



CNR: KAHC020047262017

NC: 2026:KHC-D:17353-DB
MFA No. 100761 of 2017

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD

DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN

AND

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAGHAVENDRA SEETHARAM SRIVATSA

MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO. 100761 OF 2017 (FC)

BETWEEN:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] AR,
HUBBALLI.

...APPELLANT

(BY SRI. P.S. TADAPATRI, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. K.L. PATIL, SRI. S.B. NAIK AND SRI. B.C. INDI, ADVOCATES)

AND:


[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED],
HUBBALLI.

...RESPONDENT

(BY SRI. AAYUSH G. BHAT AND SRI. G.A.BHAT, ADVOCATES)

THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 55(1) OF THE INDIAN
DIVORCE ACT 1869, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED
25.01.2017, PASSED IN M.C NO.140/2012 ON THE FILE OF THE
PRINCIPAL JUDGE, FAMILY COURT, HUBBALLI AND ETC.

THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON
22.09.2026 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT,
THISDAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:





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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.I.ARUN
AND
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAGHAVENDRA SEETHARAM SRIVATSA

CAV JUDGMENT

(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAGHAVENDRA SEETHARAM SRIVATSA)

This is an appeal by the wife who has suffered a decree of divorce in a petition filed by her husband and labelled as "*petition under Section 10-A of the Indian Divorce Act 1869 and Amendment Act, 2001*". Section 10-A stipulates dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. However, in the present case, the respondent-husband made allegations of adultery, desertion and cruelty against the appellant-wife. The Family Court has held that the ground of adultery is not proved but the ground of desertion and cruelty, have been held to be proved. It is interesting to note that in the operative portion of the judgment, the Family Court has recorded "*The petition filed by the petitioner u/s.10A of Indian Divorce Act 1869 and Amendment Act of 2001 is allowed*".



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2. The parties herein are Christians and are governed by the provisions of Indian Divorce Act, 1869¹. The husband was the petitioner before the Family Court and he is the respondent herein. The wife was the respondent in the Family Court and the appellant herein.

3. The parties are referred to by their respective ranks in this appeal.

4. The facts, culminating in the present appeal are as follows:

4.1 The marriage between the parties was solemnized on 19.10.2008 at Maier Memorial Church, Karwar Road, Hubballi, in accordance with the customs and rituals of the Christian community. After the marriage, the parties resided together at the matrimonial home in Hubballi.

4.2 A male child was born to the parties on 15.12.2011 and was named [REDACTED] It is the case of the wife that,

¹ hereinafter also referred to as 'IDA'



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after the birth of the child, she continued to be ready and willing to join the husband and resume matrimonial life.

4.3 The respondent-husband instituted a petition before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Hubballi, seeking dissolution of the marriage under Section 10-A of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. In the said petition, the husband alleged, *inter alia*, that after the marriage, the parties lived together for about two years and thereafter matrimonial differences arose between them.

4.4 The respondent-husband further alleged that the wife, despite the cooperation extended by him and his family members, frequently quarrelled with him and often left the matrimonial home and went to her parental house. According to him, despite intervention by the elders of the Church and repeated efforts were made by him to bring her back, the wife refused to resume cohabitation.

4.5 It was further alleged by the respondent that on 28.03.2011 the wife left the matrimonial home and went to



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her parental house at [REDACTED], Hubballi, and thereafter refused to return and join him. The husband also made certain allegations regarding the wife's alleged previous relationship and conduct prior to and during the subsistence of the marriage.

4.6 The respondent issued a legal notice to the wife on 21.04.2011. The appellant-wife through her counsel issued a reply to the notice on 29.04.2011. Thereafter, the respondent instituted the aforesaid petition before the Family Court seeking dissolution of the marriage.

4.7 Upon service of notice and appearance of the appellant before the Family Court through her counsel, she filed her objections denying the allegations made by the respondent. While admitting the marriage and the relationship between the parties, she denied the other allegations made against her.

