The Supreme Court has held that a High Court exercising contempt jurisdiction must examine whether an apology tendered by the alleged contemnor satisfies the statutory requirements under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act before imposing punishment.

The Court was hearing an appeal under Section 19(1)(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, challenging the Bombay High Court’s order convicting the appellant for criminal contempt, sentencing her to one week’s simple imprisonment and a fine of ₹2,000.

The proceedings arose from a suo motu criminal contempt action initiated by the Bombay High Court over a circular issued by the appellant containing statements scandalising the judiciary.

A Bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta, while stating that the High Court failed to exercise its contempt jurisdiction with due circumspection, observed that “…once the appellant contemnor had, from the very first day of her appearance in the suo motu proceedings, expressed remorse and tendered an unconditional apology, the High Court was required to examine whether such apology satisfied the statutory parameters under Section 12 of the Contempt Act”.

The Bench further clarified that “in the absence of any material suggesting that the apology was lacking in bona fides, the High Court ought to have considered remitting the sentence in accordance with law”.

Senior Advocate Dama Seshadri Naidu represented the appellant, while Advocate Prashant Shrikant Kenjale, AOR, represented the respondents.

Background

The appellant-contemnor had earlier served as Director (Cultural) of Seawoods Estates Ltd. In a pending writ petition filed by the company challenging Rule 20 of the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023, an intervenor placed before the High Court a circular authored by the appellant, allegedly containing statements imputing motives to the judiciary and criticising judicial orders relating to stray dogs.

Upon perusing the circular, the High Court initiated suo motu criminal contempt proceedings. It sought clarification on whether the statements had been authorised by the Board of Directors. Seawoods subsequently filed an affidavit explaining that the circular had been issued solely by the appellant and that the Board was neither aware of nor had approved it.

The appellant responded to the High Court’s show-cause notice by filing an affidavit expressing unconditional remorse. She stated that she had acted under pressure from residents and had already resigned from the Board as a gesture of repentance.

Despite the apology, the High Court concluded that her conduct amounted to criminal contempt under Section 2(c), imposed a custodial sentence, and declined to remit it on the ground that the apology was perfunctory.

Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

Court’s Observation

The Supreme Court, at the outset, deliberated upon the power of the Courts to hold in contempt and observed that “the power to punish necessarily carries within it the concomitant power to forgive, where the individual before the Court demonstrates genuine remorse and repentance for the act that has brought him to this position”. Therefore, the Court stressed that, “in exercise of contempt jurisdiction, Courts must remain conscious that this power is not a personal armour for Judges, nor a sword to silence criticism”.

The Court then examined the material placed on record and found that the circular satisfied the ingredients of criminal contempt, as it scandalised the Court and lowered its authority. However, the Court emphasised that Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act requires a further inquiry into whether punishment ought to be imposed, particularly when a contemnor demonstrates remorse. The Court reiterated that the statutory scheme recognises both the power to punish and the power to forgive, and that “mercy... must remain an integral part of the judicial conscience.”

Referring to the text of Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the Apex Court highlighted that the proviso explicitly permits discharge or remission of punishment where an apology is made to the satisfaction of the Court. The Explanation, the Bench stated, clarifies that an apology shall not be rejected merely because it is qualified or conditional if it is bona fide. The Court held that the High Court did not evaluate the apology within this statutory framework, despite it being unconditional and tendered at the earliest stage.

The Bench also found the High Court's reliance on earlier precedents misplaced. It explained that judgments such as D.C. Saxena, Roshan Lal Ahuja, Perspective Publications, and Rajendra Sail involved materially different factual contexts, including instances where contemnors either offered no apology, withdrew apologies, or made allegations of grave corruption against judges.

Citing Royal Medical Trust and Dhanwanti Devi, the Court reiterated that precedents must be applied contextually, stating that “the ratio decidendi of a judgment must be understood in the context of its facts and the issue decided therein, and only where the factual matrix is materially similar can the ratio in an earlier decision be applied”.

The Court stressed that the appellant’s conduct, appearance on the first date, submission of an affidavit accepting fault, and tendering an unconditional apology distinguished the case from those where the contemnor had persisted in defiance. It held that in the absence of any material indicating that the apology was lacking in bona fides, the High Court ought to have considered remitting the sentence.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court set aside the portion of the High Court’s judgment imposing a sentence of imprisonment and fine, holding that the statutory parameters under Section 12 required consideration of the appellant’s unconditional apology.

“Considering that the appellant-contemnor has, from the very outset, expressed genuine remorse and repentance for issuing the contemptuous circular, we are satisfied that the ends of justice would be met by remitting the sentence imposed by the High Court”, the Apex Court Concluded.

The appeal was accordingly allowed, and the sentence remitted.

Cause Title: Vineeta Srinandan v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay on its Own Motion (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1408)

Appearances

Appellant: Senior Advocate Dama Seshadri Naidu, with Advocates Dixita Gohil, Pranjal Agarwal, Yash S. Vijay, AOR, Shikhar Aggarwal, Anisha Mahajan

Respondent: Prashant Shrikant Kenjale, AOR

Click here to read/download Judgment