The Supreme Court dismissed a writ petition filed by Indian National Congress (INC) leader Meenakshi Natarajan challenging the rejection of her nomination papers for the upcoming Rajya Sabha by-election in Madhya Pradesh.

A Vacation Bench declined to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 32, emphasizing the absolute constitutional mandate of Article 329(b) which insulates the ongoing electoral process from intermediate judicial intervention.

The apex court held that it could not create exceptions for "manifestly arbitrary" or "glaring" errors at the threshold stage, clarifying that the aggrieved candidate must seek recourse through the standard statutory remedy of an election petition after the conclusion of the polls.

The partial working day's Bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Atul S Chandurkar said, "Whenever an attempt has been made to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32, or that of the High Courts under Article 226, during the process of elections, this Court has repeatedly declined interference, having regard to the constitutional mandate contained in Article 329(b) of the Constitution...The principal contention advanced by Dr. Singhvi is that where the rejection of a nomination is ex facie illegal, manifestly arbitrary, and demonstrably erroneous, this Court ought to intervene; otherwise, the sanctity of the electoral process itself would stand compromised...We are unable to accept the submission...If such a distinction were to be recognized, courts would be required to classify election disputes into two categories: first, those involving allegedly glaring or manifest errors warranting immediate intervention under Articles 32 or 226; and second, those where the aggrieved party must await the remedy of an election petition..."


Senior Advocate Abhishek Manusinghvi and Senior Advocate Vivek Tankha appeared for the Petitioner, while SG Tushar Mehta appeared for the State of Madhya Pradesh(Intervenor), Senior Advocate Dema Seshadiri Naidu appeared for the ECI, and Senior Advocate Mukul Rohatgi appeared for the contesting candidate.

The Court added, "Such a distinction finds no place in Article 329(b) of the Constitution. To accept the petitioner's submission would amount to reading into the constitutional scheme an exception which has not been provided by the Constitution itself...We are afraid that any interpretation permitting courts to entertain challenges to the rejection of nominations in some cases, while relegating other candidates to the statutory remedy of an election petition, would be inconsistent with the settled constitutional position and ought not to be encouraged...In view of the above, we are not inclined to entertain the present petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India...The writ petition is accordingly dismissed."

Yesterday, Senior Advocate Abhishek Singhvi, appearing for Natarajan, urged the bench to consider the unlisted mentioning of her plea on the ground that the nomination paper was wrongly rejected by the returning officer, citing alleged non-disclosure of a criminal case under the Representation of the People Act.

The Court ordered, "The order was passed by the Returning Officer (RO) on 09.06.2026, rejecting her nomination for the Rajya Sabha seat in the by-election for the State of Madhya Pradesh (MP). The Petitioner, being a candidate belonging to the Indian National Congress (INC), submitted her nomination; however, the same was rejected by the impugned order on the ground that in the Form 26 affidavit filed with her nomination paper, she did not disclose the said case. It is also mentioned that the court had taken cognizance and summons had been issued to her, subsequent to which the Petitioner filed her written statement in the Magistrate Court; therefore, she had full knowledge about the pendency of the case. After the impugned order was passed by the RO, the Petitioner approached the Election Commission of India (ECI); however, no order has been passed by the ECI despite the filing of a written representation and arguing in person..."

Singhvi urged the bench to follow the sequence of events and turned to Section 33A of the Representation of the People Act. He assured the Court that he would remain within the discipline indicated by the bench the previous day. Singhvi argued that Section 33A by itself was sufficient to answer the issue, bypassing statutory interpretation debates and case law.

He explained that the section was a legislative follow-up to the Supreme Court's judgment in the Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) case and dealt with disclosures required from candidates before the Election Commission.

Singhvi submitted, "First come to Section 33A...I assure my lords that I will be in discipline...(reads Section 33A of the ROPA)...(i) doesn't apply to this case...that this section is followed by another section of BNSS of a new one... in which there is a proviso that befopre cognizance that accused must be heard..."

Justice Mishra said, "But summons have been issued to you....once the summons are being issued, the court will only issue summons after prima facie satisfies itself so that there are some criteria".

Singhvi said, "The order passed by the RO is bizarre...if there is no cognizance, then I have a lot to disclose, even if there is cognizance I have to disclose after the charges are framed...in this way, the level playing field can be made down level, then there cannot be any elections in this country."

Singhvi contended that the returning officer acted completely arbitrarily. He explained that the provision mandated candidates to furnish information in their nomination papers regarding specific criminal cases against them. He pointed out that the first category required disclosure only when a person was accused of an offence punishable with imprisonment of two years or more, and where charges had been framed by a court of competent jurisdiction in a pending case.

He reiterated that this provision was essentially a disclosure requirement enacted pursuant to the ADR judgment. He also directed the Court's attention to Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS).

Singhvi argued that in the new law, Parliament consciously introduced a proviso requiring that a proposed accused must be heard before cognizance is taken. He stated that without cognizance, no criminal proceeding existed in the eyes of the law.

