Legislative Intent Was To Make Commissioner The Disciplinary Authority: Supreme Court Upholds NDMC Commissioner’s Power To Dismiss Executive Engineer

The Court said that the statutory qualifier "subject to any regulation that may be made in this behalf" explicitly signals a forward-looking regime rather than preserving existing rules. The Bench emphasized that subordinate legislation cannot freeze or limit the power of a competent legislature to restructure executive functions within a principal act. Consequently, until fresh regulations are formally enacted under the newly amended statutory framework, the explicit operational and disciplinary powers conferred upon the designated authority remain fully robust and legally unassailable.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Manoj Misra noting post Act 67 of 1993, Section 92 which stood amended, observed, “What is clear is, that by Act 67 of 1993 the ‘Commissioner’ was made not only the appointing authority in place of the ‘Corporation’, but also the disciplinary authority by virtue of substitution of clause (d) of Section 59”.

“…Post 1993 amendment, the power to appoint and to punish vested in the Commissioner by virtue of the amendments in Section 92 and Section 59 (d). Therefore, a proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 95 was added to declare that when an officer or employee appointable by the Commissioner is punished, an appeal would lie to the Administrator. Legislative intent was to make Commissioner the Disciplinary Authority”, the Bench further observed.

Senior Advocate Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad appeared for the appellant and Praveen Swarup, AOR appeared for the respondent.

The dispute arose following the dismissal of the appellant, Rajesh Sharma, who was employed as an Executive Engineer (Civil) with the North Delhi Municipal Corporation.

Following his conviction by a Special Judge under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Indian Penal Code on July 15, 2011, the Municipal Commissioner exercised disciplinary jurisdiction and passed an administrative order dismissing him from service on November 15, 2011.

Therafter, the appellant successfully moved the Central Administrative Tribunal, which quashed the dismissal on August 7, 2014, by ruling that the "Corporation" and not the Commissioner was the competent authority under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Service (Control and Appeal) Regulations, 1959.

However, the Delhi High Court reversed the tribunal's order on August 28, 2019, holding that the post-amendment statutory scheme empowered the Commissioner to act, which led the appellant to file the present civil appeal before the apex court.

The Supreme Court, therefore, after considering the relevant submissions, rejected the appellant's relation-back argument.

“…The question as to the relative nature of the provisions general or special must be determined with reference to the area and extent of their application either generally or specially in particular situations. The principle is expressed in the maxims Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant, and Generalibus Specialia Derogant. If a special provision is made on a certain matter, that matter is excluded from the general provision. If two sections of an Act cannot be reconciled, as they may be absolute contradictions, it is often said that the last must prevail. But this should be accepted only in the last resort. However, a more logical is indicated by Lord Herschell, L.C.: ‘You have to try and reconcile them as best as you may. If you cannot, you have to determine which is the leading provision, and which the subordinate provision and which must give way to the other’”, the Bench observed.

“In our view, there is no such conflict here because Section 95 (1) specifies punishments that may be imposed on a municipal officer or other municipal employee by such authority as may be prescribed by the Regulations. By itself it does not specify any disciplinary authority. Therefore, this provision admits of specification of the disciplinary authority by the Regulations. Regulations are piece of subordinate legislation...", the Bench said.

"...What can be achieved by a subordinate legislation under the Act can always be achieved by an amendment of the Act by the competent legislature. Moreover, existence of a Regulation framed under the Act cannot fetter the legislative power to amend the Act in a way that it overrides the Regulation. Interestingly, prior to Act 67 of 1993, the 1957 Act did not specify the disciplinary authority. Therefore, by virtue of Section 95(1) read with Section 98(1)(d) & (e), the Central Government, in exercise of powers under Section 480, notified the 1959 Regulations. But framing/ notifying the Regulations did not fetter the power of Parliament to amend the 1957 Act and thereby specify the disciplinary authority”, the Bench further observed.

The Bench concluded that "the phrase ‘subject to any Regulation that may be made in this behalf’ refers to the Regulations that are made after the substitution of clause (d) of Section 59 by Act 67 of 1993 and not the existing 1959 Regulations," noting that any contrary view would render the amendment redundant.

Accordingly, the Court formally granted leave, affirmed the judgment of the Delhi High Court, validated the Commissioner's dismissal order, and dismissed the civil appeal, concluding that the Commissioner was fully competent to pass the order on the date of dismissal.

Cause Title: Rajesh Sharma v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation and Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 646)

Appearances:

Appellant: Ardhendumauli Kumar Prasad, Sr. Adv., Shivesh P. Singh, Rahul Khurana, Karunakar Mahalik, AOR, Advocates.

Respondents: Praveen Swarup, AOR, Praveen Swarup, Yunus Malik, Rohit Swarup, Sukhamrit Singh, Ved Prakash, K.P. Singh, Advocates.

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