False Terror Threat Not Innocuous Even If No Intent To Execute It: Karnataka High Court Refuses To Quash Kempegowda Airport Bomb Threat Case

The Court was hearing a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution read with Section 482 CrPC and Section 528 BNSS, challenging proceedings for alleged criminal intimidation through anonymous communication under Section 351(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, and cheating by personation through a computer resource under Section 66D of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

A Bench of Justice M. Nagaprasanna observed: “A false threat of terrorism is not rendered innocuous merely because the person issuing it never intended to execute the threatened act."

The Bench added: "The gravity of such conduct lies not merely in the possibility of the threatened event materialising, but also in the fear that the threat is capable of generating, the disruption it may occasion and the diversion of public resources that its verification inevitably entails. A threat of this nature compels the State to act, for the law enforcement machinery cannot afford the luxury of presuming that a threat to public safety is a hoax. It must proceed on the side of caution, lest indifference to a genuine warning culminate in consequences too grave to contemplate.”

Advocate Uday Shankar M. appeared for the petitioner. High Court Government Pleader Waheeda M.M. appeared for the State.

Background

The prosecution arose from an email allegedly received by the Bengaluru Commissioner of Police on November 30, 2025. The communication purported to emanate from Jaish-e-Mohammed and allegedly threatened bomb blasts at Kempegowda International Airport and several shopping malls from 7 p.m. onwards. It also provided a mobile number and invited payment to prevent the threatened occurrence.

The police initially registered the case under Section 66F of the Information Technology Act concerning cyberterrorism. After investigation, that offence was not included in the charge sheet, which instead invoked Section 351(4) BNS and Section 66D of the Information Technology Act.

The prosecution alleged that the petitioner had disputes with friends on online platforms and had created multiple email accounts in the name of another person. It alleged that he used that person’s identity particulars to send the threatening communication and implicate him.

The petitioner sought quashing principally on the ground that the internet connection available to him was not functioning on the date of the alleged incident. The State submitted that this was a disputed defence and that the electronic trail, authorship of the email and the material gathered during the investigation required examination at trial.

Court’s Observations

Personal Animosity Did Not Confine Allegations To Private Dispute

The Court observed that the prosecution did not allege merely an empty electronic threat. It alleged the creation of electronic identities in another person’s name, their use to transmit bomb threats in the name of a proscribed terrorist organisation and the consequent mobilisation of the public-safety machinery.

The Court held: “The allegations, therefore, cannot be viewed through the narrow prism of a private dispute between individuals. The alleged conduct, though said to have originated in personal animosity, travelled far beyond the confines of that animosity and entered the realm of public safety. The material collected during investigation, at this stage, furnishes a prima facie foundation for examining the offences alleged in the charge sheet, subject necessarily to satisfaction of their respective statutory ingredients.”

The Court further observed that the email allegedly identified prominent and densely frequented locations, specified the time at which the explosions would begin and demanded payment to prevent them. The Bench stated that such a communication was capable of generating fear, disturbing public tranquillity and compelling an immediate response from law-enforcement authorities.

Ingredients Of Charged Offences Require Trial

The Court explained that Section 351(4) BNS concerns an aggravated form of criminal intimidation where a threat is conveyed anonymously or after taking precautions to conceal the sender’s name or residence. The Bench clarified that anonymity or concealment was an additional circumstance and that the provision still had to be read with the substantive ingredients of criminal intimidation under Section 351(1).

The Court added: “Section 66D of the Act, on the other hand, deals with cheating by personation through a communication device or computer resource. The provision is directed against the misuse of electronic technology to assume the identity of another and thereby commit cheating by personation. The employment of a computer resource or electronic communication is the medium through which the offence is committed; personation and the ingredients of cheating remain indispensable to its attraction.”

The Court observed that whether the threatening email fulfilled every ingredient of criminal intimidation, and whether the alleged impersonation involved the deception and inducement necessary for cheating by personation, had to be determined on evidence.

Inoperative Internet Connection Was A Disputed Defence

The Court rejected the petitioner’s reliance on the alleged failure of his internet connection as a sufficient ground for terminating the prosecution. The Bench held that an email account was not necessarily tied to one computer, internet connection or geographical location.

The Court stated: “An electronic mail account is not inextricably tied to a particular computer, a particular internet connection or a particular geographical location. Access to an electronic mail account may be secured through different devices, networks and modes of connectivity. The alleged failure of one internet connection, therefore, does not by itself establish the impossibility of transmitting an electronic communication through another available means. The complaint lodged by the petitioner with his Internet Service Provider may constitute a circumstance available to him in defence; it cannot, without more, be elevated into conclusive proof that the alleged communication could not have originated from him.”

The Court observed that the duration of the alleged internet disruption, the devices used to access the email accounts, the electronic trail and the evidentiary value of the investigation material were disputed factual questions requiring a trial.

Quashing Jurisdiction Cannot Become A Mini-Trial

The Court relied on Kaptan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021), which discussed Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (2018), Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra (2019), State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992), CBI v. Arvind Khanna (2019), State of Telangana v. Managipet (2019) and XYZ v. State of Gujarat (2019).

Referring to those principles, the Court observed that quashing criminal proceedings was an exception and that disputed evidence could not be appreciated as though the High Court were conducting a trial.

The Bench stated: “The extraordinary jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings is intended to prevent abuse of the process of law; it is not intended to prematurely foreclose a prosecution merely because the accused projects a factual defense, which requires evidentiary examination.”

Conclusion

The Karnataka High Court rejected the petition and refused to quash the criminal proceedings pending before the 45th Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru.

The Court held that questions concerning the authorship, transmission and attribution of the threatening email, as well as the satisfaction of the ingredients of the charged offences, must be tested before the competent criminal court. The connected interim application was consequently disposed of.

Cause Title: Abhay Shee v. State of Karnataka and Another (Neutral Citation: 2026:KHC:47735)

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