Personal Liberty Should Be Curtailed Only When It Becomes Imperative: Punjab & Haryana HC Grants Bail To UAPA Accused Who Allegedly Affixed Pro-Khalistan Posters
It was held that courts must minimize the absolute dependence of an accused on professional or local sureties by permitting alternative options, such as cash deposits, fixed deposits, or the blocking of equivalent funds in scheduled banks.

Justice Anoop Chitkara, Justice Sukhvinder Kaur, Punjab & Haryana High Court
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that the stringent statutory restrictions against bail under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA cannot override the fundamental right to personal liberty when a trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time.
The Court observed that the institutionalization of universal biometric identification mechanisms provided a secure, non-duplicable framework to establish individual identities.
The Bench of Justice Anoop Chitkara and Justice Sukhwinder Kaur observed, “Bail or jail?"- at the pre-trial or post-conviction stage-belongs to the blurred area of the criminal justice system and largely hinges on the hunch of the bench, otherwise called judicial discretion. The law of bail, like any other branch of law, has its own philosophy, and occupies an important place in the administration of justice and the concept of bail emerges from the conflict between the police power to restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have committed a crime, and presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged criminal. Personal liberty is a very precious fundamental right and it should be curtailed only when it becomes imperative according to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.”
Advocate Vikram Satpal Anand appeared for the Appellant, while DAG Pooja Nayar Sharma appeared for the State.
Facts of the Case
The prosecution version originated from secret information received by the police alleging that certain named individuals were involved in affixing pro-Khalistan posters bearing secessionist slogans across various districts of Punjab. Based on this intelligence, the local police registered an First Information Report (FIR) against several accused persons, including the appellant, under the provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA).
During the course of investigation, the police conducted a search at the residence of a co-accused, which led to the recovery of a massive cache of incriminating material. The seized items comprised hundreds of reams of printed paper, thousands of pamphlets promoting a referendum, wooden printing frames containing secessionist inscriptions, spray paints, and printed flags. Additionally, the police recovered a heavy-duty printing machine in operational condition, laptops, digital devices, and other printing equipment used for fabricating the materials.
The core of the prosecution's case against the appellant was that he actively participated as a module in a criminal conspiracy aimed at disintegrating the territorial integrity of India. It was alleged that the printed materials were intended for wide circulation to spread false narratives and propagate a secessionist campaign. The evidence collected against the appellant primarily rested upon the disclosure statement of a co-accused, telephonic communication records, and mobile tower location data indicating his association with the co-accused and the movement of vehicles utilized in distributing the pamphlets.
Consequent upon the completion of the investigation, the police filed a final report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the available accused persons, while keeping the absconding accused and an individual found innocent in the designated columns of the chargesheet.
Contentions of the Parties
The Appellant contended that the he had undergone a substantial period of continuous custody exceeding four years and seven months, with the trial not seeing any imminent conclusion. It was forcefully submitted that the custody certificate explicitly demonstrated that the appellant had clean antecedents and no prior involvement in any criminal activity. It was highlighted that the forensic examination of the appellant's seized mobile phone and laptop yielded absolutely no retrieved data or incriminating material, thereby weakening the link connecting him to the alleged offences.
It was argued that the mere invocation of an incorrect statutory provision for filing the appeal should not prejudice the substantive right to challenge the rejection of regular bail, and the Court ought to exercise its inherent power to treat the appeal under the correct provisions of the National Investigation Agency Act.
The State vehemently opposed the grant of regular bail, arguing that the charges against the appellant involved grave offences under the UAPA threatening national security and sovereignty. The State argued that the appellant was an active member of a module engaged in a deeper criminal conspiracy to propagate a hate campaign and distribute pamphlets aimed at fracturing the nation.
The prosecution highlighted that several key co-accused individuals were still evading arrest and remained untraceable, raising a strong apprehension that the appellant might abscond or tamper with evidence if released on bail.
