Accused Must Be Sharer In Both ‘Criminal Act’ & ‘Common Intention’ U/S 34 IPC: SC Upholds Conviction Of Mother-In-Law; Acquits Husband In Woman’s Murder Case
The Supreme Court has upheld the conviction of a mother-in-law who was accused of killing her daughter-in-law by pouring kerosene and setting her on fire. However, it acquitted the deceased woman’s husband who was allegedly present in the house at the time of the said incident.
The Court was dealing with a Criminal Appeal filed by the accused persons (mother-in-law and husband) against the Judgment of the Karnataka High Court, Dharwad Bench by which it set aside their acquittal.
The two-Judge Bench of Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice R. Mahadevan held, “… he must be a sharer both in the ‘criminal act’ as well as in the ‘common intention’ which are the twin aspects of Section 34, IPC. In view of the above position, it is difficult for the accused to legitimately urge before the Court that owing to the mention of Section 34, IPC, in the charge, he was misled or prejudiced in his defence by being persuaded to presume that all consideration of his individual liability was completely shut out as a result thereof. He would be presumed to know the law on the point and if, in spite of it, he deluded himself into any such belief, he would be doing so at his own peril.”
The Bench noted that although Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) deals with a criminal act which is joint and an intention which is common, it cannot be said that it completely ignores or eliminates the element of personal contribution of the individual offender in both these respects.
“On the other hand, it is a condition precedent of Section 34, IPC, that the individual offender must have participated in the offence in both these respects. He must have done something, however slight, or conduct himself in some manner, however nebulous whether by doing an act or by omitting to do an act so as to indicate that he was a participant in the offence and a guilty associate in it. He must also be individually a party to an intention which he must share in common with others”, it added.
Advocate Faeek-ul-Farooq appeared for the Appellants/Accused while AAG Avishkar Singhvi appeared for the Respondent/State.
Brief Facts
As per the prosecution case, the deceased woman was married to the Appellant No. 1 (accused husband) past 8 years from the date of the incident and three children were born out of the wedlock. It was alleged that after a period of one year from the date of marriage, the husband and his family members started harassing the deceased for dowry and in connection with the domestic household work. On the date of the incident, while the deceased was at her matrimonial home, her mother-in-law i.e., Appellant No. 2 (accused) was alleged to have poured kerosene on her body and set her on fire. The deceased suffered extensive burn injuries and she was shifter to the hospital by the neighbours.
The deceased succumbed to the burn injuries after a period of one week and the cause of death was septicemia. Resultantly, the mother of the deceased lodged an FIR and the Police filed a chargesheet against the husband and mother-in-law. The Trial Court acquitted both the accused and the State being dissatisfied, went in Appeal before the High Court. The High Court reversed the finding of acquittal and held both the accused guilty of the alleged offence under Sections 498A, 302, and 504 read with Section 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (DP Act). They were sentenced to life imprisonment with fine and hence, they challenged their conviction before the Apex Court.
Reasoning
The Supreme Court in the above context of the case, observed, “Participation of the individual offender in the criminal act in some form or the other which is the leading feature of Section 34, IPC differentiates it not only from Section 149, IPC, but also from other affiliated offences like criminal conspiracy and abetment. A bare agreement between two or more persons to do or cause to be done an illegal act might make a person liable for the offence of criminal conspiracy as defined in Section 120, IPC. If the said agreement is to commit offence, then such an agreement is by itself enough to make a man guilty and no overt act apart from the agreement would be necessary.”
The Court said that under Section 34 IPC, a mere agreement, although it might be a sufficient proof of the common intention, would be wholly insufficient to sustain a conviction with the application of Section 34 IPC, unless some criminal act is done in furtherance of the said common intention and the accused himself has in some way or the other participated in the commission of the said act.
“The offence itself would be complete even though the act abetted is not committed; or, even if the act is committed, the abettor himself has not participated in it. Thus, actual participation in the commission of the offence, which is a condition precedent of Section 34 and is its main feature, again distinguishes it from the offence of abetment”, it noted.
The Court explained that a person present on the scene might or might not be guilty by the application of Section 34 IPC. It added that every person charged with the aid of Section 34, must in some form or the other participate in the offence in order to make him liable thereunder.
“I find myself unable to endorse the argument of the appellants' learned counsel that a guilty associate merely present on the spot cannot be said to participate in the commission of the offence. … The element of participation in the commission of the offence is the chief feature that distinguishes Section 34, IPC from Section 149, IPC and other kindred sections. This has been emphasised in a large number of decided cases”, it enunciated.
Furthermore, the Court said that, it is true that to convict any particular accused constructively under Section 34 of an offence, say of murder, it is not necessary to find that he actually struck the fatal blow, or any blow, but there must be clear evidence of some action or conduct on his part to show that he shared in the common intention of committing murder.
“As held by this Court in Suresh Sakharam Nangare v. The State of Maharashtra, 2012 (9) Judgements Today 116, if common intention is proved but no overt act is attributed to the individual accused, Section 34 of the code will be attracted as essentially it involves vicarious liability but if participation of the accused in the crime is proved and common intention is absent Section 34 cannot be invoked. In other words, it requires a pre-arranged plan and pre supposes prior concert therefore there must be meeting of mind”, it reiterated.
The Court observed that there is nothing to indicate that the accused husband shared common intention with his mother and when his mother allegedly poured kerosene on the deceased and set her on fire, it is possible that he out of sheer fright might have run away from his house after trying to extinguish fire by pouring water on the burning body of his wife.
“For applicability of Section 106 so as to implicate the husband also in the alleged crime the prosecution has to as a condition precedent lay the foundational facts prima facie indicating his involvement or participation in the alleged crime. His sudden disappearance after the incident is not sufficient to infer common intention”, it also noted.
The Court, therefore, concluded that the High Court rightly held the mother-in-law guilty of the alleged crime; however, at the same time committed an error in holding the husband guilty of the offence of murder with the aid of Section 34 IPC.
Accordingly, the Apex Court partly allowed the Appeal, upheld the conviction of the mother-in-law, and acquitted the husband.
Cause Title- Vasant @ Girish Akbarasab Sanavale & Anr. v. The State of Karnataka (Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 221)
Appearance:
Appellants: AOR H. Chandra Sekhar and Advocate Faeek-ul-Farooq.
Respondent: AAG Avishkar Singhvi, AOR V. N. Raghupathy, Advocates Vivek Kumar Singh, Naved Ahmed, and Sakshi Raman.
