The Supreme Court has confirmed the conviction of a man for sexually assaulting his minor daughter and held that the provisions of Section 42A of POCSO Act can’t be interpreted to override the scope and ambit of enabling provision, i.e., Section 42. Section 42 mandates that when the alleged acts or omissions constitute offence both under the IPC and the POCSO Act then the law which prescribes the punishment of greater degree would have to be applied.

The appeal before the Apex Court was preferred on behalf of the appellant-accused challenging the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the Jail Appeal preferred by the appellant convicted under under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3/4 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.

The Division Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta held, “Section 42A of POCSO Act, on the other hand, deals with the procedural aspects and gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the POCSO Act over any other law for the time being in force where, the two acts are inconsistent with each other. Hence, the provisions of Section 42A of POCSO Act, by no stretch of imagination, can be interpreted so as to override the scope and ambit of enabling provision, i.e., Section 42 of POCSO Act.”

Senior Advocate R Balasubramanian represented the Appellant while AOR Adarsh Upadhyay represented the Respondent.

Factual Background

An FIR came to be lodged by the wife of the appellant alleging that she had gone to her parental house with her youngest son leaving her minor daughter, the victim, aged about 9 years, and a son, aged about 4 years at her matrimonial house in the custody of her husband, i.e., the appellant. It was alleged that the appellant enticed the minor victim (PW-2), took her to the rooftop thereby committing sexual assault upon the child. She was detained on the roof by threatening her. The minor victim came down from the roof in the morning and narrated the whole incident to her grandfather, who telephonically informed the informant about the occurrence.

The appellant-father went absconding after the incident. The informant got frightened because of the incident and did not go to her matrimonial home. She somehow mustered the courage and approached the police station along with her father and father-in-law, as well as the victim and filed the FIR against the appellant. The trial Court framed charges against the appellant, and he was later sentenced to life imprisonment. Aggrieved by the dismissal of his appeal before the High Court, the Appellant approached the Apex Court.

Reasoning

The Bench, at the outset, referred to Section 42 of the POCSO Act to clarify that when the alleged acts or omissions constitute offence both under the IPC and the POCSO Act then, the law which prescribes the punishment of greater degree would have to be applied.

The Bench also found no merit in the submission of the Appellant’s counsel that Section 42A of the POCSO Act, provides that where there is an inconsistency between the provisions of the POCSO Act and any other law, the provisions of the special law would have an overriding effect to the extent of the inconsistency.

The Apex Court said, “On the face of it, the fields of operation of Section 42 and Section 42A are in completely different spheres. Section 42 specifically deals with the quantum of punishment mandating that when a particular act or omission constitutes an offence, both under the POCSO Act and also under the provisions of the IPC or the Information Technology Act, 2000 then, the offender found guilty of the offence would be liable to punishment under the POCSO Act or under the provisions of the IPC whichever provides a punishment of a greater degree.”

It was further explained by the Bench that Section 42A of the POCSO Act gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the POCSO Act over any other law for the time being in force where the two acts are inconsistent with each other. It was also opined that Section 42A can’t override the scope and ambit of enabling provision, i.e., Section 42.

The Apex Court was of the view that the conviction of the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC and Sections 3/4 of POCSO Act was wholly justified. “However, we feel that the High Court erred while directing that the appellant would have to serve life imprisonment for remainder of his natural life as provided under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of IPC”, it added. On this aspect, the Bench referred to Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2) (i) and explained that Courts have been given discretion to award punishment for a term sentence of a minimum 10 years or of imprisonment for life. Where the sentence awarded in the discretion of the Court is for life, the same shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life. Hence, there is no mandate of law that under these provisions, the convict must be awarded life imprisonment.

Next came the question of whether the award of imprisonment for life, which means imprisonment for the remainder of the person’s natural life, was warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. The Bench referred to the judgment in Veerendra v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2008) where the Apex Court, while considering the case involving the offences under the POCSO Act as well as under 376(2)(i) of the IPC, confined the life imprisonment to mean actual imprisonment for 30 years. The Bench thus stated that the ends of justice would be served by restoring the judgment of the trial Court and directing that the sentence of life imprisonment awarded to the accused, by The trial Court for the offence under Sections 3/4 of the POCSO Act shall stand revived.

Partially allowing the appeal, the Bench ordered, “For the offences punishable under Sections 376(2)(f) and 376(2) (i) of IPC, the accused is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life, as awarded by the trial Court, without the stipulation that the life term will enure till the natural life of the appellant and a fine of Rs. 5,00,000/- and in default, to further undergo imprisonment of two years. Both the sentences shall run concurrently.”

Cause Title: Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of UP (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 335)

Appearance:

Appellant: Senior Advocate R Balasubramanian, AOR Santosh Kumar Pandey, Advocates B Venkatraman, Santosh Kumar Vishwakarma

Respondent: AOR Adarsh Upadhyay, Advocates Aman Pathak, Pallavi Kumari, Shashank Pachauri

Click here to read/download Judgment


Justice Vikram NathJustice Sandeep Mehta

Tulip Kanth

Assistant Editor

Tulip Kanth is an Assistant Editor at Verdictum having over 5 years of experience in the field of legal journalism and editing. She extensively covers judgments of the Supreme Court, High Courts as well as Tribunals. She has previously worked with a legal publishing website where she oversaw the work of other editors and has also created updates on notifications of different Government Ministries. She holds an English Honours Degree from SGTB Khalsa College, Delhi University and has completed her LLB course with specialisation in Corporate Law from Amity University.