Conviction Can Be Based On Uncorroborated Approver Testimony If Court Finds It Safe To Rely Upon: Supreme Court

The Court clarified that corroborative evidence, where required, may be direct or circumstantial and need only render the approver’s testimony believable in the facts and circumstances of the case.

The Court was hearing criminal appeals arising from a Delhi High Court judgment affirming the conviction of the appellant in two murder cases relating to the killing of a truck driver and a cleaner during the commission of dacoity.

The prosecution's case principally rested upon the testimony of an approver who had participated in the crime and later turned prosecution witness after being granted a pardon.

A Division Bench of Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Manoj Misra observed: “It is not an inviolable rule of law that testimony of an approver must be independently corroborated in material particulars before it could form the basis of conviction. The requirement of corroboration is not mandated by law but is a rule of prudence.”

The Bench further observed: “The Court may convict an accused even on an uncorroborated testimony of the approver provided it is satisfied, and record reasons for its satisfaction, that it is safe to rely on such testimony even in the absence of corroboration.”

Senior Advocate A. Sirajudeen appeared for the appellant, while Additional Solicitor General Vikramjeet Banerjee represented the respondent.

Background

The prosecution case arose from the recovery of two dead bodies within the jurisdiction of different police stations in Delhi. Investigation revealed that the deceased was the driver and cleaner of a truck allegedly stolen by the accused persons pursuant to a criminal conspiracy. One of the accused later turned approver and was examined as PW-1 during the trial.

The approver stated that the accused persons had hatched a plan to steal a truck and had hired the vehicle for the transportation of pumpkins. According to the prosecution, the driver and cleaner were thereafter killed, and the truck was stolen. The approver described the manner in which the murders were committed and the subsequent disposal of the bodies and incriminating material.

The Trial Court convicted the accused for offences punishable under Sections 302, 396, 201 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Delhi High Court affirmed the conviction, following which the appellant approached the Supreme Court, contending primarily that the conviction could not be sustained based on the approver’s testimony as it was self-exculpatory and lacked corroboration in material particulars.

Court’s Observation

The Supreme Court undertook an extensive examination of the law governing approver testimony under Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Court observed that while Section 133 expressly recognises an accomplice as a competent witness and permits conviction based on uncorroborated testimony, Illustration (b) to Section 114 embodies a rule of prudence requiring caution while acting upon such evidence.

The Bench referred to State of Andhra Pradesh v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (1963), wherein this Court had recognised that accomplice evidence is ordinarily treated with caution because an accomplice may attempt to shift blame, may disregard sanctity of oath owing to criminal disposition, or may falsely implicate others in expectation of pardon.

The Court further relied upon Somasundaram @ Somu v. State represented by the Deputy Commissioner of Police (2020), wherein it was held that corroboration of approver testimony has evolved as a rule of prudence and that corroborative evidence may itself be circumstantial in nature. Referring to the said precedent, the Court reiterated:

“The corroboration must be such that it renders the testimony of the approver believable in the facts and circumstances of the case. However, it is not the requirement of law that every material circumstance against the accused is independently confirmed.”

The Bench also relied upon Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952), where Justice Vivian Bose had observed that a conviction can legally rest on uncorroborated accomplice testimony if the Court consciously applies the rule of caution and records reasons why it considers such reliance safe in the facts of the case.

The Court thereafter summarised the governing legal principles relating to corroboration of approver testimony. It held that corroboration, where considered necessary, must ordinarily come from independent sources and that the testimony of one approver is generally not used to corroborate another approver. However, the Court clarified that corroboration need not independently establish every material circumstance against the accused.

The Supreme Court then examined the tests for determining the creditworthiness of an approver. Referring to Ravinder Singh v. State of Haryana (1975), the Court observed that an approver must prove his worthiness by narrating a natural and probable sequence of events and by implicating the accused in a manner giving rise to guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Court also referred to Rampal Pithwa Rahidas v. State of Maharashtra (1994), where this Court had observed that while assessing the credibility of an approver, Courts may examine factors such as the circumstances of arrest, participation in the crime, role played by the approver and the circumstances in which he decided to become an approver.

Addressing the appellant’s contention that the approver’s testimony was self-exculpatory, the Supreme Court held that the testimony could not be discarded merely because the approver did not implicate himself to the same extent as the other accused. The Court noted that the approver had clearly admitted participation in the conspiracy to steal the truck and had acknowledged his role during the commission of the offences.

The Bench observed: “PW-1’s statement clearly shows that he was very much a part of the plan to steal the truck and had actively participated in the crime, though not to the extent the others did.”

The Court held that the approver’s testimony stood sufficiently corroborated by surrounding circumstances, including ownership and identification of the stolen truck, recovery of the truck from co-accused persons, identification of the dead bodies, medical evidence confirming homicidal deaths, and recovery of articles and papers corroborating the narrative furnished by the approver.

The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the approver was neither a planted witness nor an unreliable witness and that his testimony inspired confidence when read alongside the corroborative circumstances proved by the prosecution.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court held that corroboration of an approver’s testimony is not an inflexible rule of law but merely a rule of prudence, and that conviction can be sustained even on uncorroborated approver testimony where the Court records reasons demonstrating why such evidence is safe to rely upon.

The Court further held that corroboration, where necessary, may be direct or circumstantial and need not independently establish every material circumstance against the accused.

Applying these principles, the Court upheld the reliability and creditworthiness of the approver’s testimony and held that it stood corroborated in material particulars by surrounding circumstances proved on record. The appeals were partly allowed.

Cause Title: Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi) (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 598)

Appearances

Appellant: Senior Advocate A. Sirajudeen; Advocate-on-Record Manjeet Chawla; Advocates Jyoti and Shaik Soni Ahamed.

Respondent: Additional Solicitor General Vikramjeet Banerjee; Advocate-on-Record Mukesh Kumar Maroria; Advocates Praneet Pranav, Rajeshwari Shankar, Prashant Singh II, Annirudh Sharma II and Sunanda Shukla.

Click here to read/download Judgment