Bribe Demand By Public Servant Not Necessary U/S 7 PC Act If Offer & Acceptance Of Illegal Gratification Are Proved: Kerala High Court
The Court held that demand and acceptance of illegal gratification may be proved through oral, documentary or circumstantial evidence, but a presumption of fact can be drawn only after foundational facts are established by relevant evidence.

Justice A. Badharudeen, Kerala High Court
The Kerala High Court has held that a prior demand by a public servant is not necessary to attract Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, where the bribe-giver offers illegal gratification and the public servant accepts it, provided the offer and acceptance are established through foundational oral, documentary or circumstantial evidence.
The Court was hearing a criminal appeal challenging the conviction and sentence for offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, in a trap case alleging demand and acceptance of illegal gratification for issuing a certified copy of a document.
A Bench of Justice A. Badharudeen observed: “Regarding the mode of proof of demand of bribe, if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.”
The Bench further added: “The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof.”
Advocate B. Vinod appeared for the appellant, while Special Public Prosecutor Rajesh A. and Senior Public Prosecutor Rekha S. appeared for the State.
Background
The prosecution's case was that the accused, while working as a U.D. A clerk in the Sub Registrar’s Office abused his position as a public servant by demanding illegal gratification for issuing a certified copy of a document. The prosecution alleged that the demand was initially made for a higher amount and later reduced, and that the accused accepted the amount during a vigilance trap.
The Special Court convicted the accused for offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. It sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one year and a fine for each offence, with the substantive sentences directed to run concurrently.
The accused challenged the conviction by contending that the evidence did not conclusively prove the demand and acceptance of a bribe. It was argued that there were anomalies in the application for a certified copy, inconsistencies regarding dates and alleged demands, defects in the trap procedure, and that the decoy witness had not personally witnessed the demand and acceptance.
The State opposed the appeal by submitting that the prosecution's evidence proved demand and acceptance beyond a reasonable doubt and that the conviction and sentence imposed by the Special Court required no interference.
Court’s Observation
The Court first examined the official evidence relating to the certified copy application and the work handled in the Sub Registrar’s Office. It noted that the Head Clerk deposed about the application, collection of fees, preparation of the certified copy, and the role of the accused in preparing and certifying the document. The Court found that nothing material was elicited in cross-examination to discredit this official witness.
The Court also noticed the evidence of other office witnesses, including the official who compared and signed the certified copy, and the official who spoke about the accused working in the same office. Their evidence supported the prosecution's case that the certified copy was prepared by the accused and that he was connected with the official act in respect of which the prosecution alleged demand and acceptance of illegal gratification.
The Court then considered the complainant’s evidence. It noted that the complainant had approached the Sub Registrar’s Office for a certified copy needed in connection with proceedings concerning the valuation of property. According to the complainant, the accused demanded illegal gratification for issuing the copy, repeated the demand, and later accepted the trap money after asking whether the amount had been brought.
The Bench found that the complainant’s evidence was supported by documentary material and trap proceedings. It observed: “Although PW-7 was subjected to searching cross- examination, nothing extracted to disbelieve his version supported by documentary evidence in the form of Ext.P-1, his application and conduct of phenolphthalein test as part of trap proceedings.”
The Court next examined the evidence of the decoy witness and the vigilance officer. The decoy witness spoke about the pre-trap procedure, demonstration of the phenolphthalein test, entrustment of currency notes to the complainant with instructions to hand over the money only on demand, the signal given after acceptance, recovery of the currency notes from the drawer of the accused, and the positive phenolphthalein reaction when the accused’s fingers were dipped in sodium carbonate solution.
The Court noted that the vigilance officer also deposed about recording the complaint, registering the FIR, preparing the entrustment mahazar, arranging the trap, entering the office after receiving the signal, questioning the accused, recovering the tainted notes from the drawer shown by the accused, and completing the post-trap procedures. The Court found that the evidence regarding pre-trap and post-trap proceedings remained unshaken.
The Court then turned to the legal ingredients of Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Referring to Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023), the Court reiterated that proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification is sine qua non to establish guilt under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii).
The Court observed that demand and acceptance may be proved through direct oral evidence, documentary evidence, or circumstantial evidence. It clarified that if the bribe-giver offers to pay without a demand from the public servant and the latter accepts the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance under Section 7. Conversely, where the public servant makes a demand, and the bribe-giver pays pursuant to that demand, it is a case of obtainment under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii).
The Court further held that once facts in issue are proved under Section 7, Section 20 mandates the Court to raise a legal presumption that the illegal gratification was for motive or reward. It also clarified, following Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023), that the mandatory legal presumption under Section 20 is different from a discretionary presumption of fact.
The Court referred to Sunil Kumar K. v. State of Kerala (2025), where the High Court had reiterated that demand and acceptance are essential to fasten criminal culpability under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Court noted the principle that mere receipt or recovery of an amount would not be sufficient in the absence of evidence proving demand.
The Court also referred to The State of Kerala v. K.A. Abdul Rasheed (2026), where the Supreme Court considered Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023) and the evidentiary value of hostile witnesses. Referring to Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1976), the Court noted that a witness’s evidence is not automatically washed off the record merely because the witness is cross-examined and contradicted by the party calling him.
The Bench reproduced the principle: “From the above conspectus, it emerges clear that even in a criminal prosecution when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the court, by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether.”
Applying these principles, the Court rejected the accused’s contention that two signatures in the certified copy application affected the prosecution's case. It held that putting two signatures in an application, whether by mistake or otherwise, would not take away the legality of the application or the truthfulness of the prosecution's allegations.
The Court also rejected the argument that the complaint contained only selective allegations or that the complainant had introduced an improved version at trial. It found that the defence contention was based on an incorrect reading of the dates and that the minor omissions brought out in cross-examination were not fatal to the complainant’s evidence.
The Court further rejected the contention that the demand of bribe in a public office was improbable. It was observed that such an argument could not be accepted, since allegations of officers demanding bribes for doing official duties had resulted in multiple trap cases.
The Court also rejected the argument that the decoy witness had not personally witnessed demand and acceptance. It held that the demand proved through the complainant alone was sufficient, particularly when supported by other evidence and the principles laid down in Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2023).
The Bench observed: “Even though it is argued by the learned counsel for the accused that the evidence of PW7 is improbable and unreliable, on reading the evidence of PW7 supported by other evidence, this submission cannot be appreciated.”
On re-appreciation of the evidence, the Court held that the prosecution had successfully proved the ingredients of the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, beyond a reasonable doubt. It found no merit in the contentions raised by the accused and held that the conviction recorded by the Special Court was justified.
Conclusion
The Kerala High Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the conviction of the accused for offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
The Court also confirmed the sentence imposed by the Special Court, noting that the sentence awarded was the minimum sentence prescribed for the offence under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act and that no substantive reduction was possible.
The Court vacated the order suspending sentence and granting bail to the accused, directing him to appear before the Special Court forthwith to undergo the sentence, failing which the Special Court was directed to execute the sentence.
Cause Title: D. Jayanarayana v. The State of Kerala (Neutral Citation: 2026:KER:44468)
Appearances
Appellant: Advocates B. Vinod and Azeem Salih
Respondent: Special Public Prosecutor Rajesh A.; Senior Public Prosecutor Rekha S.