4.8 It is the specific case of the appellant that she had been subjected to ill-treatment and harassment by the

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husband and his family members and that she was repeatedly driven out of the matrimonial home. She further contended that the disputes between the parties arose in connection with her salary and that she was subjected to abuse, assault and other forms of ill-treatment.

4.9 The appellant further contended that on 05.04.2011, after returning from her work, she found the matrimonial home locked and, despite waiting until about 9.00 p.m., the respondent and his family members did not return. She therefore called her parents, who came along with elders. According to her, a quarrel thereafter took place and she was compelled to return to her parental home along with her parents.

4.10 It was further contended by the appellant that on 06.04.2011 she lodged a complaint before the Mahila Police Station against the respondent, his father and mother. During the enquiry, the respondent and his parents came to know that the wife was pregnant. According to the appellant, thereafter, on the advice of the Police at the Mahila Police



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Station, the husband agreed in writing that she could remain in her parental home until the delivery of the child.

4.11 The appellant delivered a male child on 15.12.2011. As pleaded in the Memorandum of Appeal, she informed the respondent about the birth of the child by Telegram. She alleged that the respondent neither visited the child nor responded to the Telegram. She further contended that she continued to remain ready and willing to join the husband and resume matrimonial life.

5. The respondent examined himself as PW-1, and one Gershem R., was examined as PW.2 and documents were marked as Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-4. These documents are as follows:

Ex.P-1- Marriage Card.

Ex.P-2- Marriage Photo.

Ex.P-3-Marriage Certificate.

Ex.P-4- Legal Notice.

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6. The appellant was examined as RW.1 and she got documents marked as Ex.R-1 to Ex.R-4. These documents are as follows:

Ex.R-1- Receipt issued by the Mahila Police.

Ex.R-2- Complaint.

Ex.R-3- Pregnancy test report of the respondent.

Ex.R-4- Statement given by the petitioner before the Police.

7. The Family Court held that there was absolutely no satisfactory evidence to prove that the appellant was leading an adulterous life. It was held that the respondent-husband had failed to prove the adulterous life of the wife. However, the Family Court proceeded to grant a decree of divorce on grounds of desertion and cruelty.

8. We have heard Smt. Padmaja S. Tadapatri, learned counsel for the appellant. There is no representation on behalf of the respondent.

9. Smt. Padmaja S. Tadapatri has contended that the Family Court has erred in granting a decree of divorce on grounds of desertion and cruelty. It is her submission that the



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mandatory period of desertion for dissolution of marriage is atleast two years before the presentation of the divorce petition is not made out in this case. On the ground of cruelty, she submits that there are no specific instances of cruelty on the part of the appellant. It is also her contention that the evidence is completely wanting to bring home the ground of cruelty under Section 10(1)(x) of the IDA. She therefore prays that the appeal be allowed and the judgment and decree of divorce granted by the Family Court be set aside.

The ground of desertion:

10. Adverting to the ground of desertion, we must say that there has been total non-application of mind by the Family Court. Section 10 (1) (ix) of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 stipulates that one of the parties to the marriage can get the marriage dissolved by proving that the other party has deserted the petitioner *for at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition*. In the present case, the respondent-husband has asserted in his petition that the appellant-wife left the matrimonial home on 28.03.2011 and till

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the date of petition, she had not returned to her matrimonial home.

11. The petition seeking divorce was filed on 18.09.2012. It is therefore apparent that the mandatory period of two years of desertion is not made out as per the respondent-husband's own pleadings. In fact, the Family Court has itself recorded the relevant dates in the course of its judgment. Yet, the Court proceeded to hold that the ground of desertion had been proved by the respondent-husband. The decree for divorce has also been granted.

12. The approach adopted by the Family Court has been that of missing the woods for the trees. When the statutorily mandated period of desertion is not made out on the petitioner's own showing, it was impermissible for the Family Court to have granted the decree of divorce on the ground of desertion. We therefore set aside the finding of the Family Court that the ground of desertion has been made out by the respondent-husband.



