Sitting Silent For 20 Years Reflects Abandonment Of Agreement To Sell, Disentitles Plaintiff To Specific Performance: Delhi High Court
The Court noted that mere assertion of readiness and willingness in plaint insufficient absent proof of financial capacity and conduct demonstrating genuine intent; suit filed 22 years after agreement also barred by limitation.
Justice Neena Bansal Krishna, Delhi High Court
The Delhi High Court has held that a plaintiff who neither approaches the defendant to enquire about the status of a pending litigation nor seeks execution of a sale deed for over two decades cannot be said to have established the continuous readiness and willingness mandated under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, holding that such prolonged inaction reflects abandonment of the agreement to sell rather than diligent pursuit of a contractual right.
The Court further held that the equitable relief of specific performance cannot be granted merely because a suit is filed within the limitation period, and that courts must balance equities by considering whether one party is attempting to take undue advantage of the other, particularly where two decades elapse between execution of the agreement and institution of the suit, during which circumstances and property values change substantially.
Justice Neena Bansal Krishna observed, “…the Plaintiff sat silent for more than 20 years and did not even once approach the Defendant for even enquiring about the status of litigation or in the alternative seek Specific Performance of the Agreement to Sell in respect of the house. Deep slumber of the Plaintiff for more than 20 years is only indicative of abandonment of the Agreement to Sell. It blatantly reflects his sheer disinterest, lack of willingness to seek execution of Specific Performance of Agreement to Sell”.
“It is, therefore, established from the evidence that the Plaintiff had failed to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his part of Agreement to Sell”, the Bench said.
Advocate Kshitiz Mahipal appeared for the appellant and Advocate Vaibhav Kumar appeared for the respondent.
The plaintiff and defendant entered into an Agreement to Sell dated July 13, 1966 for a plot of land in Jogabai, Jamia Nagar, for Rs. 8,160, with part payment of Rs. 1,700. Since the defendant could not execute the sale deed due to a pending third-party suit concerning the property, a supplementary Agreement to Sell dated June 08, 1967 was executed, under which the defendant received an additional Rs. 3,200 and undertook to execute the sale deed within three months of conclusion of that litigation, failing which he would instead sell his residential house to the plaintiff for the amount already received.
The underlying suit was decided in 1976, restraining the defendant from transferring the property pending partition. The plaintiff filed the present suit for specific performance only in September 1988, 22 years after the first agreement, claiming he had approached the defendant a week before filing suit.
The trial court initially dismissed the suit as premature in 2003; in appeal, the matter was remanded. On remand, the Civil Judge decreed specific performance in respect of the defendant's house by judgment dated May 25, 2010, which was upheld by the Additional District Judge on August 28, 2017. The defendant challenged this in second appeal under Section 100 CPC before the High Court.
The Court found the second agreement to be a contingent contract under Section 31 of the Indian Contract Act, which became incapable of enforcement once the underlying injunction suit concluded in 1976 without any proven partition of the property.
Applying the principles in Kamal Kumar v. Premlata Joshi 2019 SCC OnLine SC 12 and Aniglase Yohannan v. Ramlatha and Others, (2005) 7 SCC 534, the Court held that "readiness" requires proof of financial capacity while "willingness" must be demonstrated through conduct, and found the plaintiff's bare assertion of readiness, unaccompanied by any enquiry, notice, or approach to the defendant for over 20 years, insufficient to discharge this burden.
The Court also held that limitation would have run out three months after the 1976 judgment, rendering the 1988 suit "blatantly barred by limitation", and relied on Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi & Ors., (2011) 12 SCC to hold that courts should frown upon suits not filed immediately after breach even where technically within limitation.
Accordingly, the Regular Second Appeal was allowed, and the suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance was dismissed.
Cause Title: Rattan Singh v. Akhtar Islam (Neutral Citation:2026:DHC:5495)
Appearances:
Appellant: Kshitiz Mahipal and Khairun Nisa, Advocates.
Respondent: Vaibhav Kumar, Advocate.