Observations of the Court
The Court observed that while the statutory proviso to Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) used expression mandatory in nature to create a stringent bar against the grant of bail, making jail the rule and bail the exception, such statutory restrictions did not oust the jurisdiction of Constitutional Courts to enforce fundamental rights.
The Court noted that the rigors of restrictive penal provisions must melt down in cases where an undertrial prisoner suffered prolonged incarceration and there appeared no likelihood of the trial being concluded within a reasonable time. It was held that a wholesale breach of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, could not be tolerated, and statutory barriers could not restrain a Constitutional Court from passing an order to safeguard personal liberty.
“Personal liberty, deprived when bail is refused, is too precious a value of our constitutional system recognised under Art. 21 that the curial power to negate it is a great trust exercisable, not casually but judicially, with lively concern for the cost to the individual and the community. The act of arrest directly affects freedom of movement of the person arrested by the police, and speaking generally, an order of bail gives back to the accused that freedom on condition that he will appear to take his trial―Personal recognisance, suretyship bonds and such other modalities are the means by which an assurance is secured from the accused that though he has been released on bail, he will present himself at the trial of offence or offences of which he is charged and for which he was arrested”, it said.
The Court scanned the evidentiary material presented against the appellant and observed that during the cross-examination of the investigating officer, it was explicitly conceded that no incriminating literature, posters, or secessionist materials were recovered from the personal premises of the appellant.
The Court highlighted that the forensic analysis of the digital devices seized from the appellant yielded absolutely no retrieved data or connectivity to the alleged offences. It was further observed that the case against the appellant rested entirely upon the disclosure statement of a co-accused and circumstantial data, which remained subject to the strict rules of admissibility under the law of evidence. Consequently, the Court found reasonable grounds to hold that the appellant successfully overcame the statutory embargo prescribed under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA.
The Court observed that the law of bail emerged from the inherent conflict between the police power of the State to restrict individual movement and the bedrock principle of the presumption of innocence. It was remarked that bail was never intended to be punitive or used as a mechanism for pre-trial punishment, but was strictly meant to secure the presence of the accused at the time of trial.
The Court took judicial notice of a paradigm shift in the modern socio-economic setting, observing that traditional requirements of territorial sureties were archaic in a society where citizens were constantly on the move.
The Court strongly disapproved of the prevalent practice where attesting officers and investigators insisted upon the physical verification of sureties through local village or ward officials. The Court observed that such procedures frequently led to corrupt practices where unscrupulous elements demanded illegal gratification, which degraded social values and unnecessarily delayed the formal release of prisoners.
It was explicitly observed that since modern digital applications allowed for the instantaneous verification of universal identity cards, courts and attesting officers must directly authenticate the identities of sureties through digital means rather than insisting upon the physical presence of local headmen, except when digital verification proved impossible.
“Without intending to dilute any statutory procedures or binding judicial precedents, it has also to be emphasized that once a prisoner is released on bail, any custody of the said prisoner beyond the period necessary to complete the procedures for a formal release from prison would be illegal, if occasioned merely by delay on flimsy grounds, systemic inefficiency and mediocrity, or bureaucratic red tape. In such a situation, it shall be permissible for the trial Court by passing a reasoned order to reduce the surety bond amount or after waiting for a couple of weeks, waive it altogether”, the Court said.
The Court noted that liberty under a bail order was conditional and always subordinate to the larger interest of a fair trial, witness protection, and national security. The Court observed that given the sensitive nature of the allegations, it was imperative to impose balanced restrictions, including the surrender of firearms and a complete embargo on the dissemination of any statements regarding the case on social or print media platforms.
Finally, the Court observed that if an accused jumped bail or committed a subsequent non-bailable offence of a serious nature, the breach of the judicial contract would automatically constitute a standalone and sufficient ground for the immediate cancellation of the bail by the trial court.
Accordingly, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order.
Cause Title: Sukhdev Singh @ Rinku v. State of Punjab [Neutral Citation:2026:PHHC:086085-DB]
Appearances:
Appellant: Advocate Vikram Satpal Anand
Respondent-State: DAG Pooja Nayar Sharma

