Judgments Do Not Impose Obligation To Proactively Monitor & Prevent Trademark Use In Third-Party Ad-Text: Delhi High Court Dismisses Contempt Plea Against Google
The Court ruled that online search engines are not under any proactive obligation to independently monitor or pre-emptively filter trademark violations on their advertising platforms in the absence of a specific complaint by the trademark proprietor.
The Delhi High Court has dismissed a contempt application against Google, observing that judgments do not impose any obligation upon Google to proactively monitor and prevent the use of the Subject Marks in Ad-Text, Ad-Title, or URL in advertisements of third parties.
While confirming that Google remains legally bound by its recorded undertakings to block proprietary marks like "AGARWAL" and "DRS LOGISTICS" under its internal corporate policies once notified, the Court concluded that because the disputed links had already been expeditiously removed upon receiving the plaintiffs' notice, no deliberate or malicious defiance was established to invoke punitive contempt jurisdiction.
The Bench of Justice Tejas Karia observed, "Accordingly, the contention of the Plaintiffs that the alleged Contemnors have willfully disobeyed the directions contained in the Judgments by permitting the use of the Subject Marks as part of Ad-Text, Ad-Title, and URLs cannot be accepted. However, Defendant Nos. 1 and 3 are bound by the statement recorded in the judgment dated 30.10.2021 to the effect that, if the Subject Marks are used in Ad-Text, Ad-Title, or URL, the same would not be permitted in terms of the Policy of Defendant No. 3, which was also stated to be implemented in favour of the Plaintiffs...Therefore, the Judgments do not impose any obligation upon Defendant Nos. 1 and 3 to proactively monitor and prevent the use of the Subject Marks in Ad-Text, Ad-Title, or URL in advertisements of third parties."
Factual Background
The Plaintiffs instituted a commercial suit seeking a permanent injunction against the infringement of their registered trademarks, passing off, and unfair competition regarding the marks "AGARWAL", "AGGARWAL PACKERS AND MOVERS", and "DRS LOGISTICS". The dispute arose from unauthorized third-party use of these marks on the online search engine platform managed by the Defendants.
The Court had previously passed an interim order directing the Defendants to investigate specific complaints lodged by the Plaintiffs regarding the use of their trademarks as keywords. The Defendants were ordered to review the overall effect of such sponsored advertisements and block them if they were found to be infringing or passing off. This direction was subsequently affirmed in appeal by a Division Bench.
The Plaintiffs preferred the present contempt application, alleging that the Defendants willfully disobeyed judicial mandates by continuing to permit third-party advertisers to utilize the proprietary marks as keywords and within visible advertisement texts, thereby deceiving consumers.
Contentions of the Parties
The Plaintiffs submitted that the Defendants acted in blatant violation of binding judicial directions by continuously allowing third parties to trigger sponsored links using the Plaintiffs' proprietary marks. It was also submitted that the Defendants failed to honour their recorded statements and standard policies, wherein they had undertaken to block the registered trademarks from appearing in the visible text, title, or URL of advertisements by non-owners. The Plaintiffs added that Defendants' inaction enabled fraudulent operators to divert internet traffic, impersonate the Plaintiffs, and subsequently disappear after misappropriating the household goods of innocent consumers.
Per contra, the Defendants argued that the contempt application proceeded on a misinterpretation of the operating orders, which never cast a proactive, blanket obligation upon them to pre-emptively monitor or block advertisements. It was asserted that the judicial directions operated strictly on a complaint-based mechanism. The Defendants could only investigate and block links after the Plaintiffs formally brought specific infringing advertisements to their notice. It was argued that the appellate court affirmed that the use of a trademark as a search keyword per se does not constitute infringement, provided it does not cause consumer confusion or dilution.
Findings and Observations of the Court
The High Court observed that although the Plaintiffs had originally prayed for broad relief encompassing trademarks, meta tags, and keywords, the operative directions ultimately granted in the subject judgments were specifically confined to investigating complaints regarding the use of the Subject Marks as keywords alone.
It was noted that the earlier judgments did not adjudicate upon or provide a mechanism for the use of the Subject Marks in visible Ad-Text, Ad-Title, or URLs. Consequently, the grievance of the Plaintiffs regarding textual usage remained outside the scope of the decree and fell squarely under the internal advertising policies of the Defendants.
The Court observed that during the initial injunction proceedings, the Plaintiffs explicitly confined their arguments to the sole question of keyword infringement. This strategic restriction was based on a recorded statement made by the Defendants' counsel that their standard corporate policy did not permit third-party advertisers to utilize proprietary marks in visible texts or titles.
It was held that while the final judgments did not contain specific directions regarding Ad-Text or URLs, the Defendants remained legally bound by their recorded statement to enforce their Trademark Policy in favor of the Plaintiffs whenever an infraction was brought to light.
The Court categorically found that the operating judgments did not cast any positive or proactive obligation upon the Defendants to independently monitor, pre-emptively filter, or sweep their digital platform for potential trademark infringements in the absence of a formal notification.
It was observed that both the keyword directions in the judgments and the textual restrictions in the Defendants' corporate policy functioned strictly on a complaint-based framework, meaning the Defendants could only be expected to investigate and take remedial down-action once specific infringing links were brought to their attention by the trademark proprietor.
The Court observed that upon receiving the statutory notice from the Plaintiffs, the Defendants had actively proceeded to pull down and block the offending third-party links under their internal Misrepresentation Policy and pursuant to subsequent inter-locutory orders passed in the present application.
Relying on settled legal precedents, the Court held that a court exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot indulge in a complex interpretative exercise to expand the plain terms of an order. It was further observed that where two reasonable interpretations of a judicial direction are possible, and the conduct complained of lacks malicious intent, an allegation of willful disobedience cannot be sustained.
"However, the statement made on behalf of Defendant Nos. 1 and 3, as recorded and reiterated in the Judgments, expressly refers to the Policy of Defendant Nos. 1 and 3, which provides that upon receipt of a complaint alleging such use, Defendant Nos. 1 and 3 would examine the same and take appropriate action so as to prevent any third party from using, publishing, or referring to the Subject Marks in Ad-Text, Ad-Title, or URL", the Court said.
The Court concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to establish any deliberate or willful defiance of the judicial mandates by the alleged contemnors, and therefore, no further punitive action was warranted.
The Court granted liberty to the Plaintiffs to formally notify the Defendants in the event they detected any future advertisements utilizing the Subject Marks in Ad-Texts, Ad-Titles, or URLs, with a corresponding directive to the Defendants to expeditiously investigate and resolve such complaints in terms of their corporate policy.
Cause Title: M/s DRS Logistics (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. Google India Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. [Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5102]
Appearances:
Plaintiffs: Senior Advocate Chander M. Lall with Advocates Nancy Roy and Annanya Mehan
Defendants: Senior Advocate Sandeep Sethi, Advocate Neel Mason, Advocate Vihan Dang, Advocate Ujjwal Bhargava, Advocate Aditya Mathur, Advocate Anuparna Chatterjee, Advocate Krisna Gamdhir, Advocate Shreya Sethi, Advocate Sriparna Dutta Choudhury, Advocate Naman Dutt, Advocate Kopal Tewary.