Limitation Period For Probate Revocation Begins From Date Of Knowledge: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court was dealing with a matter involving the issue of limitation with respect to revocation of probate.

The Supreme Court has held that the Indian Succession Act does not provide any limitation for the grant of probate or to move an application for the revocation thereof, and recourse must be made to Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Apex Court further explained that the issue as to when “the right to apply” would accrue would depend on the date from which the party making the application had knowledge.
The Apex Court was dealing with a matter involving the issue of limitation with respect to an application filed under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act seeking revocation of probate.
The Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi held, “The ISA does not provide any limitation for grant of probate or to move an application for the revocation thereof and as such recourse must be made to Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963.”
“As to when “the right to apply” would accrue, that depends on the date from which the party making the application had knowledge. In this case, that would be the respondents”, it added.
Senior Advocate Yashraj Singh Deora represented the Appellant, while AOR Arun K. Sinha represented the Respondent.
Factual Background
One Gouriprova Sen inherited the properties of her husband by virtue of being his sole legal heir. A certain portion of these properties was gifted to the appellant by a deed. As per her Will, her nephew(appellant) was made the sole executor and beneficiary. She died shortly thereafter, and the transfer of properties in his name by virtue of this will became the genesis of the dispute. The appellant’s application for probate of the said Will was granted, and further proceedings for necessary changes in the Revenue Record were initiated. As per the respondents, who are nephews-in-law of the testatrix and the only surviving members of the family of the testatrix’s husband, filed a suit for declaration and injunction, which has been pending before the jurisdictional Court. The respondents filed an application under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act 1925 seeking revocation of the probate granted.
The Single Judge dismissed the application, holding the same to be barred under the provisions of the Limitation Act 1963. On appeal, the Division Bench, taking a different view, allowed the appeal. It was in such circumstances that the appeal came to be filed before the Apex Court.
Reasoning
One of the main issues before the Bench was whether the proceedings at the instance of the appellant amounted to constructive notice to the respondents regarding the grant of probate in his favour. To answer this, the Bench explained that constructive notice is a deeming fiction within law that originated from equity and is distinguishable from actual notice as it is an inference by law.
“The question of whether or not something qualifies as constructive notice is either a question of fact or a mixed question of law and fact dependant on the facts and circumstances of each case”, the Bench stated while also adding, “The standard to be applied in determining wilful abstention or gross negligence is that of a reasonably prudent man as applied in Indian conditions.”
Taking note of the fact that it was admitted by the respondents that notice was served, but they chose not to do anything, the Bench stated, “This cannot be termed to be the conduct of a reasonably prudent man. If a Court of law has sent someone a notice, the least that can be accepted is for them to make attempts to find out why the same may have been sent to them and what they would be required to do in regard thereto. This is more so the case when the respondents already had mutation entries in their favour and yet the notice received by them were in connection with mutation proceedings initiated by a third party.”
The Bench also noticed that in the application for revocation of probate, during the time period between 2013 and 2019 when the title suit was filed, all that was said was that the appellant attempted to threaten them and dispossess them of their right, title and interest. They were silent on the aspect of how the right and title came to rest with them.
The Bench thus held, “In these facts and circumstances, the notice in mutation proceedings would be deemed constructive notice. Attempts ought to have been made to figure out on what basis the mutation proceedings came to be filed, and the limitation as given under Article 137 would have applied from the day they would have found out that the said proceedings rested on probate of Will granted to the appellant. The respondents’ application for revocation of probate would hopelessly be time barred.”
Thus, allowing the appeal, the Bench set aside the judgment of the Division Bench and restored that of the Single Judge.
Cause Title: Dhiraj Dutta v. Anirban Sen (Neutral Citation: 2026 INSC 602)
Appearance
Appellant: Senior Advocate Yashraj Singh Deora, Advocates Swapan Banerjee, Anindo Mukherjee, AOR Rameshwar Prasad Goyal
Respondent: AOR Arun K. Sinha