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The ground of cruelty:

13. Turning our attention towards cruelty, we must say that the cruelty as a ground of divorce under IDA has undergone a paradigm shift in recent years. Before the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 (51 of 2001) (w.e.f.03.10.2001), a wife seeking divorce on ground of cruelty had to prove adultery coupled with cruelty. A husband could not seek divorce on the ground of cruelty. Grounds for divorce were different for the wife and the husband. In other words, cruelty was not recognised as an independent ground for divorce in IDA till the amendment of 2001 was enforced. In the present case, as noted above, the ground of adultery has been held to be not proved and that finding has attained finality. Section 10(1) (x) of IDA provides for a divorce on the ground of cruelty if it is proved that the other party has '*treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent*'. It is therefore required of the Court to examine if the petitioner has made out a case of cruelty of that nature and degree.



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14. The Family Court has laid much emphasis on the complaint filed by the appellant against the respondent before the Mahila Police Station. The Court has picked holes in the deposition of the appellant to conclude that the respondent never deserted or meted out cruelty on her. In fact, the Family Court has gone to the extent of holding that the appellant heaped cruelty on the respondent by filing the police complaint and voluntarily deserted him. However, the Court has not noticed any particular act of cruelty on the part of the appellant, far less cruelty of such nature as to cause reasonable apprehension in the mind of the husband that it would be harmful or injurious for him to live with her.

15. In the context of cruelty as a ground for divorce under Sec.10(1)(x) of IDA, it is pertinent to cite the judgment of the High Court of Kerala in the case of ***Libin Varghese Vs. Rajani Anna Mathew***²; at paragraphs 15 to 20, reads as under:

²2022 SCC ONLINE KER 4383



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"15. The appellant has to establish that since the solemnisation of the marriage, the respondent has treated him with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in his mind that it would be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent. Without establishing cruelty to such an extent, no divorce can be granted under Section 10(1)(X) of the Divorce Act.

16. From time immemorial marriage was considered as solemn, and sanctity attached to the relationship of a man and wife united in marriage was considered inseparable, and it was the very foundation of a strong society. Marriage is a socially or ritually recognized union, or legal contract between spouses, that establishes rights and obligations between them, between them and their children, and between them and their in-laws. Family is the basic unit of the society, from where we learn virtues, values, skills and behaviour. Marriage is not a mere ritual or an empty ceremony for licencing the sexual urge of the parties.

"Marriage is the union of two different surnames, in friendship and in love, in order to continue the posterity of the former sages, and to furnish those who shall preside at, the sacrifices to, heaven and earth, at those in the ancestral temple, and at those at the altars to the spirits of the land and grain."

-Confucius.

17. Kerala, known as God's own Country, was once famous for its well knit family bondage. But the present trend it seems to break the nuptial tie on flimsy or selfish reasons, or for extra-marital relationships, even unmindful of their children. The wails and screams coming out of disturbed and destroyed families are liable to shake the conscience of the society as a whole. When warring couples, deserted children and desperate divorcees occupy the majority of our population, no doubt it will adversely affect the tranquility of our social life, and



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our society will have a stunted growth. Now-a-days, the younger generation think that marriage is an evil that could be avoided to enjoy free life without any liabilities or obligations. They would expand the word 'WIFE' as 'Worry Invited For Ever' substituting the old concept of 'Wise Investment For Ever'. The consumer culture of 'use and throw' seems to have influenced our matrimonial relationships also. Live-in-relationships are on the rise, just to say good-bye when they fell apart.

18. The law and religion consider marriage as an institution by itself and parties to the marriage are not permitted to walk away from that relationship unilaterally, unless and until they satisfy the legal requirements to dissolve their marriage through a court of law or in accordance with the personal law which govern them.

