Mere Fact That A Society Exercised Supervisory Or Managerial Functions Over Temple Won’t Confer Title Upon It: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court reiterated that a plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence.
Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Sandeep Mehta, Supreme Court
While dismissing a suit filed by the Gurjar Goud Brahmin Rampura Society of Kota, the Supreme Court has held that the mere fact that the society exercised certain supervisory or managerial functions over the temple or participated in the appointment of “pujaris” would not ipso facto confer title upon it.
The Apex Court was considering an appeal preferred by the appellant- defendant against the final judgment of the Rajasthan High Court affirming the order of the Additional District and Sessions Judge decreeing the suit for injunction and possession filed by the respondents.
The Division Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta held, “A careful examination of the material on record would indicate that the respondent-plaintiffs have failed to produce any document of title evidencing ownership of the suit property in their favour. There is no deed of dedication, no document of endowment, nor any legally admissible evidence to show that the property stood vested in the respondent-society. The mere fact that the society exercised certain supervisory or managerial functions over the temple or participated in the appointment of “pujaris” would not ipso facto confer title upon it.”
Senior Advocate Sushil Kumar Jain represented the appellant while AOR Ajay Choudhary represented the Respondent.
Factual Background
The suit was instituted by the respondent-plaintiffs, comprising a registered society and its members. According to the plaint, an ancient temple, namely “Moorti Swarup Shri Govardhan Nath Ji”, situated at Rampura Bazar in Kota town, is the property of the Gurjar Goud Brahmin Rampura Society, Kota, and forms the subject matter of the present suit. It was averred that the respondent-plaintiffs are entrusted with the management and administration of the temple, including the idols, along with their ornaments, articles, and a custodian or caretaker is appointed by the society. In 1951, the respondent-plaintiffs resolved to appoint the appellant-defendant as the caretaker and handed over the management of the suit property to him, and he was also paid remuneration from the income generated by the shops situated on the suit property.
Thereafter, the first respondent was registered as a trust with the Devasthan Department, State of Rajasthan and in 1976, the appellant–defendant asserted ownership over the suit property. In response, the respondent issued a legal notice calling upon the appellant-defendant to cease acting as the pujari and relinquish control over the temple. A civil suit was instituted seeking the removal of the appellant defendant from the position of “pujari” and for restoration of possession and control of the suit property. The Trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the respondent-plaintiffs, decreed the suit, and directed the appellant-defendant to hand over possession of the suit property to the respondent-plaintiffs. The first appeal preferred by the appellant–defendant was dismissed with costs. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant approached the Apex Court.
Reasoning
The Bench stated, “It is trite that in a suit for declaration and consequential relief, the burden lies squarely upon the plaintiff to establish a clear and cogent title to the suit property. The plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence.”
On a perusal of the case, the Bench found that the entire approach adopted by the courts below suffered from a fundamental infirmity as they had proceeded primarily on the premise that the appellant-defendant and his predecessors were merely “pujaris” appointed by the respondent-society and, therefore, could not claim any independent proprietary interest. “However, such a conclusion, by itself, does not discharge the burden cast upon the plaintiffs under Sections 101 and 102 read with Section 110 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to affirmatively establish their own title”, it added.
The Bench noted that the respondent-plaintiffs failed to produce any document of title evidencing ownership of the suit property in their favour. The Bench held, “In the present case, the respondent-plaintiffs have not discharged this burden. Their case rests largely on inferences drawn from management practices and appointment of “pujaris”, which, in law, are insufficient to establish proprietary rights over immovable property.”
Thus, allowing the appeal and setting aside the impugned judgment, the Bench dismissed the suit.
Cause Title: Kishan Chand v. Gautam Gaur Hitkarak Sabha, Kota (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 448)
Appearance
Appellant: Senior Advocate Sushil Kumar Jain, Advocates Christi Jain, Akriti Sharma, Om Sudhir Vidyarthi, Aditya Jain, Siddharth Jain, Yogit Kamat, AOR Pratibha Jain
Respondent: AOR Ajay Choudhary