



Serial No. 01
Daily List

HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG

CrI.Petn. No. 67 of 2025

Date of order: 09.02.2026

Flamingstar Sohkhlet

....Petitioner

- versus -

1. State of Meghalaya through the Commissioner and the Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya, Department of Home (Police)
Civil Secretariat, Shillong.
2. Smti Rilangshisha Nongrum
3. Smti Arbina Ryndem

....Respondents

Coram:

Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Revati Mohite Dere, Chief Justice

Appearance:

For the Petitioner : Mr N.M. Mansuri, Adv.

For the Respondent : Mr K.P. Bhattacharjee, GA
Ms A.P. Kharsahnoh, Adv. [for R2&3]

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| i) | Whether approved for reporting in Law journals etc.: | Yes |
| ii) | Whether approved for publication in press: | Yes |



J U D G M E N T

By this petition preferred under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023, the petitioner seeks quashing of the FIR dated **28th March, 2025** registered with the Rynjah Police Station, Shillong for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 106 (1), 125(b) and 281 of BNS and consequently, the proceeding pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Shillong, being G.R. Case No. 44 (A) of 2025. Quashing is sought on the premise that the petitioner and the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 (legal heirs of deceased - late Kennystar Lyndem) have amicably settled the dispute and as such, the said respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have no objection to the quashing of the FIR and the proceeding.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the FIR and the proceeding pending against the petitioner be quashed since post the filing of the charge-sheet i.e., during the pendency of the proceeding, the petitioner and the legal heirs of the deceased – late Kennystar Lyndem have resolved the dispute and as such, the legal heirs i.e., the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 - the wife and the mother of the deceased respectively, have given



their consent to the quashing of the same. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the offence is not heinous in nature and that the accident arose due to an unforeseen circumstance and since the legal heirs of the deceased i.e., the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 do not wish to pursue the proceedings, continuation of the same would cause unnecessary hardship to the petitioner and will be an abuse of the process of the law. Learned counsel relied on the judgments of the Apex Court reported in **(2012) 10 SCC 303 : Gian Singh v. State of Punjab**, **(2014) 6 SCC 466 : Narinder Singh & ors v. State of Punjab**, and two judgments of this Court in **Shri Derik Randall Jyrwa v. State of Meghalaya & anr** passed in **Crl. Petn. No.23 of 2019** on **19th August, 2019** and **Shri Wisterly Mawrie v. State of Meghalaya** passed in **Crl.Petn. No. 63 of 2024** on **25th February, 2025**, in support of his submission that quashing of an offence under Section 106 (1) of the BNS is permissible with the consent of the parties i.e., the accused and legal heirs of the deceased.



3. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 supported the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

4. The facts in brief giving rise to the filing of the aforesaid petition are as under:

The incident in question took place on **18th March, 2025** in the morning. It is the prosecution case, that a vehicle (Celerio) bearing Registration No. ML05 X 9687, driven by the petitioner and occupied by one co-passenger was proceeding from Mawlai, Motsyiar, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong towards Tynring, East Khasi Hills District, when the incident took place. It is alleged that the petitioner lost control of the vehicle and it veered on to the wrong side of the road and collided with a scooty bearing Registration No. ML05 V 3065 which was driven by Kennystar Lyndem (deceased), who was coming from the opposite direction. In the said incident, Kennystar Lyndem sustained grievous injuries and was taken to the hospital where he subsequently, succumbed to his injuries. Post the incident, the aforesaid FIR was registered against the petitioner alleging the aforesaid offences. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed



as against the petitioner in the trial court. It appears that during the pendency of the proceeding, the petitioner and the legal heirs of the deceased Kennystar Lyndem i.e., wife and mother of the deceased amicably settled the dispute, pursuant to which the aforesaid petition has been filed. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have filed their respective affidavits giving their no objection to the quashing of the FIR and consequently, the proceeding.

5. The question that arises for consideration is, whether the criminal proceeding under Section 106 (1) of the BNS (earlier, Section 304A IPC) can be quashed on the basis of the compromise arrived at by the legal heirs/legal representatives of the victim (deceased) with the offender under Section 528 BNSS (earlier, Section 482 of Cr.P.C.)?