19. Mere quarrels, ordinary wear and tear of matrimonial relationships or casual outburst of some emotional feelings cannot be treated as cruelties warranting a divorce. From the facts of the case on hand, it is obvious that the unholy alliance of the husband with some other lady has caused some disturbances in the family life of the appellant and respondent, which they were sailing smoothly with their three girl children. Even according to the mother and close-relatives of the appellant, such an unholy relationship was started in the year 2017, and in the year 2018 itself, the husband moved for divorce. The parties are living separately from 2018 onwards. Even now, the respondent is ready for a reunion as she wants her husband, and her children their father. Learned counsel Sri. Mathew Kuriakose for the appellant submitted that it is only a drama played by the respondent as she is also aware of the fact that their relationship is emotionally dead due to long separation. The respondent was never separated from the appellant because of any fault from her part. Still she is living with the mother of the appellant, whenever she comes down from Saudi Arabia. It was the appellant who walked out of their



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marital relationship, and now he says that due to long separation, their marriage has become defunct.

20. Since, no act of cruelties, able to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the appellant that it would be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent was proved by the appellant, he is not entitled to get a decree of divorce on the ground of matrimonial cruelties. RWs 2 to 7 categorically deposed before the Court that the appellant and respondent were leading a happy married life, and they still want to see them live together along with their children. If the appellant is ready to come back to his wife and children, they are ready to accept him, and there is nothing to show that the chances of an amicable reunion is foreclosed forever. So the finding of the Family Court, Alappuzha, that the appellant is not entitled for a decree of divorce on the ground of matrimonial cruelties is liable to be upheld."

16. It is interesting to note that before the amendment of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 by the marriage laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 the ground of cruelty for judicial separation in respect of Hindu marriages was also qualified by the requirement of *reasonable apprehension* as it is found in Section 10(1)(x) of IDA at present. After the 1976 amendment, cruelty is available as an unqualified ground for dissolution of Hindu marriages. The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, [Section 32(dd)] and the Special Marriage Act 1954, [Section 27(1)(d)] both use the simple "*treated...with cruelty*" formula



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without the "*apprehension*" qualifier, aligning them with the post-1976 Hindu Marriage Act rather than the Indian Divorce Act.

17. Although there is a marked difference in the language as to the ground of cruelty in the various statutes applicable to the followers of various religions, there is a school of thought that matrimonial cruelty must have a uniform definition or conceptualization to justify the founding of a decree for divorce. This view has been taken by a Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala in the case of ***Mary Margret Vs. Jos P. Tomas***,³ which opinion has been cited with approval by a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of ***P. G. Raju Vs. Sallamma***⁴ in the following words:

*"10. It is trite law that unsubstantiated accusation, unfounded allegations and character assassination by one spouse as against the other spouse would amount to mental cruelty. The Division Bench of Kerala High Court in the case of **Mary Margret** (supra) which arose from a petition filed under Section 10 of the*

³2022 SCC ONLINE KER 922

⁴MFA No.2800/2017 Dt.19.01.2023



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Divorce Act alleging cruelty, at paragraph Nos.10 and 27 has observed as follows:-

"10. In matrimonial life, cruelty can be defined in many ways. It has many perspectives which depend upon the socio- economic status and circumstances of parties to the marriage. It varies from person to person. It also varies with time, place, economic status and other circumstances. Cruelty can be physical and mental. Physical cruelty provides more of a direct evidence, that it can be perceptible when compared to mental cruelty. Mental cruelty can be drawn from the facts and circumstances of the case, whereas physical cruelty can be drawn from the conduct of one spouse towards other spouse which endangers the other spouse's physical health. It is true that, mere trivial irritations, quarrels, normal wear and tear of the married life which happens in day-to-day life would not be adequate for grant of divorce on the ground of mental cruelty. The married life should be reviewed as a whole, and a few isolated instances over a period of years will not amount to cruelty."

