Court's Direction To Furnish Voice Sample During Investigation Does Not Violate Article 20(3) Or Right To Privacy: Delhi High Court
The High Court held that a Judicial Magistrate is empowered to direct an accused to provide a voice sample for investigation, and that such a direction does not amount to testimonial compulsion or violate the right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution.
Justice Neena Bansal Krishna, Delhi High Court
The Delhi High Court has held that a magistrate's direction seeking the furnishing of a voice sample during investigation through a mechanical process does not constitute self-incrimination and is not protected by the prohibition under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.
The Court further held that even in the absence of an express statutory provision, a Judicial Magistrate has the power to order voice sampling for investigation, as recognised by the binding precedent of the Supreme Court.
The Court was hearing a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging an order passed by the Special Judge directing the petitioner to provide his voice samples for comparison with intercepted telephonic conversations.
A Bench of Justice Neena Bansal Krishna of the Delhi High Court, while stating that “the direction to provide a voice sample does not violate Article 20(3) of the Constitution as it does not constitute testimonial compulsion”, accordingly held that “while the Right to Privacy is a fundamental right, it is not absolute and must yield to legitimate State interests, such as the prevention and investigation of crime.”
Advocate RK Handoo represented the petitioner, while Ripudaman Bhardwaj, SPP, represented the respondents.
Background
The petitioner assailed an order passed by the Special Judge (PC Act), CBI, directing him to provide voice samples for comparison with intercepted telephone calls obtained by the Income Tax Department during the period 2013–2014.
The intercepted conversations were relied upon by the investigating agency in connection with an FIR registered by the CBI alleging commission of offences under the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act. During the investigation, an application was moved before the Special Judge seeking directions for voice sampling for spectrographic comparison.
The petitioner challenged the order contending, inter alia, that the intercepted material was old, legally disputed, and inadmissible, and that compelling him to give a voice sample violated Article 20(3) of the Constitution as well as his right to privacy.
Court’s Observation
The High Court examined the central issue as whether the Special Judge could direct the petitioner to give voice samples for comparison with intercepted telephonic conversations, the legality of which was challenged by the petitioner.
The Court examined the constitutional protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) and relied on the Constitution Bench judgment in State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, holding that only testimonial acts which convey personal knowledge fall within the prohibition. The Court noted that a specimen obtained through a mechanical process does not amount to testimony.
Relying on the aforesaid principle, the Court held that “specimen through mechanical process cannot be termed as self-incriminatory attracting the prohibition of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India.”
The Court then considered whether a Magistrate could direct voice sampling in the absence of a specific provision in the CrPC. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ritesh Sinha v. State of U.P., the Court noted that until explicit statutory provisions are enacted, a Judicial Magistrate must be conceded the power to order a person to give a voice sample for the investigation of a crime.
The Court further took note of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rahul Agarwal v. State of West Bengal, which reaffirmed that a Magistrate has the power to order voice sampling and clarified that such power now stands expressly incorporated under Section 349 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita.
On the issue of privacy, the Court held that while the right to privacy is a fundamental right, it is not absolute and must yield to legitimate State interests such as the prevention and investigation of crime. The Court observed that the Special Judge had incorporated safeguards by directing that the text to be read by the petitioner for voice sampling would not contain inculpatory sentences from the disputed conversations and would be limited to words necessary for spectrographic comparison.
The Court also declined to examine the admissibility and evidentiary value of the intercepted conversations at the investigation stage, holding that such issues are matters for trial and that pre-judging them would amount to conducting a mini-trial.
Conclusion
Holding that the direction to provide a voice sample does not violate Article 20(3) of the Constitution and does not amount to testimonial compulsion, the Delhi High Court found no illegality or perversity in the order passed by the Special Judge.
Accordingly, the petition was dismissed, the interim order was vacated, and the petitioner was directed to comply with the directions to provide voice samples in accordance with the schedule fixed by the Trial Court or Investigating Officer.
Cause Title: Moin Akhtar Qureshi v. Central Bureau of Investigation (Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:11909)
Appearances
Petitioner: R.K. Handoo, Advocate; Yoginder Handoo, Advocate; Gaurav Vishwakarma, Advocate
Respondent: Ripudaman Bhardwaj, SPP; Amit Kumar Rana, Advocate