6. Section 106 (1) of the BNS deals with rash and negligent driving. The said Section reads thus,

“[s.106] Causing death by negligence.– (1) Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment or either description for a term which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if such act is done by a registered medical practitioner while performing medical procedure, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a



term which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

7. Admittedly, Section 106 (1) of the BNS is not compoundable and as such, parties cannot settle the said offence through compromise either privately or with the permission of the court. Hence, the parties have approached the High Court under its inherent powers under Section 528 of BNSS (earlier, Section 482 of Cr.P.C.) as they seek to quash the FIR/proceeding.

8. At the outset, we may note, that admittedly, the power to compound an offence under Section 359 of BNSS (earlier, Section 320 Cr.P.C.) and the power of the High Court to quash an FIR/proceeding under Section 528 of BNSS (earlier, Section 482 of Cr.P.C.) are distinct.

9. The law with respect to quashing of FIR/criminal proceeding under Section 482 CrPC on the basis of a compromise/settlement is well settled. In **Gian Singh v. State of Punjab**, the three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in paragraphs 48 and 57 observed that the power of the High Court



in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It observed that the inherent power vested in the High Court, is of wide plentitude with no statutory limitation but the said power has to be exercised with utmost care and caution i.e., to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of any court; that in what cases, the said power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised between the offender and the victim, in view of the settlement of the dispute between them, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case; and, that no category can be prescribed. It was further observed that however, before exercising the said power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime as heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity, like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., cannot be quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute, as such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on the society.



10. It was further observed by the Apex Court in ***Gian Singh*** (*supra*) that criminal cases which are overwhelmingly and predominantly having a civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purpose of quashing, particularly, where the offences arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership disputes or transactions, or offences arising out of matrimony/family disputes, where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. It was observed that in this category of cases, the High court may quash criminal proceeding, if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice, despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court is to consider, whether, it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue the criminal proceeding, as continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of the process of law, despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer.



11. Similarly, in **Narinder Singh & ors v. State of Punjab** reported in **(2014) 6 SCC 466**, the Apex Court in paragraph 29 observed as under:

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

***29.1.** Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.*

***29.2.** When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:*

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

***29.3.** Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been*



committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. *On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.*

29.5. *While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.*

29.6. *Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/ delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas*



in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. *While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime.”*



12. In ***Parbatbhai Aahir alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and ors v. State of Gujarat & anr*** reported in (2017)

9 SCC 641, the Apex Court reiterated in paragraph 16 as under:

“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:

16.1. *Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.*

16.2. *The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.*

16.3. *In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.*

16.4. *While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.*

16.5. *The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves*



ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;

16.6. *In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.*

16.7. *As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.*

16.8. *Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.*

16.9. *In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and*

16.10. *There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8 and 16.9 above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or*



misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”

13. In ***Daxaben v. State of Gujarat & ors*** reported in **(2022) 16 SCC 117**, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider in an appeal, as to whether the criminal miscellaneous applications filed by the accused under Section 482 CrPC could have been allowed by the High Court and an FIR under Section 306 of the IPC (abetment to commit suicide) could have been quashed on the basis of the settlement between the complainant and the accused named in the FIR. The Apex Court answered the said question in the negative. In paragraphs 24, 38, 39, 49, 50 and 51 of the said judgment, the Apex Court observed as under:

“24. *The only question in this appeal is whether the criminal miscellaneous applications filed by the accused under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. could have been allowed and an FIR under Section 306 IPC for abetment to commit suicide, entailing punishment of imprisonment of ten years, could have been quashed on the basis of a settlement between the complainant and the accused named in the FIR. The answer to the aforesaid question cannot, but be in the negative.*



38. *Orders quashing FIRs and/or complaints relating to grave and serious offences only on basis of an agreement with the complainant, would set a dangerous precedent, where complaints would be lodged for oblique reasons, with a view to extract money from the accused. Furthermore, financially strong offenders would go scot free, even in cases of grave and serious offences such as murder, rape, bride- burning, etc. by buying off informants/complainants and settling with them. This would render otiose provisions such as Sections 306, 498-A, 304-B etc. incorporated in the IPC as a deterrent, with a specific social purpose.*

