Taking Snakebite Victim To Sorcerer Not Enough For Conviction U/S 304A IPC Without Proof That Hospital Treatment Could Have Saved Her: Himachal Pradesh High Court

The Court was hearing the State’s appeal against a trial court judgment acquitting the accused of the offence of causing death by negligence after a woman died due to a snakebite.

A Bench of Justice Rakesh Kainthla, while taking note that the deceased had been taken to the faith healer instead of a hospital, observed: “The testimony of this witness shows that, even though he is a sorcerer, the people visited him for cases of snake bite. Thus, the people had faith in him, and the accused cannot be faulted for reposing faith in him.”

The Bench refused to interfere with the acquittal, holding that “there is no expert opinion that Jyoti’s life could have been saved by taking her to the hospital; hence, the accused cannot be convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304A of the IPC.”

Deputy Advocate General Ajit Sharma appeared for the State, while Advocate Mukul Sharma appeared for the respondent.

Background

The prosecution's case was that the deceased had been bitten by a snake at night. Her father later reached the house where she was staying and found her unconscious. According to the prosecution, when he tried to take her to the hospital, the accused said that she had already been taken to a sorcerer who had administered medicine.

The prosecution alleged that despite the sorcerer saying that he had done whatever was possible and that the victim could be taken elsewhere, the accused took her back rather than immediately taking her to the hospital. She was subsequently taken to the hospital but was declared dead.

The trial court acquitted the accused, holding that the cause of death was snakebite and that the accused’s conduct was not the proximate cause of death. It also found contradictions in the prosecution's evidence.

The State argued before the High Court that the accused had acted negligently by not taking the deceased to the hospital, and that minor discrepancies in witness testimony should not have resulted in the rejection of the prosecution's case. The respondent argued that the snakebite, and not any act attributable to the accused, was the proximate cause of death.

Court’s Observations

The Court first noted that the matter arose from an appeal against acquittal and that interference would be justified only within settled limits.

Referring to Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2025), State of M.P. v. Ramveer Singh (2025), and Tulasareddi v. State of Karnataka (2026), the Court reiterated that where the trial court’s view is a possible view, an appellate court should not overturn an acquittal merely because another view is also possible.

The Court found that the cause of death was not in dispute. The post-mortem doctor had stated that the cause of death was snakebite, and his opinion on that aspect was not challenged.

The Court observed: “It is undisputed that Jyoti had died due to a snake bite. Dr Vivek Sood conducted the post-mortem examination and issued a report (Ext.PW6/A) in which he stated that the cause of death was a snake bite. He mentioned in the report that the probable time between injury and death was not known. He was not cross-examined regarding his opinion that the cause of death was a snake bite, and this part of his testimony was accepted as correct.”

The Court then examined the prosecution’s allegation that the failure to take the deceased to the hospital caused her death. It noted that an omission becomes punishable only where it is illegal, including where it breaches a legal duty or would furnish a ground for civil action.

Applying that principle, the Court held: “In the present case, the prosecution has not proved that the omission of the accused was in breach of some direction of law or would constitute a good ground for the civil action.”

The Court rejected the State’s submission that the deceased would have survived had she been taken to the hospital.

The Court noted that the sorcerer had said that he checked the victim and advised that she be taken to the hospital. However, the medical evidence did not establish that her life could, in fact, have been saved through hospital treatment.

The Court stated: “Buta Ram (PW5) stated that Jyoti was brought to him on 15.05.2007 at 12.30 a.m. with the history of a snake bite. He checked Jyoti and saw that there was no mark of a snake bite. He advised the accused to take her to the hospital. It was submitted that the accused had not taken Jyoti to the hospital despite the advice of Buta Ram (PW5), and had Jyoti been taken to the hospital, her life would have been saved. This submission cannot be accepted. Dr Vivek Sood never stated that Jyoti’s life could have been saved by bringing her to the hospital. Therefore, there is no expert opinion that the life of Jyoti could have been saved had she been brought to the hospital.”

The Court also relied on Queen v. Morby (1882) for the principle that a mere possibility of life being saved is not enough, and that the prosecution must prove that neglect had the effect of shortening life. It further referred to Regina v. Broughton (2021), where it was held that the prosecution must prove that the act or omission of the accused was a significant contributory cause of death.

The Court also considered the local factual context. It noted that the sorcerer had been treating snakebite victims for decades and was known in the area for such treatment.

It further noted evidence regarding the accused’s economic condition and local practice of taking snakebite victims to the sorcerer.

The Court added: “These statements show that the economic condition of the accused is not sound, and if they hesitated in taking Jyoti to the hospital, they cannot be faulted.”

The Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove that not taking the deceased to a doctor was the proximate cause of death.

The Court held: “Therefore, the prosecution had not succeeded in establishing that failure to take Jyoti to the Doctor was the proximate cause of her death. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken, and no interference is required with a reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible.”

Conclusion

The High Court dismissed the State’s appeal and affirmed the acquittal, holding that the evidence did not establish the causal link required for conviction under Section 304A IPC. It also directed the respondents to furnish bail bonds in terms of Section 437-A CrPC.

Cause Title: State of H.P. v. Dev Raj (Neutral Citation: 2026:HHC:28268)

Appearances

Appellant/State: Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General

Respondent: Mukul Sharma, Advocate, vice V.B. Verma, Advocate

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