*"27. This Court, in **A:husband** vs. **B:Wife** (2010) (4) KLT 434) held that the 'nature of cruelty which would entitle a spouse in matrimony for divorce must certainly be identical in all religions. Law cannot recognise*



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different varieties of cruelty as Hindu cruelty, Muslim cruelty, Christian cruelty or secular cruelty to justify a decree for divorce. The mere fact that Hindu Marriage Act and the Special Marriage Act refer to cruelty without any rider or explanation or the fact that the Divorce Act and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act give indication of the nature of matrimonial cruelty that ought to be established, cannot justify the conclusion that the nature matrimonial cruelty which would entitle the spouses for divorce is different under different personal laws. It would be absolutely safe to draw inspiration from Art.44 of the Constitution also to jump to the conclusion that nature of cruelty justifying a divorce cannot be different under different personal laws. To our mind, it appears that matrimonial cruelty must have a uniform definition or conceptualisation to justify the founding of a decree for divorce. Under S.10(1)(x), the cruelty must be such as to cause reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner, spouse that it would be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the respondent. The expression harmful or injurious cannot be limited to physical harm or injury. Anything that would hinder the ability of the spouse to blossom into his/her fullness and to enjoy life in matrimony must be held to fall within the sweep of S.10(1)(x) of the Divorce



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Act. Cruelty which is not defined in S.13(1)(1a) of the Hindu Marriage Act and S.27(1) of the Special Marriage Act and cruelty which is explained in S.2(viii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act and S.10(1)(x) of the Divorce Act must all take inspiration from such understanding of matrimonial cruelty. We discard the theory that the concept of matrimonial cruelty to entitle a spouse for divorce can be dissimilar and different for persons belonging to different religious faiths merely because different words are used in the relevant personal law statutes'."

(emphasis supplied)

18. It is evident that there is a thought that the ground of cruelty under various personal laws has to take the same flavour and intensity. Although this view has been voiced in the opinion of the High Courts as noted above, the textual difference still exists on the statute book. The case has to be adjudicated bearing that in mind. Cruelty need not be physical, mental cruelty is also sufficient to justify a decree of divorce. However, the Court will have to weigh the evidence in its entirety and take into account all relevant factors before arriving at its conclusion. The express language of Section



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10(1)(x) which engrafts the “*reasonable apprehension*” qualifier is a pointer towards the nature and degree of cruelty that is required to justify a decree of divorce. It is a useful aid in applying the statutory position to the factual position that emerges from the record. The Court has to be circumspect while dealing with allegations of cruelty and findings of cruelty cannot be returned on the mere *ipse dixit* of the petitioner.

19. In this context, it is necessary to note that mere oral allegation of cruelty without any concrete proof or corroboration would not establish cruelty so as to justify a decree of divorce. There is a body of judicial opinion on this aspect as well. It is pertinent to quote from the judgment of the Division Bench of Jharkhand High Court in the case of ***Sudhira Minj Vs. Amith Anuj Minj***⁵ which felicitously captures the legal position in these words:

"11. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment and also taken note of the relevant material exhibits and deposition relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties in support of

⁵2018 SCC ONLINE JHAR 558



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their own case. This matrimonial suit by the petitioner/husband sought dissolution of marriage between the parties on the sole ground of cruelty, as provided under section 10 (x) of the Divorce Act, 1869. Evidence of the petitioner and his witnesses though in support of the averments made in the plaint, are only oral on the point of allegation of cruelty. Cruelty in marriage is something beyond normal wear and tear of daily life. It must be of such a nature which creates reasonable apprehension in the minds of the aggrieved spouse that it would be harmful or injurious for him/her to live with his/her spouse. There are no exceptional circumstances or any other corroborative evidence which point out to such acts of the Respondent which could have lead to reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it was harmful or injurious for him to live with her. Ext-2 heavily relied upon by the petitioner and treated by the Learned Family Court as corroborative evidence, in its content, completely fails to establish any such allegations of cruelty as conceived under section 10(x) of the Act. Mere going to the police station by the Respondent with allegations of physical and mental torture being perpetrated by the husband, do not amount to such cruelty which would entitle the petitioner to seek divorce on that ground. Learned Family Court has completely failed to take into consideration that sanctimonious relationship of marriage as a institution, should not have been dissolved on



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unsubstantiated allegation of such nature. Learned Family Court has proceeded to arrive at such an opinion in haste without any adequate material evidence on record to establish the instances of cruelty in marriage whether physical or mental. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the findings of the Learned Family Court are suffering from errors both in law and on facts. They suffer from lack of proper appreciation of evidence on record."