39. *In criminal jurisprudence, the position of the complainant is only that of the informant. Once an FIR and/or criminal complaint is lodged and a criminal case is started by the State, it becomes a matter between the State and the accused. The State has a duty to ensure that law and order is maintained in society. It is for the state to prosecute offenders. In case of grave and serious non-compoundable offences which impact society, the informant and/or complainant only has the right of hearing, to the extent of ensuring that justice is done by conviction and punishment of the offender. An informant has no right in law to withdraw the complaint of a non- compoundable offence of a grave, serious and/or heinous nature, which impacts society.*

49. *In our considered opinion, the criminal proceeding cannot be nipped in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. only because there is a settlement, in this case a monetary settlement, between the accused and the complainant and other relatives of the deceased to the exclusion of the hapless widow of the deceased.*

50. *As held by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Laxmi Narayan, Section 307 of the IPC falls in the category of*



heinous and serious offences and are to be treated as crime against society and not against the individual alone. On a parity of reasoning, offence under section 306 of the IPC would fall in the same category. An FIR under Section 306 of the IPC cannot even be quashed on the basis of any financial settlement with the informant, surviving spouse, parents, children, guardians, care-givers or anyone else.

51. *It is clarified that it was not necessary for this Court to examine the question whether the FIR in this case discloses any offence under Section 306 of the IPC, since the High Court, in exercise of its power under Section 482 CrPC, quashed the proceedings on the sole ground that the disputes between the accused and the informant had been compromised.”*

14. Thus, from the aforesaid authorities, it is evident that the powers of the High Court to quash criminal proceeding on the basis of settlement are materially different from compounding an offence in terms of Section 359 of BNSS (earlier, Section 320 CrPC). It is also clear that the plenary powers vested in the High Court under Section 528 of BNSS (earlier, Section 482 of CrPC) are to be exercised with utmost care and circumspection. It is also clear that an FIR/criminal proceeding can be quashed on the basis of compromise/settlement, where the dispute/offence is essentially private in nature and continuation of criminal proceeding would be an exercise in futility. For settlement/compromise, the consent of the victim is essential,



rather *sine-qua-non*. Quashing of a criminal proceeding based on compromise, rests essentially upon the absence of grievance by the victim against the accused. In a case relating to Section 106 (1) of the BNS (earlier, Section 304A of the IPC) involving death due to rash and negligent act/driving, the primary victim is the deceased. The deceased being the primary/real victim, is in fact, the aggrieved party, who is no longer capable of expressing or giving his/her consent. The Apex Court in ***Guru Basavaraj alias Benne Settappa v. State of Karnataka*** reported in **(2012) 8 SCC 734**, has observed that when a number of people sustain injuries due to a motor accident and a death occurs, it creates a stir in the society; and a sense of fear prevails all around. The negligence of one shatters the tranquility of the collective. It was further observed that when such an accident occurs, it has the effect and potentiality of making victims in many a layer and creating a concavity in social fabric. It has its impact on the society and the impact is felt more when accidents take place quite often because of rash driving by drunken, negligent, or for that matter, adventurous drivers who have, in a way, no concern for others.



15. In fact, in ***State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi*** reported in **(2015) 5 SCC 182**, the Apex Court had the occasion to take note of the increasing number of road accidents in the country and exhorted the lawmakers to revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304A of the IPC. In paragraphs 23, 24 and 25 of the said judgment, the Apex Court has observed as under:

“23. In the instant case the factum of rash and negligent driving has been established. This court has been constantly noticing the increase in number of road accidents and has also noticed how the vehicle drivers have been totally rash and negligent. It seems to us driving in a drunken state, in a rash and negligent manner or driving with youthful adventurous enthusiasm as if there are no traffic rules or no discipline of law has come to the centre stage. The protagonists, as we perceive, have lost all respect for law. A man with the means has, in possibility, graduated himself to harbour the idea that he can escape from the substantive sentence by payment of compensation. Neither the law nor the court that implements the law should ever get oblivious of the fact that in such accidents precious lives are lost or the victims who survive are crippled for life which, in a way, is worse than death. Such developing of notions is a dangerous phenomenon in an orderly society. Young age cannot be a plea to be accepted in all circumstances. Life to the poor or the impecunious is as worth living for as it is to the rich and the luxuriously temperamental.

