Threat To Upload Intimate Video Can Constitute Criminal Intimidation Even Without Recovery Of Device Or Recording: Supreme Court
The Bench upheld the conviction u/s 503, 506 IPC; and ruled “special knowledge” u/s 106 Evidence Act extends to private realm of intimate relationships.

Justice Sanjay Karol, Justice N. Kotiswar Singh, Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has upheld the conviction of a man for criminal intimidation under Sections 503 and 506 IPC for threatening to upload intimate images/videos of a woman with whom he had been in a long-term romantic relationship, holding that even in the absence of recovery of the alleged video or mobile phone, conviction can be sustained if the prosecutrix’s testimony inspires confidence and establishes a genuine apprehension of harm.
While dismissing the appeal against the Madras High Court’s decision affirming conviction on the charge of criminal intimidation, the Bench held that under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, “special knowledge” is not confined only to physical spaces like a home or closed room, but can also extend to intimate relationships where only the parties involved are privy to what transpired between them. However, considering that the incident dated back to 2015, the Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone.
Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh observed, “…from the perspective of the prosecutrix, she genuinely believed that there was a video of her taken while she was bathing. That the appellant later threatened the prosecutrix with uploading the videography on social media would further convince her of the existence of such videography. She thus, held the bona fide belief that such a video was in existence. It was when the relationship broke up that the appellant threatened to upload the video if the prosecutrix persisted in seeking to continue the relationship. In our opinion, the genuine perception of the prosecutrix that such a video exists and that the appellant threatened to upload in social media would constitute key ingredients for the purpose of invoking Section 503 IPC. The failure of the prosecution to procure and produce the mobile phone or video would not be fatal, so long as the prosecutrix was under the genuine belief that it existed”.
M.P. Parthiban, AOR appeared for the appellant and Sabarish Subramanian, AOR appeared for the respondent.
As per the facts, allegations were made by the prosecutrix that the accused, with whom she had been in an intimate relationship for nearly two years, had secretly recorded her while she was bathing and later threatened to upload the material on social media after their relationship deteriorated.
Though the Trial Court acquitted the accused of offences under Sections 376, 493, and 354C IPC, it convicted him under Sections 503 and 506 IPC for criminal intimidation. The conviction was later affirmed by the High Court.
Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that the prosecution case was unsustainable because neither the alleged video nor the mobile phone used for recording was ever recovered. The defence also contended that the allegations were improvements over the FIR and unsupported by material evidence.
“…the appellant, by his conduct in remaining silent and merely stating generally that the prosecution evidence is false, missed an important opportunity to discredit or contradict the evidence of the prosecutrix on material aspects or to proffer an alternative version on the basis of preponderance of probability which would have been fatal to the prosecution case. The aforesaid opportunity becomes vital for the reason that what transpired between the appellant and the prosecutrix was mostly within the private realm between them, to which normally a third party will not have any access. Thus, when the prosecutrix made certain specific allegations against the appellant relating to a very private moment, which only the two of them could have known, it cast a legal obligation on the appellant under Section 106 of the Evidence Act to give his own version of the incident to throw a doubt on the version of the prosecutrix. If the appellant had done so, the Court would be faced with two possible scenarios, which would have rendered the version of the prosecutrix doubtful. Once a reasonable doubt could be raised on the version of the prosecutrix, the defence would have accomplished its ultimate objective of getting the prosecution case thrown out”, the Bench noted.
Rejecting the challenge, the Court held that the prosecution had successfully established foundational facts regarding the existence of a long-term intimate relationship between the parties. In such circumstances, the Court observed that the events occurring within the “private interpersonal realm” of such a relationship would often remain within the exclusive knowledge of the persons involved.
The Bench observed that in romantic relationships involving physical intimacy, parties ordinarily do not publicly disclose private interactions, and therefore certain facts may remain known only to them. Consequently, once the prosecution established foundational facts, it became incumbent upon the accused to explain circumstances especially within his knowledge.
The Court further relied on Section 114 of the Evidence Act relating to presumptions based on ordinary human conduct. It held that the prosecutrix’s belief regarding the existence of the video was genuine and natural in light of the relationship and the alleged threats issued by the accused.
“…What is noticeable is that there was no attempt at all on the part of the appellant to discredit the prosecutrix on this aspect of physical relationship. Neither did he specifically deny the sexual relationship. In view of the established fact of relationship between the appellant and the prosecutrix, which is of a physical and intimate nature, which has not been categorically denied by the appellant, taking into account the normal human conduct as contemplated under Section 114 of the Evidence Act coupled with the failure of the appellant to discredit the evidence of the prosecutrix in any manner known to law, the allegation of the prosecutrix against the appellant of making criminal intimidation after the prosecutrix insisted on continuing the relationship cannot be disbelieved as fabricated or concocted”, the Bench said.
Significantly, the Court held that for the purpose of constituting criminal intimidation under Section 503 IPC, actual recovery of the video was not indispensable. What mattered was the prosecutrix’s bona fide belief that such a recording existed and that the accused threatened to circulate it.
The judgment also contains an extensive discussion on the evidentiary value of cross-examination and contradictions under Section 145 of the Evidence Act read with Section 162 CrPC. The Court noted that the defence failed to properly confront the prosecutrix with contradictions from her Section 161 CrPC statement and instead merely referred to omissions in the FIR.
“…It may also be kept in mind that the FIR or the complaint filed is primarily to set the criminal investigation into motion and may not necessarily contain all the details of the case. It is not an encyclopaedia of all the relevant facts and omission to mention all the facts in the PIR, unless fundamentally goes to the root of the prosecution case cannot be faulted with”, the Bench categorically observed.
The Court additionally emphasised the importance of examination under Section 313 CrPC, observing that the accused merely offered blanket denials such as “false evidence” without furnishing any alternative explanation despite the incriminating circumstances put to him.
While sustaining the conviction, the Bench strongly criticised the investigating officer for failing to recover the mobile phone or digital evidence, observing that cases involving electronic material require greater professional competence and diligence during investigation.
“Though we are satisfied that in spite of non-recovery of the mobile phone/video recording, the charge against the appellant has been established beyond reasonable doubt in the present case, there can be no doubt that had the Investigating Officer (IO) recovered the same, it would have bolstered the case of the Prosecution. Unfortunately, there is nothing on record to show that the (IO) even tried to recover the same from the appellant. We also do not know what steps had been taken by the IO to recover and what prevented the IO to recover the same. This lapse on the part of IO is disappointing to say the least…”, the Bench further said.
Cause Title: Vijayakumar v. State of Tamilnadu (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 525)
Appearances:
Appellant: M.P. Parthiban, AOR.
Respondent: Sabarish Subramanian, AOR.

