Termination Of Regular Employee By Public Authority Must Satisfy Article 14 Even If Origin Of Relationship Is Contractual In Nature: Delhi High Court

The Court was hearing a writ petition challenging the termination of a Manager (Finance) employed with Energy Efficiency Services Limited (EESL), a joint venture of public sector undertakings under the Ministry of Power, whose services were brought to an end on the ground of “deemed abandonment” due to unauthorised absence.

A Bench of Justice Sanjeev Narula observed: “Where the employer is subject to public law discipline, and the action impugned is one terminating the services of a regular employee purportedly under service rules, the matter transcends the realm of a private contract.”

“Even if the origin of the relationship is contractual, the exercise of power under such rules must conform to the requirements of fairness, non-arbitrariness, and Article 14 of the Constitution”, the Bench added.

Advocate Vikash Kumar appeared for the petitioner, Jivesh Kr. Tiwari, CGSC, along with Advocates Nandini Aggarwal and Samiksha appeared for the respondents.

Background

The petitioner, a Chartered Accountant appointed to a regular post of Manager (Finance), was initially posted at Noida and subsequently transferred across various locations. He claimed to have reported financial irregularities within the organisation, following which he was transferred to Agartala, Tripura by order dated 30 August 2019.

The petitioner objected to the transfer, citing personal and professional grounds, but did not join at the transferred place. Thereafter, the employer issued communications alleging unauthorised absence and ultimately terminated his services on 6 December 2019 by invoking a clause in the service rules providing for “deemed abandonment” upon absence exceeding 90 days.

The petitioner challenged the termination, contending that it was in substance punitive and effected without adherence to principles of natural justice or disciplinary procedure.

The respondents opposed the petition, raising a preliminary objection that the dispute arose out of a contract of personal service and was not amenable to writ jurisdiction. It was further contended that the termination was not punitive but automatic under the service rules.

Court’s Observation

At the outset, the Court rejected the preliminary objection regarding maintainability and held that the dispute was not confined to a private contract of service. It noted that the petitioner was appointed to a regular post in a public sector entity, and the impugned action was sought to be justified by reference to service rules and internal disciplinary framework. In this context, the Court observed that “the Petitioner does not seek enforcement of a purely private contract of service… the legality of such action… is clearly amenable to judicial review.”

The Court further clarified that once the employer invokes service rules to terminate a regular employee, the action acquires a public law character and must satisfy constitutional standards. It held that “termination of service entails civil consequences and must be preceded by a fair opportunity of hearing,” emphasising that Article 14 mandates that the procedure adopted must be just, fair and reasonable.

Turning to the concept of “deemed abandonment”, the Court held that such a provision cannot be applied mechanically to terminate service without examining the intention of the employee. It observed that “abandonment is not a mere consequence of lapse of time; it necessarily involves an element of intention,” and therefore requires a proper determination rather than a presumption.

The Court noted that the petitioner had, in fact, submitted representations against the transfer and continued to communicate with the employer, which militated against any inference of voluntary abandonment. It held that “these communications… militate against any inference that the Petitioner had voluntarily abandoned service,” thereby rejecting the basis of the impugned action.

Significantly, the Court found an inconsistency in the stand of the employer. While seeking to justify termination as “deemed abandonment”, the respondents had simultaneously characterised the petitioner’s conduct as wilful disobedience and misconduct. The Court held that once such allegations are made, the matter necessarily falls within the disciplinary framework, observing that “once the employer itself characterises the conduct in terms of wilfulness… the action necessarily assumes the character of disciplinary action.”

In this context, the Court examined the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules and noted that detailed procedural safeguards are prescribed, including issuance of a charge-sheet, framing of charges, and conduct of inquiry. It found that none of these safeguards was followed, and the termination was effected without any adjudicatory process. It held that “the impugned action proceeds directly from non-joining to termination, without the interposition of any adjudicatory process,” rendering it unsustainable.

The Court further emphasised that even in cases of alleged disobedience of transfer orders, discipline must be enforced through lawful procedure. It observed that “discipline cannot be enforced by bypassing established procedure… procedural safeguards are not dispensable, even in the face of alleged misconduct.”

Conclusion

The Court held that the termination of the petitioner’s services on the ground of deemed abandonment was unsustainable in law, as it violated principles of natural justice and failed to comply with the applicable disciplinary framework.

Accordingly, the termination order dated 6 December 2019 and the consequential release order were set aside, and the petitioner was directed to be reinstated in service.

However, the Court clarified that the employer would be at liberty to initiate disciplinary proceedings in accordance with law for alleged unauthorised absence or misconduct, and that the question of back wages and consequential benefits would depend on the outcome of such proceedings.

Cause Title: Avinash Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. (Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:3717)

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