UAPA Accused Not Entitled To Default Bail After 90 Days: Delhi High Court Rules CrPC References In Special Laws Automatically Apply To BNSS
The Bench noted that the transition to new criminal procedural code does not defeat UAPA’s extended detention period; statutory references to CrPC automatically update to BNSS under Section 8 of the General Clauses Act.
The Delhi High Court has held that an accused under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) cannot claim default bail upon completing 90 days of custody under BNSS. The Court ruled that investigating agencies retain the statutory right under Section 43D(2) UAPA to seek an extension of investigation and judicial custody up to 180 days, notwithstanding the repeal and replacement CrPC.
Applying Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the Bench clarified that references to Section 167 CrPC in the UAPA must automatically be construed as references to Section 187 of the BNSS. Consequently, the transition between general procedural laws does not create a technical loophole to bypass the legislative intent of special anti-terror statutes.
A Division Bench comprising Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Justice Vikas Mahajan while dismissing a consolidated appeal filed by Jasir Bilal Wani alias Danish, an accused in the November 2025 Lal Qila Metro Station IED blast case, observed, “In conclusion it is held that the Appellant is thus not entitled to default bail after 90 days merely because there is no reference to Section 187 of the BNSS in Section 43D(2) of the UAPA. The reference to Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. has to be construed as a reference to Section 187 of the BNSS in terms of Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897”.
“…the intention of the Special law i.e., UAPA shall prevail over the general law i.e., BNSS”, the Bench noted further.
In the matter, on November 17, 2025, the Appellant was arrested under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the UAPA, and the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. Thereafter, on February 13, 2026, the Trial Court granted a first 45-day extension of custody beyond the initial 90-day period.
The Trial Court granted a second 45-day extension, bringing total permissible custody to 180 days on March 27, 2026 and subsequently, dismissed the appellant’s application for default bail after 90 days of detention. On May 14, 2026: National Investigation Agency (NIA) filed its charge-sheet before the extended 180-day window expired.
The Court, thus, reaffirmed that under Section 4 of both general procedural codes, special statutes like the UAPA override general procedural rules. The Court also held that the appellant had acquiesced to the initial extension order of February 13, 2026, by failing to challenge it promptly, thereby forfeiting the right to claim default bail on that ground.
“…There is no intention that can be deciphered from a reading of the BNSS that it seeks to express anything to the contrary. The BNSS merely makes some modifications in the 15 days period of police custody. However, broadly, the 15 days, 60 days and 90 days would still have to be construed as 30 days, 90 days and 90 days for the UAPA”, the Bench noted.
“By applying Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 along with the principle of ‘Legislation by reference’, it becomes clear that in the case of Section 43D(2) of the UAPA, reference to Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. has to be construed as reference to Section 187 of the BNSS. The first proviso to Section 43D(2) would therefore apply and the period of detention can be extended upto 180 days. Ultimately, the intention of the Legislature has to be seen. The purpose of increasing the detention period to 180 days in the UAPA, is clearly to provide longer period of detention for heinous offences such as terrorism. While answering the questions raised herein, the said intention cannot be forgotten. Under UAPA, longer period of detention is permissible, anticipatory bail is not applicable – subject to the conditions in the statute. Thus, by the mere enactment of BNSS the said intention of the Legislature cannot be defeated. In fact Section 4 of the Cr.P.C and Section 4 of the BNSS, make it clear that offences under other laws shall be inquired, investigated, tried and otherwise dealt with as per the Special laws”, the Bench noted.
Additionally, the Bench held that an accused is not entitled to receive copies of confidential progress reports submitted in sealed covers by the Public Prosecutor during extension hearings.
Cause Title: Jasir Bilal Wani @ Danish v. National Investigation Agency (2026:DHC:6814-DB)
Appearances:
Appellant: Warisha Farasat, Sr. Adv., Suvarna Swain, Adv.
Respondent: Madhav Khurana, Sr. Adv., Trisha Mittal, Anil Dabas, Teeksh Singhal, Deeparghya Datta, Nishant Sharma, Advs., Dr. Navneet Sharma, CIO for NIA.