioner was removed from service under Clause 10(2) of the Department of Personnel & Training’s Office Memorandum dated May 19, 1993, which mandates dismissal of government servants found to have furnished false documents or false information at the time of recruitment.

His appeal and revision petitions before the higher authorities were dismissed, prompting him to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petitioner argued that the discrepancy in his marksheet was a bona fide mistake, that all other particulars were correct, and that his removal was disproportionate to the alleged misconduct.

The respondents opposed the plea, submitting that the departmental inquiry had conclusively established that the petitioner had produced a forged certificate and that such misconduct warranted dismissal under the applicable service rules.

Court’s Observation

The Delhi High Court, at the outset, noted that the petitioner’s defence of “bona fide mistake” could not be accepted as credible, since marks obtained in a matriculation examination are among the most vital particulars a candidate would remember. The Court held that the petitioner had consciously submitted a false document and that such an act amounted to a breach of trust between employer and employee, particularly in a disciplined force like the CRPF.

The Bench further held that the punishment could not be termed disproportionate, as the very foundation of the employment relationship was vitiated by fraud. The argument that the petitioner’s duties were non-combative and therefore leniency should be shown was also rejected. The Bench held that “a minor and trivial looking lapse may endanger the life, limbs and property of CRPF personnel, common men and country too.”

While referring to Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 611, the Bench observed that “judicial review, generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but against the decision-making process.” The Court further relied on B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995) 6 SCC 749, where the Supreme Court held that interference with punishment is warranted only when it is “so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience of the court.”

The High Court reiterated that courts exercising judicial review are concerned only with ensuring procedural fairness and adherence to the principles of natural justice, while clarifying that the adequacy of evidence or the correctness of findings by disciplinary authorities falls outside their purview.

Conclusion

The Delhi High Court held that the departmental proceedings against the petitioner were conducted in accordance with law and that he was afforded due opportunity of defence. Finding no procedural irregularity or disproportionality in the punishment, the Bench dismissed the writ petition.

Cause Title: Amit Kumar v. Union of India & Others (Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:9132-DB)

Appearances

Petitioner: Advocates Mohan Kumar and Neetu Singh

Respondents: Avnish Singh, SPC, with Advocates Mahendra Vikram Singh and Pushplata Singh

Click here to read/download Judgment


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