(emphasis supplied)

20. The allegations and evidence in the present case have a resemblance to those in the ***Sudhira Minj's*** case cited above. Apart from making general allegations against the appellant, the respondent has not been able to prove any particular instance of cruelty against her. Except for the self-serving statements of the respondent-husband, there is no corroboration of any of his allegations. It is forthcoming from the records that the appellant, when she was pregnant, was compelled to approach the Police. When the respondent assured her, albeit before the Police, that she could stay in her parental house till the delivery and that he would also look after her, she did not pursue the complaint. Except this solitary

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incident of lodging the complaint with Mahila Police Station which ended in a quick closure, there is no other incident of the appellant causing any semblance of hurt, much less cruelty, against the respondent. The Family Court has rushed to the conclusion that there was cruelty on the part of the appellant.

21. There is yet another significant aspect which has been ignored by the Family Court. This aspect has a direct bearing on the ground of cruelty can assed by the respondent-husband. In the course of the trial, the respondent denied that the child born on 15.12.2011 to the appellant is not his child. He has denied knowledge of the fact that the appellant gave birth to a male child. He has also made sweeping allegations about the appellant's character in the course of his deposition. In an attempt to cover up his follies, he has gone to the extent of denying the very notice issued on his behalf by his advocate. The respondent has adopted an approach of blanket denial without any substantiation of his allegations. The most striking feature of his deposition is that he stated that he was not

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prepared to undergo a DNA examination to ascertain the paternity of the child.

22. The nature of reckless and unsubstantiated allegations made by the respondent against the appellant would surely amount to cruelty on his part towards the appellant. Moreover, the child was born on 15.12.2011, i.e., during the subsistence of a valid marriage between the appellant and the respondent. The presumption under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act is that such a child would be that of the respondent-husband. In the face of such a statutory presumption, the respondent-husband has proceeded to make baseless allegations not only about the paternity of the child but also about the character of the appellant. Such irresponsible conduct of the respondent ought to have been noticed by the Family Court while taking a final view on the divorce petition filed by the husband. Far from taking note of such deplorable conduct and irresponsible deposition of the husband, the Family Court has not even adverted to this crucial aspect. In our opinion, while taking a view on the aspect of cruelty, this factor ought to have weighed with the Family



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Court. One must bear in mind that this case involves allegations of mental cruelty: something very abstract and of which there can be no direct evidence. Conclusions will have to be drawn by the Court based on the facts and circumstances of the case, in accordance with settled principles. The Court has a duty to appreciate the evidence and circumstances holistically to arrive at its conclusion. In our view, the Family Court has erred in its approach towards the evidence in the case.

Conclusion:

23. The statutorily mandated period of two years of *desertion* is not made out even as per the respondent-husband's own case. The finding of the Family Court on that ground is plainly erroneous. The discussion on the ground of *cruelty* by the Family Court is surely unsatisfactory. Moreover, all relevant factors, including the irresponsible deposition of the respondent including disowning the child and refusing to undergo DNA examination ought to have featured in the judgment of the Family Court. On an overall examination of the material on record and the judgment of the Family Court, we

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are of the opinion that there has been non-application of mind to the relevant factors by the Family Court. The judgment and decree of the Family Court, therefore, deserve to be set aside.

24. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we make the following order:

- (i) The appeal is allowed.
- (ii) The judgment and decree dated 25.01.2017 passed by the Prl. Judge, Family Court, Hubballi in M.C.No.140/2012 is set aside.
- (iii) No order as to costs.

**Sd/-
(M.I.ARUN)
JUDGE**

**Sd/-
(RAGHAVENDRA SEETHARAM SRIVATSA)
JUDGE**

PJ/NAA/ CT:SD