24. Needless to say, the principle of sentencing recognizes the corrective measures but there are occasions when the deterrence is an imperative necessity depending upon the facts of the case. In our opinion, it is a fit case where we are



constrained to say that the High Court has been swayed away by the passion of mercy in applying the principle that payment of compensation is a factor for reduction of sentence to 24 days. It is absolutely in the realm of misplaced sympathy. It is, in a way mockery of justice. Because justice is "the crowning glory", "the sovereign mistress" and "queen of virtue" as Cicero had said. Such a crime blights not only the lives of the victims but of many others around them. It ultimately shatters the faith of the public in judicial system. In our view, the sentence of one year as imposed by the trial Magistrate which has been affirmed by the appellate court should be reduced to six months.

25. *Before parting with the case we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchallant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the "Emperors of all they survey". Drunkenness contributes to careless driving where the other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty and the civilized persons drive in constant fear but still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as "larger than life". In such obtaining circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinize, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304A, IPC. We say so with immense anguish."*

16. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in **Baldev Singh v. State of Punjab and another : CRM No. M-40769 of 2014** decided on **2nd June, 2016**, was also called upon to consider on a reference made to it by the learned Single Judge, whether an FIR and proceeding emanating therefrom, under Section 106(1)



of BNS (earlier, Section 304A of IPC) can be quashed on the basis of a compromise/settlement between the legal heirs of the victim and the accused? The Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court after considering various judgments of the Apex Court answered the said question in the negative.

17. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear, that proceedings under Section 106(1) of BNS (earlier, Section 304A of IPC) where the deceased is no more, cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise/settlement having arrived at between the accused and the legal heirs/representatives of the deceased. This practice of entering into a settlement/compromise more often than not, involves monetary consideration to the victim's family. Criminal justice system is not a purchasable commodity. Where there are serious public wrongs and where the society as a whole, has a stake, the justice delivery system cannot be put at naught by the accused, only because of his/her financial capacity/position in society. If the same is permitted, the same will be antithetical to the rule of law. If faith in the public justice delivery system is to be maintained, any compromise between the accused and the legal heirs/representatives of the deceased



under Section 106(1) of BNS cannot be sustained. There cannot be misplaced sympathy, based on settlement between the legal heirs of the deceased and the accused.

18. The jurisprudential foundation for quashing criminal proceedings on the basis of a compromise essentially, rests upon the absence of any grievance by the victim concerned as against the accused. Section 106(1) of BNS (earlier, Section 304A of the IPC) pertains to death caused due to rash and negligent act. Thus, where the deceased who is the real victim is no more and is incapable of giving his consent, the question of a settlement between the accused and the legal heirs of the deceased would not arise. In fact, if such a compromise is permitted on the ground of mutual accord, the same would not only undermine the public confidence in the justice delivery system but would also ultimately shatter the faith of the public in the judicial system.

19. As noted aforesaid, the Apex Court in ***Daxaben*** (*supra*) has clearly refused quashing of a case under Section 306 of the IPC on the basis of a settlement between the complainant (a



family member of the deceased) and the accused, as permitting quashing would set a dangerous precedent and financially strong offenders would go scot-free. Thus, on a parity of reasoning, a case under Section 106(1) of the BNS cannot be said to be essentially private in nature warranting grant of permission to the accused and legal heirs of the deceased, to settle the dispute amicably. In fact, if a compromise is permitted, it will give the accused who may be powerful, influential, having clout of money, to happily settle the matter with the family of the deceased, who may not be financially well off. Criminal justice system cannot be used and abused by parties to permit a compromise in cases such as this. It cannot be forgotten that the plenary powers vested in the High Court are to be exercised with due care and circumspection, befitting judicial propriety and must serve the ends of justice.

19. As far as reliance placed on the judgments of this Court by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it appears that the judgments of the Apex Court were not pointed out and hence, not considered. Accordingly, the said judgments are not binding on this Court.



20. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the FIR dated **28th March, 2025** registered with the Rynjah Police Station, Shillong and consequently, the proceedings pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Shillong being G.R. Case No. 44 (A) of 2025, cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise entered into between the accused and the legal heirs of the deceased.

21. Petition is accordingly, dismissed.

(Revati Mohite Dere)
Chief Justice