Complaint In 2004, Still Pending In 2026: Kerala High Court Expresses Concern After Noticing Two Decades Delay In Section 138 NI Act Trial
The Court held that a summary trial pending for over twenty years across one hundred postings must be concluded expeditiously within a strict timeline of two months.
Justice CS Dias, Kerala High Court
The Kerala High Court has remarked that a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act instituted in 2004, still pending in 2026, is antithetical to legislative intent.
Expressing grave concern over the plight of a complainant whose trial languished for over two decades and across one hundred posting dates without cross-examination being recorded, the Court observed that a pattern of repeated and liberal adjournments frustrates the legislative intent of summary trials and undermines public confidence in the administration of justice.
The Court further held that a pre-trial challenge to the marking of evidence or the financial capacity of the complainant is legally untenable at a belated stage, especially since Section 139 of the Act raises a mandatory statutory presumption of a legally enforceable debt that must be rebutted during trial rather than through a detailed factual enquiry by the High Court under its inherent powers.
The Bench of Justice CS Dias observed, "Before parting with the case, this Court expresses its concern over the manner in which the prosecution has languished for two decades. The object of Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to instil confidence in commercial transactions and to ensure prompt redressal of grievances arising from dishonoured cheques. Parliament has expressly mandated that trials under Section 138 be conducted summarily and concluded expeditiously. A complaint instituted in 2004, still pending in 2026, is antithetical to legislative intent."
Advocate R Anilkumar appeared for the Petitioner.
Brief Facts
The complainant instituted a criminal complaint against the accused before the jurisdictional Magistrate Court alleging the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. It was alleged that a cheque issued by the accused for a sum of ₹8,00,000/- was returned dishonoured by the bank due to insufficiency of funds. Despite the issuance of a statutory demand notice, the accused failed to discharge the liability and instead sent a reply containing untenable contentions.
The Trial Court subsequently recorded the sworn statement of the complainant and took the case on file. During the trial, the case was transferred to the present Trial Court and renumbered. The complainant filed a proof affidavit in lieu of chief examination and marked certain documents, but the trial languished for over two decades without the cross-examination of the complainant being recorded.
The accused subsequently filed an application seeking a stay of the criminal proceedings on the ground that a civil appeal was pending against a decree passed in an inter-party civil suit concerning the same cheque transaction.
The Trial Court dismissed the stay application, which led the accused to approach the High Court seeking to quash the complaint, the proceedings sheet, and the impugned order.
Contentions of the Parties
The Petitioner said that the original documents marked by the complainant were currently unavailable, and the Trial Court had erroneously marked photocopies of the said documents in evidence without any formal proceeding. The complainant lacked the financial capacity to advance the substantial amount of ₹8,00,000/- to the accused. The criminal proceedings ought to be stayed during the pendency of the appeal filed before the High Court against the inter-party civil court decree involving the same cheque transaction. The complaint and the entire criminal proceedings were liable to be quashed under the inherent powers of the High Court.
The Respondents contended that the documents in question were marked in evidence decades ago without any objection from the accused, and the plea raised at this belated stage was legally untenable. The application for stay was a deliberate attempt to protract the final determination of the trial, which had already been delayed for over twenty years. It was submitted that there was no legal bar to the simultaneous continuation of independent civil and criminal proceedings arising out of the same transaction.
Observations and Findings of the Court
The Court observed that the contention of the accused seeking a stay due to the pendency of a civil appeal was demonstrably incorrect and legally untenable. Relying upon settled precedents of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Court held that civil and criminal proceedings arising from the same cause of action can proceed simultaneously and independently. There was no legal prohibition against their concurrent continuation, and therefore, the Trial Court committed no error or illegality in declining to stay the criminal prosecution.
The Court found that the primary documents had been marked in evidence decades ago without any objection from the accused. It was held that, having remained silent for more than two decades, the accused could not turn around to challenge the marking of those documents, rendering the contention wholly unsustainable.
The Court categorically rejected the prayer to quash the complaint, observing that a plain reading of the complaint unmistakably disclosed the essential ingredients constituting the offence under Section 138 of the Act. It was noted that under Section 139 of the Act, there exists a mandatory statutory presumption in favour of the complainant regarding the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability.
The Court held that since this presumption is rebuttable, the accused must raise their defence during the trial. High Courts cannot enter into a detailed enquiry or adjudicate upon disputed questions of fact at a pre-trial stage to quash a complaint. Furthermore, the Court held that the gross delay of over twenty years since the institution of the complaint was by itself a sufficient ground to reject the relief of quashing.
The Court expressed grave concern over the plight of the complainant and the manner in which the prosecution had languished for over two decades and across more than one hundred posting dates.
It was observed that the justice delivery system cannot permit summary trials to degenerate into interminable litigation through a pattern of repeated and liberal adjournments. Such delays frustrate the legislative intent of Chapter XVII of the Act, which mandates speedy trials to instil confidence in commercial transactions.
"The proceedings sheet reveals a pattern of repeated and liberal adjournments that has frustrated the mandate of law. The justice delivery system cannot permit proceedings under Section 138 to degenerate into interminable litigation. Delay undermines not only the complainant's rights but also the public's confidence in the administration of justice", the Court said.
Consequently, the High Court dismissed the petition and directed the Trial Court to scrupulously follow the comprehensive guidelines of the Supreme Court and dispose of the complaint expeditiously within a strict timeline of two months.
Cause Title: Sheelarani v. S Raveendran Nair and Anr. [Neutral Citation: 2026:KHC:41451]
Appearances:
Petitioner: Advocate R Anilkumar