Second Wife Not Required To Be Impleaded As Party In First Wife’s Maintenance Claim: Delhi High Court

The second wife of a man sought her impleadment in the revision petition, whereby the petitioner-wife assailed the judgment passed by the Family Court in a petition filed under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), claiming maintenance.

The Single Bench of Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma held, “It is also contended that she married the respondent after a decree of divorce had been granted in his favour and maintenance had been denied to the revisionist. This contention also is unmerited and cannot be accepted. If such a plea were to be entertained, it would open the door for every person claiming to be dependent, upon a person from whom maintenance is sought, to seek impleadment in such proceedings, which would unnecessarily enlarge the scope of what are otherwise summary proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. Such an approach would render the adjudication of the present revision petition unwieldy and defeat the very purpose of proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C., which are intended to be expeditious and limited in scope.”

“Insofar as the present proceedings are concerned, the revisionist has instituted the petition seeking maintenance from the respondent for herself and their children. In this Court‟s opinion, the applicant is neither a necessary party, in whose absence the matter cannot be effectively adjudicated or any enforceable order cannot be passed, nor can she be regarded as a proper party, as her participation is not required for a complete, effective, and comprehensive determination of the issues involved in the present lis. The proceedings under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. are confined to the rights and obligations inter se the petitioner and the respondent, and the status or claims of the applicant, if any, do not have any direct or substantial bearing on the adjudication of such rights”, it added.

Advocate Meera Kaura Patel represented the Petitioner while the Respondent appeared in person.

Factual Background

The marriage between the parties was solemnised in 2005 at an Arya Samaj Mandir and was again solemnised in the presence of their family members in 2006. The parties were blessed with two children. The relationship between the parties turned sour, and in 2019, the respondent-husband filed a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) against the petitioner-wife, seeking restitution of conjugal rights. The said petition was eventually withdrawn in 2022. Prior thereto, the petitioner wife filed a petition seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty against the respondent, and the husband instituted a petition under Sections 13(1)(i-a) and (i-b) of the HMA , seeking divorce from the petitioner-wife on the grounds of cruelty as well as desertion.

The Family Court dissolved the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent, after holding that the petitioner-wife had deserted, as well as inflicted cruelty upon, the respondent-husband. However, the divorce petition filed by the petitioner-wife was not decided by the Family Court. The Family Court had held that the petitioner-wife was not entitled to maintenance since she had deserted the respondent-husband. The respondent-husband solemnised a marriage with the applicant. The applicant, being the second wife of the respondent, sought her impleadment in the revision petition.

Reasoning

The Bench, at the outset, explained that a person may be impleaded in a proceeding only if such person qualifies either as a necessary party or a proper party and in the absence thereof, no third party can be added to the array of parties merely at the instance of such person. “In the present case, the applicant, who is the second wife of the respondent, asserts that she may be adversely affected in the event the proceedings are decided in favour of the revisionist. However, this Court is of the view that such an apprehension, by itself, does not confer upon her the status of either a necessary or a proper party for the purposes of the present proceedings”, it added.

The Bench noticed that no adjudication was being undertaken with respect to any independent right of the applicant, and the proceedings in the petition were confined to determining the statutory obligation of the respondent to maintain the petitioner and the children born out of their wedlock.

Considering that the impact on the applicant would be indirect or incidental, arising out of the financial obligations of the respondent, the Bench held that such an incidental effect cannot be equated with a direct infringement of rights to attract the principles of natural justice or to confer a right of impleadment. “Accordingly, the plea of violation of natural justice, being misconceived, is also rejected”, it added.

The Bench further stated that the controversy in the captioned revision petition was confined to the claim of maintenance by the petitioner and her children against the respondent-husband, and the impleadment of the applicant would only unnecessarily expand the scope of the proceedings under Section 125 of Cr.P.C. Thus, the Bench was of the view that the presence of the applicant was neither necessary, nor required for the effective adjudication of the present proceedings. Taking note of the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the Bench dismissed the application.

Cause Title: A v. B (Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:3846)

Appearance

Petitioner: Advocates Meera Kaura Patel, Ritika Saini, Monika Chowdhary, Shailesh Chandra Jha

Respondent: Respondent-in-person

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