While considering a property dispute matter, the Supreme Court has explained that matruka property simply refers to the property left behind by deceased person. Referring to the law relating to the devolution of such property, the Apex Court explained that the Will is the first document that is to be satisfied subject to the limits imposed by Muslim Law.

The Apex Court was considering the appeals challenging the final judgment passed by the Bombay High Court, whereby the appellants assailed the order of the First Appellate Court in overturning the findings of the Civil Court.

The Division Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra asserted, “Reference may also be made to John T Platts’ A Dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi and English’ which defines ‘matruka’ as the estate of a deceased person. Also, as per the Rekhta Dictionary, ‘matruka’ is a word of Arabic origin and means “abandoned from his possession (property etc.)[,] left by immigrants (property etc.) [,] inherited wealth and property etc. It is clear from the above that matruka property simply refers to property left behind by deceased person and nothing more. Regarding the devolution of matruka property, it has to be observed that the Will is the first document that is to be satisfied subject to the limits imposed by Muslim Law, namely, that it cannot exceed one-third of the estate and cannot ordinarily be made in favour of an heir without the consent of the other heirs, and then whatever remains hereafter, is to be distributed strictly as per the rules of intestate succession prescribed in Muslim Law.”

Advocate Ajay Majithia represented the Appellant, while Senior Advocate Sudhanshu S. Choudhari represented the Respondent.

Factual Background

The appellant’s husband Chand Khan passed away, and the litigation pertained to the property he left behind, between his surviving spouse namely Zoharbee and his brother i.e. Respondent Imam Khan. It was the plaintiff’s case that all the property left behind by the deceased was matruka property, and since he died issueless, as per Mohammedan law, the former would be entitled to 3/4th of the total property, and only the remaining 1/4th would fall in the rights and entitlements of the first defendant. On the other hand, it was the first defendant’s case that the land already stood transferred to the third party in the lifetime of the deceased Chand Khan by an Agreement to Sell with the second and third defendants and so the said property couldn’t be the point of contention.

In so far as the other piece of land is concerned, it was claimed that the same stood transferred to the sole and exclusive ownership and possession of the first defendant many years before the death of Chand khan but in the challenging circumstances of the latter’s continued illness, the same was sold to one Ayub Khan and so nothing remained to be partitioned in terms of matruka property.The Civil Court agreed with the contentions of the first defendant and partly decreed the plaintiff’s suit insofar as the property sold to the fourth defendant was concerned, for the reason that he chose not to contest the suit in any way whatsoever and did not file a written statement. Regarding the remaining property, it was observed that the Agreement to Sell entered into between the parties in the lifetime of Chand Khan stood duly proved and no property remained to be divided between the successors in interest of the deceased.

The plaintiff, being aggrieved, filed the first appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The First Appellate Court reversed the findings of the Civil Court and held that the plaintiff would be entitled to 3/4th of the total property in the name of the deceased. In Second Appeal, by way of the impugned judgment, it was recorded that no substantial question of law arose for consideration.

Reasoning

Reaffirming that an agreement to sell does not confer any rights, nor does it vest any interest in the party that agrees thereby to buy a particular property, the Bench noted, “In view of the above, the view taken by the First Appellate Court and the High Court cannot be faulted with. The property agreed to be sold was, at the relevant time still the property of Chand Khan and therefore would be subject to division of property as per the applicable law. In other words, said property would form part of ‘matruka’ property…”

The Bench explained that matruka property refers to property left behind by a deceased person and nothing more. As per the Bench, since the Agreement to Sell had no value in the eyes of law, all the property that vested in Chand Khan would become matruka property. “A perusal of the above extracted principles of Muslim Law of inheritance depicts that the sharers are entitled to a prescribed share of the inheritance and wife being a sharer is entitled to 1/8th the share but where there is no child or child of a son how low so ever, the share to which the wife is entitled is 1/4th”, it stated.

Holding that the property in question was unquestionably matruka property and so had to be distributed amongst the survivors of Chand Khan, the Bench mentioned that the first defendant, in executing the sale deed had the right only to do so in respect of the 1/4th share that fell in her share and not the entire property. It further explained that the maxim governing such transactions is nemo dat quod non habet, which translates to no one can transfer a better title onto another than what they themselves have.

Dismissing the appeals, the Bench held that the First Appellate Court and the High Court took the correct view in law.

Commenting on the aspect of translation of the judgment, the Bench stated, “Before parting with the matter, we record our dissatisfaction with the manner in which the judgment of the learned Civil Court was translated into English. In matters of law, words are of indispensable importance. Each word, every comma has an impact on the overall understanding of the matter. Due care has to be taken to ensure that the true meaning and spirit of the words in the original language are translated into English for the Courts in appeal to comprehend what had transpired below. Just recently, a Co-ordinate bench also highlighted similar concern vide order dated 18th March 2025 in Chairman Managing Committee & Anr v. Bhaveshkumar Manubhai Parakhia & Anr. We may only underscore the observations made therein.”

Cause Title: Zoharbee v. Imam Khan (D) Thr. Lrs. (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1245)

Appearance

Appellant: Advocate Ajay Majithia, AOR Shekhar Kumar

Respondent: Senior Advocate Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, AOR Vatsalya Vigya, Gautami Yadav, Pranjal Chapalgaonkar, Yash Singhania

Click here to read/download Judgment



Justice Sanjay KarolJustice Prashant Kumar Mishra

Tulip Kanth

Assistant Editor

Tulip Kanth is an Assistant Editor at Verdictum having over 5 years of experience in the field of legal journalism and editing. She extensively covers judgments of the Supreme Court, High Courts as well as Tribunals. She has previously worked with a legal publishing website where she oversaw the work of other editors and has also created updates on notifications of different Government Ministries. She holds an English Honours Degree from SGTB Khalsa College, Delhi University and has completed her LLB course with specialisation in Corporate Law from Amity University.