However, he clarified that his submission did not concern the stage of cognizance, but rather the subsequent stage of framing charges. He noted that in a private complaint, cognizance was ordinarily the first procedural step before a matter proceeded in accordance with the law.

Singhvi submitted that the present case stood on a different footing because no cognizance had been taken at all. Therefore, he argued that the statutory threshold contemplated under Section 33A—namely, the existence of a pending case in which charges had been framed by a competent court—was clearly not satisfied.

Singhvi further stated that the complainant had submitted several representations seeking disciplinary action against one Mr. Reddy. According to her, she received no response to those requests.

The complainant stated that she approached the AICC, Mr S. Rao, and the AICC in-charge for Telangana. She further noted that she demanded disciplinary action be taken on May 10.

Singhvi pointed out that those were the only places where the petitioner was mentioned. He indicated that the second reference appeared in paragraph 25 of the file. He argued that those references constituted the entirety of the allegation against the petitioner.

Singhvi stated that the complaint also detailed internal Congress Party politics, including Mr. Reddy’s promotions, ticket allocations, and how the complainant felt sidelined as a member of a backward community. Singhvi clarified that he was not concerned with those allegations.

Singhvi noted that the entire grievance against the petitioner was that her concerns went unaddressed. He emphasized that the petitioner was only appointed AICC in-charge for Telangana in 2025, whereas the alleged incident occurred in 2022.

Turning to the Returning Officer's order, Singhvi argued that the officer failed to prioritize statutory requirements over detailed allegations. He asserted that Section 33A served as the guiding provision for such matters and required disclosure only if charges had been framed by a competent court.

Singhvi concluded that the order was remarkable because, despite objections raised before the scheduled election, no cognizance had been taken, no charges had been framed, and no criminal proceedings had met the legal threshold of Section 33A.

Singhvi submitted, "At this stage, she is merely seeking the right to contest. The RO has excluded her at the threshold itself. Let her contest the election. If the electorate chooses not to support her, she will lose. That is how democracy functions...I am also compelled to point out the conduct of the Election Commission...This is the Supreme Court of India. Once Your Lordships is in seized of the matter, that matter cannot be taken away be saying, "We are watching the tomorrow morning, you are going to sit in the evening. Therefore, I will act tonight and make the proceedings infructuous."...That is not how the rule of law operates...That is not a game of cat and mouse."

Senior Advocate Mukul Rohatgi, appearing for the contesting candidate, countered that this Court had consistently held the right to contest an election to be a statutory right rather than a fundamental right, a proposition originally laid down in Jyoti Basu and reiterated in subsequent decisions.

He argued that since no fundamental right was involved, a petition under Article 32 was not maintainable. Furthermore, Rohatgi pointed out that Article 329 created a constitutional bar, emphasizing that its opening words, "Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution," effectively excluded remedies under Articles 32 and 226 in election matters.

Rohatgi submitted that the entire electoral process remained insulated from judicial interference under Articles 32 and 226 from the moment the election notification was issued until the declaration of results. He stated that the constitutional scheme required any challenge to await the completion of the election process so it could be raised through the proper election law mechanism.

"I also wanted to say that the arguments on 33A are completely wrong...33A only provides that in addition to the information required in the act...33A now requires a list of all pending cases. It does not say charge or cognizance or pending cases. This lady knew that this was a pending case and therefore there is a deliberate suppression in the Affidavit", Rohatgi said.

Justice Mishra said, "Alright, if we dismiss the petition on the ground that the Petitioner has a remedy of election petition and at the same time record a finding as to whether the affidavit is required in this form or that the form is not required at all, then it will affect the election petition. We are not going on that issue."

The Court said, "Form 26 contains different natures of information which a candidate is required to disclose or reveal in his affidavit. Clause 5 of Form 26 provides the information to be provided by the candidate at the time of filing of the nomination. According to the respondents, the petitioner was under an obligation to disclose all pending criminal cases, irrespective of the stage at which such proceedings were pending. It was contended that disclosure is not confined only to those cases where charges have been framed...The respondents, therefore, submitted that non-disclosure of information required under Clause 5 of Form 26 would render the affidavit incomplete and would justify the rejection of the nomination. Consequently, the Returning Officer had committed no error of law in rejecting the petitioner's nomination. We have considered the rival submissions."

An order by the Rajya Sabha Election Returning Officer, Arvind Sharma, stated that it was found after examining available documents that Natarajan submitted an incomplete affidavit, omitting a court complaint in Form 26 submitted with her nomination.

According to a Madhya Pradesh assembly official, the ruling BJP candidate, Mahesh Kewat, filed a complaint with the returning officer alleging that Natarajan had not mentioned in her affidavit a case registered against her in Telangana.

Cause Title: Meenakshi Natarajan v. Election Commission of India [W.P.(C) No. 766/2026]

Click here to read/download the Judgment

(This was a hearing story; the judgment was uploaded later.)


Justice Prashant Kumar MishraJustice Atul S ChandrukarSupreme Court

Aastha Kaushik